Other wills: the second-person in ethics

Abstract

This paper is about the interest of the second-person to ethics. The focus of recent discussion has been the explanatory power of the second-person, rather than its careful description or the very possibility of what is described. This paper is something of a corrective. Its aim is to get the claim that the second-person matters to ethics into a clearer focus with a view to raising further questions and puzzles.

Keywords:

• second-person
• other wills
• Darwall
• practical reason

Acknowledgements

For discussion many thanks to Leland de la Durantaye, Naomi Eilan, Noah Feldman, Matthias Haase, Sebastain Rödl, Michael Thompson, and especially Matthew Boyle and Richard Moran whose seminar on other minds I attended in the spring term of 2014.

Notes on contributor

Douglas Lavin is Lecturer in philosophy at University College London. Previously he was John L. Loeb Associate Professor of Humanities at Harvard University. He works primarily on ethics, history of ethics and action theory.