Pluralistic folk psychology and varieties of self-knowledge: an exploration

Abstract

Turning the techniques we use to understand other people onto ourselves can provide an insight into the types of self-knowledge that may be possible for us. Adopting Pluralistic Folk Psychology, according to which we understand others not primarily by thinking about invisible beliefs and desires that cause behavior, but instead by modeling others as people - with rich characters, relationships, past histories, cultural embeddedness, personality traits, and so forth. A preliminary investigation shows that we understand ourselves at least in terms of our phenomenal states, informational states, perceptual states, traits, desires, and beliefs. I then appeal to empirical research to examine the accuracy of our sense of self-understanding in these ways, and argue that these are often non-veridical. Moreover, in our folk practices, we do not take our statements of self-understanding as infallible, but we allow others to help us see ourselves. While there is room for some improvement in our acurarcy, I conclude that our sense of self is largely a joint construct of self and others, and that looping effects play a significant role in what one’s self turns out to be. The self is a fluid thing that we are constantly creating through our actions and self-constituting thoughts, but it is a creation we do not make alone. Others help to create us, as we help to create them.

Keywords:

• self-knowledge
• self-understanding
• folk psychology

Acknowledgements

Thanks to Fleur Jongepier and Derek Strijbos for inviting me to think about self-knowledge from the perspective of my theory of Pluralistic Folk Psychology. Also thanks to Jacob Beck, Ian Wright, Brian Huss, Olivia Sultanescu, and Johannes Roessler for their conversations and comments on the paper.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes on contributor

Kristin Andrews is Associate Professor in the Department of Philosophy and Cognitive Science Program at York University, in Toronto, Canada. Her main research interests are in the nature of folk psychology, moral psychology, and methodology in animal cognition research. She is the author of two books Do Apes Read Minds? Toward a New Folk Psychology (MIT 2012) and The Animal Mind (Routledge 2015). In addition to her academic research, she is a member of the Executive Board for Borneo Orangutan Society Canada, an NGO focused on orangutan conservation and education, and serves on the scientific advisory board of the Nonhuman Rights project, which aims to gain legal rights for great apes, dolphins, and elephants in the USA.