Europeanization? Two Logics of Change of Policy-Making Patterns in Switzerland

Abstract

This article is based on a comparison of changes of policy-making patterns in Switzerland between the strongly Europeanized sector of economic regulatory policy (in spite of Switzerland not being a EU member state) and the weakly Europeanized sector of social policy (as a control case). We observe in both sectors the erosion of the traditional Swiss concensual pattern that was used to imply a strong influence for the interest groups at the expense both of the executive and of parties of the legislature. Co-operative procedures lost their influence for different reasons: in the case of economic regulatory policy their integrative role was considered as an obstacle to reform, and in the case of social policy it was undermined by a higher level of conflict. Also process change meant more technocratic policy making in the first case, and an increased influence of parliamentary politics in the second. Two “causal narratives” emphasize the distinctiveness of the logic of change in each policy sector.

Notes

1. Radaelli (2001) distinguishes horizontal (mimetic) from vertical (imposed) Europeanization; one should not overlook, however, that even diffusion through mimetism may occur not simply because domestic reformers freely chose to inspire themselves from best practices, but also because they may feel their range of choice is restricted (in reality then “coercive isomorphism” entailing adjustment pressure: McNamara 2002).

2. Of relevance here is K. W. Deutsch's definition of power: “the ability to afford not to learn” (Deutsch 1963: 11).

3. It has been argued that consensual democracies are more likely to adjust easily to the EU due to institutional isomorphism, but in a systematic quantitative comparison Giuliani (2003) disconfirmed this hypothesis. He showed that European adjustment is significantly negatively correlated with the number of veto players in domestic political systems. Anyway, such an argument is not very convincing on theoretical grounds either, because European adjustment has to do with substantive policy elements, and not with institutions that might be subject to isomorphism. As regards institutional adjustment Schmidt (2006) finds that the EU had more “disruptive” effects on “simple” than on “compound” polities.

4. Usually, in European countries at least, the effects of external developments other than European integration are ignored. For a significant exception, see the work of D. Levi-Faur on the liberalization of public utilities (for example, Levi-Faur 2004). Working on telecommunications reform, Thatcher (2004) argued that the addition of several international sources of pressure reduces path dependency as evidenced by the “varieties of capitalism” literature and increases cross-state convergence.

5. This project was directed by Yannis Papadopoulos and funded by the Swiss National Science Foundation (Grant number: 5004-058511/1) as a part of its Priority Programme “Switzerland Towards the Future”. The empirical research was carried out by André Mach and Silja Häusermann. The current project is also directed by Yannis Papadopoulos, and also funded by the Swiss National Science Foundation in the framework of the National Centre of Competence in Research (NCCR) “Challenges to Democracy in the 21st Century”.

6. It appears that the EU impact on domestic legislative activity should not be overestimated (Bovens and Yesilkagit 2004). In the case of Switzerland, we found that only very few among the major decisions made by the legislature between 1999 and 2003 were externally driven. However, based on expert judgements, Sciarini et al. (2002) found an increase in the last decades of the impact of indirect internationalization (including from global institutions such as the WTO) on Swiss legislation.

7. For a similar research strategy in a project sharing several objectives with ours but employing network analysis see Sciarini et al. (2004).

8. Interestingly, the gradual institutionalization of consultation (Vernehmlassungsverfahren) resulted from parliamentary pressures in order to reduce administrative discretion, as evidenced by historical research (Blaser 2003).

9. We distinguish between formulation and implementation of externally driven decisions, a distinction that is similar to Treib's (2006) between national transposition of EU law and its application (“law in action”).

10. See for instance Ellen Immergut's (1992) comparative work where she convincingly tests the explanatory power of veto points against alternative factors. She demonstrates that the liberal colouration of Swiss health policy is mainly due to the multiple veto points embedded in the system (pre-parliamentary consultation, a bicameral parliament with rather weak party discipline, and the referendum threat).

11. For such a reading of policy stalemate in Switzerland see Borner et al. (1990), who claim that, thanks to the blackmailing power of veto players conferred by the availability of the referendum instrument against undesired reforms, such players are in a position to block reforms by having a strong voice as early as in the pre-parliamentary phase.

12. It should be noted that in our control case it is the impact of other kind of shocks that is scrutinized.

13. In a recent book chapter on the Europeanization of state structures Bursens (2007: 115–116) acknowledges such a neglect but concentrates only on central – regional relations in national states. See however the recent book by Vivien Schmidt (2006).

14. For a recent test of the ongoing relevance of Katzenstein's thesis in the case of the Europeanization of utilities in Norway and Switzerland, see Bartle (2006).

15. In fact one would be tempted to speak about the uneven institutionalization of institutions: see Lagroye 2002.

16. He writes that “although the content of politics may have changed in response to integration, the containers have not” (Anderson 2002: 795), and that “apparently this is all taking place within untouched national institutional frameworks, which suggests a disconnection between policy and polity” (Anderson 2002: 817). See also Radaelli (2001: 123): “research conducted so far shows a higher level of Europeanization of policy, whereas structures seem to be less permeable”.

17. Note that this finding derives originally from an intergovernmentalist view. Schmidt (2006: 74–101) maintains that the European impact on the domestic force of national governments is differential, and is mediated by variables subsumed in the distinction between “simple” and “compound” polities. It is also often suggested that the EU favours above all (and sometimes explicitly promotes as in the case of structural funds and regional policy) more horizontal network forms of governance. Moreover, comparative research indicates that national parliaments have reacted differently to the strengthening of executives due to European integration (Auel and Benz 2005).

18. This is notably the case for anti-trust legislation and the opening of the domestic market. Similar to EU member states, telecom liberalization is only partially driven by EU developments. As to public procurement policy, it is subject to the strong impact of WTO regulations.

19. Switzerland is portrayed as having in comparative terms a political system with a weak state coupled to a strong system of interest associations, even though there is no scholarly agreement on the force of Swiss “neo-corporatism” (Kriesi 1998).

20. However, the strength of the pro-Europeanization coalition decreased in more recent years, due to the impact of the national-populist positions of the moderate Right, and to a more critical attitude of the Left on liberalization measures.

21. There are Swiss policy cases however where this “dirigist” turn did not occur, as in the reform of the post, or in the debate on flanking measures related to the free movement of persons as a consequence of the bilateral agreements between Switzerland and the EU. We lack at this point a convincing interpretation of these “deviations”. Although the referendum power of the trade unions can be an explanatory factor in these cases, it is not clear why such a reputational power did not impede the dirigist turn in other cases (perhaps decision makers are unevenly sensitive to such a power, or learning effects on the reality of this power may have occurred across time too).

22. Influential actors interviewed by Kriesi (1980: 584) asserted that the earlier they were able to gain access to the policy process, the more helpful was their access for the defence of their interests.

23. On the diffusion of international norms through socialization mechanisms see Finnemore and Sikkink (1998), and for an approach emphasizing the role of “epistemic communities” in the diffusion of competition policy in EU countries see Van Waarden and Drahos (2002).

24. Relying on expert judgements, Sciarini et al. (2002: 13) found that social policy is (together with cultural policy, but decisions at the federal level are the exception in this field) the only policy sector where policy making is largely immune to external influence.

25. Palier (2003: 177) portrays similar reforms in France as the outcome of a “contradictory consensus”.

26. See Talos and Kittel (2002) for Austria, Blom-Hansen (2001) for Denmark, or Anderson (2001) for the Netherlands.

27. For a cross-cantonal comparison of the implementation of unemployment policy reform in Switzerland, see Battaglini and Giraud (2003).

28. It should be noted however that, relying on different methods (“insiders'” perceptions), Sciarini et al. (2004) come to different conclusions: as regards telecommunications reform both the consultation procedure and the parliamentary phase were perceived as important.

29. This is the topic of two ongoing dissertation projects in the framework of the above mentioned research programme: Alexandre Afonso “Does the European Union undermine corporatist policymaking? Europeanization and policy concertation in three small European states”, and Marie-Christine Fontana “The impact of internationalisation on decision-making processes in consensual democracies: the cases of Switzerland and Belgium”.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Yannis Papadopoulos

Yannis Papadopoulos is a professor of public policy and Swiss politics at the University of Lausanne. He is currently also working on accountability in systems of multi-level governance, and on the politicization of the European Union. He recently co-edited a special issue of the European Journal of Political Research on “Innovative, Participatory, and Deliberative Procedures in Policy-making: Democratic and Effective?”, and a special issue of the European Law Journal on “Accountability in the EU Multi-level System” (both 2007).