Abstract
The international community has in recent decades supported the installment of formal regulations and institutions for monitoring, control, and surveillance to decrease illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing in African nations. Yet, few studies have investigated the effectiveness of these reforms. By conducting a systematic comparison of the enforcement of fisheries regulations in five Southern African Development Community (SADC) countries, we illustrate how the effectiveness of international agreements and regional commitments is fundamentally conditioned by national capacities. The empirical investigation also provides some tentative insights into the general dynamic process and mechanisms through which this can be understood.
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Notes on contributors
Martin Sjöstedt
Martin Sjöstedt is currently a research fellow at the Department of Political Science at the University of Gothenburg. He has, for example, previously been published in Marine Policy, Fish & Fisheries, Perspectives on Politics, Public Administration and Development, and European Journal of Development Research.
Aksel Sundström
Aksel Sundström is a PhD student at the Department of Political Science at the University of Gothenburg. His previous work has appeared in, for example, Marine Policy, International Journal of the Commons, and Energy Policy.