Why Do Comparative Public Policy and Political Economy Scholars Need an Analytic Eclectic View of Structure, Institution and Agency?

Abstract

This article illustrates an analytic eclectic value of structure, institution and agency (SIA) framework in comparative public policy. It engages and utilizes certain structural, institutional and agential perspectives from past literature to specify how elements of their causal properties coexist as part of a more complex argument. It argues that desired or preferred policy and/or institutional outcomes are most likely when multiple structural and institutional complementarities (from structures and institutions to agents) and multiple structural, institutional and agential enabling conditions accompany one another in motivating and empowering actors (from agents to structures and institutions) to engage in purposeful agential actions.

Keywords:

• comparative
• public policy
• structure
• institution
• agency
• policy entrepreneur

Acknowledgements

I am grateful to the reviewers of the JCPA for their encouragement. I thank Derin Atiskan, Paul Cairney, Robert H. Cox, Paul Fawcett, Kadir Aydin Gunduz, and Erdem Yoruk for helpful comments and acknowledge the valuable feedback from other participants of the 18th Annual JCPA–ICPA Scholarly Society Virtual Workshop entitled “What Does Comparative Policy Analysis Have to Do with the Structure, Institution and Agency Debate?” at Research Center for Globalization Peace and Democratic Governance (GLODEM), Koc University, Turkey in September 2020, and the Governance Design Network (GDN) Workshop entitled “Understanding Policy Mechanisms: Lessons for Policy Managers and Designers” at Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, National University of Singapore, Singapore in February 2017.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.

Notes

1. Such actions are effective when they deliver desired (ideas-driven) and/or preferred (interests-driven) outcomes.

2. In the international political economy and international relations literatures, it is also common to conflate and combine institutions and organizations. For example, international intergovernmental organizations such as the IMF, the World Bank and the WTO refer to “international institutions” (see, for example, Roger 2020, pp. 3, 6). For the same conflation and combination problems, see a special issue entitled “The Legitimacy and Legitimation of International Organizations” in the Review of International Organizations (December 2019).

3. Zeitgeist refers to “a set of assumptions that are widely shared and not open to criticism in a particular historical moment” (Mehta 2011, p. 27).

Additional information

Funding

This research was supported by The Scientific and Technological Research Council of Turkey grant (TUBITAK 2219, Project No. 1059B192001130).

Notes on contributors

Caner Bakir

Caner Bakir is a professor of political science, with particular emphasis on international and comparative political economy, and public policy and administration, of the College of Administrative Sciences and Economics at Koç University. He is a Visiting Fellow at the Hoover Institution, Stanford University, and the director of the Center for Research on Globalization, Peace and Democratic Governance (GLODEM).