IMPERSONAL MARKETS AND PERSONAL COMMUNITIES? WILDLIFE, CONSERVATION, AND DEVELOPMENT IN BOTSWANA

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I would like to thank Goran Hyden, David Leonard, Dennis Galvan, Arielle Levine, and the reviewers at JIWLP for their comments. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the 2004 Breslauer Symposium on Natural Resource Issues in Africa at the University of California, Berkeley.

Notes

2 David Hulme & Marshall Murphree, African Wildlife & Livelihoods: The Promise & Performance of Community Conservation, at 1 (2001).

3 The current trend towards CBNRM in southern Africa started in the 1980s with Administrative Management Design for Game Management Areas (ADMADE) and the Luangwa Integrated Resource Development Project (LIRDP) in Zambia, and the Communal Areas Management Programme for Indigenous Resources (CAMPFIRE) in Zimbabwe. Since the late 1980s and early 1990s, Namibia, South Africa, and Botswana also have implemented CBNRM projects.

4 CBNRM became possible only after a number of policies and ‘guidelines’ were implemented over two decades. The first was the Tribal Grazing Land Policy (TGLP), an attempt at privatizing the grazing commons. For a cogent policy and academic critique of TGLP, see Pauline Peters, Dividing the Commons: Politics, Policy, and Culture in Botswana (1994). The areas not economically viable for cattle ranching were set aside for other uses. One of the unintended consequences of TGLP was to distinguish these areas from the wildlife dominated areas. The Wildlife Conservation Policy of 1986, designed to encourage the economic utilization of wildlife, designated these areas (not useful for cattle) on twenty-two per cent of Botswana's land, setting them aside exclusively for wildlife utilization or land uses compatible with wildlife. To rationalize the consumptive use of wildlife through devices such as hunting quotas in Controlled Hunting Areas (CHAs), all CHAs were rezoned in 1989. The entire country has been divided into 163 CHAs, of which 43 have been zoned for wildlife uses that include commercial and community managed wildlife use (photographic and hunting safari) areas, livestock areas, and un-designated areas.

5 One of the major criticisms of CAMPFIRE in the 1990s was its ‘aborted devolution’ wherein the districts continued to decide access to material benefits from resource management rather than local communities See Hulme & Murphree, supra note 2.

6 CBNRM is an instrumental conservation and development approach, perhaps best exemplified by the pithy statement that ‘if wildlife needs to survive, its needs to pay for itself.’

7 Nico Rozemeijer, CBNRM in Botswana: Revisiting the Assumptions after Ten Years of Implementation. Background paper presented at the World Parks Congress in Durban (2003). Available at: 〈http://www.cbnrm.bw/CBNRMinBotswanaforWPC2003.pdf〉 (last visited: August 05, 2004).

8 Arun Agrawal & Clark C. Gibson, Enchantment and Disenchantment: The Role of Community in Natural Resource Conservation, 27 World Development 629–649 (1999).

9 Rozemeijer, supra note 7.

10 Marshall Murphree, Communal approaches to natural resource management in Africa: From whence and to where? Keynote Presentation at the Center for African Studies. Breslauer Symposium on Natural Resource Issues in Africa (March 5, 2004). Available at 〈http://repositories.cdlib.org/cas/breslauer/murphree2004a〉 (last visited: August 5, 2004).

11 It might seem obvious that actors in the market do not function only according to the invisible hand, state actors do not only apply legal rational impersonal rules, and community actors are not only driven by norms of reciprocity. However, these perspectives are often not reflected in academic and policy debates.

12 ‘Benefits’ is a technocratic and reductionist term used by CBNRM policy makers. These ‘benefits’ are critical nodes of distribution and closely intertwined with communities' access to money, power, and prestige.

13 Map adapted from University of Texas map collection 〈http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/Africa/botswana_pol95〉.

14 This area in Ngamiland is the poorest district in Botswana. The five villages, adjoining settlements and cattleposts discussed here, are predominantly composed of the minority Wayeyi, Humbukushu, and Bukagwe ethnic groups.

15 There are five broad ecological zones in the Okavango Delta—perennial swamps, seasonal swamps, seasonal grasslands, intermittently flooded land, and dry land. Resource use and livelihoods in the northern sandveld influence the shape of the hydrological pulse, which in turn has effects on vegetation and wildlife populations throughout the Delta. Water from the Okavango River first enters Botswana in Mohembo, 95 kilometers from Seronga. The river spills over near the village of Seronga, spreading across 15,000 square kilometers twisting waterways, islands, floodplains, and lagoons.

16 According to Polanyi, economic actions were ‘embedded’ before capitalism in community, politics, and religious activities. Economic relationships were managed either through reciprocity among kin or friends, or through distribution by the state or a similar central/communal authority, and did not constitute a separate social sphere. Rather, the economic system was submerged in general social relations. Markets were merely an accessory feature of an institutional setting controlled and regulated by social authority. Karl Polanyi, the Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time 43–55 (10th ed. 1970).

17 Why disembedding is considered negative, however, is sometimes a matter of ideological persuasion.

18 Economic sociologists, such as Mark Granovetter, resurrected and popularized this interpretation to argue that social relations stabilize exchange relationships. SeeMark Granovetter, Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem of Embeddedness, 91 AM. J. Soc. 481 (1985).

19 Mark Granovetter & Richard Swedberg, the Sociology of Economic Life (1993).

20 Polanyi supranote 15, at 73.

21 Polanyi supranote 15.

22 Ben Fine, Social Capital Versus Social Theory: The Political Economy and Social science at the Turn of the Millennium (2001).

23 However, Polanyi's key weakness according to Hart, “is his agnosticism on the question of the social and political forces through which the double movement is constituted in any particular juncture.” Gillian Hart, Geography and Development: Development/s Beyond Neoliberalism? Power, Culture, Political Economy, 25 Prog. Human. Geog. 816 (2001).

24 Jane Guyer, Traditions of Invention in Equatorial Africa. Paper Prepared for the Joint African Committee of the Social Science Research Council/American Council of Learned Societies (1995).

25 Jane I. Guyer, Wealth in People, Wealth in Things-Introduction,36 J. Afr. Hist, 83 (1995). See also Suzanne Miers & Igor Kopytoff, Slavery in Africa: Historical And Anthropological Perspectives (1977); Igor Kopytoff. The African Frontier: The Reproduction of Traditional African Societies (1990). The arguments in this article were more specifically inspired by contextual studies of rural Africa. See Göran Hydén, Beyond Ujamaa in Tanzania: Underdevelopment and an Uncaptured Peasantry (1980). See also Sara Berry, No Condition is Permanent: The Social Dynamics of Agrarian Change in Sub-Saharan Africa (1993).

26 Jean Comaroff & John L. Comaroff, Goodly Beasts, Beastly Goods: Cattle and Commodities in a South African Context. 17 Am. Ethno. 196, 206 (1990).

27 Id, at 203.

28 Id. at 202.

29 In Botswana, cattle accumulation is usually a man's prerogative. Women are expected to focus primarily on agriculture and domestic activities.

30 Comaroff & Comaroff, supranote 26, at 201.

31 Thomas T. Tlou a History of Ngamiland 1750 to 1906: The Formation of an African State (1985).

32 Ørnulf Gulbrandenson. Poverty in the Midst of Plenty: Socio-Economic Marginalization, Ecological Deterioration and Political Stability in a Tswana Society (1996).

33 Cattle also circulate on a need basis, where households who lack draught animals approach those with sufficient animals. Go tsenya mabogo(putting in hands) was one way for cattle owners to lend cattle in the community.

34 To protect the anonymity of respondents, names of community members interviewed, especially with regard to the renewal and re-tender process have been changed. In the northern sandveld villages, the chief along with the dominant lineages have historically been the richest, owning most of the cattle.

35 Peters, supranote 4.

36 Recently in southern African historiography there has been a debate about the Afro- or Zulu-centric views about the centrality of difaqane (‘forced migration’ in Sotho) or mfeqane (‘the crushing’ in Zulu') as the moment of great chaos or radical transformation. Historians have begun to question whether the ‘history’ of southern African people begins with the difaqane, but there is consensus that this was an important historical moment for understanding pre-colonial state building processes in southern Africa. See The Mfecane Aftermath:Reconstructive Debates in Southern African History (Carolyn Hamilton ed. 1996).

37 KM, Seronga (January 03, 2002).

38 Elders remember similar crises during an outbreak of locusts and TseTse in the 1940s and 1970s when local livelihoods were adversely affected.

39 Interview with GM, local community member, Seronga, November 16, 2001.

40 Peter Geschiere. The Modernity of Witchcraft (1997).

41 What was holding back investment, according to investors, was the lack of a “management plan” for the area. A management plan would provide guidelines for sustainable resource use and formalize property rights that could be a basis for private investment.

42 The kgotlais a customary institution, undertaking administrative, consultative and judicial functions. Local community members congregate at the kgotlato ask and hear about local developments, including announcements about new legislation and policies. The chief settles disputes among community members at the kgotla,including the problem of stray cattle. Historically open only to men, everyone can now attend kgotlameetings. SeeIssac Schapera, a Handbook of Tswana Law and Custom (1955).

43 In Botswana, the powers of chiefs have declined in national politics compared to those of elected officials. However, customary authorities are still important figures in rural communities.

44 Highlighting the positive contribution of the safari operator, the chairman of the village development committee (KT) said, “the safari operator has kept his promises to the community. If we go for re-tender, Wolfarlin [the safari operator placing a new bid] will remove all the equipment in the concessions and fire all the employees at the (safari) camps. I don't think the new safari company will be able to employ as many people in the first year.” Interview with KT, Seronga (March, 28 2001). A similar argument was made by KM, who was on the Okavango Conservation Trust (OCT) Board in previous years, “Look at the problems of OCT. It is because of the Board and not the businessman. The JVP (Joint Venture Partner/safari operator) has paid his amount, but the community does not have development. This is because the (OCT) Board has many problems.” Interview with KM, Gudigwa, (20 March 2001).

45 At one of the newly opened tuck-shops, the discussion about renewal and re-tender was also about monetary benefits: “We just want more money. Whoever, gives us more money, we will select them.” MK, a member of Seronga's village trust committee also said “[H]e (the safari operator) promised us a tractor, boreholes, and a training school (for tourism). None of this has happened. Maybe a new safari company will provide us with these benefits.” Participant Observation, Seronga (April 03, 2001).

46 Two hundred and six people from the five villages voted for a re-tender, while a hundred and ninety-six voted to renew the existing contract.

47 The constitution of OCT is a legally binding document. However, it was drafted by a lawyer who was hired by the safari operator. The constitutions of community-based projects were originally drafted by the USAID/NRMP project and were replicated by several different communities without much deliberation.

48 First, he claimed that another safari operator was illegally canvassing for votes. He also claimed to have information about money that was paid to specific people in the villages to vote against renewal. In addition, some of the people working at the safari camps could not vote during the election, since they were not present in their home villages when the voting took place. They were later not allowed by government officials to vote in another village. Finally, during the elections in Gudigwa, there was a shouting match between those who wanted renewal and those who wanted re-tender and during this affray the chief allegedly told people that if they voted for renewal they would face consequences.

49 Interview with PM, ex-OCT Board member, Gunitsoga (November 20, 2001).

50 Interview with SS, village elder, Seronga (Dec. 16, 2001).

51 Throughout OCT's existence, a British donor-supported NGO was providing technical training and support to the five villages. It is noteworthy that the final assessment of the project also supports the perspective that there was manipulation by the private sector. See Through Our Eyes ACORD's Experience in CBNRM(October, 2002), available at 〈http://www.acord.org.uk/Publications/ACORD%20Botswana%20Experience%20with%20OCT.pdf〉 (last visited August 05, 2004).

52 There are other instances when actions by local communities seem contrary to economic cost-benefit rationales. In Sankuyu, another community project under CBNRM, the local community decided to select a safari operator who was offering a substantially smaller amount of money rather than the highest bidder. The Wildlife Department withheld the hunting quota of the community (and in turn of the safari operator), because from the perspective of state actors these were economically irrational decisions.

53 These development challenges will only be exacerbated with the deepening HIV/AIDS endemic. The HIV epidemic has already reduced life expectancy from 56.1 years in 1970–75 to 39.7 years in 2000–05 and it is predicted to slip further to 29 years by 2010. The change in life expectancy has caused Botswana to slip 51 places down the Human Development Index rankings of 174 nations from an impressive 71 in 1996 to 122 in 1999 and 2000. SeeUnited Nations Development Program, Botswana Human Development Report (2002). Available at 〈http://www.http://www.unbotswana.org.bw/undp/poverty_bhdr2002.html〉 (last visited August 11, 2004).

54 Ian Taylor, Botswana's ‘Developmental State’ and the ‘Politics of Legitimacy.’ Paper presented at a conference entitled ‘Towards a New Political Economy of Development: Globalisation and Governance,’ University of Sheffield (July 4–6, 2002) Available at 〈http://www.valt.helsinki.fi/staff/mhossain/state/Botswana.pdf〉 (last visited August 05, 2004)

55 James C. Scott, Seeing Like A State (1998).

56 Peters, supra note 4.

57 Among traditional farming households, 47% have no cattle, and 20% have fewer than 11. While 71% of such farming households own only 8 percent of the total national herd, the wealthiest one percent own roughly 25% of the herd, and the wealthiest 2.5% of farming households own 40%. Cattle ownership is especially gender biased. About 60% of all female farmers have no cattle, compared to 33% for male farmers. The average number of cattle owned by female farmers is six, compared to twenty for male farmers. See Botswana Human Development Report, supra note 53.

58 Remote communities in the Okavango Delta have received inadequate training in organization and fiscal management. However, this article has focused primarily on the ‘politics’ of establishing local conservation regimes.

59 Murphree, supranote 10.

60 Agrawal & Gibson, supranote 8.