Introduction to the Special Issue – A Theory of Housing: Problems and Potential

2008 was the 25th anniversary of Housing, Theory and Society and its antecedent the Scandinavian Journal of Housing and Planning. To mark the occasion a plenary debate was organized at the European Network for Housing Research conference in Dublin on 8 July 2008. This special issue has arisen from that debate.

The subject of the debate was the role of theory in housing research. Clearly this fits with the journal's objective, established by former editor Jim Kemeny in 1999, which is to stimulate the application of theory to housing research. This followed Kemeny's call in his book Housing and Social Theory (Kemeny 1992) for a more theoretically informed housing research. This call was accepted by many people and the articles published here reflect on the impact this has made.

The issue consists of four papers. Bo Bengtsson laments the minor role of political science in housing research and examines why this is the case. The lament is based on the positive impact that political theory could potentially make to housing studies through the concepts of democracy and citizenship and the focus on elite actors through actor‐based approaches such as path dependence.

Ken Gibb in the second paper speaks from the discipline of economics, arguably the most influential discipline in housing research. Nevertheless the paper is quite defensive in tone – trying to justify the dominance and showing how different economic approaches can and have contributed to housing studies. He points particularly to approaches such as behavioural economics, which offer scope for integration with other disciplines in the study of actor behaviour.

Peter King's paper argues against one of the key tenets of Kemeny's approach. Kemeny urged housing researchers to engage with debates in the mainstream disciplines and to bring theory back into the housing field. King argues that housing is a unique phenomenon and so is a worthy subject for theory making in its own right. Whereas Kemeny was arguing for the application of theory to housing, King is arguing for a theory of housing.

In the fourth paper Chris Allen offers a critique of the claim to special knowledge of academics in housing. He argues that there are no grounds for the knowledge generated through academic enquiry to have any special status over and above the common sense knowledge of the people who live in houses. He is sharply critical of academics who have used their form of knowledge to argue against the views of local people in the Housing Market Renewal Programme in the UK. In this view, theory making is an exercise in imperialistic power by academics to pursue the interests of the middle classes like themselves. It is unclear to what extent Allen is arguing against particular forms of research for the generation of knowledge (such as positivism) or against all forms of academic enquiry in this field. Are his arguments designed to stop research in housing or to foster particular approaches? Either way Allen offers an effective critique that all researchers in the field would benefit from reading.

These four papers cover a number of themes with which this introduction will engage. The first theme is the argument put forward by both Bengtsson and Gibb for a multi‐disciplinary approach to housing studies. Both hint at further potential for an inter‐disciplinary approach. King goes further than this arguing that there can be a theory of housing which by its very nature must be interdisciplinary. In this introduction I will examine whether and how this is possible, and look at some of the barriers. In pursuing this endeavour it is necessary to confront Allen's argument that theory is a form of knowledge imperialism. I argue that academic research and theory making can offer insights not available to others and that there is room for a theory of housing that adds insight without denying the importance of the common sense knowledge held by residents.

Interdisciplinary Housing Studies?

In his discussion of the different strands of economic thought related to housing Gibb explicitly argues for a multi‐disciplinary approach. He argues that there is a role for economics (and by implication other disciplines) in making contributions to particular questions or issues. Two implications are possible here. The first is that there are areas of interest or topics that are the preserve of particular disciplines and a multi‐disciplinary housing studies involves the disciplines working in isolation in particular fields. The acceptance of this proposition is made more difficult by what Jordan (2008) sees as the colonization by economics of many areas previously the domain of other disciplines. An example is the evaluation of the impact of government policies that could be argued to be the preserve of political science, but about which economists have a lot to say. If it is impossible to avoid overlap, what happens when this overlap occurs? This brings us on to the second implication, which is that different disciplines will provide different insights on the same topics. The question then is how does one choose which insight from the different disciplines is relevant and useful. Gibb's answer is that contributions should be judged on the basis of whether they are useful, insightful or interesting and testable. Of course this is the test of positivism and this is a major stumbling block to the acceptance of some approaches.

Multi‐disciplinarity in housing studies is very difficult to justify. It has been argued above that it is not possible to demarcate areas of different relevance. For example, I cannot think of one application by economists that does not rely on some assumptions about human or organizational behaviour that can be questioned by advocates of other disciplines. Therefore, multi‐disciplinarity merely consists of a live and let live attitude in which people are left to accept what they want from the menu of different and partial approaches. In my view this does not take us far forward in the understanding of housing phenomena.

Therefore, the way forward has to be to move as far forward as possible in the direction of inter‐disciplinarity. Heckhausen (1972) identifies six types of interdisciplinarity in terms of pedagogy. His typology can be adapted for our purposes here. His first category he calls “indiscriminate interdisciplinarity” in which different disciplines are just laid side by side. This type is what I have called above multi‐disciplinarity. The second category is “pseudo‐disciplinarity” which involves different disciplines being brought together at the level of particular analytical tools. “Auxiliary interdisciplinarity” is where methods are used in one discipline that were developed in another. The following three categories are of most interest for us here. The first of these is “composite interdisciplinarity” where issues form the main propelling force for integration. The process of “housing” would seem to be an obvious focus for creating concepts and theories that crossed disciplines as King argues. We shall return to this later. The penultimate category is “supplementary interdisciplinarity” where disciplines in the same field develop a partial overlap at the margins of the disciplines. Finally, there is “unifying interdisciplinarity” where there is an increased consistency between the subject matter of disciplines that is then paralleled by integration of theories and methods.

Gibb seems to implicitly accept interdisciplinarity as he clearly champions behavioural economics and lauds its drawing on psychology in building a more coherent approach based on sound empirical research on perceptions and behaviours. Links can be made here with Bengtsson's advocacy of actor focused approaches in political science based on bounded or thin rationality. Therefore one can begin to see a way that these approaches could form the basis of some rapprochement between psychological, economic and political approaches to housing. But clearly, in terms of Heckhausen's typology, what is being suggested here is supplementary interdisciplinarity, with some marginal elements of economics being mixed with some (arbitrarily) selected psychological or political theories and concepts.

However, is it possible to move beyond this and to incorporate sociology and geography that have in the main rejected the positivist paradigm? Can some non‐positivist approaches within social psychology or political science also be incorporated? For example, is it possible to incorporate the burgeoning work from ethnography, geography and sociology that takes a social constructionist framework (see for example, Jacobs, Kemeny & Manzi 2004)?

A possible step forward in this direction is provided by Munro and Smith (2008). They examine the economics of house purchase and question traditional models of agent behaviour in economic analysis based on rationality. They highlight emotional responses and call for an emotional economy of housing markets. However, Munro and Smith (2008) move beyond a sole concern with individual psychological and emotional factors and emphasize the importance of interaction in market operations. An example they give is of surveyors talking to others in order to decide on a price taking into account a “feel” for how the market is moving. It is but a small step from this to accept the socially constructed nature of housing markets and the importance of social interaction in creating and sustaining the “rules of the game” that frame market transactions.

At first sight the incorporation of social constructionist perspectives into positivist approaches would seem to be impossible. Social constructionism takes as its basic premise the social construction of reality through social interaction. It alerts the researcher to the different perceptions of reality that may be held by individuals or groups. However, a key element of social constructionism is that knowledge of the world often becomes reified or objectified in that people view the world as they see it as an objective “fact”. It is only by doing this that people can manage their everyday lives by accepting its reality. In many or most situations there is general agreement over what is reality between the different actors. Of course social constructionism would have a lot to say about how the dominant conception of reality was constructed and the discourses that underpinned it. It would also be concerned with the power structures that led to one particular version of reality being accepted rather than another. However, within a particular “reality” it may be possible to forge a common conception of how actors would behave. Of course social constructionists would stress the limited extent of the “reality” over both time and space which would limit the generality of the conclusions that could be drawn.

It would be interesting (and extremely challenging) to work through the conditions under which an agreed position of what may be termed “limited positivism” or “fixed constructionism” could be derived. Social constructionists would have to accept that social institutions could become reified in certain situations where it could be accurate to talk about social facts. The key factor would be to ascertain the boundaries in time and space of such situations. Some traditional elements of the economic approach would have to be changed. For example, the assumed utility maximization behaviour of actors would be challenged as it already has been from within the discipline. For example, Layard (2005) has argued that utility should be seen in relation to “happiness” rather than material consumption. Jordan (2008) argues that the concept of utility maximization should be abandoned and replaced with the idea of social value. His argument is that people are seeking to be valued and to achieve high social status by consumption of goods and services. This chimes with recent approaches to housing that have stressed its use as a means to the end of personal fulfilment and a socially valued lifestyle rather than as an end in itself. Behavioural economics has questioned the presumed rationality of actors and the work by Munro and Smith (2008) on local housing markets stresses the social interactions by which housing institutions are constructed and maintained. All of this work undermines the fundamental assumptions of neo‐classical economics, but opens the way for a more integrated housing studies that uses insights from a wide range of disciplines.

Theories of Housing?

We have so far concentrated on the construction of theory for housing by accepting Kemeny's instruction to go back to our disciplines and prepare for an assault on the housing field. However, we have made a first faltering attempt to move beyond a multi‐disciplinary approach and assess the possibility of a unified theoretical framework, by examining the possibility of an agreed approach. The difficulties in achieving this by a top down method are immense. However, a more fruitful method may be to adopt King's plea to theorize from housing itself. King argues that most housing research focuses on housing policy, which he sees as being about housing as both aggregated and standardized, as an entity capable of generalization. He contrasts this approach with the concept of dwelling, which focuses on the individual experience in which people use dwellings to meet their ends and fulfil their interests in a way that the dwelling becomes meaningful for them. Elsewhere (Clapham forthcoming) I have argued that housing policy does not have to be concerned with the standardized and general, but could be constructed in a way that is based on the meaning that housing has for the people who live in it. Here I wish to engage with King's argument that we should not just apply different theories drawn from disciplines to housing, but should attempt to theorize from housing by deriving theories or concepts of housing. King argues that the application of disciplinary theories leads to much housing research that applies theory rather than making it.

Housing is clearly not a discipline. Therefore, to justify the activity of making theory from housing one needs to make the case for housing to be different enough to justify a theory of its own. Interestingly economists have made great play of the uniqueness of housing as a commodity in terms of its durability, immobility and so on. Other disciplines have emphasized the uniqueness of a house as a place compared to other places. King and others have stressed the uniqueness of the private experiences in the home and its importance in identity formation. Therefore, the case for housing being at least different from other features of life is a strong enough one to justify a theory of housing. However, it is not so strong that a theory of housing can ignore general theories and concepts. To cut housing theory making off from other fields and disciplines in general is to run the risk of seeing housing in isolation from wider social processes and structures. A pragmatic approach would be to study housing armed with theories drawn from the disciplines, but to be aware of the possibility that they will not fit and to be aware of the possible need for unique concepts. In this way a theory of housing can be constructed from the phenomenon itself in a bottom up way to complement the top down approach explored earlier.

In his paper King uses the concept of dwelling to provide the focus for a theory of housing. This concept is reminiscent of Kemeny's (1992) concept of residence. Both focus on the relationship between an individual and their house and its environment, but enable this relationship to be embedded in society. In his paper King mentions three concepts that arise out of the focus on dwelling and elaborates on one – the concept of accommodation, which he defines as the state we find ourselves in when we live sustainably with others. Certainly this is an interesting concept that emerges directly out of the relationship between people and their house. However it is only one possible form of such relationship and so should be open to empirical enquiry to determine its relevance in different situations and settings.

Although King argues the case for theory making his examples are, as he admits, concepts not theories. It is easier to see that the unique relationship between an individual and their house may need unique concepts in order for it to be understood. However, theory building needs more than this. A theory requires an understanding of the way that concepts relate together that help us to understand why something is as it is or why something happens. In order to achieve this, concepts of dwelling need to be integrated into a wider framework of theory.

Towards an Emancipating Housing Studies?

Any construction of a theory of housing needs to confront the criticisms of Allen that housing studies claims a superior form of knowledge that does not bear scrutiny. I would contend that Allen's critique is relevant to some forms of housing research but not all.

Allen examines two claims that housing researchers may make for superior knowledge. The first claim is based on the validity of empirical data derived in a sound methodological way. Allen's argument is that housing knowledge derived in this way is only one form of knowledge because of the embeddedness of the researcher in society. He argues that there is no convincing argument that this form of knowledge is “scientific” and so superior to other forms. Further he argues that all knowledge is derived using concepts held by the observer or researcher. In other words there are no such things as social facts or objective evidence and housing researchers should not claim any superiority for their form of knowledge. However, this critique is not original in any sense. Indeed many housing researchers, including myself, would heartily agree with it. Allen's argument is the major criticism of positivism in any research and social constructionists (and many others) would take it for granted. So is Allen's critique of housing research or just positivist housing research? We will return to his argument later in the attempt to formulate a form of housing theory that does not fall foul of his critique.

In his paper Allen also attacks theoretical housing research for claiming to offer insights that are superior to other forms of knowledge, whether empiricist or common sense. But again, the claim to superiority is imputed by Allen to the researchers rather than made by the housing theoreticians themselves. For example, he widely quotes my own work and my claim that my social constructionist approach can provide insights that help us to understand a post‐modern world. But, as Allen recognizes, in the introduction to my “pathways” approach I am at great pains to point out that this is just one way of looking at the world among many and that others may also offer important insights. Allen's criticism is again just relevant to some kinds of housing research that do make claims of superiority and these are mainly the positivist ones.

Allen's key critique of a theoretically aware housing studies is that debate is confined to different methodological and theoretical approaches and claims superiority over what he calls the common sense knowledge or the lived experience of residents. Allen's fascinating autobiographical account of his development as a housing researcher highlights the problems of inadequate theorizing. He notes one study where he interviewed impaired children within the research confines of the social model of disability and found that this approach clashed with their understanding of the world and their place in it. Again, this is a strong critique of certain kinds of housing research rather than research itself. Any research that takes a rigid conceptual framework to define its data gathering runs the risk of cutting across the understanding of those being researched. In positivist and empiricist research the problem is not really acknowledged and data is merely forced into the preconceived categories. But for some traditions of research such as ethnography and the interpretevist tradition, the main aim of empirical research is to elucidate the “worlds” of those “being researched”. This form of research builds the conceptual understanding from the common sense worlds of ordinary people and so does not deserve Allen's opprobrium. However, he criticizes this type of research for applying concepts to the data; in other words for placing externally derived concepts on to the ordinary worlds of individuals. But surely this is an appropriate role for researchers and does not have to be imperialistic if the “worlds” are open for inspection and for alternative theory making. He argues that social scientists believe they have a superior understanding of their research subjects than their research subjects are deemed to have of themselves. Again to me this criticism is a valid one of “realist” methodologies that seek a “reality” outside the understanding of human subjects or for positivism. Is it valid for social constructionist research that merely seeks to understand and generalize (in a very limited way) from the common sense understanding?

Allen's view of the role of housing studies and housing theory is a very limiting one that would indeed spell the end of housing studies (and social science). However, it is possible to accept most of his basic points and still construct a modest, but important role for housing research.

Allen's main target is the housing researchers who have used their claim to “special knowledge” to override the problem definition of ordinary individuals. It is perfectly possible to agree with his condemnation of the pretensions of positivist research and “evidence based policy making” but still accept a role for appropriate housing research and theory. I would argue that a major element of social constructionist research is elucidating the world views of participants in a particular slice of life. Allen, quite understandably, asks us to concentrate particularly on the worlds of working class residents. Why them rather than any other group? What about local government officials or housing developers or middle class residents? Do they not have a view too? Why do working class people necessarily have a view we should honour, but the other parties not? The answer of course is because this fits Allen's own political views which many of us may share. These views were evidently outraged by the Housing Market Renewal Programme in England that saw demolition of housing in the name of market renewal, and against the wishes of those living in the houses and areas. However, this example may not sound the death knell for housing studies. It is surely acceptable for housing researchers to claim knowledge of housing processes over and above that of particular residents without necessarily negating resident views. Clearly residents know what it is like for them to live in a particular place and have an understanding of their situation in the housing market. However, researchers may be able to offer experience of different situations and an understanding of different points of view, as well as of general processes that may operate in other locations. Residents may understand their own situation, but this does not mean that they will know when the next credit crunch is about to appear or what its impact will be. What may be important here is how housing researchers use their knowledge. It can be used to negate resident views or alternatively, to inform them.

To move forward in defining a role for housing studies, it is useful to examine the decision making process and the role of research and academics within it. If a rational and positivist decision making process is adopted based on “evidence” or “what works” then academic research (and other forms of “professional” or “expert” knowledge) is assigned the role of neutral arbiter of the facts. Of course decision makers will pick the experts and the facts they want to pursue their case and will use this to argue for a particular course of action. I agree with Allen that in this case housing academics who say they are producing “objective” knowledge based on positivist research are implicated in the exercise of power that sees one group able to have their definition of the problem accepted.

If the decision making process is viewed as a power game between competing groups with different “world views” or realities pursuing their own aims and interests, and there are no neutral social facts, then the role of academics and other experts could be a very different one. Rather than the positivist exponent of the “true knowledge” researchers could see themselves as the voice for the different views. One role here is for research to describe the views of the different participants and to compare them using an analytical framework. This could lead to more open decision making in which the oppressive impacts described by Allen were more difficult to hide behind “the facts”.

Housing research does not necessarily have to be oppressive in the way described by Allen. Indeed it is possible for it to be emancipatory in highlighting perceptions and views that otherwise may be hidden. However, Allen's critique can alert us to the dangers of particular kinds of research. In particular positivist researchers need to be more aware of the limits to its claim to scientific truth. There is clearly an educational role with political decision makers to ensure that they understand the limits of positivism. Current trends in the UK in favour of “evidence based policy” militate against this awareness unless the approach is interpreted in a questioning way. What is evidence? Whose evidence is it? What are the differences in views of the evidence?

A Way Forward for Housing Theory?

The different papers in this special issue highlight many of the difficulties facing housing studies as a research and policy field, but show a potential way forward. Gibb's and Bengtsson's chapters show the value of an interdisciplinary approach and how easy it is to achieve if one accepts the positivist base. However, developments in economics show the limits of positivism and the assumptions of rational behaviour. Behavioural economics has incorporated psychological thinking into its approach, but Munro and Smith (2008) show the limits of this and the need to incorporate an interactionist perspective. They show the limits of positivist generalization in that housing markets may have different features from other kinds of markets and each local market may have its own socially constructed way of working. Clearly what is needed is a set of concepts not rooted in positivism, that enable research on housing to capture its unique aspects.

The paper by King suggests that the experience of dwelling is unique enough to warrant its own set of concepts and theories. Rooting concepts in this way would overcome some of Allen's concerns about theorizing that is not based on the experience of residents. There is a need for concepts grounded in the experience of the relationship between people and the house in which they live. There is also a need for theory that enables us to examine the ways in which the built form is made and exchanged which is based on the social construction of the institutions and other social relationships involved. In Heckhausen's (1972) typology this would be composite interdisciplinarity based on an issue focus, but could move beyond this to a unifying disciplinarity where there is an integration of theories and methods.

At the heart of theories of housing has to be the relationship between individuals and the house they live in, as King asserts. There have been many ways of conceptualizing this relationship. For example, environmental psychologists look for the meanings and identities that the house has for individuals. Here the house is seen as a passive object and the meanings and identities of individuals are projected onto it. It is a fault of much research that the built environment is considered to be a “sleeping partner” in the relationship. Gabriel and Jacobs (2008) draw attention to new forms of theory that recognize the significance of non‐human actors. Although they are critical of the prominence given by some authors to the agency of objects, Gabriel and Jacobs argue that housing studies can be strengthened by at least recognizing that material objects, such as a house or artefacts, should be considered as part of any analysis. Although the relationship between a person and their house is one sided in the sense that the human agent is dominant, this does not mean that the material object does not have an influence on the relationship. Coolen (2006) has used Chemero's (2003) concept of affordances to capture the potentialities which material objects have to enable material objects such as a house to meet the aims of humans. Clearly this is a key area in the development of a theory of housing and should be the focus of a bottom‐up theory of housing.

In conclusion, I have argued that there is the potential for an interdisciplinary housing studies that moves beyond the limits of positivism and is built around the relationship between humans and the material house. We are a long way from realizing this dream, but there are clear signs pointing towards the immediate directions we need to travel.