Good Governance, Security and Mining in Africa1

1. Earlier presented at International Mining Seminar, London, 20 and 21 June 2005, Session: Assessing Developments in Mining Policies.

Abstract

Using as a point of departure the observations contained in the document ‘Our Common Interest. Report of the Commission for Africa (March 2005)’, Chapter 5:

“Countries with economies dependent on one or a few primary commodities, particularly high‐value resources such as oil and other minerals, are often poor, have weak and less accountable governance systems, and are more vulnerable to violent conflict and economic shocks”, the article sets out to explore the broader trends and specific conditions which might help explain why mining activities in Africa may well be at present and increasingly in the future, linked to issues of security.

To this end the paper explores various hypotheses which have been put forward such as the following:

•	an overly externally driven reform process may well have contributed to undermining the legitimacy of the governments of mineral rich countries concerned.
•	economic reforms, and mining policies more specifically, have perhaps not sufficiently contributed to building effective and accountable states that represent and respond to the needs of their population, which is essential to improving the peaceful management of conflict.
•	insufficient capacity to monitor and implement regulations may lead to the potential by‐ passing of governments as key regulatory agents and consequently further undermining their legitimacy.
•	in situations of conflict, in order to ensure security, mining companies may turn to private security companies or co‐opt armed groups to protect installations, thus contributing to further insecurity.

In an attempt to understand what is driving present trends, by broadening the perspective adopted and including an analysis of the reform process of which mining policies are a part, the paper echoes the conclusions of the Commission to the effect that ‘Responsibility for resolving conflict in Africa should lie primarily with Africans, but there is much more the developed world can do to strengthen conflict prevention’ and to that end, the articles seeks to identify specific measures of policy reform which might substantiate this observation.

Keywords:

• mining – Africa – governance – security – conflict and corporate responsibility

Notes

1. Earlier presented at International Mining Seminar, London, 20 and 21 June 2005, Session: Assessing Developments in Mining Policies.

2. Commission for Africa, Our Common Interest, Report of the Commission for Africa, Chapter 5 “The Need for Peace and Security”, U.K, March, 2005. p. 161.

3. Op.cit., p. 126.

4. Op.cit., p. 128.

5. Op.cit p. 138.

6. Ibid.

7. Op.cit p. 139.

8. Ibid.

9. Op.cit., pp. 161‐162.

10. World Bank, Project Appraisal Document for a Mining Sector Reform Project, Report No.17788‐MAG, Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 2 June 1998. p. 6. Quoted in Bruno Sarrasin “Madagascar: A Mining Industry Caught Between Environment and Development” in B. Campbell (Ed.), Regulating Mining in Africa: For Whose Benefit? Discussion Paper 26, Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, Uppsala, 2004.

11. World Bank, Governance and Development, World Bank, Washington D.C. 1992, p. 1; See also World Bank, Governance. The World Bank Experience, World Bank, Washington D.C. 1994.

12. The findings are summarized in: “Factoring in Governance is Not Enough. Mining Codes in Africa, Policy Reform and Corporate Responsibility”, B. Campbell and the Groupe de Recherche sur les Activités Minières en Afrique, in Minerals and Energy‐ Raw Materials Report, Stockholm, vol. 18, no. 3, September 2003, pp. 2‐13; “The Challenges of Development, Mining Codes in Africa and Corporate Responsibility”, B. Campbell et al., in International and Comparative Mineral Law and Policy, edited by Elizabeth Bastida, Thomas Walde and Janeth Warden, Kluwer Law International, The Hague, 2004, pp. 801‐822; B. Campbell, Regulating Mining in Africa : For Whose Benefit?, op. cit.

13. T.M. Akabzaa, in ‘The Challenges of Development, Mining Codes in Africa and Corporate Responsibility’ in International and Comparative Mineral Law and Policy: Trends and Prospects, A Compendium edited by Elizabeth Bastida, Thomas Walde and Janeth Warden Centre for Energy, Petroleum and Mineral Law and Policy, Kluwer Law International, The Hague, 2004. See also: Thomas M. Akabzaa, Boom and Dislocation. The Environmental and Social Impacts of Mining in the Wassa West Distinct of Ghana, Third World Network, Africa, 2000.

14. World Bank: “Project Performance Assessment Report: Ghana, Mining Sector Rehabilitation Project (Credit 1921‐GH) and Mining Sector Development and Environmental Project (Credit 2743‐GH), July 1, 2003, Report No.: 26197.

15. Op.cit., p. 21.

16. World Bank, Strategy for African Mining, World Bank Technical Paper No.181, Africa Technical Department Series, Mining Unit, Industry and Energy Division, Washington D.C.: World Bank, 1992. p. 53.

17. United Nations Research Institute for Social Development (UNRISD) (2000), What Choices do Democracies have in Globalizing Economies? Report of the UNRISD International Conference, Geneva, 27–28 April.

18. Ibid.p.1.These objectives, according to the same source, include conservative fiscal policies, privatization, and open trade and capital accounts, all of which reflect an acceptance of price stability as the primary concern of macroeconomic policy.

19. Ibid. pp. 1‐2.

20. Ibid. p. 3.

21. Ibid. p. 4.

22. Ibid. p. 6.

23. World Bank, Ajustment in Africa: Reforms, Results and the Road Ahead, Published for the World Bank by Oxford University Press, Oxford and New York 1994, p. 8.

24. See on this subject: Bonnie Campbell, ‘New Rules of the Game. The World Bank's Role in the Construction of New Normative Frameworks for States, Markets and Social Exclusion’, in Canadian Journal of Development Studies, Ottawa, vol. XX1, no. 1, March 2000, pp. 7‐30.

25. Deblock. C., and Brunelle, D., ‘Globalisation et nouveaux cadres normatifs. Le cas de l'Accord multilateral sur l'investissement’, in Géographie, Économie, Société, Paris, vol. 1, no. 1, 1999, pp. 49‐95.

26. Teivo Teivainen, Enter Economism Exit Politics – Experts, Economic Policy and the Damage to Democracy, London and New York: Zed Books Ltd, 2002.

27. Ibid. p. 189.

28. Ibid. p. 17.

29. This subject was developed in: ‘Towards a Spiral of Violence? The Dangers of Privatization of Risk Management of Investments in Africa: Mining Activities and the Use of Private Security Companies”, Memorandum submitted to the Special reporter on the use of mercenaries of the human rights commission of the United Nations Mr. Enrique Bernales‐Ballesteros and Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Commmerce of Canada Mr. Lloyd Axworthy, Groupe de recherche sur les activités minières en Afrique, March 2000.

30. The breath of the mandate of such companies and the question of their accountability may be illustrated by the description of the security companies working for a Canadian mining company in Angola in the late 1990s. Vancouver‐based DiamondWorks Ltd. had properties in Africa at the time in Sierra Leone, Angola and Lesotho. In its report to the Securities and Exchange Commission, Washington, the Company noted the security arrangements were important for all precious minerals mining operations, particularly in Angola and Sierra Leone. In Angola, security services are: “provided to the Company by Teleservice Sociedade de Telecomunicaçoes, Segurança e Serviços, S.A.R.L” (“Teleservice”) and by Mambodji, both Angolan private companies at arm's length from the Company. Both companies provide security services on commercial terms to various foreign and domestic business enterprises in Angola. The security services provided are intended to protect the assets and personnel located at the Luo and Yetwene properties from fire, theft, burglary, vandalism, terrorism, riot or civil commotion and include the following: 24‐hour armed foot and mobile patrols; access and egress control; establishment and manning of observation posts covering the area by sight; escorting the personnel to and from the area of operations; armed standby protection forces; protection for the residential area. The overall current security costs in Angola are approximately $400,000 per month. Security services will be required at the Company's other properties in Angola when operations commence at those properties.” (Report to the Securities and Exchange Commission, Washington, April 29, 1999, p. 16).

31. Marina Jimenez, “Canadians seek fortune in land of anarchy, violence. Ex‐soldiers go unarmed”, in National Post, Toronto, August 23^rd, 1999. Not all, however, share the same view. Canada, which is involved with the Commonwealth effort to bring peace in Sierra Leone, recently reviewed the private security company, Globe Risk Holdings and was considering backing it. According to David Pratt, a Liberal MP and the government's special envoy to Sierra Leone: “The British are helping rebuild the country's army and police and Canada is looking to help on the policing side. A private security company could help with that.”

32. Paul Collier ‘Natural Resources and Conflict in Africa’ in Crimes of War, October 2004. http://www.crimesofwar.org/africa‐mag/afr_04_collier_print.html This section is based directly on this source.

33. Ibid. p. 4.

34. Ibid. p. 5‐6.

35. Report of the Commission for Africa, op.cit., p. 140.

36. Ibid. p. 160.

37. Ibid. pp. 160‐161.

38. Commission for Africa, op. cit., p. 166.

39. Ibid.

40. Ibid, p. 165.

41. See : Bonnie Campbell, ‘Canadian Mining Interests in Africa in the Context of Globalization’, International Center for Human Rights and Democratic Development, Montreal, 1999 [on line] http://www.ichrdd.ca/english/commdoc/publications/globalization/globAfrCamp.html. Bonnie Campbell, ‘Les intérêts miniers canadiens et les droits de la personne en Afrique dans le cadre de la mondialisation, Centre international des droits de la personne et du développement démocratique, Montreal, 1999 [en ligne] http://www.ichrdd.ca/francais/commdoc/publications/mondialisation/afriqueMondial.html.

42. This recommendation was put forward in the document: Georgette Gagnon, Audrey Macklin, Penelope Simons, Deconstructing Engagement. Corporate Self‐Regulation in Conflict Zones – Implications for Human Rights and Canadian Public Policy, A Strategic Joint Initiative of the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council and the Law Commission of Canada, University of Toronto, January 2003, p. 133.

43. Ibid.

44. This section is drawn directly from the Report of the Commission for Africa, Chapter 5.

45. Commission for Africa, op. cit., p. 164.

46. Ibid. p. 174.