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Original Articles

The role of symbolic politics in exceptional crime policy debate: a study of the 2014 Swedish general election

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Pages 22-40 | Received 07 Apr 2017, Accepted 13 Mar 2018, Published online: 26 Mar 2018

ABSTRACT

Symbolic politics are often considered to be closely linked to an alarmist rhetoric, as well as to punitive crime policy initiatives. This article explores the symbolic dimension of the Swedish crime policy debate. Since Sweden is frequently depicted as an antithesis to punitive Anglophone societies, exploring symbolic politics in this setting might expand our understanding of what symbolic statements may consist of. The article analyses the electoral campaign preceding the Swedish general election of 2014, with the aim of identifying which symbolic statements occupy a central position in the debate through the use of a qualitative content analysis. This analysis reveals an ambiguous political rhetoric, comprising morally and emotionally charged condemnatory statements about getting tough on crime, as well as reformist and restrained references to expert knowledge and long-term solutions. On the one hand, these reformist statements strengthen the image of Swedish crime policy as being based on ideals such as rationality and humanity. On the other, they also serve to legitimize and obscure penal expansion.

This article is part of the following collections:
Nordic Journal of Criminology Best Article Prize

Introduction

In Sweden, as in many Western countries, crime policy is considered to have taken a punitive turn since the mid-1980s with symbolic politics and alarmist rhetoric as accompanying traits (e.g. Andersson, Citation2002; Demker & Duus-Otterström, Citation2009; von Hofer & Tham, Citation2013; Tham, Citation2018). In criminological research, the concept of symbolic politics is often used to describe a defective form of politics that fails to achieve any significant effect on crime or the fear of crime (Andersson, Citation2002; Baker & Roberts, Citation2005; Garland, Citation2001/2006). Frequent examples involve moral condemnations and the introduction of stiffer sentences (Garland, Citation2001/2006; Newburn & Jones, Citation2007; Shammas, Citation2016; Tham, Citation2018). Following David Garland’s (Citation2001/2006) analytical framework, these phenomena can be said to express the anger that crime provokes through an ‘acting out’, or manifesting political efficacy through political acts; processes which Garland calls ‘symbolic denial’ (Garland, Citation2001/2006, pp. 131–135). Previous research thus provides a solid framework for understanding the role played by symbolic politics in relation to punitive crime policies in Western societies.

Less research concerns the role of symbols in relation to the form of crime policy which Garland (Citation2001/2006) labels ‘penal welfarism’. Sweden is, along with the other Nordic countries, often viewed as being characterized by an extensive welfare state. This, in turn, is assumed to have influenced these countries’ penal policies, protecting them from the neoliberal shift and punitive crime policies experienced in the Anglophone countries (Cavadino & Dignan, Citation2006; Lappi-Seppälä, Citation2012; Pratt & Eriksson, Citation2013). In addition, the concept of ‘Scandinavian exceptionalism’ (Pratt, Citation2008) and analyses of a moderate Nordic crime policy (Cavadino & Dignan, Citation2006; Loader, Citation2010; Pratt & Eriksson, Citation2013) have been used to show that the political debate in the Nordic countries also includes a rhetoric that counteracts the punitive trend experienced elsewhere in the Western world (Waggoner, Citation2015). Although the notion of an exceptionally humane Nordic penal order is being challenged (Barker, Citation2013, 2017; Smith & Ugelvik, Citation2017), it has been argued that this notion continues to influence the logic and positive self-image of the Nordic countries (Barker, Citation2013, 2017; Hörnqvist, Citation2016; Smith, Citation2017). Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that the pride that the Nordic penal order is associated with (Barker, Citation2017; Smith & Ugelvik, Citation2017), influences the symbols being used in Swedish crime control rhetoric.

Symbolic statements are of particular importance to election campaigns; both for the political parties and the electorate (Edelman, Citation1964/1976). In order to legitimize their policy proposals and increase their appeal, political parties make symbolic statements that signal how the party’s proposals should be understood (Edelman, Citation1964/1976, 1971). Previous research has also shown that electoral debates constitute an arena in which symbolic statements are employed extensively (Marion & Farmer, Citation2003). Against this background, the aim of this study is to explore the role of symbolism in the Swedish crime policy debate; specifically, the electoral campaign preceding the Swedish general election of 2014. Election campaigns are important to analyse due to their potential power to shape wider public understanding (Bacchi, Citation2009). By studying which symbolic statements occupy a central position in this election campaign, the present article explores how crime control is legitimized and understood, and how the political parties strive to engage the general public through the use of symbolic statements (Edelman, Citation1964/1976). Whether or not this kind of rhetoric will counteract punitive measures, as previous research has indicated (Loader, Citation2010; Waggoner, Citation2015), will also be discussed.

Contextualizing the electoral campaign of 2014

The parliamentary situation prior to the Swedish general election that was held in September 2014 differed from that of previous general elections in a number of ways. In 2004, the four centre-right parties (the Conservatives, the Liberal Party, the Christian Democrats and the Centre Party), had joined together to form an electoral alliance. They entered the 2014 election campaign as a united political block for the third time. This centre-right Alliance, with the Conservatives as its single largest political party, had by this time been in government since 2006; for two four-year terms. The opposition comprised four political parties represented in parliament: The Social Democratic Party, the Green Party, the Left Party and the Sweden Democrats. Previously, such extended periods of centre-right government were unusual since the Social Democratic Party had been the dominant government party since the 1930’s (Ljunggren, Citation2015; Svensson, Citation1994).

Studies show that the constellation of a Conservative-led government and a social democratic opposition has a cooling effect on the crime policy debate (Estrada, Citation2004; Lenke & Olsson, Citation2002). Generally, crime seems to be a social problem primarily placed on the political agenda by the Conservatives (Demker & Duus-Otterström, Citation2009), especially when in opposition to a social democratic government (Estrada, Citation2004). Therefore, one would expect the crime policy debate preceding the 2014 election to be limited in terms of frequency. Furthermore, research has indicated that the Social Democratic Party has moved closer to what may be described as a traditional conservative approach to crime policy issues (Demker & Duus-Otterström, Citation2009; Estrada, Citation2004; Tham, Citation2001). Consequently, this policy arena is increasingly characterized by consensus across party lines (Lenke & Olsson, Citation2002; Tham, Citation2001, 2018). However, the opposition facing the centre-right government (the Alliance) in the 2014 election involved something new: An extreme right-wing party, the Sweden Democrats, represented in the Swedish parliament since 2010. Like other populist right-wing parties in Europe, the Sweden Democrats favour ‘tough’ crime-control policies (Elgenius & Rydgren, Citation2018; Tham, Citation2018), which means that the Conservatives faced an opponent that could criticize them for being too lenient on offenders. This situation created a new set of premises for the crime policy debate preceding the 2014 general election, which in turn makes this election an interesting object of study.

Swedish crime policy – punitive or exceptionally humane?

Several scholars have investigated how the punitive turn has manifested itself in the Swedish context (Andersson, Citation2002; Demker & Duus-Otterström, Citation2009; von Hofer & Tham, Citation2013; Tham, Citation2018). This development is often emphasized by highlighting elements such as declining confidence in rehabilitation; declining trust in government; reduced belief in experts; a positive view of punishment and the justice system; and an increase in the political exploitation of the crime problem in general and of the crime victim in particular (Balvig, Citation2004; Demker & Duus-Otterström, Citation2009; Estrada, Citation2004; Heber, Citation2011; von Hofer & Tham, Citation2013; Shammas, Citation2016). Furthermore, an individualized discourse in which the crime problem is described in individual and moralist rather than structural terms, and which presents solutions in the form of increased control rather than social or economic measures has been stressed as a contributing factor to this punitive trend (Demker & Duus-Otterström, Citation2009; Estrada, Citation2004). Alongside this crime policy trend, the policy debate has been described as characterized by an alarmist discourse (Andersson, Citation2002; Tham, Citation2018).

However, there is another narrative parallel to descriptions of the punitive turn in Swedish crime policy. This narrative portrays Sweden and the other Nordic countries as being exceptional in relation to the rest of the Western world, with their small prison populations and humane prison conditions (Lappi-Seppälä, Citation2012; Pratt & Eriksson, Citation2013). Studies of media and crime policy debates have also utilized this conceptual framework (Pratt & Eriksson, Citation2013; Waggoner, Citation2015). Factors that help to constrain a trend towards greater punitiveness, thus supporting the thesis on Scandinavian, or Nordic, exceptionalism, include high levels of public confidence in government agencies, social cohesion and an ability to resist fear of crime (Lappi-Seppälä, Citation2012; Pratt & Eriksson, Citation2013; Snacken, Citation2010; Waggoner, Citation2015). A policy discourse that focuses on these values has therefore been viewed as a factor that may promote more humane crime policies.

Meanwhile, the idea of Nordic exceptionalism has been criticized by a number of scholars who have shed light on the repressive elements of these countries’ crime policies (Barker, Citation2013, 2017; Franko Aas, Citation2014; Smith & Ugelvik, Citation2017; Ugelvik & Dullum, Citation2012). In contrast to much of the research on the punitive turn of Western societies, where neoliberalism and international influences are frequently portrayed as causal factors (e.g. Tham, Citation2018; Wacquant, Citation2001), this branch of research analyses controlling practices and penal logics as inherited traits of the Nordic welfare states (Barker, Citation2013, 2017; Smith, Citation2017). For instance, it has been stressed that the Nordic welfare states harbour an interventionist culture and that these states fail to protect individual rights (Barker, Citation2013). These characteristics, in turn, predominantly affect vulnerable groups such as pre-trial detainees, drug users and foreign nationals (Barker, Citation2013, 2017; Smith, Citation2017). Furthermore, as mentioned in the introduction, the logic that penal policies in the Nordic countries rests upon is assumed to be related to the rationality of the welfare state (Barker, Citation2017; Hörnqvist, Citation2016; Smith & Ugelvik, Citation2017). Although the thesis of Nordic exceptionalism is empirically grounded, which is evident in comparative prison research (Lappi-Seppälä, Citation2012), the present article focuses on how the idea of Nordic exceptionalism, and the pride that the Nordic model is associated with (Barker, Citation2017; Smith, Citation2017; Smith & Ugelvik, Citation2017), influences the symbols used in the Swedish rhetoric on crime control.

The importance of symbols in election campaigns

Previous research has indicated that political parties in many Western societies view crime control discourse as a useful arena for improving their public support (e.g. Andersson, Citation2002; Garland, Citation2001/2006; Hall, Critcher, Jefferson, Clarke, & Roberts, Citation1978; Shammas, Citation2016; Tham, Citation2018). Consequently, crime control is considered an advantageous topic to use in electoral campaigns (Garland, Citation2001/2006; Oliver & Marion, Citation2008; Tham, Citation2018). Research has also suggested that presidential candidates in the US often address crime in a symbolic manner (Marion & Farmer, Citation2003; Oliver & Marion, Citation2008), and that party platforms are primarily used to evoke symbols rather than to present substantive proposals for action (Oliver & Marion, Citation2008).

In election campaigns, the use of what Edelman (Citation1964/1976) calls hortatory language plays an important role. Hortatory language is directed at the general public with the intention of influencing them. Edelman argues that abstract and imprecise statements are particularly effective in this context. Such statements speak to our subconscious and evade our critical gaze, since they are imprecise and may convey different meanings (Edelman, Citation1964/1976). According to Edelman (Citation1971), the symbolic dimension of political actions and statements fills an important function both for politicians and voters, simplifying complex situations, affirming identities and worldviews and signalling what we are expected to feel about a given phenomenon or proposal. Symbols can affect how we view actual conditions, but they may also function by injecting emotion into the debate; they both create and filter out certain value premises (Edelman, Citation1964/1976, 1971).

Following Loader (Citation2010), the symbols that politicians refer to in crime policy debates shed light on ‘the feelings of national shame/pride that punishment can provoke’ (p. 360). Against this background, it is reasonable to assume that the symbols employed in the Swedish election campaign will differ from the symbols found in the more punitive Anglophone context (Garland, Citation2001/2006; Pratt, Citation2008; Pratt & Eriksson, Citation2013; Smith & Ugelvik, Citation2017). At the same time, symbols should be equally central to politicians who advocate stiffer sanctions as to those who advocate a more restrictive use of criminal law. Evidently, political initiatives may be grounded in empirical evidence on effective measures to prevent crime. However, even those initiatives have to be communicated to the general public, which is presumably done through the use of symbolic statements. Given that the political parties involved in an election campaign establish their profiles in relation to one another, strive to affirm different group identities and have different crime policy goals, it is also reasonable to assume that there will be some variation between the parties regarding which symbols they utilize.

Methodological considerations

The data used to represent the electoral debate are comprised of electoral manifestos produced by the political parties represented in the Swedish Parliament in 2014, debate articles written by a party representative and speeches made by party leaders prior to the election. All political parties represented in parliament, with the exception of the Conservatives, published an election manifesto of their own. In addition, the centre-right Alliance presented a joint election manifesto. The speeches included for analysis are the party leader speeches held during the week of politics that is yearly arranged in Almedalen, in the town of Visby and the so-called ‘summer speeches’, which all of the party leaders represented in parliament yearly hold. Debate articles were included in the analysis if they were (1) published in either Aftonbladet, Dagens Nyheter, Expressen, Göteborgsposten, Svenska Dagbladet or Sydsvenskan; (2) written by the party leader or the person representing the party on criminal justice issues; and (3) published during the period from start of May to 14 September 2014, the date of the general election. The aims of the data selection process were to include texts that (1) may be viewed as central to both the parties in general and in relation to their desire to influence voters and (2) in which the parties themselves, rather than the media, had control over the message (see Håkansson, Citation1999 for similar argumentation). As a result of the second criterion, interviews and TV debates were excluded from the analysis. These criteria led to the selection of 59 documents which were then subjected to analysis; 8 electoral manifestos, 16 speeches and 35 debate articles. The quotes presented in the results section have been translated from Swedish to English. (See Appendix 1 for an overview of the data selected for the analysis.)

The analysis combined directed and conventional approaches to qualitative content analysis (Hsieh & Shannon, Citation2005). An analytical framework in which symbolic statements were equated with abstract prescriptive statements was employed in order to operationalize the theoretical point of departure regarding symbolic politics, and to concretize what distinguishes a symbolic statement. This analytical framework was influenced by Marion and Farmer’s (Citation2003) categorization of the statements of presidential candidates into ‘symbolic’ and ‘substantial’, and also by Håkansson’s (Citation1999) research on election rhetoric. Håkansson (Citation1999) distinguishes political goals or points of departure for action, which are viewed as abstract statements, from concrete proposals for action. The analytical focus on abstract statements is also motivated by the theoretical frame employed in this study, in which abstract or diffuse statements are viewed as particularly effective symbols (Edelman, Citation1964/1976).

One example of a statement expressed by several parties which was categorized as symbolic, is: ‘People in Sweden should be able to feel safe’. It expresses how something ought to be without including a concrete proposal for action. The statement: ‘It is not enough to work reactively to deal with the hate crimes that are committed. Society also needs to work long term, to obstruct recruitment into neo-Nazi movements’ (the Green Party, Svenska Dagbladet, 6 September 2014) has also been interpreted as a symbolic statement, since it expresses a point of departure for policy. As was the case in the previous statement, its meaning is not formulated in concrete terms. Examples of substantial statements include proposals or plans to appoint governmental inquiries, formulations about increased resources or proposals to criminalize or decriminalize various phenomena. Thus, both symbolic and substantial statements may promote as well as contradict traditional ‘law-and-order’ policies.

Following the initial coding procedure, the symbolic statements were thematized and the following analysis is structured on the basis of three overarching themes: (1) Emotional condemnation with the subthemes Manifesting state power and Unifying indignation, (2) Symbolizing rational progress and (3) The multifaceted meaning of crime prevention. In order to illuminate the consequences of different forms of symbolic statements, the analysis relates the parties’ concrete proposals for action (the substantial statements) to the thematized symbolic statements. This renders how different policies are being legitimized visible, thus deepening the understanding of the symbolic statements themselves.

Results

Initially, it is worth noting that crime policy was not assigned a central role in the political debate leading up to the Swedish general election of 2014.1 The extent to which crime policy statements figure in the Swedish election debate differs depending on the types of text that are examined. Crime policy is relatively prominent in the parties’ election manifestos. However, four out of sixteen of the party leaders’ speeches made no references at all to issues of crime or punishment. The extent of the crime policy debate also varies between the political parties; the centre-right Alliance and the Sweden Democrats reference issues of crime and punishment more than parties of the centre-left opposition.

The general picture emerging out of the categorization of political statements into either symbolic or substantial is that almost all documents, including speeches, consist of both symbolic and substantial statements. Although the symbolic rhetoric dominates, the political parties also discuss tangible solutions. In the analysis of symbolic statements, the centre-right Alliance and the populist right-wing party the Sweden democrats dominate. These are the parties that primarily focus on crime policy in the election debate, which manifests itself in the amount of symbolic rhetoric used by the political parties. However, due to the qualitative nature of this study, the analysis cannot show if some political parties are more prone to using symbolic rhetoric in contrast to substantial statements.

From the initial analysis, it is not apparent that politicians were using crime policy in order to increase their public support. If crime policy was being used to project values and emotions, this did not reveal itself in an extensive crime policy debate. However, this does not mean that the content of the crime policy debate cannot be analysed as intended, especially since symbolic statements were relatively prevalent in the Swedish election debate. The fact that the debate was not unusually animated suggests more restrained examples of symbolic statements, which is what this study intends to capture.

Emotional condemnation

Previous studies have discussed how politicians condemn criminal acts and other undesirable phenomena, linking that to how symbolic politics function in relation to crime policy (e.g. Andersson, Citation2002; Garland, Citation2001/2006; Newburn & Jones, Citation2007; Tham, Citation2018; Tonry, Citation2004). Such condemning statements can also be seen in the Swedish crime policy debate. In line with Garland’s (Citation2001/2006) analysis of what he calls ‘non-adaptive responses’ (p. 131) to crime, these emotionally charged condemnations can be understood both as a way of manifesting state power and as a way of confirming and directing public unrest.

Manifesting state power

Expressive political statements condemning crime, such as politicians stating that they will ‘take powerful action against everyday crime’, and ‘forcefully combat’ different forms of crime, have previously been interpreted as a display of state efficacy aimed at calming an uneasy public (Edelman, Citation1971; Garland, Citation2001/2006; Newburn & Jones, Citation2007; Tonry, Citation2004). In the Swedish election debate, this type of symbolic statements are mainly used by the centre-right Alliance. In a debate article, they state:

We in the Alliance Government consistently stand up for the view that crime should be punished. In the crime victim survey conducted each year by the National Council for Crime Prevention, we can see that people in Sweden are feeling increasingly safe, but every crime victim is one too many. (The Alliance, Dagens Nyheter, 23 June 2014)

Here the trend towards an increasing sense of safety among the Swedish population is contrasted with a vision of completely eradicating crime, thus taking a form of zero-tolerance position which intensifies the image of crime as a serious and acute social problem. This justifies increasing the resources of the justice system even in the context of a trend where the public’s sense of safety in relation to crime is described in positive terms.

Marion and Farmer (Citation2003) argue that symbolic rhetoric became important in the 2000 presidential election campaign in the US due to the combination of decreasing crime rates and a public perception of increasing criminality. According to Marion and Farmer, symbolic statements dominated the debate, and politicians condemned crime without presenting proposals for concrete solutions. However, this kind of rhetoric does not seem to be a substitute for presenting concrete solutions in the Swedish election debate, where symbolic statements of this kind are often combined with proposals for action. These proposals include the introduction of stiffer sentences and measures to extend the powers of agencies involved in combating crime. In a debate article, the Alliance describes having ‘taken the initiative for a national mobilisation against serious organised crime’ (the Alliance, Svenska Dagbladet, 29 August 2014), which involves eleven agencies being required to share information with one another. The Alliance further states that they ‘will take powerful action against everyday crime that affects individual members of the public’ (the Alliance, Dagens Nyheter, 23 June 2014) and, in relation to this symbolic statement, they propose the introduction of a new burglary offence with a stiffer sanctioning scale.

Newburn and Jones (Citation2007) have analysed the use of the concept zero tolerance, arguing that the concept’s international currency is due to the fact that it is an effective symbol in the crime policy context. Referring to Manning (Citation2001), they conclude: ‘It is a symbol, used to convey a mood and to impress an audience rather than in any concrete way to describe a set of policies or to frame particular objectives’ (Newburn & Jones, Citation2007, pp. 236, 237). Therefore, symbolic rhetoric can serve as a substitute for concrete proposals for action. This interpretation appears to be applicable to the Social Democrats’ use of this form of symbolic statements. In their election manifesto, they condemn crime without relating these condemnatory statements to any substantial solutions. Under the title ‘Fighting crime and the causes of crime’, the Social Democratic Party states:

Organised crime is a serious threat. We can never accept that it should gain a foothold across Sweden. There must be zero tolerance in relation to gang criminality. The recruitment of young people into criminal gangs must be countered forcefully. (The Social Democratic Party, Electoral manifesto, p. 40)

In the Social Democrats’ election manifesto, powerful condemnations could thus be interpreted as functioning as a substitute for concrete proposals for action. Loader (Citation2010) introduces the term ‘decoy rhetoric’ (p. 361) to illustrate a political strategy where politicians adopt a symbolically aggressive rhetoric to appear tough, and in so doing creating space to adopt a more moderate approach to dealing with crime at the administrative level. Since the present study does not concern this administrative level, the analysis is delimited to note that the Social Democrats adopt an aggressive rhetoric, thus aiming at a tough appearance (see Downes & Morgan, Citation2002 for a similar interpretation regarding New Labour).

Unifying indignation

Other than demonstrating political efficacy, expressing moral condemnation of certain phenomena also serves another function. These condemnatory statements signal that politicians are taking voters’ feelings and indignation seriously. Furthermore, these statements function as an assurance that politicians share and care about the public’s outrage. In the above quotation in which the centre-right Alliance stated that they ‘consistently stand up for the view that crime should be punished’, they are taking a stand for certain values in equal measure to manifesting efficacy. The effects of the policies are not a central factor here; rather the political parties are using their statements to confirm that their voters constitute the very antithesis of the defined enemy. By voting for the party in question, the electorate are offered the opportunity to distance themselves from a certain group or phenomenon. The framework of this symbolism thus constitutes a space in which the politicians ally themselves with the voters. This is visualized by statements about the need for everyone to move in unison towards a common goal:

By standing up for each other and speaking up when we see someone being treated badly, or when a crime is committed, we strengthen social solidarity and send a signal about what is right and wrong. (The Alliance, Electoral manifesto, p. 82)

As voters, we are urged to condemn crime and other undesirable phenomena, as well as take a stand for good values. For instance, the oppositional Green Party states:

If Sweden is to be a country for everyone, we must all now take a stand for humanism, and we must all have the courage to see the consequences in terms of threats and violence that this hate leads to for many Swedes. (The Green Party, Svenska Dagbladet, 6 September 2014)

By morally condemning and distancing themselves from various phenomena, Edelman (Citation1971) argues that politicians simultaneously formulate a moral ‘we’, thus confirming group identities. Roe (Citation1994) states that political narratives are most influential when they succeed in articulating what we feel or when they ‘make sense of the uncertainties and ambiguities around us’ (p. 51). While Newburn and Jones (Citation2007) argue that such uncertainties and ambiguities create a need for quick and simple solutions, I would argue that these solutions are not always necessary in order for a political statement to have a calming effect. Rather, being given a confirmation that one’s own perceptions are morally correct may suffice as reassurance (Edelman, Citation1971; Garland, Citation2001/2006). Condemnatory symbolic statements that signal repression while simultaneously formulating a moral and well-intentioned ‘we’ are clearly illustrated by political declarations about drugs. This duality is evident in a debate article written by the centre-right Alliance:

It is therefore important that Sweden’s drugs legislation manifests a stringent, firm and consistent view of drug crime. We will have a responsible policy that shows that Sweden cares about the problems that drugs cause for people and for our society. We will act forcefully against drug smuggling and drug sales. We will be particularly hard on those people who profit from others’ drug abuse. (The Alliance, Expressen, 29 July 2014)

In the quotation above, the rhetoric moves from ‘caring’ about the problems created by drugs to ‘acting forcefully’ and being ‘particularly hard’. The quotation is expressive of the Swedish approach to drug policy, which combines aggressive penal legislation with extensive treatment measures (Lenke & Olsson, Citation2002). Out of consideration for both the individual drug user and society at large, Sweden arrives at a policy in which severe sanctions and, as in this case, proposals for harsher sentences can be presented as humane. In the following quotation, a benevolent attitude is directed both towards the crime victim and the offender:

The Alliance wants those who commit crimes to be punished and crime victims to be noticed and to be able to feel safe. The punishment should be proportionate to the crime, so that the crime victim is given redress, and the offender should be able to atone for the offence and should be given the opportunity of having another chance. (The Alliance, Electoral manifesto, p. 82)

In the quotation above, punishment is regarded as providing an opportunity for the offender to make new life choices. In addition, the crime victim is rhetorically used as a basis for legitimizing the introduction of harsher sanctions. Similar benevolent arguments can be seen in the rhetoric of the radical-right Sweden Democrats, although these are primarily linked to crimes committed by persons ascribed a non-Swedish cultural background. In a speech, the leader of the Sweden Democrats states:

It is not racism to want to combat the genital mutilation of completely healthy children, it is humanity. It is not racism to work to combat violence and oppression exercised in the name of honour, it is humanity. (The Sweden Democrats, Party leader speech, 1 July 2014)

The concrete proposals for action that are linked to the arguments in the quotation above include the withdrawal of citizenship status and deportation. Accordingly, repressive crime policy manifested in these concrete proposals for action is partly being legitimized through a rhetoric of humanity. In her critique of the thesis of Nordic exceptionalism, Barker (Citation2013) argues that the Nordic countries are not distinguished by a humane crime policy but rather by the maintenance of a self-image in which repressive measures are also assumed to be taken for the good of both the public and, as we see in this material, the offender.

Symbolizing rational progress

In addition to the morally condemnatory crime policy rhetoric described above, the Swedish election debate also consists of symbolic statements that adopt a more restrained tone, focusing on expert knowledge and on long-term crime prevention work. Although studies have suggested that the influence of experts has diminished in Western crime policy over the past decades (Garland, Citation2001/2006; Tham, Citation2018), references to expert knowledge are quite frequent in the Swedish election debate. In these statements, the motivating force is not moral indignation. Furthermore, the politicians do not adopt the same ‘we’ position in relation to the voters’ feelings. Instead, policy proposals are presented as being politically neutral and rational given current knowledge. This form of symbolic statements is used both by the centre-right Alliance and the opposition parties. One of the parties in the centre-left opposition states that justice and the debate on punishment ‘should proceed on the basis of research and proven experience’ (the Green Party, Electoral manifesto, p. 27). The centre-right Alliance formulates a similar, seemingly neutral, position in relation to one of its proposals:

We want to examine whether the withdrawal of passports might be an effective, proportionate and defensible measure for preventing travel for the purposes of joining groups defined as terrorist organisations by the EU and the UN. (The Alliance, Svenska Dagbladet, 1 September 2014)

In the quotation above, proportionality is presented as an objective condition, the level of which can be established by a governmental inquiry. Many of the measures to increase the severity of sentences introduced over recent years have been legitimized by stating that punishment should be proportionate to the seriousness of the offence. However, this argument regarding proportionality has often been made with reference to public feelings and perceptions (Andersson, Citation2002; Jerre, Citation2013; Tham, Citation2018). One of the Alliance parties states in a debate article on political extremism that it is ‘a question that is clearly suited to consensus and collaboration and not a single party issue’ (the Centre Party, Svenska Dagbladet, 18 August 2014). This statement serves as a means of concealing that the problem could be formulated in different ways, which would then enable different solutions. With these statements, politicians are signalling that governmental inquiries, rather than their own ideological convictions, should provide answers to the question of what might constitute suitable measures (Bourdieu, Citation2014). The tradition of appointing governmental inquiries has previously been described as a way for Swedish politicians to govern through a rhetoric of scientification (Roumeliotis, Citation2014). Not only does this form of rhetoric establish a distance between the voters and policy solutions, it also serves to distance politicians from these solutions to some extent since solutions are presented as apolitical (Bourdieu, Citation2014). While this could be interpreted as a means for politicians to exempt themselves from responsibility, my interpretation is rather that this form of rhetoric signals a responsible approach.

When political parties use symbolic statements that signal rational deliberation, they promise voters to steer society towards a positive development on the basis of expert knowledge (Edelman, Citation2001). This constitutes a traditional form of Social Democratic rhetoric, exuding ideas like social engineering and society-building (Ljunggren, Citation2015). The leader of the Social Democratic Party states in a speech that they want to ‘dismantle’ the gender–power structure since this structure is assumed to lead to a constant threat of violence to women (the Social Democratic Party, Party leader speech, 10 August 2014). The use of the expression ‘dismantle’ signals that something is to be thoroughly and systematically removed. In a similar way, several parties describe their policies in terms of taking ‘steps’, thus producing an image of development through systematic work. The populist right-wing party, the Sweden Democrats, states in its election manifesto that: ‘As a first step towards an even better Sweden, we want to … achieve the following changes’ (the Sweden Democrats, Electoral manifesto, p. 5), and the centre-right Alliance parties ‘want to continue taking further steps towards a safer Sweden’ (the Alliance, Dagens Nyheter, 23 June 2014). The Conservatives, part of the centre-right Alliance, note that:

National surveys show that levels of safety are increasing in Sweden. Fewer people report having been exposed to crime and more are saying that they have confidence in the police. This is a good thing, but there is still more to be done. (The Alliance, Aftonbladet, 1 August 2014)

In contrast to the preceding theme, where the Alliance referred to the increasing levels of safety with the statement ‘every crime victim is one too many’, a different image emerges. Instead of presenting the policy as a failure, what is depicted here is an image of successful policy that has the capacity to continue delivering safety to the population. Furthermore, by emphasizing the positive development neither the problem with crime nor the political initiatives are presented as acute. Accordingly, systematic policy steps appear adequate.

While the emotional dimension of crime policy proposals is evident in the first theme, ‘Emotional condemnation’, this second theme instead shows how it becomes central to signal that these proposals will have an effect. The desired effects are often reduced crime levels and increased levels of safety for crime victims and the public. Another common desirable effect pertains to intra-organizational goals. While statements about effects signal a dry technocratic practice, selecting certain desirable effects is political. Edelman (Citation2001) argues that speaking about change constitutes an effective symbol that provides satisfaction for the general public. As such, symbolic statements are partly emotional, even though they signal rationality and neutrality. By focusing on the effect of policy proposals, politicians signal desire and ability to deliver change, even if this change, according to Edelman’s (Citation2001) analysis, rarely involves any transformation of societal conditions at a fundamental level. The symbolic statements described within this theme encourage people to have faith in government agencies and the state, and could be interpreted as comprising a rhetoric intended to counteract a trend towards more punitive crime policy (Waggoner, Citation2015). As will be described below, a more detailed analysis of the concept of crime prevention reveals an ongoing political struggle regarding the concept’s meaning. The political debate uses rhetoric signalling rationality and a long-term approach both as a means of resisting punitive expansion, and as a means of promoting this same trend.

The multifaceted meaning of crime prevention

In the 2014 election debate, most political parties refer to crime prevention as being crucial in some sense. In certain cases, symbolic statements stressing crime prevention also problematize reactive measures such as the use of punishment. The oppositional Green Party makes clear and recurrent use of this type of rhetoric. They repeatedly state that the focus should be on crime prevention, expressing opposition to the introduction of harsher sanctions and arguing that the central objective of punishment should be to reduce crime:

The breeding ground for crime is social problems such as poverty, drug abuse, unemployment and growing economic inequalities. If we confront these social problems, we will also improve people’s safety and their belief in the future. (The Green Party, Electoral manifesto, p. 27)

In connection with its statements about the importance of crime prevention, the Green Party presents concrete proposals for preventive measures located outside the criminal justice system. They also describe the Alliance’s proposals for stiffer sentences as populist, referring to research showing that increasing the severity of sanctions does not reduce crime. These symbolic statements thus signal resistance to punitive crime policy in several ways, and are partially in line with the moderate philosophy of punishment advocated by Loader (Citation2010). By emphasizing crime prevention and that social factors influence criminality, politicians signal that they are getting to grips with the essentials of the crime problem. Some of the centre-right Alliance parties also adopt this rhetoric to some extent. The Liberal Party, for example, notes in its electoral manifesto that the Liberals ‘do not believe that longer sentences are generally the solution to criminality’ and that ‘The most important work is crime prevention’ (the Liberal Party, Electoral manifesto, p. 14). However, the Liberals do not distance themselves from the introduction of stiffer sanctions like the oppositional Green Party does. Instead, they present examples where they believe stiffer sentences are motivated.

As illustrated above, crime prevention is at times presented as a contrast to reactive measures implemented within the framework of the criminal justice system, thus as opposing penal expansion. However, crime prevention is frequently equated with police measures or with the work conducted by prison and probation services. Furthermore, there are cases where crime prevention and what might be termed aggressive crime policy are presented as the way to progress society in the right direction, with these two components being viewed as complementary to one another. For example, the Social Democrats make the following statement in a debate article:

It is important to be able to stop these youths already at an early stage. Criminalising participation in terrorist training is good, but is not enough … Preventive measures must also be greatly intensified in order to prevent travel to war zones. (The Social Democratic Party, Svenska Dagbladet, 26 August 2014)

Similarly, the centre-right Alliance parties emphasize the criminal justice system as a central actor in preventing crime. One of the Alliance parties states that what is needed are ‘gradual prevention measures in order to improve conditions for those living in our suburban areas’, and describes a number of measures that might be employed, including ‘an ever present and locally accountable police force’ (the Centre Party, Electoral manifesto, p. 11). The Conservatives, also members of the Alliance, write in a debate article that:

Today only a few percent of the reported offences are cleared up. These results must get better. One way to achieve this would be to introduce a new burglary offence. This sends a clear signal to the police and to the rest of the justice system that burglary must be prioritised. In this way, we can reduce the risk of more families with children being burgled. (The Conservatives, Expressen, 1 August 2014)

By introducing a new criminal offence with a stiffer sanctioning scale, the goals are to influence the priorities of the police, increase the number of cleared offences and affect the crime rate. In some cases, this final aim of reduced crime is not expressed, and the objective is thus limited to increasing the number of crimes that are investigated or the number of convictions. Thus, it is ambiguous whether symbolic statements advocating crime prevention involve a questioning of penal expansion.

Research has suggested that the basis for legitimizing criminal justice sanctions has shifted from a focus on rehabilitation towards a focus on legalistic ideals such as just deserts (Andersson, Citation2002; Tham, Citation2018). However, the status of rehabilitation as the goal of the Swedish prison and probation system does not appear to be questioned, at least not at this rhetorical level. The Swedish prison and probation system’s explicit goal of rehabilitation appears to be accepted by most of the political parties. When the prison and probation system is discussed, it is the system’s work to prevent recidivism that is viewed as in need of intensification. The Social Democratic Party states that ‘The prison and probation service must become better at preventing reoffending’ (the Social Democratic Party, Electoral manifesto, p. 41). The Conservative party expresses a similar goal: ‘At the same time, time spent in prison should naturally have a good content … in order to prepare the inmate for life after prison’ (the Conservatives, Svenska Dagbladet, 10 June 2014).

The picture that emerges from this analysis of political statements on crime prevention is thus rather incoherent. The political parties fill the concept of ‘crime prevention’ with varying content. In some cases, the term ‘crime prevention’ is used in a way that is reminiscent of Loader’s (Citation2010) ideas on penal moderation. However, the concept is also used in a way that reflects penal expansionism, with no hope of any actual crime preventive effect. The fact that it can be filled with such a varied content is itself testimony to the concept’s considerable symbolic potential. The concept of crime prevention, like the previous theme, ‘Rational progress’, symbolizes rationality and systematic work. In addition, it signals benevolence (Barker, Citation2017), since the term implies a positive effect regarding the problem of crime.

Concluding discussion

By studying a country frequently depicted as an antithesis to the more punitive Anglophone societies (Garland, Citation2001/2006; Pratt, Citation2008; Pratt & Eriksson, Citation2013; Smith & Ugelvik, Citation2017), the aim of the present article has been to broaden our understanding of what symbolic statements may consist of. In the analysis, the symbolic statements of politicians have been thematized on the basis of three overarching themes: (1) Emotional condemnation with the subthemes Manifesting state power and Unifying indignation, (2) Symbolizing rational progress and (3) The multifaceted meaning of crime prevention. While the symbolic statements illuminate how crime policy is justified and legitimized, combining these statements with their associated concrete proposals adds to the study by revealing what is being legitimized. Thereby, we get an indication of the material consequences following a certain type of rhetoric.

The analysis of symbolic statements provides a picture of Swedish crime policy rhetoric as being relatively restrained and muted, with few alarmist descriptions of the crime problem and with an emphasis on the desirability of a rational, long-term approach. Moreover, the rhetoric of being tough on crime can also be found in Sweden with public safety and the provision of redress to the crime victim being assumed to be dependent on the criminal justice system as an actor. It is not surprising that symbolic statements of this kind are often followed by proposals for action that involve penal expansion and an extension of surveillance and control systems, since this pattern has been detailed by previous research (Andersson, Citation2002; Garland, Citation2001/2006; Newburn & Jones, Citation2007).

What is not as clear, however, is how other types of symbolic statements should be interpreted. Symbolic politics are often assumed to be connected to an animated debate on crime (Garland, Citation2001/2006; Tham, Citation2018). However, according to Edelman (Citation1964/1976), politicians use symbolic language either to calm and pacify the public or to animate them. Whereas the first theme, ‘Emotional condemnation’, is an example where the politicians animate the debate and confirm an assumed indignation of the general public, the two subsequent themes instead exemplify a rhetoric that strives to calm and pacify the general public by evading the image of an acute crime problem. The symbolic statements in the first theme nourish indignation, even though the manifestation of state power or the political confirmation of this indignation is said to have a calmative effect on the public (Garland, Citation2001/2006). Contrariwise, the reassuring effect that is associated with the symbolic statements of the second and third themes does not depend on the public’s indignation nor anxiety to the same extent. Instead, an image of rationality is used by politicians in order to direct the emotions and perceptions of the general public (Bourdieu, Citation2014; Roumeliotis, Citation2014).

The symbolic statements that are employed in the Swedish crime policy debate further involve a substantial level of allusion to the values associated with the thesis of Scandinavian exceptionalism, thus saying something about Sweden’s self-image as a prudent and humane country (Barker, Citation2017; Smith & Ugelvik, Citation2017). While these statements might serve as amplifiers of this image of Sweden, they also function to legitimize what could be described, on the basis of the proposals for concrete action, as punitive crime policies. This conclusion may be understood within the framework of the criticism that has been directed at the idea of Scandinavian, or Nordic, exceptionalism (Barker, Citation2013, 2017; Smith & Ugelvik, Citation2017; Ugelvik & Dullum, Citation2012), and on the basis of the work of scholars who emphasize the importance of studying individual countries separately in order to be able to distinguish potentially distinctive punitive characteristics (Barker, Citation2013, 2017; Wacquant, Citation2001). What this study shows is that symbols signalling rationality and humanity are to some extent employed as a means of legitimizing an expansion of control.

In the discussion on ‘penal moderation’, a penal culture of which Sweden is often seen as representative, the presence of a political will to implement moderate crime policy has been emphasized as a crucial factor (Armstrong & McNeil, Citation2009; Loader, Citation2010). Following Loader (Citation2010), who advocates a ‘public philosophy of moderate punishment’, symbolic statements can be regarded as having the potential of changing our way of thinking about successful crime policy. However, as this study has illustrated, these types of symbolic statements can also serve to camouflage punitive policy.

Since this is a case study of one specific election, this restricts comparisons to other general elections. However, in order to establish whether or not the patterns presented in this article are specific to Sweden, or the Nordic countries, or if they resemble more general patterns in Western crime policy discourse, comparative research including several countries would be required. Additionally, including data from a longer time period would enable more explanatory analyses in which the correlation between the content of symbolic statements and other factors such as the parliamentary constellation could be clarified. Furthermore, the present article has aimed at exploring the relation between symbolic and substantial political statements. In order to reach concretion regarding the material consequences of symbols used in the political discourse, inclusion of other kinds of data would be desirable. Future research should focus on how symbolic statements in the political discourse are transformed into concrete practices.

Lastly, due to the space limitations, some observed patterns have not been emphasized in the present article. Symbolic statements stressing ‘human rights’ and ‘public safety’ also appeared in the material. Future research should consider the symbolic meaning of these concepts.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank Kalle Tryggvesson, the editor and two anonymous reviewers for this journal for their helpful comments on an earlier draft of this article. I also would like to thank Dave Shannon and Tea Fredriksson for translating and reviewing the language of the article.

Notes

1. My observation that crime policy was not a salient issue in 2014 Swedish general election is supported by several other indicators. In 2014, crime policy did not attain the role of one of the top ten most important issues for the voters (e.g. Oscarsson & Bergström, Citation2017). Different studies report varying numbers regarding the percentage of voters ranking ‘law and order’ as one of the most important issues. Many surveys report similar trends, however, that the numbers are lower in 2010 and 2014 compared to previous elections as well as in comparison with the succeeding years (Oscarsson & Bergström, Citation2017). Additionally, the Swedish public service broadcasting company (SVT, Citation2014) listed, in 4 May 2014, the three most important issues for the political parties during the electoral campaign, and ‘law and order’ did not make it to any of top three lists.

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Appendix 1. Data selection overview

Electoral manifestos

The Alliance (2014) Vi bygger Sverige. [We are building Sweden.]

The Centre Party (2014) Sverige behöver närodlad politik. [Sweden needs home-grown policies.]

The Liberal Party (2014) Rösta för skolan. [Vote for school.]

The Christian Democrats (2014) Frihet och gemenskap. [Freedom and community.]

The Green Party (2014) Dags för en varmare politik! [It is time for a warmer policy!]

The Social Democratic Party (2014) Valmanifest för ett bättre Sverige. För alla. [An electoral manifesto for a better Sweden. For everyone.]

The Left Party (2014) Valplattform. [Electoral platform.]

The Sweden Democrats (2014) Vi väljer välfärd! [We choose welfare!]

Party leader speeches

The Conservatives (16 August 2014) Summer speech.

The Conservatives (3 July 2014) Speech in Almedalen.

The Centre Party (6 August 2014) Summer speech.

The Centre Party (6 July 2014) Speech in Almedalen.

The Liberal Party (3 August 2014) Summer speech.

The Liberal Party (5 July 2014) Speech in Almedalen.

The Christian Democrats (10 August 2014) Summer speech.

The Christian Democrats (30 June 2014) Speech in Almedalen.

The Green Party (23 August 2014) Summer speech.

The Green Party (2 July 2014) Speech in Almedalen.

The Social Democratic Party (10 August 2014) Summer speech.

The Social Democratic Party (29 June 2014) Speech in Almedalen.

The Left Party (17 August 2014) Summer speech.

The Left Party (4 July 2014) Speech in Almedalen.

The Sweden Democrats (2 August 2014) Summer speech.

The Sweden Democrats (1 July 2014) Speech in Almedalen.

Debate articles

The Alliance (Dagens Nyheter, 23 June 2014) Vi vill öka tryggheten och skärpa straffen för inbrott. [We want to highten the public sense of safety and increase the penalities for burglary.]

The Alliance (Svenska Dagbladet, 23 July 2014) Krafttag krävs mot id-kapning. [Forceful measures are required to prevent ID-theft.]

The Alliance (Expressen, 29 July 2014) Vi skärper straffen för narkotikabrott. [We are increasing the penalties for drug related crime.]

The Alliance (Svenska Dagbladet, 29 August 2014) Lindra straffet för den som bidrar till uppklarning. [Ease the punishment for those who cooperate with police.]

The Alliance (Svenska Dagbladet, 1 September 2014) Så ska terrorträning stävjas. [This is how training for terrorism is deterred.]

The Conservatives (Svenska Dagbladet, 10 June2014) Brott måste få konsekvenser. [Crime has to come with consequences.]

The Conservatives (Aftonbladet, 11 June 2014) Så stärker vi kvinnors skydd mot sexuella övergrepp. [This is how we intend to strengthen women’s protection from sexual assault.]

The Conservatives (Svenska Dagbladet, 18 June 2014) Bo Wennström rätt ensam om sin bild. [Bo Wennström alone in his view.]

The Conservatives (Dagens Nyheter, 30 July 2014) M kommuner ska gå före i arbetet med hbtq-rättigheter. [M municipalities to lead the way in questions of HBTQ-rights.]

The Conservatives (Expressen, 1 August 2014) Alliansen vill skärpa straffet för inbrott. [The Alliance wants to increase the punishment for burglary.]

The Conservatives (Aftonbladet, 1 August 2014) MP gör det svårt för polisen att utreda brott. [MP makes it difficult for the police to investigate crimes.]

The Conservatives (Aftonbladet, 4 August 2014) MPs nedskärning på polisen är oseriös. [MPs police cutbacks are not serious.]

The Conservatives (Expressen, 24 August 2014) Skärp straffen för sexbrott mot barn. [Sexual assault of children needs to be punished with increased severity.]

The Conservatives (Svenska Dagbladet, 8 September 2014) Oseriöst när MP lovar prioritering. [MP promises of prioritization seem unserious.]

The Centre Party (Aftonbladet, 14 June 2014) Vänsterns män tiger om ojämställdheten. [The men on the left keep quiet about inequalities.]

The Centre Party (Svenska Dagbladet, 18 August 2014) Kamp mot extremism har försummats. [The fight against extremism has been neglected.]

The Liberal Party (Svenska Dagbladet, 10 June 2014) Nu samlas vi mot islamofobin. [Now we come together to fight islamophobia.]

The Liberal Party (Svenska Dagbladet, 14 August 2014) Nu krävs ny lag mot terrorträning. [A new law against terror training is required.]

The Liberal Party (Svenska Dagbladet, 22 August 2014) Vi får inte blunda för extremismen. [We cannot be blind in the face of extremism.]

The Liberal Party (Aftonbladet, 2 September 2014) Gör en skyddade zonen vid kontaktförbud större. [Increase the safe zone in cases of prohibited contact.]

The Christian Democrats (Expressen, 15 June 2014) Så kan vi bekämpa jihad-terroristerna. [This is how we can combat Jihad terrorists.]

The Christian Democrats (Aftonbladet, 30 June 2014) Hälsointyg kan ge flickor bättre skydd. [Health certificates can provide better protection for girls.]

The Christian Democrats (Svenska Dagbladet, 29 July 2014) Lag om hatbrott måste omfatta transpersoner. [The law on hate crime needs to extend to trans persons.]

The Christian Democrats (Göteborgsposten, 4 August 2014) Mängdbrott måste bekämpas hårdare. [We need to be tougher on common crime.]

The Green Party (Dagens Nyheter, 30 May 2014) Nästa regering måste driva på för säker asylväg in i EU. [The next government has got to push for safer passage into the EU for asylum seekers.]

The Green Party (Aftonbladet, 28 July 2014) Vilka svar ska jag ge min dotter. [What answers do I give my daughter?]

The Green Party (Aftonbladet, 3 August 2014) Beatrice Asks grundlösa angrepp är populism. [The baseless accusations of Beatrice Ask amount to populism.]

The Green Party (Svenska Dagbladet, 23 August 2014) När vi ser flyktingar som hot har vi redan förlorat. [When we see asylum seekers as a threat, we have already lost.]

The Green Party (Svenska Dagbladet, 6 September 2014) Kamp mot hatbrott ska prioriteras. [The fight against hate crime to be prioritized.]

The Green Party (Svenska Dagbladet, 8 September 2014) Ask försöker skifta fokus från hatbrotten. [Ask attempts to shift focus away from hate crime.]

The Socialdemocratic Party (Aftonbladet, 11 June 2014) Svik inte offren för sexövergrepp. [Do not fail the victims of sexual assault.]

The Socialdemocratic Party (Aftonbladet, 16 July 2014) Kräv fler kvinnliga EU-kommissionärer. [Demand more women commissioners in the EU.]

The Socialdemocratic Party (Svenska Dagbladet, 26 August 2014) Kriminalisera deltagande i krig och terror utomlands. [Criminalize participation in war and acts of terror abroad.]

The Sweden Democrats (Svenska Dagbladet, 19 August 2014) FP har konsekvent nobbat SDs förslag. [FP has turned down all propositions posed by SD.]

The Sweden Democrats (Svenska Dagbladet, 2 September 2014) Vår politik ska göra kvinnor tryggare. [Our policy will make women feel safer.]