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Abstract
The approval of major infrastructure and industrial developments is often dependent on the results of environmental and social impact assessments (EIA and SIA, respectively). Depending on the recommendations of ‘experts’ undertaking the assessments, projects are approved, rejected or modified to take account of unintended negative consequences. In practice, there are pressures on consultants to come up with favourable results, and unfavourable results are often ignored. These pressures may be subtle. For example, because consultants are usually employed by somebody with an interest in seeing projects go ahead, any consultant with a reputation for being too negative is unlikely to get work. The present paper explores issues faced by anthropologists in SIA, as well as the structure of interests within which SIA is carried out, and ways in which ethical dilemmas can be negotiated. It asks whether simply opting out of the process altogether is an ethical option preferable to critical engagement.
Notes
1. This is a revised version of paper originally presented at the Australian Anthropological Society Conference held in Cairns, 26–29 September 2006, as part of a session held in honour of Doug Miles by former students. I participated as Doug had been my honours supervisor. Doug's role in the controversy over the Tribal Research Centre at Chiang Mai during the Vietnam War reflected his insistence that anthropologists have ethical responsibilities and cannot hide behind the claim that they are carrying out objective research without human consequences. His concerns remain an inspiration and are very relevant to the practice of modern anthropology. I am grateful to Ronlyn Duncan, Michael Allen and two anonymous referees for very useful comments on an earlier draft.
2. This occurred in the context of a workshop and field exercise involving academics from a number of universities in the Mekong region as part of a program called the Mekong Learning Initiative, which involves academics from these universities and the Australian Mekong Resource Centre at the University of Sydney.
3. An overview of ownership arrangements and financing is available from Australian Mekong Resource Centre 2006. For a detailed discussion of the history of NGO involvement in the controversy, see Soutar (2007).
4. Disputes about impact assessment continue in a current expansion phase for the Theun- Hinboun. According to a statement circulated by email from the IRN and FIVAS on 20 December 2007: ‘The environmental scientist originally hired to conduct the environmental impact assessment (EIA) for the Theun-Hinboun Expansion Project in Laos has disassociated his group from the official report. Instead of accepting Dr. Murray Watson's original – and highly critical – report, the Company ceased communicating with him and hired a Norwegian company, Norplan, to complete the EIA.’
5. The development banks often present themselves as honest brokers. For a discussion of this point see Witoon (2000).
6. I am indebted to Ronlyn Duncan for highlighting this point.
7. Spry (1976) argues that, instead of relying on the idea that Environmental Impact Statements should be partial and subjective, there might be advantages in having EISs that are ‘explicitly partisan’, because ‘the assessor [or decision-maker] would be aware that he must investigate the problem himself and challenge every fact and opinion before accepting it’ (p. 255).