Maintaining legitimacy: an institutional cooptative analysis of a green technology innovation scheme crisis

ABSTRACT

Most institutions adopt deliberate methods of intervention for managing their legitimacy, particularly under conditions of a crisis. Maintaining legitimacy is therefore significant in institutional research, and the question of how social actors defend and protect their institution in the face of legitimacy judgement attacks is empirically significant. This study explores a green technology innovation scheme that engulfed a whole governance system, leading to a financial crisis, deterioration in public confidence, and the collapse of a devolved government. It identifies three types of legitimacy attacks that evolve throughout the crisis, and cooptation strategies institutions can apply to shore up and maintain dimensions of their legitimacy. The institutional analysis of the scheme crisis identifies that legitimacy attacks occur when an institution: (i) morally falters; (ii) relationally disconnects; (iii) instrumentally disregards. The findings, moreover, uniquely identify three institutional cooptation strategies, which can halt and avert threats in the face of such legitimacy attacks. These cooptation strategies include: (i) warranting transparency; (ii) streamlining communality; (iii) accepting responsibility. This demonstrates the inhabited nature of institutions and how they can regain legitimacy in the face of disruptive attacks.

KEYWORDS:

• Innovation
• legitimacy
• cooptation
• institutions
• green innovation
• maintenance

Introduction

Climate change has emerged as a global threat. This politically and socially embedded phenomenon has produced varying implications and depictions in academic discourse, bringing relevance to the policy imperative, particularly in the introduction and diffusion of green innovations (Baptista et al., 2019; Martin & Scott, 2000; Wright et al., 2013). Green innovation is described as an innovation that reduces environmental impact, increases renewable resources, decreases pollution, and/or enhances overall liveability (Geels, 2014; Shove, 2010; Wright et al., 2013). While green innovations are generally disseminated for the achievement of positive effects for the environment, there remains considerable uncertainty on their overall institutional outcomes (Lüdeke‐Freund, 2020), particularly within the context of government diffusions.

There is a large body of literature on the consumption-side of innovations (Damanpour & Schneider, 2009; Geels, 2014; Shove, 2010), as well as the barriers to innovation and innovation diffusion (Nählinder & Eriksson, 2019). This research builds on this literature and demonstrates that governments diffusing innovations can bring institutional disruption (Arundela et al., 2019), which can enhance or compromise their legitimacy (Beck, 1994; Bitektine, 2011; Hurd, 1999; Stephen, 2018). It is through such levels of diffusion/adoption resistance that the legitimacy of a government can come into question (Townsend, 2010). This research therefore builds on this literature by exploring the dynamics of legitimacy attacks towards a government institution in an evolving green innovation scheme diffusion crisis.

This research further answers a call from Tost (2011) on exploring the micro-level (subtleties) dynamics of legitimacy, which is the understanding of the nuances of an innovation, such as the role actors play. By drawing on an institutional perspective, we explore legitimacy work (Bitektine, 2011; Bitektine & Haack, 2015) where legitimacy judgement formation is rapidly made, expectancy-driven, and impression-led. We also focus on how legitimacy attacks occur, and by what means a government institution can regain and maintain legitimacy vis-à-vis averting threats through cooptation strategies. Cooptation is ‘the process of absorbing new elements into the leadership or policy-determining structure of an organisation as a means of averting threats to its stability or existence’ (Selznick, 1949, p. 13). It supports an institution as it seeks to maintain a sense of authority, continuity, and stability. This is important for institutions, as cooptation can be used as a strategy in the face of institutional pressures, or judgement attacks – to ‘neutralize institutional opposition and enhance legitimacy’ (Oliver, 1991, p. 157).

There is emerging scholarly interest in green innovations (Chenglin et al., 2017; Collins, 1994; Geels, 2014; Gramkow & Anger-Kraavi, 2018; Shove, 2010; Torre & Nash, 2009), and this research advances this scholarship by exploring institutional work and green innovation diffusion, while exposing legitimacy threats amidst a crisis (Constantinides, 2013). This research further aims to develop and shape a contextual understanding of government cooptation strategies in the face of legitimacy judgement attacks. This is approached by adopting a qualitative inductive method using multiple data sources to answer the following question: What types of legitimacy attacks evolve throughout a green innovation diffusion crisis, and how can institutional actors defend and protect legitimacy in the face of such attacks? This leads to the objectives of this study, which are to: (i) identify the nature of legitimacy judgement attacks amidst a green innovation scheme crisis; (ii) explore how a local government can avert threats in the face of legitimacy attacks through cooptative strategies. Here, we recognise that for green innovation schemes to be effective, they need appropriate governmental diffusion systems in place – but what happens when systems are breached and the legitimacy of the government is undermined?

Theoretical development

The role of governments in green innovation diffusion

Environmental concerns have attracted attention worldwide (Wright et al., 2013), with entities facing normative pressures to respond to climate change threats (Durán-Romero & Urraca-Ruiz, 2015; Geels, 2014). This shift has become internationally emphasised, with governments now developing green innovations to adapt accordingly (Caiazza & Volpe, 2017; Marchand et al., 2015; Thaler & Sunstein, 2008). Green innovation is described as an initiative or activity that reduces environmental impact (Wright et al., 2013). It further refers to measures which are taken to mitigate adverse effects on the environment (Yousaf, 2021). Such innovations increase renewable resources, decrease pollution, or enhance overall liveability (Shove, 2010). There is an emerging interest in green innovation, and the steady growth of interest in this area is evident in the research (Chenglin et al., 2017; Collins, 1994; Geels, 2014; Gramkow & Anger-Kraavi, 2018; Oduro et al., 2021; Shove, 2010; Torre & Nash, 2009). This study extends the literature by focusing on actor actions and reactions, capturing interrelations that are part of social systems. The research also places special attention on government-led green innovation diffusion.

Recognisable strands of inquiry have sparked governments to approach climate change as the greatest long-term challenge facing humanity (Shove, 2010). Governments have therefore been considering the promotion and implementation of green technology innovations, with worldwide programmes being implemented to reduce energy bills, water usage etc. (Liu & Yan, 2018; Torre & Nash, 2009). Though, the challenges of climate change are associated with ‘patterns of consumption’ (Shove, 2010, p. 1273), where green innovation diffusion and adoption become the driving forces to realising sustainability (Wright et al., 2013). Most studies view green innovation adoption from the end consumer (Auld et al., 2014), and this paper extends this literature by exploring the role of actors involved in the diffusion and adoption of a green initiative – a politically and socially embedded phenomenon.

Government institutions play a central role in influencing communities to adopt green innovations (Liu & Yan, 2018; Marchand et al., 2015; Torre & Nash, 2009). It is challenging however for government institutions to develop an effective incentive programme without having a bona fide understanding of how actors will react and what drives them to adopt such innovations. In the case where the implementation of a green innovation scheme leads to a crisis, institutional pressures can arise, constraining and impacting overall institutional legitimacy (Oliver, 1991). Therefore, an effective approach would be to consider how government-induced innovations and ideas spread among actors, and how legitimacy is recognised, confronted, and preserved amidst a crisis.

The role of governments and their legitimacy

Government institutions both enable and constrain actions. They are not viewed as passive pawns controlled by demands of their environments, but as active players, capable of responding to actor pressures (Scott, 2008). Here, actors (institutional constituents) exert pressures and expectations (Oliver, 1991), to ascertain whether they regard their government as desirable, correct, or appropriate (Stephen, 2018). This brings forth a central question for institutional analysis – how do institutions persist? Research studies address this question and point to the importance of legitimacy in the survival of institutions (Bexell, 2014; Bitektine, 2011; Debenedetti et al., 2020; Lounsbury & Glynn, 2001; Stephen, 2018; Westman et al., 2019). This research study further extends this literature by exploring a government’s legitimacy amidst a green innovation crisis.

It is established in the organisational literature that Weber (1978) and Parsons (1960) are anchor points in building foundations for legitimacy studies. They addressed both normative and cognitive forces, which constrain and empower actors to act and react accordingly (Parsons, 1960; Weber, 1978). Suchman (1995) later adopts an inclusive, broad-based definition of legitimacy acknowledging that ‘it is a generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within a socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions’ (p. 574). Tost (2011) also argues the importance of legitimacy, stating that it ‘is critical in institutional research because it is a necessary component of institutionalization, which occurs as an emerging social entity gains a taken-for-granted quality that leads it to be perceived as an objective and natural reality’ (p. 686). Actors therefore have bound up perceptions and beliefs that can resonate by either enabling or constraining an institution. For example, when actors judge institutions as legitimate, such institutions are perceived to operate with an elevated level of public trust, and a reduction in the levels of uncertainty around their actions (Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Westman et al., 2019). This provides institutions with a reservoir of support that enhances survival and perpetuates influence by increasing actor loyalty (Tost, 2011). On the other hand, illegitimacy, as an act, process, or ideology, occurs when an institution ‘is characterized by policy that is incoherent with practice; where there is a loss of institutional will, when organizational members’ practices taint the formal goals of the organisation, and there is also a loss of public confidence as the public begins to lose faith in the organisation’s ability to act efficiently and effectively’ (Clegg & Gordon, 2012, p. 421). When actors perceive and judge institutions as illegitimate, their attitudes change towards the institution’s authority, and legitimate validation becomes unstable (Hampel & Tracey, 2017; Jost & Major, 2001). Lacking legitimacy therefore becomes costly to any institution, especially a government (Brown, 1997). The current scholarship addresses the importance of legitimacy in institutions, highlighting decision-making (Franck, 1990), legitimacy and power (Hurd, 2002), legitimacy deficits (Stephen, 2018), individual-level legitimacy (Tost, 2011). This research study extends this literature by according more explicit attention to legitimacy judgements, and their changing patterns under conditions of a crisis.

Tost (2011) developed a theoretical framework which outlines the content underlying legitimacy judgements and how these forms of attack are established and transformed. She explored how actors judge entities as being legitimate or illegitimate by integrating a process of legitimation. Tost (2011) argues, that: (i) instrumentally, individual-level judgements can be made based on the effectiveness, efficiency, and institutional utility of an innovation; (ii) relationally, individual-level judgements can centre on the government institution and its likeability, social identity, and communality; (iii) morally, individual-level judgements can be made based on government institution trust, and whether it is consistent with ethics and integrity. These legitimacy judgements become an actor’s opinion or perspective about the social properties of an institution, and the evaluation dimensions are not exclusive – they can overlap given the context. In the case of a green innovation crisis, when a government institution is confronted with a great confluence following an unsuccessful implementation, it can become out of sync with actors questioning its legitimacy (Roupas, 2008). Tost’s (2011) research gained attention in the body of knowledge, with her work being recently used to further delve into legitimacy judgement attacks (Bachmann & Ingenhoff, 2016; Gustafson & Pomirleanu, 2021). In this context, and for the purpose of this research, we therefore expand this literature to attribute evaluators’ legitimacy judgements by showing how they impact a government and its maintenance efforts gradually over time.

The role of governments in their legitimacy maintenance efforts

It is essential that legitimacy is maintained to ensure synchronous adaptations in the face of attacks (Suchman, 1995). Most governments adopt deliberate forms or methods of intervention for managing their legitimacy, and studies identify proactive approaches (Bitektine, 2011; Debenedetti et al., 2020; Stephen, 2018; Tost, 2011). These legitimacy imperatives, however, are often framed conceptually in a building imperative: building activity that is deemed appropriate (Suchman, 1995); building norms to be adhered to (Hurd, 1999); building the regulatory provision within which to operate (Bitektine, 2011), and building a boundary for the field by identifying its members (Bitektine, 2011). In these situations, governments are often on the front foot and are proactively building legitimacy. Conversely, when a threat exposes a vulnerability, the likelihood for loss or damage may surface, putting a government at risk. In these situations, governments are often on the back foot and are reactively defending their legitimacy. This refers to a circumstance where an institution attempts to adapt to the ‘changing political and normative environment’ (Stephen, 2018, p. 101).

The literature has shown that institutions can manage the dynamics of their legitimacy by deploying strategies to help them cope when under attack (Hampel & Tracey, 2017). Cooptation as an example, a principle coined by Selznick (1949), can orient a government towards accessibility or legitimisation through the ‘process of absorbing new elements into the leadership or policy-determining structure of an organization as a means of averting threats to its stability or existence’ (Selznick, 1949, p. 13). Cooptation is further associated with recuperation when an alignment of interests is derived. For example, in the case of unsuccessful innovation diffusions (Raven & Verbong, 2004), cooptation can be applied in a proper and adequate manner, by a government to inoculate itself when threatened by legitimacy judgment attacks. In Selznick’s (1949) study, he describes how outside interests are ‘coopted by the organization and persuaded to support its projects’ (Oliver, 1991, p. 157). Here, the cooptation phenomenon gives actors the opportunity to provide voluntary associations and publicly participate in conversations, as a means of acquiring control. This allows for neutralisation of institutional opposition to enhance overall legitimacy (Oliver, 1991).This research study expands on legitimacy and cooptation by responding to several calls for more research on how legitimacy attacks impact overall institutional outcomes (Hampel & Tracey, 2017; De Vries et al., 2016; Schwarz et al., 2014; Tost, 2011; Woerter et al., 2017). Specifically, this study explores how actors attack a government’s legitimacy, and how such a government can respond to re-legitimise its formal structures and practices ‘in a proper and adequate manner’ (Meyer & Rowan, 1977, p. 349). In conditions of government instability during a crisis, and with a decrease in trust among actors, exploring this evolvement of legitimacy judgement attacks and averting threats through cooptation, aids in understanding the socially relevant phenomenon in the face of order.

Methodology

Institutional setting

To better understand different types of legitimacy judgement attacks and cooptation strategies amidst a crisis, this study takes the case of the Renewable Heat Incentive (RHI) scheme introduced in Northern Ireland (NI), a devolved region of the United Kingdom (UK). A devolved government in this case involves ‘rescaling, spatial planning, and new forms of fluid governance’ (Murtagh & Shirlow, 2011, p. 47). In 1998, an Assembly was established in NI, where decision-making powers were transferred from the UK (Murtagh & Shirlow, 2011). Here, the NI Assembly became central to the devolved government where politicians debated and passed laws on significant issues such as the RHI (Coulter & Shirlow, 2018).

The RHI scheme was introduced in 2012, to address the increasing pressures of climate change (Damert & Baumgartner, 2018; De Giacomo & Bleischwitz, 2020). It was intended to encourage non-domestic groups, including businesses, industry, and public organisations, to switch from fossil fuels to renewable sources. In 2014, the scheme began accepting applications from domestic groups, including homeowners, builders, and private property owners (Department for the Economy, 2019). The scheme promised participants a tariff payment per each kilowatt hour of generated heat, quarterly for 20 years for non-domestic groups, and quarterly for 7 years for domestic groups – it was a case of ‘it pays to be green’ (García-Sánchez et al., 2020, p. 2). This encouraged an uptake of innovative renewable heat technologies, such as biomass boilers, biomass wood pellet stoves, ground to heater heat pumps, air to water heat pumps, and solar thermal panels (Ofgem, 2019). The underlying motivating factor was the incentives that rewarded participants for the renewable heat their newly adopted innovative systems generated and produced (Ofgem, 2019). The NI government’s financial incentive to encourage the use of renewable heat was therefore intended to support UK’s carbon emission reduction.

Two years after the scheme’s implementation, it was discovered that there were financial issues, resulting in an estimated overspend of millions of pounds, leading to a budgetary crisis, deterioration in public confidence, and a collapse of a devolution government (Coulter & Shirlow, 2018). Though the scheme was successful by adopter uptake, its design precipitated a crisis, hindering the government’s overall legitimacy. This embedded green policy diffusion underwent flaws and controversies, reaching the highest levels of the NI government – leading to a collapse of power sharing in NI. After several years, in January 2020, the government agreed on a deal to restore the devolved government, and as part of the deal, the parties involved agreed to shut down the existing scheme, which was later reiterated in February 2021. Therefore, the scheme’s events affirmed orientating beliefs about the critical importance of diffusing a scheme effectively.

This research therefore explores the evolving legitimacy judgement attacks that occurred during the scheme crisis, as well cooptation strategies that could be adopted for the government institution to maintain its legitimacy. Case studies are ‘often regarded as the most interesting research and are among the highly cited pieces’ (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007, p. 25). There is therefore rich empirical data represented by the persuasive power of the single RHI case.

Data collection and data sources

The data collection considered the phenomenon through a dynamic process perspective (Langley, 1999; Lingo & Elmes, 2019), where patterns were identified during the evolving stages of the RHI scheme. The large corpus of data surrounding the scheme was collected from multiple sources: (i) media articles and publications; (ii) government documents and accounts; (iii) in-depth interviews. These data sources are further explicated below.

Media articles & publications

The media has influence over an institution’s legitimacy by highlighting consequential events and by publicising transgression or wrongdoing (Clemente & Gabbioneta, 2017). When the media frames issues that draw attention to governments, they influence actor interpretations, and shape opinions accordingly. Therefore, the first set of data sources approached in this study is media articles and publications. Such articles and publications were gathered from the LexisNexis platform by searching ‘RHI Scheme’. See, Figure 1 for the LexisNexis search process.

Figure 1. LexisNexis media article and publication search.

As shown in Figure 1, articles and publications were compiled using LexisNexis, and the timeline range was set from the 1^st of November 2012 (when the RHI scheme was publicly introduced) and continued until 13^th of March 2020 (when the RHI Public Inquiry report was released). The search was narrowed further, by filtering articles published in ‘Europe’, and then ‘United Kingdom of Greater Britain & Northern Ireland’, given the geographic location of the case. These compiled list of articles and publications included 3,497 documents from: Web-based Publications; Newspapers; News; Newswires & Press Releases; Video News; Magazines & Journals; Industry Trade Press; News Transcripts; Market Research Reports; Newsletters; Country & Region Reports; Law Reviews & Journals. To narrow down the search even more, British and Irish national newspapers were considered, with the highest number of articles published from: Belfast Telegraph (998); News Letter (640); BBC (228); PA Newswire: NI (246); Press Association Mediapoint (157). Other publications had less than one hundred articles and publications. Because the role of the media is significant in this research, added importance was given to the main media outlets that have published more than one hundred articles on the topic of the RHI. These outlets ensured variety in media framing – the process of constructing a political issue (Clemente & Gabbioneta, 2017). In addition to the multiple archival media sources, this research also drew from government documents and accounts, further explicated below.

Government documents and accounts

Given the RHI is an administratively diffused scheme, with much adopter uptake, there are various government documents and accounts shared publicly on its diffusion, matters, and disputes. This research firstly drew from the RHI’s main website (Ofgem, 2019), as well as other government documents and accounts (RHI Inquiry, 2020), highlighting the RHI’s main events. See, Table 1 for more details on the government documents and accounts considered for this research.

Table 1. RHI government documents & accounts.

Content	Details of Content	Content Quantity	Content Examples
NIA Minutes of Proceedings	•Includes the minutes of proceedings from 22 June 2016 until 25 January 2017	A total of 17 documents highlighting Minutes of Proceedings	‘Inquiry into Managing Legal Aid: Preparation Session. The Committee discussed its preparation for the Inquiry into Managing Legal Aid and agreed lines of questioning for the evidence session’ (Northern Ireland Assembly, 2019).
NIA Minutes of Evidence	•Includes official reports related to the Inquiry into the Non-domestic RHI Scheme	A total of 7 (approximately 50 page) reports dated from 28 September 2016 until 18 January 2017	‘We have a responsibility to see whether there is action we can take to bear down on the future and secure better value for money from the existing payments going forward’ (Northern Ireland Assembly, 2019).
NIAO Report by the Comptroller and Auditor General for Northern Ireland	•Includes Department of Enterprise, Trade and Investment Resource Accounts •Reviews the findings of their audit and provides a qualified opinion on outcomes	A 19-page document outlining the department’s total spend, dated 5 July 2016.	‘The report also highlights general concerns in relation to the operation of the scheme and the circumstances surrounding the large increase in demand in October and November 2015 which will result in a significant cost to the NI block grant for many years’ (NIAO, 2016).
The RHI Inquiry Report Findings	•Includes the results of the RHI public inquiry investigations	A Three-volume report, consisting of 56 chapters and 656 pages.	‘To investigate, enquire into and report on the Non-Domestic Renewable Heat Incentive scheme’ (RHI Inquiry, 2020).

As outlined in Table 1, there were multiple official government accounts pertaining to the RHI scheme, such as the Minutes of Proceedings, Minutes of Evidence, a report by the Comptroller and Auditor General for NI, as well as an RHI inquiry report. This data showed different means of official government responses and testimonials to legitimacy threats and attacks, leading to the next stage of data collection – interviews.

In-depth interviews

Archival data sources were triangulated with a total of 31 interviews. First, 22 exploratory interviews were conducted in the beginning of the research, to uncover patterns and relationships. Second, nine secondary interviews were conducted to dive into deeper levels of detail, to identify gaps or errors in the interpretation – confirming generated patterns and findings (Jabbouri et al., 2019; Turaeva & Hornidge, 2013). The two rounds of interviews are further explicated below.

Exploratory interviews

In the first round of interviews, 22 exploratory interviews were conducted in the UK, over a 10-month period, beginning September 2019 until July 2020. The interviews were designed to generate informant perspectives about experiences, feelings, and ideas, by utilising a set of open-ended questions – convergent interviews (Noy, 2007). Initial informants suggested other actors, and this evolved into a process of gathering and generating new names and contacts. Here, informants were selected through a snowballing approach, which decreased sampling error and bias (Maguire et al., 2004; Noy, 2007).

The first set of informants were media representatives who were directly involved in reporting the scheme updates to the public, streamlining the initial selection process. Drawing upon media representatives from different media organisations allowed the opportunity to get a holistic overview of events from various viewpoints and perspectives.

The purpose of the exploratory interviews was ‘to gather descriptions of the life-world’ with respect to interpretation of the research phenomenon (Kvale, 1983, p. 174). A range of informants were therefore interviewed, including media representatives, government representatives, RHI participants and RHI non-participants to better understand how legitimacy judgement attacks were formed, and what cooptation strategies could have been applied by the government accordingly. These actor categories were selected based on a multiplicity of those involved or impacted by the scheme (directly and indirectly). See, Table 2 for more details regarding the conducted exploratory interviews.

Table 2. Exploratory interviews: informant interview details.

#	Name of Respondent(Pseudonym)	Participant Category: (M)= Media; (G)=Government; (P)= Participant; (NP)=Non-Participant	Mode of Recording: (M)=Manual; (A)= Audio	Word Count of Interview	Duration of Interview
1	Alice	M	M	1134	1 hr 45 min
2	Smith	M	M	1773	2 hr 0 min
3	Mike	M	A	3614	1 hr 0 min
4	Steven	M	A	2667	0 hr 35 min
5	James	NP	A	2670	1 hr 45 min
6	Gina	NP	A	1990	0 hr 30 min
7	Paul	NP	A	2559	0 hr 30 min
8	Terence	NP	A	3833	1 hr 0 min
9	Cammie	NP	A	3691	0 hr 25 min
10	Norman	NP	A	1386	0 hr 45 min
11	Bob	G	A	2028	1 hr 00 min
12	Kyle	G	M	1990	1 hr 00 min
13	Paula	P	M	2313	0 hr 30 min
14	Dickson	P	M	1890	0 hr 40 min
15	George	P	A	1902	0 hr 45 min
16	Julia	P	A	3208	0 hr 25 min
17	Parker	P	A	2874	1 hr 00 min
18	Travis	P	A	2014	1 hr 20 min
19	Anthony	P	A	4538	1 hr 35 min
20	Faris	P	A	4254	0 hr 45 min
21	Rob	P	A	2430	0 hr 35 min
22	Oliver	P	A	1540	0 hr 30 min

As outlined in Table 2, informants were kept anonymous given the crisis was a public matter with critical ramifications on those involved – they were given pseudonyms to protect their identities. All informants were asked to talk about their thoughts, emotions, and insights regarding the RHI scheme, and through anonymity, they felt comfort in eliciting their views accordingly. Given the public scrutiny of the RHI scheme, government representatives were part of many public debates and discussions related to the scheme – giving all their testimonials and perspectives publicly. Furthermore, with the public inquiry investigation hearings, many government officials gave their testimonials accordingly. The media also highlighted government quotations and testimonials, which gave this study ample data related to government representative viewpoints and quotations, not impacting the number of government-conducted interviews.

Secondary interviews

After deriving this study’s initial findings, subsequent interviews were conducted to further discuss emerged themes. Nine secondary interviews were conducted over a month, in April 2021. These interviews were progressively more semi-structured, inquiring about the overall findings. Yin (2009) argues that ‘examining consistency of evidence across different types of data sources is akin to verification’ (Yin, 2009, p. 21), and the second round of interviews deciphered and confirmed the overall findings. See, Table 3 for an outline of the secondary interviews.

Table 3. Secondary interviews: informant interview details.

#	Name of Respondent(Pseudonym)	Participant Category: (M)=Media; (G)=Government; (P)= Participant; (NP)=Non-Participant	Mode of Recording: (M)=Manual; (A)=Audio	Word Count of Interview	Duration of Interview
23	Steven	M	A	1829	0 hr 35 min
24	Smith	M	M	1021	0 hr 30 min
25	Paul	NP	A	1633	0 hr 35 min
26	Norman	NP	A	1720	0 hr 30 min
27	Anthony	P	A	2131	1 hr 0 min
28	Travis	P	A	1784	0 hr 30 min
29	Faris	P	A	1387	0 hr 30 min
30	Bob	G	M	1253	0 hr 30 min
31	Kyle	G	M	1122	0 hr 25 min

As outlined in Table 3, the interviews contained two or three informants from each of the initial selected categories. The informants that participated in the second round of interviews were previously interviewed, and this supported the research in overall refinement. Secondary interviews also advanced ideas and findings, while adding more external validity (Jabbouri et al., 2019). The combination of the two rounds of interviews allowed the opportunity to minimise any potential bias and identify rival explanations to counter arguments critical readers of the case study may have (Creswell et al., 2007).

This qualitative study applies research practices to appreciate a variety of both ontological and epistemological stances. It explores the actions, interactions, and viewpoints of social actors involved in activities of the study (Burrell & Morgan, 1979). This research further delves into the multi-layers of human agency by exploring legitimacy attacks amidst an innovation diffusion crisis through multiple sources. Here, the multiple sources of data were collected and warranted to support in the exploration and analysis of the RHI case study.

Data analysis

A preparatory step was taken in the data analysis to identify the chronology of the RHI scheme. This was done by steering a timeline review exercise to establish the main events, which was gathered and arranged using media articles and publications, as well as the government documents and accounts. The RHI timeline placed temporal brackets on the data (Langley, 1999), beginning in November 2012 (when the RHI scheme was introduced to the public), and continuing to 13 March 2020 (when the public inquiry report was published). The summary of the key events is highlighted in Figure 2.

Figure 2. RHI scheme timeline.

The timeline in Figure 2 shows the chronology of the main events that took place in the RHI scheme. For example, it demonstrates that the scheme was introduced in NI in November 2012 to support actors to adopt green technologies. Four years after the RHI’s implementation, the scheme was claimed to be mishandled, with Stormont’s PAC calling it ‘one of the biggest scandals’ since devolution (BBC News, 2017). Later in 2017, a motion was brought before the Assembly calling for a public inquiry to be set up, and the public inquiry thereafter released its findings in March 2020. Such events provided a path to ascertain when moments of legitimacy attacks could have taken place and where cooptation strategies could be identified. They also facilitated a basis for delineating themes and aggregate dimensions.

The generated RHI timeline was used to separate the scheme into the three evolving periods: (i) Period One: Scheme Diffusion – when the RHI scheme was introduced and diffused; (ii) Period Two: Surfacing of Issues – when issues began to surface with the scheme; (iii) Period Three: When the public inquiry report was released. This helped in categorising evolving events to identify initial concepts, themes, and patterns.

The data analysis was structured by applying an inductive analytical process (Gioia et al., 2013), to bring forth rigorous exploration of the phenomenon. It further involved cycling between the data and emerging theoretical arguments in an iterative manner (Rindova et al., 2011), collecting and coding the data to answer the main research questions. Through the Gioia et al. (2013) method, a process of abstraction transpired across concepts, themes, and dimensions. This approach was emergent in that it was not tightly prescribed, and there were various flexible shifts applied for the purpose of gathering and analysing the data.

After the RHI timeline recreation, the data analysis continued with capturing instances in which the data collected referred to legitimacy attacks. For example, when a whistle-blower contacted the DETI Minister Arlene Foster claiming abuse of the scheme in 2013, this instance shows a direct judgement attack. More data was derived during this time from the various sources of data to determine the types of attacks that could have occurred during this period. During the interviews for example, Smith (media representative) stated that the whistle-blower was ‘very clear in her whistleblowing, yet anyone she spoke to was in dire denial’. Volume 3 of the RHI public inquiry report also referred to this situation by emphasising ‘DETI’s failure to deal effectively with information from a “whistle-blower”’ (RHI Inquiry, 2020, p. 170). Equipped with these occurrences and accounts, open coding supported in the identification and categorisation for initial concepts. This helped reduce the data by interpreting the main coded themes and how they relate to one another.

The analysis was centrally significant for the research through its dynamic approach, as it generated broad themes and generalised the study in an objective way. Interpretations were derived from the raw data, information was defined, and themes were developed by coding patterns. Through this process perspective, patterns were evaluated at the different periods of the scheme by identifying moments of legitimacy attacks and how that impacted a government’s legitimacy. The data coding structure is demonstrated in Figure 3.

Figure 3. RHI data analysis coding structure.

Figure 3 shows the fragments of the data content relevant to the occurrence of legitimacy attacks. Here, the analysis moves from the description of the attributes of why the government institution was being attacked, to themes among those attributes, to aggregate dimensions that are more abstract.

In Period One, when the scheme was first diffused, there was an initial moral conviction about going green. However, the government’s systems did not reflect that of the already existing successful Greater Britain scheme – no benchmarking exercise was executed. The RHI scheme therefore had various flaws in its diffusion, which created attacks against the government, together into an aggregate dimension code, labelled morally faltering.

In Period Two, actors engaged in legitimacy attacks due to newly announced scheme regulations and policy shifts. In this period, The NI Assembly was dissolved, and the NI Executive collapsed on the 26^th of January 2017. Actors were frustrated with such changes and outcomes, initiating attacks against the government, into an aggregate dimension code, labelled relationally disconnecting.

In Period Three, actors passing legitimacy attacks felt the government was disregarding their emotions and overall care for its community. Actors believed the government was unable to take responsibility for its actions to bring back order to its institution. This brought forth an aggregate dimension code, labelled instrumentally disregarding.

In this stage of the data analysis, connections were formed, and links were created, qualifying an arrangement of inductive coded text. This facilitated and generated inferences about the approaches actors carried during their legitimacy judgement attacks. By exploring legitimacy judgement attacks during the evolvement of a green innovation scheme, this research further aggregates the motives behind why attacks occurred, and through this data, we further uncover cooptation strategies applied.

Findings

Through this research, it became increasingly evident that not all green innovation diffusions are effective, and that some initial missteps or inefficiencies can erode overall confidence and threaten a diffusor’s legitimacy. For example, a government diffusing an ineffective green innovation can produce much larger institutional waves, leading to legitimacy attacks and ultimately a crisis. In the case of the RHI, actors attacked the government’s legitimacy and further prescribed the anticipated types of cooptative strategies they expected. The RHI brings forth a plethora of data on the government’s missed opportunities and how such mishaps further undermined their legitimacy. Informant/archival data sources in all three periods were saying ‘they could have done better, and here is how. This research therefore positions the findings in a way that advances scholarship on institutional work through a theoretical eclectic approach to legitimacy attacks and expected cooptation strategies. By analysing the three periods of the RHI scheme, our data presented a clear image of what actors expected of their government whenever they attacked their legitimacy – they were seeking particular cooptation strategies. This is where our theoretical question stood out for us: How can institutional actors defend and protect legitimacy in the face of such attacks? We attempted to answer this question by finding out what types of cooptation strategies actors expected of their governments to rectify the crisis.

As our data revealed, the crisis evolved in three periods, where the government firstly morally faltered, thereafter relationally disconnected, and finally instrumentally disregarded. Here, our coding shows, for each period, legitimacy judgment attacks coinciding with actors’ expected cooptative strategies. In a green innovation diffusion crisis, the analysis of the data identified aggregated cooptation strategies the government needed to apply as coping mechanisms in the face of legitimacy attacks. Figure 4 represents a summary of the generated cooptation strategies actors expected of their government at each period of the evolving RHI scheme.

Figure 4. Cooptation strategies in the face of legitimacy attacks.

Figure 4 shows the legitimacy attack motivations aggregated out of an evolving green innovation crisis. It further identifies emerging cooptation strategies to address each of the attacks as brought forth by the data gathering and analysis. These zoomed in emerging themes and concepts focus on highlighting produced new insights. We present our findings by periods. Within each period, we demonstrate how legitimacy attacks reinforce expected cooptation strategies, as follows: (i) Period One: Warranting Transparency when observed as Morally Faltering; (ii) Period Two: Streamlining Communality when observed as Relationally Disconnecting; (iii) Period Three: Accepting Responsibility when observed as Instrumentally Disregarding; (iv) Dynamic Model of Legitimacy Attacks.

Period one: warranting transparency when observed as morally faltering

During the first period of the scheme, the government diffused the green innovation scheme in an initial encouraging manner, with exalted legitimacy. When the scheme was first introduced, actors were pleased with how the scheme was set up to use renewable heating technologies as a means of combating climate change. However, shortly after the diffusion, the government lost authority given certain moral and ethical mandates were not followed in the implementation and monitoring stages of the scheme. In this case, the scheme was not appropriate or sound in the eyes of the public. Through testimonials, informants such as Terence (NP), a member of the public, felt that the government has let their people down. He stated: ‘It made me think of, and this is a government scheme that has gone absolutely wrong. I was disappointed that the people managing it let it get to that stage’. Consequently, a moral disconnect surfaced between the government and other actors because the scheme revealed a lack of trust towards the government institution. As another member of the public put it:

‘You can’t trust them and the way they dealt with it, by denying facts, was not good. The PR around it, I remember thinking this is such a scandal and they just tried to brush it under the rug. I think the annoying thing was it was flagged in the first place, and that’s the annoying thing, and they didn’t pay any attention to it, by the whistle blower’ (Gina, NP).

The clear inference is that the warning and red flags regarding the scheme’s cost controls was not specifically addressed. This is further explicated in Volume 3 of the public inquiry report:

‘The Inquiry has already found that, in June 2012, Ofgem did warn DETI officials about the need for cost controls in the NI RHI scheme. However, the Inquiry finds that the recollection of Ofgem officials that additional detailed/focused discussions of the need for cost controls in the meetings with DETI during 2014 was not supported by the evidence’ (RHI Inquiry, 2020, p. 47).

Testimonials in Period One described how the crisis impacted the government’s overall legitimacy, and it began to decline. Actors felt that the government acted in a morally condemnable manner, with potential misconduct and transgression. To this regard, an RHI participant further stated: ‘In the beginning you thought they would never get away from this. They’ve done something that’s wrong, surely common sense will prevail, but then they kept telling lies and then it’s just like shopping hour, you just can’t believe it you know’ (Faris, P). The North Ireland Assembly also addresses this period by stating in the Public Accounts Committee official report the following: ‘It is clear that this case only came under proper scrutiny because of the allegations made by whistle-blowers. It is essential that the culture within DETI is changed, and the Department must recognize the need to take decisive and prompt action to address problems’ (Northern Ireland Assembly, 2016). In this period, actors expected for the government to adapt its discursive strategies by morally taking liberty with telling the truth. The moral deviation was key in constituting legitimacy attacks.

As Arundela et al. (2019) maintain, innovation objectives and outcomes are ‘two sides of the same coin’, where the success of a diffusion is not measured only by its objectives, but also by its outcomes. This study shows that when public organisations are under pressure to diffuse green projects, it is important to provide adopters with accurate information about the incentives being offered – transparency is key. With a lack of transparency, and an absence in contingency measures, the same actors can lose trust in their policy makers and question their overall legitimacy. Therefore, our findings demarcate that in Period One of the scheme, the government could have regained its legitimacy by warranting transparency as a type of a cooptation strategy. If the government had attempted to fairly monitor and mitigate issues, while communicating such attempts to the public, they would have been able to validate their legitimacy and the scheme’s validity. One actor from the public felt that transparency would have had a positive impact on the government’s legitimacy, by stating:

‘I think in general for legitimacy in a democracy anyway has to be a government that is transparent, both in how it’s elected and then in how it operates … I think it’s a clear example of how spectacularly we can miss the point on things in NI, on all levels, whether through ministers, or through the press, or through the average man on the street, it’s just completely missing the point. We are getting so fixated on a small issue, and letting it bubble into what it’s become, a national crisis […] when more transparency come to light, fundamental questions start to get more addressed’ (Paul, NP).

This statement brings to light the importance of transparency at the beginning of a crisis, for institutions to promote and respond to actor interests. Actors expect government institutions to warrant transparency through open and translucent debate, providing accessible information related to their overall integrity. Here, the research focuses on actors’ conferral of morally faltering their legitimacy, which hinged on the institution gaining normative approval from actors. This intriguing aspect of the analysis highlights the moral landscape of actors, where the concept of morality is influential and reinforces their social boundaries. These findings show that by warranting transparency and addressing issues immediately, the government could have been able to avoid or prevent a crisis from ensuing.

Period One generated hundreds of emotionally charged testimonials from different actors calling on the government to do better, and to be open and transparent. Here, the political system should be restrictive with its state of affairs, setting accountability measures so that actors cannot simply get away from their mistakes and mishaps. Given that not all government representatives were on the same page at the onset, and expected cooptation strategies were not applied, legitimacy judgement attacks persisted and continued into Period Two of the scheme.

Period two: streamlining communality when observed as relationally disconnecting

In Period Two of the scheme, informants and opposing actors alike were triggered to continue attacking the legitimacy of the government, leading to its collapse. This was due to a lasting material disconnect between the government and the opposing actors. Those opposed believed that the government did not approach the scheme in a relational manner by treating the local community with accorded respect, dignity, and status, consequently forming a disconnect. As one member of the public put it:

‘So, it would have to be elected by the people, and then it has to be accountable to the same people who voted for them, and legitimacy comes through the particularly, in Northern Ireland, the consensus of all parties, because of the system we have for shared power, and for all and any community to be represented’ (Paul, NP).

The emerged legitimacy judgement attacks were related to actors feeling as though their government did not promote or respond effectively to their overarching interests. One member of the media also mentioned:

‘There was lots of angst around how people felt walked all over by the government, and people generally don’t have good options because they think “they’re all the same” “they don’t care about us” and this fed into the general public resentment toward politicians who are not interested in the wider public and just about their own interests’ (Smith, M).

As per this media representative, when scheme issues surfaced, opposing actors felt the government did not promote their material interests. Findings further suggest that actors felt the scheme was being abused repeatedly, and the government was ‘brushing it under the rug’ (Gina, NP). In this case, positive work efforts as a form of a cooptation strategy was what actors were seeking from their government. Actors needed the government to address their attacks by streamlining communality, by showing how they collaborated with different teams to ensure the diffusion’s systems were all sound. The public inquiry report’s Volume 2 addresses this by stating: ‘More generally, we recommend a Northern Ireland government-wide framework for information exchange and, where appropriate, co-operation between the Northern Ireland Civil Service, Whitehall Departments and (where relevant) Departments of other devolved Governments and of the Government of the Republic of Ireland’ (RHI Inquiry, Vol. 2, 2020, p. 205). Therefore, through the demonstration of positive work efforts and increasing support by fairly addressing all communities, the government would have been able to maintain their legitimacy in the eyes of opposing actors.

Government intervention in the face of attacks, occurred late into the scheme, and although the government began changing the scheme’s policies by altering the tariff payments, the attacks continued to persist because the public and scheme participants felt their individual needs were not being addressed. The government was ‘trying to save themselves, which is all very well, but it’s the people they are hurting’ (George, P). In this period, the government was unable to bring justice and communality that would commensurate the rights and entitlements of scheme participants. By changing the tariff payments, the government changed the already existing contractual agreements between themselves and the scheme participants. Actors therefore approached the government with relational legitimacy attacks, and in this period, the devolved government collapsed.

This period further shows that policy makers should look to better understand the process by which diffusions are made and how this integral element impacts relationships between actors. Based on the large corpus of data that surrounds the RHI scheme, this research found that although institutional environmental concerns were being addressed, the government did not have an appropriate governance system to monitor, manage and control the scheme – resulting in a crisis. To avoid or prevent crises, governments can therefore have appropriate governance systems to become effective driving forces for realising a sustainable future while ensuring overall communality. This can be done by introducing efficient practices and developing holistic contingency measures that are shared with everyone involved. Also, if governments depend on values and positive attitudes, even amidst a crisis, they will drive positive adopter behaviour and responses. By focusing on the policy arena of a diffusion, governments will consequently ensure effective management of their green technologies, as well as environmental regulations, thereby ensuring that their legitimacy is not in a decline.

In Period Two, not only was the government’s legitimacy in a decline – it was also lost due to their forfeiture of power and responsibility in the NI Executive and NI Assembly. This led to more legitimacy judgement attacks in the next period.

Period three: accepting responsibility when observed as instrumentally disregarding

In Period Three of the scheme, after the Public Inquiry report was released, the government’s legitimacy was attacked because opposing actors believed ‘there was no accountability’ (Faris, P). Opposing actors felt the government was not being held accountable for the mistakes that were made, even with clear indications made in the public inquiry report, stating:

‘As will be clear from the detailed narrative and findings made throughout the Inquiry Report, responsibility for what went wrong lay not just with one individual or group but with a broad range of persons and organizations involved, across a variety of areas relating to the design, approval, management, and administration of the NI RHI scheme throughout its life. […] In addition, there were repeated missed opportunities to identify and correct, or seek to have others correct, the flaws in the scheme. The sad reality is that, in addition to a significant number of individual shortcomings, the very governance, management and communication systems, which in these circumstances should have provided early warning of impending problems and fail-safes against such problems, proved inadequate’ (RHI Inquiry, Vol. 3, 2020, p. 201).

In this period, after the public inquiry results were released, the government did not attempt to take full responsibility for their mistakes. While they accepted that there were some errors made, they did not take full responsibility or were held accountable. Through testimonials, opposing actors expected them to take responsibility and for those at fault to be held accountable – rectifying the challenges they posed to scheme participants and the public as a whole. As publicised in the Belfast Telegraph, the First Minister at the time of the RHI diffusion addressed the scheme and its flaws, and stated:

‘There were shocking errors and failures in the RHI scheme and a catalogue of mistakes, all of which coincided to create the perfect storm. It is critical that lessons are learned and that the costs of the scheme are brought under control. As First Minister, I am determined that that will be done’ (McCausland, 2018).

As shown above, later in this period, the government rhetoric changed, and some officials were accepting that mistakes and inaccuracies had occurred. While this was the case, there was no accountability, and scheme participants were left to face financial hardship due to the changes in their contractual agreements. Therefore, actors felt issues with the scheme were not being addressed entirely. The First Minister at the time further acknowledged the crisis which brought down NI’s devolved government, and addressed the issues brought forth from the public inquiry by saying:

‘The public inquiry has been difficult for many individually and painful for the party collectively … no party would want to have all of its dealings exposed for all to see at a public inquiry, especially in the unique system of government we have … but I make no excuses’ (McCausland, 2018).

This last period of the findings demonstrates that in moments of crises, supporting the public and participants by taking responsibility is important, but not without rectifying issues and being held accountable. As communicated in actor testimonials, expected cooptation strategies in this period could have helped pave the government’s legitimacy in the face of attacks, even if not fully.

This research study therefore unfolds three periods of a green innovation scheme, and the evolving decline of an institution’s legitimacy during a crisis. This is further explicated below.

Dynamic model of legitimacy attacks

By situating the findings within the larger context of the RHI scheme, and identifying key periods, this research study illuminates the interplay between legitimacy judgement attacks and legitimacy decline. Our data uncovered a dynamic model that shows how a government’s legitimacy shifts during fuelled legitimacy judgement attacks. We propose a model that links the evolving relationship between different types of legitimacy attacks, and how these in turn impact an institution’s legitimacy, impinging on a complete legitimacy loss. Figure 5 illustrates how the RHI scheme evolved through this process model in each of the three periods of legitimacy attacks. It further presents how a green scheme crisis presents legitimacy loss when cooptation strategies are not applied. Although the model emerged from our data collection and analysis, we also cite relevant literature (Tost, 2011) – moral, relational, and instrumental attacks – to enhance plausibility.

Figure 5. Dynamic model of legitimacy attacks.

Figure 5 represents a summary of the findings from the emergent data and provides a structure for green innovation diffusion crises and their interrelations with legitimacy judgement attacks. In the first period of the RHI scheme, there were no cooptation strategies applied in the face of moral legitimacy attacks. This began a legitimacy variability for the government involved in the crisis. In the second period, when relational legitimacy attacks ensued, the government persisted in denial, blame evasion, and amended stipulatory agreements, which triggered a further legitimacy decline and a collapse of a devolved government. In the third period, once the government collapsed, and after investigations were made public, no one was held accountable, and the public lost trust in their government entirely – shifting to a complete legitimacy loss. The government had an opportunity to reverse this legitimacy loss, but they unfortunately decreed a climate of resistance. This model shows the institutional dynamics of a green innovation crisis, where institutions and actions are linked, displaying an evolving process. It further provides insight into how diffusion outcomes shape institutions’ legitimacy amidst persisting crises.

Through temporal bracketing, the findings show that when perceptions of personal control among opposing actors decrease, certain words and statements are made to demonstrate a decline in support of government arrangements. Cooptation, as a remedy, was expected by opposing actors, to confront such a distrust and disconnect. When this was not done, legitimacy attacks persisted, leading to a complete legitimacy loss. As a form of recuperation, opposing actors felt that appropriate means of cooptation could have provided them with more control, thereby mitigating legitimacy judgement attacks during the crisis.

Theoretically, this research study highlights how actors respond to governance structures under policy uncertainty and failed systems. Such uncertainty and gaps pose challenges in innovation diffusions, and this study contributes to the literature by presenting actor legitimacy judgement attacks and expectations to the diffusion of innovations amidst high levels of diffusion uncertainty. This research also adds to the literature by further exploring the process of policy diffusions, and how that impacts consequences. To engage with actors adopting an innovation, governments can pay close attention to their policy design as well as their existing systems, to ensure that legitimacy judgement attacks do not persist. Without invoking appropriate structures, diffusions may face crises. This supports governments in reaching their long-term goals of tackling climate change and offers a collective approach to implementing a green innovations in an effective and efficient manner.

Therefore, drawing from archival data and interviews, this research identifies three historical phases of a green innovation diffusion crisis characterised by distinct types of legitimacy attacks and corresponding cooptation strategies serving as expected institutional responses.

Discussion

This research theorising is timely, given it links green innovation diffusion and institutional dynamics, with legitimacy judgement attacks and cooptation. The research journey further notes a granular theoretical understanding of how legitimacy attacks ensue in the evolvement of a green innovation crisis, and what expected cooptation strategies coincide with such attacks. At the onset, we asked the following questions: What types of legitimacy attacks evolve throughout a green innovation diffusion crisis, and how can institutional actors defend and protect legitimacy in the face of such attacks? Our empirical answers to the research questions bring forth legitimacy judgement attack reasons, as well as a breakdown of cooptation strategies needed in the face of such legitimacy attacks. Despite being part of the institutional work literature, persisting crises in green diffusions are undertheorized. Here, this study integrates the research on institutional work, with the underpinnings of legitimacy and cooptation. Our research further presents this in a dynamic model of the evolvement of legitimacy variability, decline and loss. The developed dynamic model of institutional legitimacy attacks considers not only actor actions, but also how certain legitimacy attacks evolve and persist. Therefore, our research study’s central contribution is to show how persisting legitimacy attacks can lead to legitimacy loss, if not addressed with cooptation strategies.

Persisting legitimacy judgement attacks allow us to explain an institution’s shift from legitimacy to that of illegitimacy, as an emerging situational phenomenon. The findings further contribute to theory by presenting a novel way of connecting legitimacy attacks to cooptation strategies, with cooptation being a phenomenon that gives social actors the opportunity to provide voluntary associations and publicly participate in meaningful conversations within an institutional context. This contributes to the general management and social organisational literature of legitimacy and judgement attacks (Bitektine, 2011; Bitektine & Haack, 2015; Tost, 2011). While the existing research explores how institutions can cope in the face of legitimacy attacks (Hampel & Tracey, 2017), this study further shows how institutions can regain and maintain their institution by applying cooptation strategies. For example, Bertha et al., (2011) argue that ‘extensive monitoring’ lead to greater efficiency in the adoption of green innovations. This study builds on this literature and refines it, by also highlighting the importance of regaining and maintaining legitimacy in a diffusion, and how to do so effectively through cooptation strategies: (i) warranting transparency; (ii) streamlining communality; (iii) accepting responsibility.

Dating back to Parsons (1960) and Weber (1978), there is a recognition that ‘power stands in constant need of legitimation’ and legitimacy can be both amassed and depleted (Huy et al., 2014, p. 1651). Since then, there has been much development of theory around legitimacy of organisational structures and practices, and the findings add theoretical and concrete implications to this existing literature (Bitektine, 2011; Debenedetti et al., 2020; Huy et al., 2014; Jost & Major, 2011; Tost, 2011). This research study focuses on legitimacy judgement formations and attacks, and how they impact overall institutional outcomes. It also identifies how actors defend and protect the legitimacy of a scheme from legitimacy attacks by exploring a green innovation that engulfed a whole government system.

When considering legitimacy research, Tost (2011) highlights the importance of distinguishing between individual-level legitimacy and collective-level legitimacy to better display the focus of one’s research. This research focuses on individual-level legitimacy, referring to an actor’s own judgements into whether the government institution is appropriate for its social context (Tost, 2011). In this case, actors applied their own individualistic judgements and beliefs towards the government, ruling it inappropriate within its social context. This research further responds to this call by identifying actor perceptions of a government institution being labelled as illegitimate, coming from judgements, while adding a layer of strategic cooptation strategies.

Two contributions are made to the institutional literature on legitimacy and cooptation. First, this research builds a model of how actors attack the legitimacy of an institution through social evaluations, within the context of a green innovation crisis. Second, the research draws on insights and establishes cooptation strategy descriptions that can be assembled and applied by actors, such as governments, to defend and protect their institution. While the existing research explores how institutions can cope in the face of legitimacy attacks (Hampel & Tracey, 2017), this study further shows how institutions can regain and maintain their institution through expected cooptation strategies. These contributions are further explicated below.

Green innovation diffusion and legitimacy dimensions

The findings in this study support and extend the literature on green innovation diffusion in markets (Chengli et al., 2017; Shove, 2010). This is justified beyond the likely description that green technology plays a major role in moving communities towards sustainability, increasing renewable resources, decreasing pollution, and enhancing overall liveability (Shove, 2010). While green technologies can result in a reduction of negative environmental impact, it is important to elaborate the processes for policy makers to succeed in their diffusions. The substantive outcome of the implementation of an innovation, which can be intended or unintended, and positive or negative, is in some of the innovation-related studies (De Vries et al., 2016). These theoretical studies highlight successful long-term incentives and outcomes in green innovation adoption, and this research extends this literature by focusing on legitimacy dimensions in innovation diffusion crises.

Huy et al. (2014) built on Tost’s (2011) insights into legitimacy judgements by explaining how actors are likely to apply varying sets of evaluation criteria in judging legitimacy. This research on the other hand, considers Tost’s (2011) dimensions of legitimacy judgements to better understand how attacks occur amidst a green innovation crisis. The empirical findings establish a dynamic model linking legitimacy judgement attacks to the need for cooptation strategies. The findings further identify that legitimacy judgement attacks persist over the evolvement of a crisis, leading to legitimacy loss. For example, when an institution diffuses an innovation and loses authority by disregarding moral mandates, the model suggests that actors attack and judge the institution’s moral legitimacy. This requires the institution to respond by warranting transparency through open and translucent debate – otherwise legitimacy attacks will persist. These insights provide an empirical basis for demonstrating how legitimacy attacks unfold over the evolvement of a crisis.

Legitimacy maintenance through cooptation strategies

This study maintains that while legitimacy may not directly increase efficiency in the diffusion of innovations, it creates comfort around initiatives being adopted. When legitimacy comes into question, maintenance efforts are needed to prevent crises from ensuing. Recently, institutionalists have refined a great deal of theory around legitimacy maintenance (Bitektine, 2011; Helms et al., 2019; Huy et al., 2014. This study supports the literature and expands it by focusing on a green innovation crisis, and how a government institution can regain and maintain its overall legitimacy in the face of attacks. Specifically, this study complements this recent work by demonstrating that evolving legitimacy attacks continue to persist if not addressed, and cooptation strategies can be applied to regain and maintain legitimacy.

This research shows that a local government can avert threats during a crisis through reassessment and cooptation. Cooptation in this study is associated with recuperation when an alignment of interests is derived, especially in the diffusion of an innovation (Raven & Verbong, 2004). Such undertakings are essential for in-depth engagement between institutions and their opposing communities, during the process of legitimacy attacks. For example, when an institution warrants transparency through open and translucent debate, they ensure that collective legitimising work is happening, and moral levels are displayed. This alleviates more substantially the logic of confidence and good faith as argued by Meyer and Rowan (1977). This form of cooptation also allows institutions the opportunity to address their communities as one. This builds moral rapport and establishes grounds for legitimacy attack deterrence. This is of course based on responsible people that would actually own up to their mistakes and take responsibility and accountability. This ties back to Selznick’s (1949) literature which points to the association of recuperation through alignment of interests. Selznick (1949) therefore confirms that within a socially constructed market, legitimacy can be maintained through cooptation strategies, which this study confirms and validates. Furthermore, when institutions take responsibility for their mistakes, they are sending a unified message to opposing communities that their capabilities and intentions are aligned towards maintenance. Such cooptation strategies can be applied in different settings, such as Covid-19 tracking applications being diffused by governments to help communities. If the applications are not monitored properly, legitimacy may become in question, and forms of cooptation strategies can avoid this. This builds on trust between the diffusor of the applications and opposing communities. It also shows the interrelation between the action-responses of an institution and its overall legitimacy over the evolvement of a diffusion.

This study further makes inference on how governments’ can be led to legitimacy loss, especially during social actor influences, actions, and reactions. For example, when actors perceive an institution as illegitimate, their attitudes change towards the institution’s authority. Clegg and Gordon (2012) argue that illegitimacy leads to a loss of public trust. Legitimacy attacks persist when social actors perceive and judge their institution as illegitimate during a crisis. Their attitudes changed towards the institution’s authority, and the overall legitimate validation becomes unstable (Jost & Major, 2001). Lacking legitimacy therefore becomes costly to any institution, especially a government, given every aspect of its work is being analysed and watched (Brown, 1997). This study therefore describes how a crisis impacts institutional legitimacy, especially when governments assign responsibility to other actors, or avoid blame for errors. When a government frequently downplays breaches to protect its reputation, it can hinder overall institutional outcomes in the face of legitimacy. This study therefore shows that in extreme cases of crises, an institution’s decline or loss of legitimacy can destabilise existing structures and lead to the wholesale of loss of power. This further ensures that legitimacy crises should be addressed on intention. The findings suggest that institutions applying cooptation strategies in the face of legitimacy attacks can take ownership of issues at hand, and ultimately avoid or prevent crises.

Conclusion

Climate change has attracted much attention worldwide, with institutions facing pressure to respond to environmental needs. As part of a wider global effort to combat climate change, government institutions have committed to reducing negative environmental impact through the introduction and diffusion of green schemes. In particular, the United Kingdom has identified the importance of addressing climate change and considered it a topic of importance. Green schemes have therefore played a key role in the UK government’s efforts to transition communities towards a low carbon society. Climate change has recently attracted much scholarly attention, and this study extends this literature by applying an institutional lens on the diffusion of a green innovation scheme – the RHI.

This research study is homogeneous as it features distinctive implications not only for green innovation diffusion, but also for institutional markets and regulators. Inductively, this study generated insight into how a crisis impacts institutional legitimacy, especially when institutions downplay legitimacy attacks and do not address them with cooptation strategies. This study shows that diffused green innovations may be infinitely impacted through the decisions, viewpoints and actions of actors involved (Beck, 1994; Davies, 1996), revealing new and important insights.

Often governments function as institutional diffusors of schemes and must institutionally manage the issues and challenges associated with such incentivised innovations (Chenglin et al., 2017; Shove, 2010; Thaler & Sunstein, 2008). The challenge for government institutions to develop an effective incentive program is having a bona fide understanding of how actors will react and what drives them to adopt or abandon such green innovations. This study points to an effective approach in studying government diffusions, by displaying the importance of understanding how ideas and implementations spread among market actors, why legitimacy attacks occur, and how these attacks can be mitigated through cooptation strategies. This study also identifies how actors influence the shaping and outcomes of a diffusion, specifically amidst a crisis (De Vries et al., 2016), complementing prior work in the literature (Debenedetti et al., 2020; Bitektine, 2011; Tost, 2011). It is well established in the general management and social organisational literature that legitimacy is important in proving social value in the survival of organisations (Tost, 2011). This shows how actors assess the legitimacy of specific institutional actions or decisions as desirable or inappropriate within a specific context (Bitektine, 2011; Tost, 2011). Our findings therefore address the need for more research bridging legitimacy to other concepts such as cooptation.

The overall aim of this study was to identify the nature of legitimacy judgement attacks amidst a green innovation crisis, as well as explore how institutions defend and protect the legitimacy of their diffusion from such legitimacy attacks. Through this study, the findings demonstrate that in a diffused scheme crisis, legitimacy attacks can occur when an institution is: (i) morally faltering; (ii) relationally disconnecting; (iii) instrumentally disregarding. The findings further identify expected cooptation strategies to avert threats and maintain legitimacy in the face of these legitimacy attacks. The cooptation strategies include: (i) warranting transparency; (ii) streamlining communality; (iii) accepting responsibility. By doing so, institutions can become key drivers in legitimacy maintenance.

Going forward, it will be noted that governments facing unsuccessful innovation diffusions, not only focus on the implementation and monitoring stages, but of equal importance in ensuring that they have contingency plans in place, thereby incorporating cooptation depending on the setting. By doing so, institutions can build and maintain their legitimacy accordingly. Further, this research shows that legitimacy is important in proving social value, accessing resources, and ultimately the survival of institutions.

Future research

This research study focuses on a single case. The findings may not be generalisable; however, there are suggested transferability of the findings. It is encouraged for future research to determine legitimacy attacks by using multiple cases, in different contexts.

Alternatively, with the large corpus of data surrounding the RHI scheme, and through its evolving landscape, this paper has the potential of inspiring more research into the same institutional setting, especially given the RHI scheme continues to evolve. This research also calls for more future research into the scheme, specifically focusing on later periods – not presented in this study. For example, in February 2021, the government in Northern Ireland made the decision to terminate its controversial scheme. This can have further impact on all actors involved, which can offer a greater contribution to the phenomenon.

There is always a risk in disconnect between informants and their perceptions to the specific RHI scheme, which can introduce ambiguity with the inferences drawn. However, we found clear evidence that this could be addressed through the use of multiple data sources and triangulation. The data in this research is triangulated with multiple sources of data and have sought depth in understanding this extreme phenomenon. While triangulation served as a means to gather and assess public views on the RHI, social media analysis might have also provided alternative viewpoints on actor perspectives.

Finally, research can further go beyond limitations, as some ideas for future explorations can include: (i) exploring the adoption of green technologies based on the type of innovation (product); (ii) identifying emotion work and its legitimacy impact when it comes to green technologies; (iii) exploring the collapse (failure) of a scheme that did not involve a crisis (it failed for other reasons). This research study therefore opens several avenues of future research, which adds a contribution to the body of literature.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).