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Articles

Yet another paradigm change? Narratives and competing policy paradigms in Brazilian labour market policies

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ABSTRACT

When policy paradigms compete for sovereignty, a well thought-out narrative story is essential to arguing why one paradigm is superior to another. Narrative stories can be applied to underline the imperative for paradigmatic policy change. Combining Hall’s work on policy paradigms with Stone’s conceptualisation of narrative stories, this article explores how narrative stories are applied to support or oppose competing policy paradigms and proposes that the systematic analysis of narrative stories fosters a better understanding of policy paradigms. The case of labour market policy in Brazil is used to exemplify the argument: 13 years of Workers’ Party rule induced far-reaching changes in Brazilian social and labour market policy based on demand-orientation. Following the impeachment of President Rousseff, interim-President Temer initiated major labour reforms, reviving liberal narratives. This article explores how these policy changes are representative of the competition between policy paradigms, which are reflected in party-political competition, and how recent paradigm change is supported by the construction of narrative stories.

1. Introduction

To advance policy change, policymakers often use narrative stories to frame policy problems and present their preferred policy as a solution to the defined problem (Stone, Citation1989, Citation2012). In the field of social and labour market policy, the social construction of the problem can be particularly relevant, enabling a political party to gather support for reforms that are associated with cutbacks or retrenchment (Bandelow & Hornung Citation2019; Cox, Citation2001). Given the inherent ambiguity of policymaking, particularly during the agenda-setting phase (Capano & Galanti, Citation2018), narrative stories are essential for defining policy preferences (Stone, Citation2012). The competition for the ‘right’ policy solution to a problem, such as unemployment, is often embedded into a broader ideational framework on how the world works; Peter Hall calls these overarching ideas policy paradigms (Hall, Citation1993). Generally, policy paradigms include the basic ideas shared within a policy community (Daigneault, Citation2014) and help to define policy problems as well as to seek potential solutions for the identified problem (Howlett & Ramesh, Citation2003). Radical, far-reaching policy changes are often accompanied by a change of policy paradigms (Bandelow, Vogeler, Hornung, Kuhlmann, & Heidrich, Citation2019; Hall, Citation1993). In what ways are these paradigm changes supported by narrative stories? This paper elaborates on the relationship between policy paradigms and narrative stories and exemplifies these by studying the case of labour market policy in Brazil. After combining research on policy paradigms with narrative stories, this paper proposes that the latter are crucial to communicating policy paradigms as they make them credible both within the policy community and for voters. When policy paradigms compete for sovereignty, a well thought-out narrative story is particularly essential to arguing why one paradigm is superior to another and to underline the imperative for change.

In past decades, Brazilian economic and social policy has been shaped by competing paradigms that can broadly be characterised as a neoliberal paradigm versus a demand-oriented or state-interventionist paradigm (Kingstone, Citation2000; Power, Citation2000; Schneider, Citation2013; Vogeler, Citation2016). These paradigms are thought to be closely related to two of the three policy paradigms proposed by scholars of social policy (Hemerijck, Citation2018; Morel, Palier, & Palme, Citation2012). Whilst the social investment paradigm has been gaining prominence in Europe since the 1990s (Nolan, Citation2013; O’Leary et al., Citation2018), this article argues that labour market policy in Brazil is characterised by the competition between a Keynesian-Beveridge and a neoliberal paradigm (see ). The competing paradigms have evolved into an element of party competition: whilst the Workers’ Party (PT) governments of Lula da Silva (2003–2011) and Dilma Rousseff (2011–2016) strengthened the role of the state in economic and social relations (Hall, Citation2009; Schneider, Citation2013), the government of interim President Michel Temer assigned a greater responsibility to the market (Section 3). Following the impeachment of PT President Rousseff in 2017 (Planalto, Citation2018), radical policy changes have been induced: the labour market reform of 2017 is outstanding, since it aims at the flexibilisation and deregulation of the labour market as well as the significant restructuring of industrial relations (Planalto, Citation2017). The reform presents the most radical change in labour laws since 1943. It radically alters social and industrial relations (Hall, Citation2009; Hunter & Power, Citation2007; Silva, Citation2017) and is especially interesting because it was severely contested: in reaction to the bill’s ratification, general strikes took place across Brazil (Brazilian Parliament, Câmara dos Deputados, Citation2017a). In light of its far-reaching implications on the one hand and its contested character on the other, this paper hypothesises that the reform is an expression of the competition of policy paradigms. Moreover, the analysis uncovers how narrative stories were built to underline the imperative for paradigmatic policy change.

Table 1. The Keynesian-Beveridge and the neoliberal welfare paradigms.

Table 2. Descriptive overview of narratives in media and party political releases.

Table 3. Narratives on the labour reform and connection to policy paradigms.

The article is structured as follows: Section 2 elaborates on the connection between policy paradigms and narrative stories. Section 3 presents the case study. Section 4 introduces the design for the empirical analysis, which follows in section 5. Section 6 then discusses the findings and provides concluding remarks.

2. Narrative stories and policy paradigms

Studying the case of macroeconomic policymaking in Great Britain, Peter Hall illustrated how important policy fields are dominated by an overarching set of ideas that guide policymakers (Hall, Citation1993). This set of ideas ‘specifies the goals of policy and the instruments that can be used to attain them, but also the very nature of the problems they are meant to be addressing.’ (p. 279). Policy paradigms include general interpretations of the world, of the problem in a particular policy field, and of the policies that should be applied to address the identified problem (Daigneault, Citation2014; Howlett & Ramesh, Citation2003). However, only a few ideas can be labelled as paradigms (Baumgartner, Citation2014), and the delimitation of paradigms is contested (Hogan & Howlett, Citation2015). Policy paradigms have become particularly relevant for the study of major policy change: Hall argues that radical policy change will only occur if there is a change in the overarching policy paradigm (Hall, Citation1993; Hall Citation2013). Changes in actors and the rise of new coalitions may contribute to paradigm change, e.g. when new actors rise to power and promote a different policy paradigm (Hall, Citation1993). An alternative policy paradigm must include a clear policy objective and the policy instruments that will be used to achieve this objective (Daigneault, Citation2014; Hall, Citation1993).

It is exactly this subjective construction of reality by the proponents or opponents of a policy paradigm that makes the connection with narrative stories particularly fruitful: narrative stories present a frame of how the world works by providing an interpretation of a defined policy problem as well as a potential solution to this problem (Stone, Citation2012, Citation1989). Stone proposes that ‘narrative stories are the principal means for defining and contesting policy problems (…) stories provide explanations of how the world works’ (p. 158). Narratives are important when it comes to policy change and have recently been included in frameworks for the analysis of public policy, such as the narrative policy framework (Shanahan, Jones, McBeth, & Radaelli, Citation2018). Since policy paradigms are in a constant struggle for authority, this article argues that narratives must be constructed to tell the story around them and stress the imperative for paradigmatic change. To the author’s knowledge, policy paradigms and narrative stories have not yet been examined in combination with each other. Both approaches stress the role of discourses in policymaking, particularly in policy change. Yet, in contrast to policy paradigms, narrative stories can be studied at a lower analytical level than paradigms (Blum & Kuhlmann, Citation2019). Stone’s approach is likewise suitable for understanding the ideas and goals surrounding minor policy reforms. Narrative stories can be distinguished between stories of change and stories of power. Stories of change include a story of decline or a story of rising. Stories of decline are told to show how things will get worse if nothing is done, e.g. how unemployment rates will further rise if a certain policy is not passed. A story of decline shows how things are worsening, e.g. by using facts or figures. Moreover, a story of decline often includes a prediction of imminent crisis. In social policy, an economic crisis might be used to justify the need for policy change towards retrenchment (Blum & Kuhlmann, inpressCitation). In the field of labour market policy, the story might begin with rising unemployment rates and transition to the prediction of a lasting economic recession if nothing is done (Bandelow & Hornung Citation2019). Stories of decline include a suggestion of what could be done to address the depicted problem and might be followed by a story of rising, in which the alternative policy solution is presented. Stories of power are characterised by stories of helplessness or stories of control (Stone, Citation2012). After elections, for example, newly elected politicians can argue that, prior to the assumption of government, they were helpless. As soon as they are in power, their new capabilities to control the situation will be emphasised. These narrative stories can be related to the idea of blame avoidance in welfare state reform: if unpopular reforms are passed, politicians make use of blame avoidance strategies to communicate their reforms (Pierson, Citation1996; Wenzelburger & Hörisch, Citation2016). A new government can argue that the preceding government has provoked an economic crisis, which can only be addressed by passing far-reaching reforms. These narrative stories are presumably used to support policy paradigms at times when paradigms compete. Stories of decline can be constructed around an existing policy paradigm by opponents of this paradigm. Likewise, stories of rising can be constructed around a new or alternative policy paradigm. Accordingly, narrative stories of power are expected to be related to specific policy paradigms. If the political power of proponents of a new policy paradigm is strengthened, e.g. by an electoral victory, the proponents are likely to tell stories of prior helplessness and stress their newly attained ability to take control of and address a policy problem.

In the field of social policy, a distinction between three policy paradigms has been proposed (Hemerijck, Citation2018; Morel et al., Citation2012; Nolan, Citation2013). These social policy paradigms can be effectively adapted to the field of labour market policy (see , the social investment paradigm is intentionally left out, because it is not relevant for the policy reform under analysis). An important difference between these paradigms relates to the role of the state: advocates of the so-called Keynesian-Beveridge and the social investment paradigms assign a major role to the state as the fosterer of economic growth and social stability. In the social investment paradigm, the focus of state intervention is on human development as an investment in economic growth (Kuhlmann & Blum, Citationin press; Morel et al., Citation2012). In the Keynesian-Beveridge paradigm, full employment is the primary goal of state intervention in a volatile market. Instruments to achieve full employment, which is seen as a prerequisite for economic growth, include counter-cyclical demand management, job protection and strong social partnerships (Hemerijck, Citation2018; Morel et al., Citation2012). Advocates of the neoliberal paradigm, on the contrary, assume that the market is able to provide the best allocation of labour in the economy. Within this neoliberal paradigm, state intervention and most social policies are interpreted as a disturbance to market functions. To ensure undistorted labour allocation, the state should engage in deregulation, liberalisation, pre-empt organised rent-seeking, and cut social benefits (Hemerijck, Citation2018; Morel et al., Citation2012).

By studying the case of labour market policy in Brazil, this paper seeks to analyse how the Keynesian-Beveridge and the neoliberal policy paradigm influence labour market policy and identify how narrative stories are told to support them.

3. Brazilian labour market policy and the 2017 reforms

The 2017 labour market reforms in Brazil were passed in the context of an economic recession coupled with a political crisis: following 13 years of Workers’ Party rule, President Rousseff (PT) was impeached in 2016 and replaced by her former Vice-President, Temer, who belonged to the centre(-right) party PMDB (now MDB) (OECD, Citation2018; Planalto, Citation2018). The request for impeachment was the result of a huge corruption scandal, the so-called ‘Lava Jatos’, which involved dozens of elected politicians (Ministério Público Federal, Citation2018). While the political crisis unfolded, the Brazilian economy experienced recession, high unemployment, and rising levels of inflation (OECD, Citation2018). The reasons for the economic crisis are manifold and subject to interpretation: opposition parties from the centre-right accused the previous PT governments of economic mismanagement and of failing to implement the necessary reforms. Following the financial crisis of 2008, the Rousseff government had increased state-intervention by means of massive government investments, e.g. in infrastructure, which culminated in the abandonment of fiscal discipline (Ladi, Lazarou, & Hauck, Citation2018). Her successor in office committed his government to fiscal discipline and passed a constitutional amendment to enforce limits on government expenditure (Pereira & Bertholini, Citation2017). In this context, the Brazilian history of hyperinflation is important: the memory of hyperinflation in the 1990s has led to a relatively consensual belief among societal, economic and political actors that achieving macroeconomic stability should be a top priority (Alston, Melo, Mueller, & Pereira, Citation2012). In addition to the alleged failure of the PT government, the challenging international economic environment and the fall in commodity prices are often cited as reasons for the economic recession that hit Brazil from 2014 onwards. In 2015 and 2016, GDP growth was below minus three per cent, the worst value since re-democratisation (OECD, Citation2018). As the economic crisis deepened, Brazilian think tanks strengthened and promoted the need for austerity policies (Ladi et al., Citation2018). Accordingly, the coupling of the severe economic crisis with the political crisis opened a window for advancing far-reaching policy reforms, among them the reform of labour regulations. Law No. 13.467, enacted on 13 July 2017, significantly altered the Brazilian labour regulations (Consolidação das Leis do Trabalho (CLT)) originally passed in 1943 (Coslovsky, Pires, & Bignami, Citation2017; Planalto, Citation2017). The proposed adaptations represent the most far-reaching changes of labour laws for decades (Hall, Citation2009; Hunter & Power, Citation2007; Silva, Citation2017). Changes include increased flexibility in working times and the inclusion of teleworking. Moreover, negotiations between companies and workers were reorganised. Collective agreements on the company level are now strengthened vis-à-vis sectoral agreements. This reorganisation aims to decentralise collective bargaining and increase sectoral and regional flexibility. Another major and much contested change is the elimination of the previously mandatory character of trade union contributions. Traditionally, every employee had to pay the union fee (Coslovsky et al., Citation2017). Consequently, union density in Brazil is comparatively high, though drawing conclusions on the actual degree of labour organisation is challenging (Schneider, Citation2013). Now, each employee must consent to having the fee reduced from his salary (Silva, Citation2017).

The reform plans were presented in December 2016. Originally, Temer planned to pass the policies as a Medida Provisória, which is an instrument available to the Brazilian President for speeding up the passing of legislation in the case of urgency. However, due to foreseeable conflicts with opposition parties and unions on 22nd December, it was announced that the reform was to be sent to and decided by congress (Globo, Citation2016). In Congress, a special commission was established to negotiate the reform and organise hearings with unions and other representatives. The commission was headed by deputy Rogério Marinho, an advocate of the labour reform, member of the PSDB party and an ally of Temer. Crucially, he added the clause ending the compulsory union fee arguing that this would increase both the representativeness of the unions and the efforts they made for workers, as well as decrease the fragmentation of the unions (Marinho, Citation2018). In the middle of the negotiations on the labour reform, the government was hit by a political crisis: at the beginning of April 2017, investigations were initiated against several ministers of the Temer government in light of the Lava Jatos corruption scandal (Paulo, Citation2017). Temer subsequently urged congress to accelerate the political process, hoping to prove to the public that the government was not paralysed by the political scandal (Brazilian Parliament, Câmara dos Deputados, Citation2017b). To this aim, the proposal to declare the labour reform as a matter of urgency was put to vote in congress. This means that congress had to decide upon the policy within a very short time period. However, the government failed to achieve a majority for the acceleration of the process on April 18th. A day later, the vote was repeated and the government achieved the necessary majority to advance the voting (Globo, Citation2017). On April 26th, the reform was passed by congress with 296 votes in favour and 177 votes against; then it was passed on to the senate (Deputados, Citation2017a). In July 2017, the reform was approved by the senate with 50 votes in favour and 26 votes against. On July 13th, President Temer sanctioned Lei No 13.467, which came into force on 11 November 2017.

Figure 1. Processing of the Brazilian labour reform of 2017.

Source: own design

Figure 1. Processing of the Brazilian labour reform of 2017.Source: own design

The controversial character of the reform manifested in the course of the political process: during the vote in congress, deputies of the opposition protested and delayed the vote (Deputados, Citation2017b). Similar opposition manifested during the vote in the senate in July. Following the approval, massive, and partly violent, public protests against the reform took place, including a general strike organised by the unions (Brazilian Parliament, Câmara dos Deputados, Citation2017a). When analysing the proponents and opponents of the labour reform, the conflict line reflects overarching ideas regarding the role of the state vis-à-vis the market: the proponents of the labour reform stem from liberal and conservative parties, like the PMDB or the PSDB, whilst the opponents stem from the Workers’ Party (PT), the unions, and various social movements (see ). Although the Brazilian party system is highly fragmented, and party-switching is common among elected deputies (Power, Citation2000), the results of the vote in congress on the labour reform are clear: the deputies from the PT and the left-wing PCdoB unanimously voted against the reform, whilst the majority of deputies from the centre or right-wing parties PMDB, PP and PSDB voted for the reform, to name just the bigger parties (Deputados, Citation2017a; see ).

Figure 2. Results of the voting on the Brazilian labour reform in the chamber of deputies on 26 April 2017.

Source: own design; data from the Brazilian Chamber of Deputies (Deputados, Citation2017a)

Figure 2. Results of the voting on the Brazilian labour reform in the chamber of deputies on 26 April 2017.Source: own design; data from the Brazilian Chamber of Deputies (Deputados, Citation2017a)

In light of these patterns, this article argues that the labour market reform of 2017 is an expression of a more general conflict of policy paradigms. The years following the re-democratisation of Brazil in the 1990s are often associated with Brazilian ‘neoliberalism’ (Kingstone, Citation2000; Vogeler, Citation2016). Although the PSDB-led governments pursued privatisation, deregulation and trade liberalisation at the beginning of the 1990s, these liberal reforms were coupled with state intervention in selected policy fields (Kingstone, Citation2000; Power, Citation2000; Schneider, Citation2013) and are therefore sometimes cited as examples of ‘selective liberalism’ (Singer, Citation2012). With regard to labour relations, the liberal economic policy reforms of the 1990s weakened the traditionally powerful unions, leaving them in a defensive position (Payne, Citation1995). When the Workers’ Party came into government in 2003, the political power of the unions increased significantly (Singer, Citation2012). The electoral victory of the former union leader Lula da Silva is often associated with public discontent over the strict fiscal authority of the PSDB governments and the liberal reforms (Ladi et al., Citation2018). During the PT governments, the liberal reform agenda was amended by generous redistributive and demand-oriented policies. Following the social policy paradigm proposed by Morel et al. (see ), the policies passed by the PT can be ascribed to the Keynesian-Beveridge paradigm. Particularly from 2011 onwards, the state played a more significant role in the structuring of economic relations and its political intervention in the economy increased (Musacchio & Lazzarini, Citation2014). When political power shifted again in 2016, a policy paradigm closely related to the neoliberal paradigm, which is associated with flexibilisation and deregulation, seemed to gain influence (see ). The ensuing analysis explores how narrative stories were applied in order to underline the imperative for paradigmatic policy change. The analysis is guided by the following hypotheses:

Hypothesis 1 expects the labour reform to be representative of two competing policy paradigms in Brazilian labour market policy, namely a neoliberal and a Keynesian-Beveridge paradigm.

Hypothesis 2 assumes that these paradigms are closely related to party politics: the PT advocates the Keynesian-Beveridge paradigm, whereas the PSDB propounds the neoliberal paradigm. Regarding the relationship of narrative stories and policy paradigms, this hypothesis assumes that narrative stories played an essential role in the battle of policy paradigms for sovereignty.

Hypothesis 3 assumes that stories of change are used to promote paradigm change. The PSDB will tell stories of decline concerning the economic situation and the unemployment sparked by the previous PT governments. The severity of the situation will be connected to the need for paradigmatic policy change, which will be communicated by stories of rising.

Hypothesis 3a expects the narrative stories of the PSDB to be dominated by stories of power and control. Following the PT’s loss of power, the PSDB now has the power to change the situation.

Hypothesis 3b expects the PT to narrate stories of helplessness, given their loss of political power.

4. Methods

To test these hypotheses, a two-tiered empirical analysis is conducted. Following the vote in congress on the labour reform that was dominated by party lines (see ), the major political parties are expected to represent the competing policy paradigms (hypothesis 2) and narrate diverging stories about the labour reform. Given the high fragmentation of the party system in Brazil, the decision was taken to focus on the positioning of the two major parties: the PT and the PSDB. Secondly, a systematic media analysis using the online database nexis (LexisNexis, Citation2018) is conducted to assess whether this conflict is mirrored in public discussion. For the media analysis, two of the Brazilian newspapers with the widest circulation and with nationwide coverage were selected: O Globo (Brazil) and O Estado de São Paulo. The archives of both newspapers are accessible via the database nexis. The time frame for the analysis is from 1 December 2016 until 25 April 2017. The selection of the time frame follows the political process of the labour reform as depicted in . Within the five months of analysis, all articles that included the keyword ‘reforma trabalhista’ were searched. By this procedure, 126 relevant articles were identified and included in the empirical analysis. The aim of the media analysis is the identification of narrative stories and their connection to the competing policy paradigms in Brazilian economic policy. Accordingly, the differentiation of narrative stories in stories of decline, stories of rising and stories of power – which are divided into stories of helplessness and control – is applied to the analysis. Each article was first screened for its main content and its positioning on the labour reform of 2017. Secondly, the article’s positioning towards the reform was identified either as neutral, pro or anti. Thirdly, the articles were screened for narrative stories of change (decline/rising) and for stories of power (control/helplessness).

For the analysis of party positions, the archives of the webpages of the two parties were searched for press releases and news articles that contained the word combination ‘reforma trabalhista’ and which were published in the same time period. In total, the search revealed 64 relevant articles for the PSDB and 60 for the PT. The articles were then analysed following the same procedure as used for the media articles.

5. Empirical findings

A descriptive overview of the results is given in ; the detailed findings are systematically sorted in the annex. A clear picture can be seen in the party-political releases: the PT heavily opposes the reform, whereas the PSDB advocates the reform (hypothesis 2). Of interest to this study is the exploration of which narrative stories are constructed around the competing positions and in what ways these stories relate to policy paradigms.

The first noteworthy fact revealed by examination of the media articles is that the vast majority of articles take a position in favour of the labour reform and implicitly or explicitly supports it. Of the analysed articles, 72 were in favour of the reform and only 5 articles opposed it or cited more arguments against the reform than for it. In 49 articles, no positioning was identified. In the majority of articles, only advocates of the reform were cited. In particular, economists and scientists were cited, as well as politicians who spoke out for the reform explicating the positive effects that it would have on the economy and labour market.

Regarding the narrative stories constructed around the labour reform, there was only one consistent story line in the media that largely mirrors the policy preferences of the PSDB. This story is closely related to the neoliberal policy paradigm (hypothesis 1): at the beginning of the discussion, most articles tell a story of decline, focusing on the connection between the reform and the lasting economic recession. This finding closely relates to the theoretical expectation that the retrenching of social policies is accompanied by stories of decline (hypothesis 3). Rising unemployment rates are cited as a significant, negative consequence of the economic decline. The argument that follows is that the proposed labour reform is essential for revitalising growth and will help to create jobs (stories of rising). This is also the main line of argument found in the PSDB news releases as deregulation and flexibilisation are presented as necessary for stimulating economic growth, which will in turn result in employment. Several media articles and PSBD releases draw a connection to the broader macroeconomic reform agenda, the fiscal discipline of the Temer government and the austerity policies. In the PSDB press releases, the PT governments are blamed for the economic crisis and the high unemployment rates. They claim that the economic mismanagement of the PT governments brought about the current recession. This story of decline is connected to stories of power and control, related to the assumption of government by President Temer (stories of power, hypothesis 3a), and to a story of rising concerning the new policy paradigm (hypothesis 3). The PSDB admits that the reform may be damaging in the beginning but insists that the long-term positive effects will compensate for these losses. An advantage of the reform mentioned in most articles and PSDB press releases is the reduction of labour costs by means of flexibilisation and liberalisation which will allow firms to hire more workers – unlike the existing regulatory framework, which is considered rigid and hostile to the market (stories of decline and of rising). Connected to the general flexibilisation of the labour market, many articles draw a connection to the newly created legal possibility of outsourcing for firms. The legalisation of outsourcing presents a novelty in the Brazilian labour market, though it was not passed as part of the labour reform but as a separate policy. In the media, arguments in favour of the outsourcing reform dominate. Furthermore, the argument that the labour reform presents an important step towards modernising labour relations prevails in the majority of media outlets as well as in the PSDB releases (stories of rising). They justify this modernisation as necessary by emphasising that the existing labour laws date back to 1943 and have never been significantly altered. An adaptation of the laws is considered essential in order to combat current and future challenges in the labour market.

The PT releases, on the contrary, interpret this modernisation as regression and as the deterioration of the achievements of workers and unions (stories of decline). Regarding the outsourcing reform, several articles of the PSDB mention that the reform is much contested and that unions fear the precarisation of employment. The PT party press releases share this stance, arguing that the outsourcing and labour reforms will destroy workers’ rights and the achievements of unions in past decades. This line of argumentation is closely connected to harsh criticism of Temer and his ‘neoliberal’ policies. In the PT releases, Temer is heavily censured and is in most articles connected to a story surrounding the impeachment of Rousseff, in which Temer is called a ‘golpista’, or ‘usurper’ (hypothesis 3b, stories of helplessness). This line of argument portrays the Temer government as illegitimate and unwilling to cater to the interests of the Brazilian people, preferring instead to bolster the industrial elite as well as financial and international investors. In many of the PT articles, a general critique is made of the neoliberal economic and social policies of the Temer and even Cardoso governments and is contrasted with the demand-oriented and redistributive policies of the PT governments. An argument frequently cited is that the Temer government is aiming to withdraw the state from economic and social relations and that this will deepen the economic crisis. Interestingly, the PT articles interpret most consequences of the labour reform completely contradictorily to the PSDB articles: deregulation and flexibilisation will result in even higher unemployment, lower demand, and a deepening of the economic crisis. In many articles, a story of the decline of the rights of the Brazilian people and workers is told by arguing that the labour reform is a cutback on the social achievements of past decades. Stories of helplessness are told in conjunction with the impeachment of Rousseff and the ‘coup’ of Temer (hypothesis 3b). These stories are backed by narratives of Temer attempting to accelerate approval of the reform and bypass congress, which is interpreted as a lack of democratic behaviour. At the same time, especially in March and April of 2017, stories of power and control were appearing in an increasing number of articles as the PT, together with the unions, were presented as organising nationwide demonstrations and general strikes, thereby mobilising the Brazilian people to stand up against the ‘illegitimate’ government.

In February 2017, another pivotal element of the labour reform moved into the focus of the media discussion: namely the proposal to turn the existing compulsory union fee into a voluntary fee, as raised by Rogério Marinho and the congressional commission dealing with the labour reform. The supporters of the proposal argued that the current, compulsory system was the cause of Brazil’s excess number of unions. Secondly, they argued that the compulsory character of the union fee had resulted in the existence of unions that do not adequately represent their members. If the union fee was made voluntary, this would strengthen those unions committed to supporting their members while weakening those unions uncommitted. Another argument coupled with narrative stories of decline is the fact that the existing union organisation was founded in the 1930s during the fascist regime of Getúlio Vargas, making it outdated and unable to cope with contemporary challenges in the labour market. In the PT press releases, the reform of the union system is described as an attempt to destroy social partnerships, hinder representation, and strengthen the role of employers.

Shortly before the vote in congress, media coverage on the labour reform intensified: in April alone, more than 50 articles on it were published. A new thematic focus of media coverage in this period was the planned public demonstrations and strikes against the labour reform. These demonstrations were also discussed in the statements of the PT and the PSDB. Interestingly, the PT combined the public demonstrations with stories of power: they argued that the demonstrations revealed the resistance against the ‘illegitimate’ Temer government and his reform plans. The PT called on social movements and the Brazilian people to participate in the demonstrations to convey the condemnation of the alleged destruction of the advancements made by Brazilian workers in past decades (stories of power). The PSDB similarly reported on the public demonstrations, but the focus of their coverage was the necessity of the reforms for restimulating growth. Advocates of the reform were cited in several media articles, stating that they would proceed with the reform plans, regardless of the announced resistance. In the days preceding the vote in congress, the voting behaviour of the deputies became another focus of reporting. In several articles, members of the advocates were cited, arguing that they had enough supporters to pass the reform. In , the main narratives of the PT and the PSDB are summarised and connected to policy paradigms that are proposed in the existing literature (Hemerijck, Citation2018). It becomes apparent that the narratives applied by the two parties are very closely aligned to overarching policy paradigms (hypothesis 1).

To draw primary conclusions for the hypotheses: When comparing party political statements, support for hypotheses 1 and 2 becomes evident: The analysis shows that a close connection between the labour reform and overarching policy paradigms is drawn (hypothesis 1, ). Moreover, there is a clear division between the PT, who criticise the labour reform for strengthening a (neo)liberal policy paradigm, and the PSDB, who stress the need of these liberal policies and criticise the formerly high degree of state intervention. The narrative stories build around the advocacy for, or opposition against, the reform are backed by general assumptions on the role of the state and the market in social and labour relations. These policy paradigms are closely related to party politics (hypothesis 2): in the PT press releases, criticism of the labour reform is connected with criticism of the ‘neoliberal’ agenda of Temer, while the need for demand-oriented policies and the importance of social partnerships are stressed. In the PSDB press releases, the economic crisis is accredited to the economic policymaking of Rousseff and da Silva and the massive state intervention in the economy (stories of change, hypothesis 3). Here, policy solutions are closely associated with neoliberal paradigms and consist of flexibilisation and deregulation, which are predicted to guarantee undistorted labour market allocation. Interestingly, the media analysis shows a clear prevalence of advocates of the labour market reform. The reform is framed within a narrative story of a necessary macroeconomic reform agenda that is aligned to a neoliberal policy paradigm and which largely mirrors the PSDB’s position. The majority of media articles supports the reform and the imperative of policy change, telling stories of the rise of a neoliberal policy paradigm (hypothesis 3). The number of articles telling stories of decline or which openly criticise or blame the previous governments is considerably lower. Contrary to the PSDB press releases, explicit criticism of the PT governments or blame directed towards Dilma Rousseff and/or Lula da Silva for the economic crisis appears predominantly in guest articles in the media. These are authored by (former) politicians, economists or scientists and contain explicit, somewhat harsh criticism of the previous PT governments. Criticism is voiced in particular regarding the economic policymaking of Dilma Rousseff, which is characterised as state-interventionist and hostile to the market. Although opposing arguments were raised in some of these articles, they all spoke out for the imperative of reform. In the few media articles to oppose the labour reform, the reform was criticised as a measure that would lead to imbalances between employers and employees, at the expense of employees. The cutting of social rights was raised as another possibility, for they argued that the reform would lead to a general weakening of workers’ representation and of labour laws. Moreover, doubts were raised regarding whether the reform of labour laws would prove an adequate measure for tackling the economic crisis and whether it really would lower unemployment. Sometimes these articles are embedded in a broader narrative story of the social achievements of the PT governments, in particular its greater social inclusion and its redistributive policies.

Hypothesis 3 expected stories of change to be narrated in order to promote paradigm change. The analysis shows how the supporters of the labour reform are telling stories of decline, tracing-back the economic challenges and the high unemployment to the ‘interventionist’ and ‘paternalist’ policies of the PT government that have debilitated the competitiveness of the Brazilian economy. This story of decline is connected to a story of rising which presents an alternative policy paradigm as a solution to the problems. This story of rising relies on the imperative of the withdrawal of the state from labour relations and the advantages of flexibilisation and reregulation. The opponents of the reform also rely on stories of decline, however, with a different interpretation: they argue that the reform agenda of Temer and the labour reform in particular are a setback of labour rights and as such a general attack to the achievements of the labour movement. The Temer government is blamed for withdrawing rights from the Brazilian people and for the precarisation of employment. With regards to the role of stories of power in the face of competing policy paradigms, the analysis offers support for the frequent use of these narratives. We expected the PSDB to tell stories of power and control, given the change of government (hypothesis 3a), while the PT narrated stories of helplessness (hypothesis 3b). In 45 out of 64 PSDB releases, stories of power and control were identified. These stories of control also dominated the media articles that overwhelmingly advocated the labour reform: out of the 126 media articles, 72 were clearly in favour of the reform; and 38 of these narrated stories of power and control. Hypothesis 3a can thus be confirmed, which suggests that paradigmatic policy change is supported by narrative stories of control. Interestingly, stories of helplessness (8) and stories of control (16) were also identified in the PT releases. Stories of control were connected to planned demonstrations and public resistance against the reform agenda and the Temer government. Given this mixed picture, hypothesis 3b can neither be confirmed nor disproven.

6. Discussion and conclusion

This article aimed to identify opposing narratives in Brazilian labour market policy and explore in what ways narrative stories are employed to promote policy paradigms. The findings firstly suggest that the labour market reform of 2017 was an expression of competing policy paradigms in Brazilian politics, which are themselves reflected in party political competition. The analysis moreover showed how the advocates and opponents of the competing policy paradigms – neoliberal versus Keynesian-Beveridge – rely on narrative stories to ‘sell’ their ideas and stress the imperative for paradigm change. The supporters of the reform strategically applied stories of control and stories of rising that were connected to censure of the previous governments in order to support their preferred policy solutions. Whereas support for the reform program was to be expected in the PSDB releases, it is striking that supporters of the labour reform, who represent the neoliberal policy paradigm, also dominated the media discourse, whilst comparatively low attention was given to opponents of the reform, who support the Keynesian-Beveridge policy paradigm. As revealed by the PSDB press releases, the supporting media articles connect their narrative story for the imperative of change to a broader social and economic reform agenda, which is related to a neoliberal policy paradigm. In contrast, no such comprehensive story for the opponents of the reform and their paradigm is to be found in media reporting. Apparently, the shift in government responsibility was accompanied or even entailed by a strengthening of this paradigm, of which the labour reform is evidence. Then-President Temer, who, besides the labour reform, pushed through several other structural reforms, such as the pension and outsourcing reforms, took office following the outbreak of a political crisis coupled with an economic recession. These crises opened a window of opportunity for inducing radical policy changes. For the connection of narratives with policy paradigms, the empirical analysis revealed how the labour reform is embedded within the competition posed by the two overarching policy paradigms. These paradigms shape the conception of policy problems and solutions. This competition of paradigms is supported by narrative stories of change: whilst one side describes the withdrawal of the state as imperative for economic growth, the other presents these policies as conducive to the deepening of the economic crisis. Regarding the labour market, one side perceives state regulation as the reason for unemployment, whereas the other considers deregulation a danger to Brazilian society as a whole. The supporters of the neoliberal policy paradigm rely heavily on stories of power, basing them off the change of government and stressing that they are now in control. They connect this story of control to stories of decline, interpreting the existing problems as consequences of the PT governments’ policymaking. They present a story of rising about their preferred policy solution, namely to solve the existing economic crisis by relying on instruments inspired by the neoliberal policy paradigm. The study shows how narrative stories are applied to support policy paradigms and how narrative stories of decline and of rising are told to stress the imperative for paradigm change. Especially at times when policy paradigms compete for sovereignty, a well thought-out narrative story helps to communicate why one paradigm is superior to another and why radical change is needed.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Colette S. Vogeler

Colette S. Vogeler is research associate at the Chair of Comparative Politics and Public Policy at the University of Braunschweig. Previously, she worked at the Universities of Heidelberg and Kaiserslautern and gathered international experience during her work and educational stays in China and South America. Her research interests and expertise lie in the field of policy analysis, with a focus on economic, environmental, agrarian and animal welfare policies.

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