Violent civic nationalism versus civil ethnic nationalism: Contrasting Indonesia and Malay(si)a

Abstract

In 1963 the Federation of Malaya, Singapore, Sarawak, and Sabah formed the Federation of Malaysia. In the same year Indonesia gained control over West Papua. In the first case the integration was accomplished participatory and peacefully, in the second violence reigned supreme. I argue that different visions of community, nation and state, developed during the decades of decolonisation and the early years of state- and nation-building, are responsible for the different outcomes. Contrary to the expectations of the predominant theories on nationalism the ethno-cultural variant of nation-building in Malaysia proved to be much more integrative than the civic variant espoused by the Indonesian nation-builders.

Keywords:

• Nation-building
• State-building
• Ethnic Violence
• Political Culture
• Ethnic- nationalism
• Civic Nationalism
• National Identity
• Indonesia
• Malaysia

Notes

1. I would like to thank Susanne Buckley-Zistel, Mirjam Weiberg and Heidrun Zinecker who read the manuscript and made valuable suggestions. I greatly profited from the critical remarks made by the two anonymous reviewers. However, I am solely responsible for any and all shortcomings.

2. On these and the following themes see for example: Ginsburg and Roberts (1958); Gullick (1958); Milne (1967); Simandjuntak (1969); Means (1970); Tan (1988); Ariffin (1993); Milner (1998, 1995); Shamsul (1998); Hefner (2001); Cheah (2002); Hng (2004).

3. On the varying meanings of ‘Malay’ see Nagata (1974 and 1982).

4. See Means (1972: p.51). Enshrining special rights into the constitution had the effect to narrow access to the political arena for the non-Malay groups. Only those representatives, who were ‘willing to acknowledge the basic Malay identity of the country and to avoid any challenge to the system of Malay special rights’ were allowed to participate.

5. Nevertheless the elections of the 1950s were lopsided, because a large number of Chinese were not registered as voters. In 1955 they constituted only 11 per cent of the electorate, in 1959 the percentage had risen to 34 per cent and in the 1964 elections, a full 37 per cent of the electorate were Chinese (Grossholtz, 1970: p.98). From then on the racial distribution of the electorate basically resembled the actual distribution of the population.

6. It should be pointed out that this style was not only the product of three 'enlightened’ elites, but also of a bundle of circumstances which, however, due to considerations of space can not be dealt here in detail. However, a few words on the emergency and the inter-ethnic violence of 1945 seem in order. The communist subversion, which began properly in 1948, was as a very strong external force in pointing to the shared interests of the conservative elites of the three ethnic groups (Simandjuntak 1969: pp.56–70; Cheah, 2002: pp.22–39) The war waged by the Chinese dominated Malayan Communist party made clear to UMNO that too much pressure on non-Malays might result in even higher levels of violence. This led to a softening of UMNO's stance on citizenship (Thompson, 1967: pp.63–64).To the conservative Chinese elites the violent rebellion served as a stark reminder, that their only chance for survival lay in the cooperation with the dominant Malay force, i.e. UMNO. Seen from their vantage point, the Communist insurrection also aimed at their leadership over the Chinese community. Considering the history of the Malayan Communist Party and the fact that it was overwhelmingly led and manned by Chinese, the insurrection can be interpreted as an image of the struggle between the Guomindang (GMD) and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in China. The defeat of the GMD in 1949 closed the doors to China for the moderate or conservative Chinese whose future fate now completely relied on their new Malayan existence, a fact, which had significant repercussions on their readiness for compromise. The insurrection had not only catalytic effects on the indigenous elites, but on the British colonial power as well, since it ‘forced the British Government to accelerate its plans further for Malaya's decolonisation’ (Cheah, 2002: p.22). Besides the pressure provided by the Communist insurrection, the remembrance of the inter-racial violence in the weeks between the Japanese surrender and the return of the British haunted the political actors. During these crucial weeks, the fighters of the basically Chinese Malayan Peoples Anti-Japanese Army (MPAJA), who had spearheaded the anti-Japanese resistance in Malaya, settled scores with all those people whom they believed to have collaborated with the Japanese occupation forces. This heightened inter-ethnic tensions which had already been fostered by the Japanese over the years before.

7. This occasion does not mark the beginning of Malayan interest in state-enlargement. Its roots can be traced back to the late 1940s at least (Sopiee, 1973). For an introduction into the developments in Sabah and Sarawak preceding the Formation of Malaysia see the Report of the UN Malaysia Mission (1963). On the process of integration and the first years of Malaysia see Ongkili (1972); Milne and Ratnam (1974); Roff (1974). On the role of the British and their ‘Grand Design’ for a Greater Malaysia see Tan (2003).

8. It can be stated that the readiness with which the Malayan political elite accepted all Bornean demands is due to their overarching interest to safeguard an indigenous majority and provide a strong counterweight against Chinese assertiveness in the new federation. This underestimates their strategic opportunities at the negotiation table. Both the Singapore leadership under Lee Kuan Yew and the British colonial power had an overwhelming interest in a ‘Grand Design’ (albeit for different reasons). The British overlords of Sabah and Sarawak had aimed at the formation of a Greater Malaysia since the late 1940s, because they felt their interests best represented by such a solution. They clearly pushed the local elites of the two territories to accept Tunku Abdul Rahman's overture. In contrast, it was the Malay side which initially had no interest in these proposals. As late as 1960 the Tunku, while showing some interest in the integration with Brunei and Sarawak was ‘quite happy to let the British retain North Borneo for defence purposes, as a ‘British fortress’ colony outside his association’ (Tan, 2003: p.158). The British were advised to ‘dangle the Borneo Territories as an incentive if they were to have a chance of persuading the Tunku to accept a merger with Singapore’. Therefore the Malay bargaining position would have been rather strong, if they had chosen to opt for a maximalist position.

9. The House of Representatives was to have 159 Members, of which only 104 were to represent population of the former Federation of Malaya (∼9 million). The Bornean territories received 40 seats even though they had a population of only 1.5 million. Singapore, with a population of more than one million people received only 15 seats.

10. For the text of the agreement see Ongkili (1967: pp.130–134).

11. See also Moedjanto (1990).

12. In a way, Sutan Sjahir can be seen as a counter-model to the one personalised by Sukarno. Sjahir showed a high degree of empathy for the positions and arguments of his political opponents and also knew that in politics learning and progress could only come from openness und a willingness for real negotiation, which had to involve compromise. He also insisted on the adoption of the Western form of Democracy, whereas for Sukarno ‘true democracy was embodied in the Indonesian system that was his model’ (Dahm, 1969: p.329). Perhaps it is more than mere coincidence that the most prominent critics of Suharto were natives of Sumatra, while his successor in the position of president once more displayed the attitude of the Javanese ruler In respect to the question of centralization most non-Javanese politicians ‘supported regionalist claims, especially after Sukarno began to favour the establishment of new, even more centralized political institutions’ in the late 1950s (Bertrand, 2004: p.36).

13. See Feith (1962).

14. On the conceptual development of Gotong royong see for example Rigg, Alliott, Harrson, Kratz (1999).

15. See Geertz (1963: pp.105–157. The citation is on p.09.

16. For excellent studies of the process of incorporation of West Papua see Chauvel (1997 and 1998). Chauvel debates a host of issues, which, for constraint of space, cannot be discussed here. Overall, he comes to a conclusion similar to the one advanced here (see for example Chauvel 1997: pp.559, 572). For further literature see also Lijphart (1966); Sharp (1977); Savage (1978); Lagerberg (1979); Osborne (1985); May (1991); Browne (1998); Rutherford (2002); Bertrand (2004). A host of literature on West Papua has been published recently, most of which, however, focuses on later events. See Chauvel (2003) and various studies by the ICG (see: www.crisiweb.org).

17. It has to be pointed out, that there were counter-tendencies opting for more restraint and openness and counselling against a new imperialism now perpetrated by the centre of the former colony against its own periphery. Most prominent among them was Mohammad Hatta, who argued against the inclusion of West Papua into a future independent Indonesia (Hatta, 1945: pp.442–443). However, with respect to West Papua Hatta ‘was singular among the main leaders in contemplating other options’ than Indonesian national aggrandizement (Chauvel, 1998: p.19). Not only in 1945 but throughout the following decade these voices, while audible, never took centre stage. With the introduction of Guided Democracy they had been effectively and definitely silenced.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Peter Kreuzer

Peter Kreuzer is in the Peace Research Institute, Frankfurt