Explaining Northern Ireland? The limitations of the ethnic conflict model

Abstract

This article claims that while the concept of ethno-nationalism may be taken as shorthand for describing what appear to be the dominant features of certain political conflicts, it possesses little explanatory value – instead obscuring and confusing more than it reveals. Using the Northern Ireland case as an illustrative example, it is argued that the reluctance to problematise or contextualise ethnic claims means that ethnic conflict theorists may effectively contribute to the reproduction of dominant narratives. The article explicitly rejects the notion that a single framework should replace the ethno-national model. Instead, it highlights the importance of focusing issues of timing and historical sequencing, source criticism and empirical evidence, as well as the significance of marginal narratives and experiences.

Keywords:

• Northern Ireland
• ethno-nationalism
• path-dependency
• historical sociology
• British government

Notes

1. Visit of the Prime Ministers of the Irish Republic and of Northern Ireland, 26–27 September 1971, National Archives, London (hereafter NA), PREM 15/487.

2. Faulkner to Heath, 1 March 1972, NA CJ 4/189.

3. Report of a meeting between Dermot Nally and Brian Faulkner, 26 October 1973, National Archives of Ireland (Dublin) (hereafter NAI), DT/2004/21/670.

4. Newsletter, 3 May 1973.

5. Newsletter, 4 July 1973.

6. Newsletter, 28 September 1973.

7. Newsletter, 9 November 1973.

8. Northern Ireland Committee minutes, 1 March 1973 NA CJ 4/514.

9. Newsletter, 3 November 1973.

10. Kerr (2006a, p. 55) actually hints at these ideas when he claims that while 7% of Protestants rejected the March 1973 White Paper (on which power sharing was based) in 1974, 76% favoured negotiations to ‘try to make it work’. Although he does not specify what those negotiations would be aimed at, he admits that in May 1973 three-quarters of Protestant voters voted for anti-Faulknerite candidates. The position of these candidates (politicians such as Ian Paisley and William Craig) was to negotiate a return to devolved, majoritarian government.

11. Belfast Telegraph, 12 October 1973.

12. Joint statement by the Parliamentary leaders of the Ulster Unionist Party and the Ulster Democratic Unionist Party at Westminster, 12 March 1973, NA CJ 4/514.

13. Irish Independent, 25 May 1972.

14. Meeting of the SDLP standing committee, 18 July 1972, Public Record Office of Northern Ireland (Belfast) (PRONI) D/3072/1/32/1.

15. SDLP proposals, 21 September 1972, NAI DFA/2004/7/2698.

16. Council of Ireland, Paper 1, N.D. [December 1972], NAI DT/2003/16/430.

17. Memorandum, 24 May 1973, NAI DT/2004/21/624.

18. Wilson, ‘Apocalyptic Note for the Record’, 10 January 1976, NA CJ 4/1358.

19. See John Hunt to Harold Wilson, 16 January 1976, ‘Northern Ireland’, NA PREM 16/960.

20. Official working group on Northern Ireland, ‘Majority rule, Note by the NIO, October 1975’, NA CJ 4/754.

21. Kerr's source in this instance is James Molyneaux, who remained aloof from the Faulkner camp during this time.