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ABSTRACT
This study examines the distinctive roles that social media play for the diasporic Kurds in regard to the political and nationhood process. It attempts to understand how the notion of Kurdayeti [Kurdish nationalism] has been affected by the growth of Kurdish social media. It argues: although the Kurdish political activism has been accelerated by the rise of social media and the ethnic identity discussions have become much more visible, the idea of a unified imagined Kurdish nation has been affected by the existing socio-political fragmentations among the Kurds and transformed into a participatory and pluralistic imagined community.
Correction Statement
This article has been republished with minor changes. These changes do not impact the academic content of the article.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.
Notes on contributor
Jiyar Hossein Aghapouri is a recent PhD graduate in Politics and International Relations from the University of Auckland, New Zealand. His PhD thesis discussed the Kurdish diaspora and nationalism on social media. In addition to the diaspora, nationalism and Kurdish studies, he is interested in teaching and researching the areas of International Relations of the Middle East, Constructivism in IR, Politics and Media, Migration, Cross-Cultural Communication, and Globalization.
Notes
1 For gender, the observation was conducted based on the main two genders, males and females. In terms of generation, the ‘first generation’ of the Kurdish diaspora is referred to those who have been born, grown up or lived in Kurdistan for a while and then moved to diaspora. The second generation of the Kurdish diaspora us referred to those who have been born or grown up in the diaspora.
2 ANZAC day, 25 April, marks the anniversary of the landing of Australian and New Zealand Australian soldiers – the Anzacs – on the Gallipoli Peninsula in 1915. On this day Australians and New Zealanders remember the sacrifices of their soldiers who died in the Gallipoli war. The Gallipoli war resulted in thousands of death from all sides: 87,000 Turks, 44,000 people from France and the British Empire, including 8500 Australians and 2778 New Zealanders. The campaign led to the defeat of Australia and New Zealand forces who were serving in the name of British Empire, however, this date produced a feeling among Australians and New Zealanders that they had a role in the war distinct nations (see, https://nzhistory.govt.nz/war/anzac-day/introduction).
3 Coincidently, this is a case in which Kurdish nationalisms falls in line with Australian/New Zealand nationalism both against Turkey.
4 This is probably partly due to the fact that there is an active discourse of multiculturalism in Australia, the US, Canada, etc, that allows people to combine a national identity – Australian, etc – with an ethnic identity – Kurdish. (eg: Greek Australian, Italian Australian, etc.)
5 There were disagreements on the subject of the Kurdish national flag. A majority of Kurdish diaspora users from Iraq and Iran mostly opted for the current Kurdish flag raised on the Kurdistan Regional Government’s institutions, including the Parliament. Yet, the majority of the Kurdish diaspora users from Turkey and Syria were unwilling to raise/ display this flag and had their own flag(s) which was different from the flag of Kurdistan raising or accepted in Iraqi or Iranian parts of Kurdistan.
6 Although Kurdistan is not an independent country, the national anthem of Kurd/Kurdistan is widely accepted, respected and recited in all parts of Kurdistan as well as in the diaspora. The anthem is originally from a poem written in 1938 by the poet Yunis Rauf known as Dildar. The title, Ey Reqib [hey enemy] refers to the enemies of Kurds that have tried to eliminate/assimilate or kill Kurds. It underlines the statelessness situation of Kurds and the importance of its existence a recognizable nation or ethnicity. The poem was originally written in the Sorani dialect of Kurdish and was later translated into the Kurmanci dialect. In fact, apart from few religious political groups, all Kurdish political groups, regardless of their contesting ideologies, have accepted the poem as the Kurdish national anthem.
7 The video of the attack is available on YouTube, accessible at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vuqad2rOfDY
8 Mohammad Sedigh Kaboudvand is the Iranian Kurdish journalist and human rights activist and the founder of Kurdistan Human Rights Organisation. He was imprisoned by the Iranian authrities under the charges of ‘acting against the national security’ and boycotting the 9th presidential election which resulted in bringing Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to office in 2005. In 2009, he was awarded the international journalist of the year by the British Press Awards. The international human rights organisations and the human rights activists throughout the world organised several d campaigns for his release. He was released on 12 May 2017 after serving a ten-year sentence (Kurdistan24, 12 May 2017: http://www.kurdistan24.net/en/news/b7ab7b30-f666-4990-b99e-d0c5a1be04e4/Kurdish-journalist-released-from-prison-in-Iran)
9 For example, the story of Turkish military attacking at the Kurdish city of Cizre was highly echoed by the Kurdish diaspora users of Facebook. Some of the postings showed photos of Kurdish mothers mourning while showing photos of their children who were killed by the Turkish army. These stories went viral online and had many repercussions among social media users both in the diaspora and in the homeland.
10 Kolbar(s) are semi-legal porters who carry heavy packs of goods (usually cigarret, tea, house furniture, automobile parts and so on) on their backs, across the mountains and dangerous routs from the Kurdistan Region to Iran. Since there is not enough employment opportunities in the Iranian Kurdistan, thousands of people even highly educated ones, are involved in such a risky job. The Iranian border security forces regard the unlicensed kolbars as ‘smugglers involved in an illegal economy, bringing weapons and drugs into the country and posing a threat to Iranian security.’ According to the France-based Kurdistan Human Rights Network, Iranian authorities indiscriminately shoot people in the borderlines, and in 2016 only, 42 Kurish Kolbers were directly shot dead, 30 were injured, and 22 drowned or died of hypothermia and other causes (cited in Rudaw, 30 March 2017: http://www.rudaw.net/english/middleeast/iran/30032017?keyword=ISIS).