Critical challenges to consultants in pursuing quality of Environmental and Social Impact Assessments (ESIA) in Cambodia

Abstract

The challenges faced by consultants in improving ESIA quality in Cambodia are discussed in this paper. Despite progress since its introduction in 1996, ESIA practice and the role of stakeholders in Cambodia remain inconsistent, resulting in assessment reports that show significant gaps in critical information. Based on interviews, observations and report reviews, the role of the consultant is found to be vital. Certain shortcomings need to be addressed: consultancy roles are legislatively mandated; there is undue political influence; the socio-economic and environmental databases and amount of time for assessment are restricted; there is limited expertise among hired assessors; financial constraints; and a lack of serious regard by project proponents for ESIA and its consultants. Resolving these issues would greatly improve the potential contribution consultants toward good practice in ESIA.

Keywords::

• Cambodia
• challenges
• consultants
• ESIA
• quality

1. Introduction

Following the establishment of the Ministry of Environment (MoE) in 1993, Cambodia enacted the Law on Environmental Protection and Natural Resource Management (LEPNRM) in 1996, and three years later, in 1999, the Sub-Decree on Environmental and Social Impact Assessment (ESIA). A newly drafted law on ESIA has been going through the consultation process for the last two years and is expected to be handed to the Council of Ministers by mid-2015. Based on these laws, ESIA has been used as a pre-requisite for infrastructure development projects. The laws state that project proponents can put together a technical team and conduct the assessment internally, or, alternatively, hire professional ESIA consultants to undertake such an assignment. However, these groups have to be certified by the MoE. Private consulting firms have subsequently emerged to assist project proponents with the completion of their assessment for submission. More than one hundred assignments have been contracted to various private consultancy firms and many assessments have been completed and approved.

Project proponents hiring and paying consultants to carry out ESIAs raises concerns for conflict of interest. Regulations require total impartiality; however, affiliating with or acting in favour of the proponents may be inevitable (ELAW 2010, p. 20; Machaka et al. 2013). Macharia (2005) has investigated consultants' challenges in ESIA; for instance, limited time, insufficient expertise, inadequate financial resources for assessments and political influence affect quality and process (Nadeem & Hameed 2006, p. 437; Momtaz & Kabir 2013). The quality of the assessment depends on the work of the consultants, i.e., their technical judgment and the process of interaction with stakeholders (Zubair 2001, p. 476; Nadeem & Hameed 2006). Consultants frequently deal with critical projects and have to deal with criticism of the proposed activities (Morrison-Saunders & Bailey 2009). In addition, conducting an assessment requires teamwork and the collaboration of its members, i.e. the technical aspects alone do not determine the success or failure of ESIA performance (Erickson 1994). Depending on the complexity of the project, outsourcing of additional experts may be required for full coverage of all technical aspects, and harmonisation among various technical specialists is a must (Shah 2013).

When observing common flaws in successful ESIA completion, a variety of issues has been reported internationally. They usually relate to structure, process and resources of the ESIA, and often prevent high-quality holistic assessments (Annandale & Taplin 2003; Abaza et al. 2004; Macharia 2005; Zhang et al. 2013):

• the inevitable dilemma of the requirement for consultants to remain impartial but simultaneously depend on project proponents to be (re-)hired;

• limitations in resources to conduct thorough assessments;

• the often heightened sensitivity of projects in terms of potentially severe impacts as well as public perception; and

• the quality of the interaction process with stakeholders in government, industry and potentially affected population.

There have been studies of key stakeholders and their interrelationship in the ESIA process. For instance Morrison-Saunders and Bailey (2009) and Machaka et al. (2013) examined the relationship between regulators and consultants. However, less focus has been placed on the link between process quality and consultants.

It is widely understood that consultants help to bridge the regulations and practices of ESIA, as well as linking up key stakeholders. For example, consultants are able to create a linkage between the project proponents and the concerned public (Morrison-Saunders & Bailey 2009). Thus, their credibility is essential in trust-building and forging partnerships with all involved parties through their assessment procedures and protocols such as household surveys, field tests, or public hearings (Shah 2013). Expanding the consultants' roles to improve interaction with other stakeholders would contribute to better quality assessment and aid decision-making (Erickson 1994; Glasson et al. 1994; Harmer 2005; Morrison-Saunders & Bailey 2009).

Owing to the critical role of consultants as mediators between government regulators, project proponents and other stakeholders, this paper investigates the role of consultants in Cambodia in the ESIA process, with a view to process quality and best practice reporting. As the key element for making evidence-based decisions on large-scale infrastructure development projects, we look at the ESIA process itself and identify constraints to improving ESIA outcomes, which consultants find difficult to overcome. Rather than wholly denouncing a flawed process, the paper attempts to provide some concrete leverage points, at which improvements to the overall outcomes could be made.

2. Methodology

A quality review of ESIA reports in Cambodia employed a combination of four review methods by Lee et al. (1999); IAU (Glasson et al. 2005), European Commission (2001) and Glynn (2004); as well as the required components of the 2009 Declaration on General Guidelines for Preparing ESIA Reports endorsed by the MoE. A ‘double-blind’ method was used to reduce the subjectivity of the review. The selected 39 ESIA reports were chosen randomly among development projects. Reports were written between 2007 and 2011 in Cambodia by private consultants.

In addition, we conducted interviews with 22 key informants from government offices, non-governmental organisations and independent consultants in Phnom Penh in 2013. These informants were experts who had conducted, reviewed, or lectured in relation to ESIA in Cambodia. With prior consent, audio records and transcripts were used for analysis. Sample qualitative questions for consultants involved how existing regulations and mechanism inspired their ESIA work and why; how they linked ESIA theoretically to the practices in Cambodia; or what areas they suggested for improvement and why. Each interview lasted around 1 h and 15 min and was held at their respective offices.

Participant observation was also conducted.1 The first author worked as an intern for three months with the Department of Environmental and Social Impact Assessment Review (DoESIAR) of the MoE. He was able to experience practical, structural and conceptual issues relating to the conduct of ESIA with the key government officials responsible and to witness their work on reviewing and approving ESIA reports. Such an opportunity provided actual insights on how ESIA reports were treated prior to final MoE decisions. Data were collected and analysed through recording scripts, expert debriefings and field observation. Findings were then compiled and returned to informants for verification.

3. Results

3.1 ESIA report quality

The quality review revealed that the overall quality of information was 69% satisfactory. Nevertheless, the review highlighted that many sections of the ESIA reports provide inadequate information for decisions on infrastructure development projects. For example, the review pinpointed omissions in the executive summaries as well as the economic assessment chapters (67% and 77% of reports incomplete, respectively).

Compared with international reviews, the Cambodia ESIA reports fared slightly better in quality than, e.g., the 49 wind energy reports in the US, where 66% failed to provide sufficient information using the same review method (Chang et al. 2013). Scottish forest ESIA reports from 1988 to 1996 were reviewed with the adoption of the method of Lee et al. (1999), and proved to be very poor with only 20% of the 81 reports complete and positive (Gray & Edwards-Jones 1999). Similarly, there was low-quality reporting in Lesotho with 15 reports reviewed (Talime 2011).

3.2 Six restrictions faced by consultants

Investigating the linkages between report quality and consultants' performance needs to focus on their role in the ESIA process in Cambodia. For investors to carry out the ESIA according to Government regulations, they do not have much choice other than to hire one of the registered consulting firms in the country. Eight consulting firms2 were registered with the MoE since ESIA became mandatory in 1999 (Table 1). These firms are Cambodian-owned, and obtain a five-year licence with a renewal option after expiration of the term.

Table 1 List of registered ESIA consulting firms.

No.	Consultants
1	CES Co., Ltd
2	E&A Consultant Co., Ltd
3	SBK Research and Development Co., Ltd
4	PPIC Co., Ltd
5	Green Environment Group Co., Ltd
6	Envirotech Service Co., Ltd
7	Creative Green Design Co., Ltd
8	SAWAC Consultants Cambodia Co., Ltd

Source: MoE (2014).

Key informants identified six critical constraints to the work of private consultants: (i) consultants' role in legislature; (ii) political influence by local elites; (iii) limited time and access to data; (iv) limited consultants' expertise; (v) financial constraints for assessments and (vi) no serious regard of or trust in consultants' work by the proponents. These issues are major obstacles for better ESIA practice and need to be analysed and understood separately. Each of these points can be addressed through concrete policy measures if taken seriously by regulators, proponents and consultants alike. Figure 1 depicts the six constraints which are discussed individually in the following sections.

Figure 1 Consultants' constraints in positively influencing the ESIA process and report.

4. Discussion

4.1 Consultants' roles in legislature

There has been little legislature to regulate private consultants in Cambodia. The 1996 LEPNRM, the 1999 Sub-Decree on ESIA, and the forthcoming law on ESIA merely mention the need for consultants, but do not characterise which entities are qualified to provide professional assessment services to clients. The ordinance under the leadership of the new Minister for Environment invited existing firms to reapply for their licences, and these were to be valid for five years. However, as indicated by officials and consultants interviewed, there were no strict criteria and only few licence applications were in fact submitted. It is likely that the low application rate is linked to the registration fee, which consultants complained was exceptionally high.

Obtained from the interviews and report reviews, the experience of ESIA, for instance, low-quality reports and incompetent assessment process in Cambodia revealed that existing regulations were not effectively enforced for major development projects. The commitment to ESIA practice among government officials and other stakeholders remains relatively low because the regulations do not offer adequate guidance and provisions for the performance of the assessment and the role of the consultant. They remain limited in content and execution due to inexplicit and vague statements; for instance, there are no serious penalties for consultants' misconduct.

Moreover, there is a lack of legislative procedure to assess the completeness and quality of ESIA reports in a comprehensive way. In the case of unsatisfactory reports or misconduct, there is no legal power for the public or other stakeholders to complain or condemn the project proponents and the consultants. This is unlike India, for example, where judicial inspection is strong: if false information is provided in a report, the Indian Court can rule on the matter and hold consultants liable (Chowdhury 2014).

As consultants are leading the assessments, incentives rather than fines need to be in place, to encourage them to improve report quality. Scholars and practitioners have emphasised that incentives and merit-based systems enhance productivity and initiate innovation within the system (Oliver 1980; Baker et al. 1988; Kohn 1993; Che & Yoo 2001).

4.2 Political influence by local elites

Political factors have been the driving force behind the global introduction and practice of ESIA (Thomas 1998; Nadeem & Hameed 2008, p. 563; Wilkinson 2015). All key informants admitted that, in Cambodia, many project assessments were politically influenced – meaning that local elites and politicians were project owners or shareholders, and usually intervened on behalf of their businesses. For instance, the Kamchay Hydropower Project located in Bokor National Park was contracted to Sinohydro Corporation during the official visit of the Cambodian Prime Minister to China in 2005, and later had its ESIA report approved in 2011, after construction had been completed. The contract for the project was signed behind closed doors and little information was available in the public domain. To date, hydropower development in Cambodia has proceeded in the absence of meaningful public consultation and an overall lack of transparency in the decision-making process (Middleton 2008, p. 7).

In Cambodia, the concept of elites influencing project decision-making was evident to the public, because major resources were contracted to a select group of local and international businessmen who had close relationships with government officials or their families – some of whom had shares in those businesses (Keskinen et al. 2007; Un & So 2009; Clements et al. 2010; Cock 2010; Springer 2011). For example, the Boeung Kak Development Project is owned by an organisation known to have ties to the Prime Minister. It was a very controversial project as it pumped sand to fill the biggest freshwater lagoon in Phnom Penh and evicted poor households to make way for city development. Despite public criticism, it was given the green light. Through family ties and kinship, the elite benefits from exclusive access to natural resource development opportunities (Jarvik 2007, p. 16).

This could be interpreted as lack of political will in Cambodian politics to push for changes in the ESIA to achieve best practice. According to an article published by The Cambodia Daily in 2012, the majority of the ESIA-required projects proposed by private firms had gone ahead without assessment reports, and only 5% of the 2000 projects between 2004 and 2011 had gone through assessments conducted on them (Lewis & Narim 2012). In addition, Grimsditch (2012) affirms that the approval of ESIA reports in Cambodia usually occurs after the development projects have been implemented. It can therefore be said that the current practice reverses the intended ESIA approval process as legitimated by Cambodia's regulatory authority, and the implementation of current ESIA regulations will continue to be challenging.

4.3 Limited time and access to baseline data for assessments

The report quality depends on an adequate time being allocated to data collection, analysis, and public consultation. Full ESIAs need time for technical analysis to assess the patterns of possible changes and impacts. The key informants interviewed emphasised that for a full assessment more than a year was needed to investigate at least two seasons, and track the pattern of the impacts over the long term. For initial assessment, 6–12 months were required. Key informants believed that an assessment with an adequate amount of time allowed would enable assessing impact scenarios of the projects, and provide a more relevant assessment to aid decision-makers. The MoE approves the fieldwork and analysis plans as part of the terms of reference submitted by consultants prior to the start of an ESIA.

However, our study confirmed that the time spent for the assessment and approval process, especially for full assessments, was critically short. The review of 39 reports indicate that 1–7 months were spent on fieldwork, irrespective of whether this was for an initial or full ESIA, and this accounts for 64% of time spent on fieldwork and report preparation. The average amount of months spent for full investigation was about 7.4, while the MoE additionally spent 8.3 months for reviewing and approving the reports (Figure 2).

Figure 2 Months spent for ESIA.

This is insufficient for a best practice assessment when compared with the time spent on ESIA projects in Europe. A comparative study in 1996 by the European Commission which examined eighteen case studies from the UK, Greece, the Netherlands, and Spain, concluded that it took about two years to complete a single ESIA project, including assessment, consultation, review, and approval (European Commission 1996).

Insufficient time spent on assessing and predicting anticipated impacts poses risks, e.g., the inability to predict the adaptation of freshwater fish to fluctuating water levels in the dry and wet seasons. In another example, a 100 MW coal-fired plant in Sihanouk Ville had been of public concern due to the alarming impact of ash deposition, as well as water discharge from the cooling system into the nearby lagoon. The project ESIA was conducted within two months with 12 sub-assessments exercised in parallel from February to March 2009. Despite the employment of experts, the quality of report remained low and negative impacts were not adequately identified.

4.4 Limited consultants' expertise

As confirmed by key informants, the insufficient specialist expertise of both government officers and private consultants posed a critical risk to an effective ESIA in Cambodia. The majority of consultants surveyed had expertise in socio-economics and GIS/RS (Figure 3). Therefore, specific knowledge in the fields of water, waste, land, air, or environmental sciences was not available, so critical environmental issues may not have been identified. The existing capacity precluded systematic environmental assessments. Impacts on ecosystems, air pollution, or water quality, for example, require proper technical expertise, lab testing, chemical training, and advanced statistical methods. As most key informants observed, the consultants seemed to be ‘jacks of all trades, masters of none’ as also asserted by Nadeem and Hameed (2008) in the ESIA context of developing countries. This diminished report quality and led to inaccurate assessments.

Figure 3 Percentage of academic qualifications obtained by private ESIA consultation team.

Assessing project impacts and reviewing ESIA reports requires specialist expertise as well. This, however, remained very limited among MoE staff tasked with reviewing the assessment reports. Li (2008) emphasised that it was critical for countries in the Mekong region, including Cambodia, to employ sufficient qualified staff within government agencies. Few specialists are employed by the government as there are no incentives to attract capable technical staff in terms of salaries and other benefits. Most qualified experts tend to work for international organisations or have their own businesses, which do not involve ESIA.

As observed by most key informants, the consultants seemed to be stretched in terms of coverage of areas and topics. This equally impacts report quality. The USD 44-million project to build a new town known as ‘Sihanouk Emerald Town Development’ project in Sihanouk Ville province hired local consultants without appropriate academic background. Five experts were responsible for the initial ESIA. Of the five, three held master's degrees in Public Health, Architecture, and Civil Engineering, while two held bachelor's degrees in Social Sciences and Architecture. Given their background and ESIA experience, the team did not have the expertise in environmental impacts, such as pollution, wastewater, noise, and biodiversity degradation. Key informants considered that the impact assessment of the project would result in an inadequate synthesis and consideration of sensitive ecosystem impacts. Indirect and cumulative impacts were not taken into account in the report. Moreover, the environmental management plan did not identify measurable indicators for monitoring and verification.

4.5 Financial constraints for assessments

All of the consulting firms were Cambodian-owned and registered with both the Ministry of Commerce and MoE. ESIA consultancies were considered good business because the fee for such service was relatively high. The initial assessment cost ranged from USD 40,000 to USD 80,000, while full assessment ranged from USD 80,000 to USD 150,000 per project (personal communication, June 10, 2014). These sums are based on professional fees for experts, field data collection, write-up, public consultation, reviewing services carried out by the MoE, and overhead costs. Although there was no evidence, several respondents mentioned that the fee also included an ‘informal fee’3 for approval of the reports. This was considered to be a ‘package agreement’ for an approved, impact-assessed report and certificate given to proponents, who paid the consultants a one-off payment.

For instance, USD 20,000 (out of a total service fee of USD 150,000) was asked unofficially from one consultancy firm in Phnom Penh for the approval of the ESIA report (personal communication, June 12, 2014). This was about 13% of the total cost of the ESIA, and considered a large amount of cash to pay informally. This particular matter was not investigated during the course of this research paper on ethical grounds, but similar stories were relayed by many key informants during the interview process. There was no proof as to whether they were true or false, but the key informants believe corruption to exist between the government and consulting firms.

Although the overall budget was sufficient, net profit for firms is critical for the longevity of the system. Such practice, as the interviewed consultants and governmental officials echoed, constrained the performance of the assessment, besides being unethical. For example, field tests for water or air quality were dropped in some cases, public hearings were limited, staff with lower qualifications or recent graduates were employed instead of professional experts, or the scope of assessment was reduced. Financial viability was the only reason behind such cuts, otherwise the consulting firms would not run profitably. Significantly, a restricted fund for assessment affects the quality and overall process, and therefore informed decisions are not guaranteed.

4.6 No serious regard of or trust in consultants by the proponents

Key informants admitted that project proponents did not pay serious attention to the ESIA work and usually did not collaborate fully with the consultants. ESIA was perceived to be a mere requirement for project approval, not an actual tool for management of impacts and conservation of resources. The proponents wanted to have the assessments done and approved as quickly as possible, without much consideration of quality or commitment to follow-up later.

Project proponents did not place a great deal of trust in the consultants and showed them little respect. Without adequate project input, consultants were unable to develop scenarios to assess and mitigate possible impacts. For example, the proponents were reluctant to share information on the financial feasibility of a project, master plan, or related planning documents with the ESIA consultants. The proponents often complained that consultants were interfering with their business secrets. ‘I did not understand why you [private consultants] kept asking for more information. Some of it was very confidential and could not be shared, you know?’ said one proponent as relayed by a consultant.

5. Conclusion

Among many other key stakeholders in Cambodia, consultants play an essential role in assuring the quality of the reporting process, and their professionalism is often compromised by the existing ESIA system put in place by the government. There is no doubt that, to a large extent, the quality of ESIA practice depends on the consultants' performance and their interaction with other stakeholders. Improving ESIA quality requires a modification of the roles and contributions of all concerned parties. Consultants are technically paramount to the assessment, and clearly identifying and mandating their duties is a priority, especially in relation to the forthcoming ESIA law in Cambodia. The limitations ESIA consultants are currently facing have to be addressed by means of regulations, technical capacity building, and institutional arrangements.

Acknowledgements

The authors would like to acknowledge financial support from a Norwegian Scholarship provided through the Norwegian Embassy in Thailand, the Ministry of Environment, Royal Government of Cambodia, the participants in the study, and the anonymous reviewers for their comments.

Notes

^1. Ministry staff were aware that the author was conducting a study and that he was going to use his experiences to inform the analysis.

^2. Prior to August 2014, there were more than 10 consulting firms, but there had been no formal requirement to register with the MoE. After the July election in 2013, licensing was reinforced and only eight firms appeared on the final list of registered firms. No clear registration criteria were publicised, and it cannot be determined whether or not the process was transparent.

^3.Dirty money used to buy the decision in the report. Many key informants suspected that this was a form of corruption exercised by both the government and private sector. Naturally, it is difficult to prove this since such payments do not leave a paper trail.