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Research Article

Support for Ukrainian refugees after Russia's invasion of Ukraine: aid structure and resilience factors. Case studies of Lublin and Lutsk

ORCID Icon, , , &

ABSTRACT

Russia's invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 triggered forced migration on a scale not seen in Europe since World War II. The city of Lublin (Poland), as the capital of the border region, has become both a destination and transit point for refugees, generating the need for both emergency and long-term assistance. Lublin Voivodeship is adjacent to the Volyn region with its capital in Lutsk, where the situation has also changed rapidly (an influx of internally displaced persons).

The purpose of this article is to capture the overall picture of the response to war in regional urban centres with similar demographic, absorption and adaptation potential and to identify social resilience factors. We begin by describing the aid structure based on the concept of multilevel governance. We then identify three groups of social resilience factors in both cities: past experience in emergency response, the diversity of actors involved, and the way the work is managed (with professionalisation of volunteer phenomena).

The article is based on data resulting from qualitative research in Lublin and Lutsk with the actors of the humanitarian aid.

1. Introduction

Russia's invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 triggered forced migration on a scale not seen in Europe since World War II. Due to the threat of war, Ukrainian citizens headed to the western regions of Ukraine (IDPs – Internally Displaced Persons) and abroad (war refugees). Most of them ended up in Poland, where the Ukrainian labour diaspora dominated the migration landscape for nearly a decade.

According to the Border Guard, more than 4.9 million refugees from Ukraine crossed the Polish-Ukrainian border between 24 February and 20 July this year alone, and almost 3 million people left Poland for Ukraine (Official Twitter Profile of the Polish Border Guard Citation2022). Some of them moved to other EU countries after entering Poland. Estimates in the autumn of 2022 indicated that there were approximately 1-1.4 million refugees from Ukraine (Duszczyk, Citation2022; Monitor Deloitte Citation2022: 5; UNICEF Citation2022) in Poland. The city of Lublin, as the capital of the border region, has become both a destination and transit point for those fleeing, generating the need for both emergency and long-term assistance. More than 1.2 million Ukrainians have visited the city since the end of February, and the number of Lublin residents increased by 20% from 24 February to the beginning of April. More than 50,000 Ukrainians stayed in Lublin alone, with an additional 35,000 living in neighbouring municipalities (Wojdat, Cywiński Citation2022).

On the Ukrainian side of the border (Lublin Voivodeship neighbours Volyn Oblast with its capital in Lutsk), the situation also changed abruptly after 24th February, 2022. Since the outbreak of the Russian-Ukrainian war in 2014, the Volyn region has been one of the least popular refugee destinations. In 2019, only over 3,000 IDPs (0.23% of all IDPs in Ukraine) lived here. However, according to the Volyn Oblast Administration, since 14th November, 2022 – there have been more than 75 thousand IDPs living in the Volyn Oblast. More than 18 thousand IDPs came directly to the city of Lutsk (Volyn Oblast Military Administration Citation2022). IDPs were more likely to arrive in territorial communities bordering Poland, which seemed to them the safest strategy, taking into consideration the risk of invasion from the territory of Belarus. This is evidenced, inter alia, by the percentage of IDPs in the total population of territorial communities bordering Poland (territorial communities of Poromov and Novovolynsk – 14%) compared to the territorial community of Lutsk (7.5%) and territorial communities bordering Belarus (territorial communities of Ratne and Lyubieszov – 0.17%) (Volyn Oblast Military Administration Citation2022).

The main research question in the article is: what are the main success factors of the response to a local crisis (caused by war) in a specific spatio-temporal and cultural context? In other words, we would like to consider the relevance of this response to the level of resilience of local communities (Shimizu, Clark Citation2018). To identify resilience factors, we are going to start by describing the aid structure based on the concept of multilevel governance (Scholten, Penninx Citation2016). To achieve these objectives, below we present two case studies (Lutsk and Lublin) prepared according to the same structure: a description of the context of the events, a description of the structure of the humanitarian response and the identification of factors contributing to an effective community response.

In order to embed our data theoretically, we primarily refer to the literature that has emerged on the so-called migration crisis of 2015 and the way some Western European countries responded to it (e.g. Guadagno Citation2016; Paul, Roos Citation2019). The public response at the time was characterised by a strong involvement of non-governmental, grassroots initiatives and a weaker response from systemic aid institutions (Nam, Steinhoff Citation2019; Pries Citation2019). Such a situation is sometimes jokingly referred to as ‘do-it-yourself governance’ (Boersma et al. Citation2019).

In Poland, what distinguished the current situation from those mentioned above, was actually the lack of involvement of different actors in the political discussion on the choice of ‘to help/not to help’, depending on the definition of newcomers as refugees (needy) or economic migrants (abusive), or even ‘good’ and ‘bad’ refugees (Holmes and Castaneda Citation2016). This is in line with the whole European approach to this crisis, which is sometimes assessed as a double standard in international protection and asylum policy (different standards of protection for European and non-European refugees) (Bosse Citation2022). Its expression is the first implementation of the Temporary Protection Directive, unused since its approval in 2001.

The earlier migration of Ukrainian workers to the European Union, as well as the openness of the EU to their movement (since 2017, Ukrainian citizens can travel without a visa within the EU for 90 days), resulted in a strong presence of Ukrainian social networks across Europe, especially in countries close to the border, such as Poland (Garcés Mascareñas Citation2022). This presence was invaluable both in the first days of the spontaneous response to the war and, as the Lublin case shows, in the following weeks and months of refugee support at the local level.

In Ukraine, the main topics of political debate since 2013 have been issues of existential importance due to the ongoing conflict: maintaining political sovereignty and territorial integrity and ensuring the protection of IDPs from Donbas and Crimea. One of the key challenges (IOM Citation2022) was to reduce the growing tensions between the local population and IDPs, encouraged by Russia for propaganda purposes. Some experts believe that while the current large number of IDPs in Ukraine is a serious problem, in the long term it will be a factor of integration and even greater consolidation of Ukrainian society (Demyanenko Citation2018). Both Euromaidan and the war with Russia have revealed the importance and potential of volunteering and NGOs in the face of weak structures and traditional state institutions in Ukraine.

2. Theoretical background

Our considerations are rooted in two theoretical concepts. Firstly, the concept of multilevel governance (MLG), which is based on the involvement of multiple actors in the process of managing migration flows, as well as in downstream mobility integration activities. MLG refers to the interaction and joint coordination of relationships between different levels of government without the clear dominance of one of them (Scholten Citation2013). In this context, it is important to define the level of action (international/transnational/central/regional/local) and to characterise the actors involved in the process. In a crisis situation, particular attention should be paid to the role of NGOs (which often fill gaps in the migration management system). The interventionist role of grassroots initiatives should also be reflected. Local actors, often also non-state actors, through their involvement, cooperation (e.g. in city partnerships), lobbying, can even influence central law-making (vertical policy-making as venue-shopping, Guiraudon Citation2000).

However, the participation of entities from different levels and areas of action can also be a weakness of the governance mechanism, especially in times of crisis when the diversity of actors is one of the features of the response (Şahin-Mencütek et al. Citation2022). In the absence of coordination, there is a risk of substandard response and the desired multi-level governance may turn into separate pathways of action at central and local levels (Scholten and Penninx Citation2016; Gökalp et al. Citation2020). Moreover, the constant context here is the uncertainty and temporariness of actions and the risk that ad hoc actions will be implemented centrally as target actions, without proper plans, evaluation and legal authority (Sahin-Mencutek et al. Citation2022).

The second theoretical framework is the concept of social resilience, which is the ability of actors to access capitals ‘not only to cope and adapt to adverse conditions’ (i.e. reactive capacity), but also to seek and create options (i.e. proactive capacity), thereby developing increased competence (i.e. positive outcomes) in coping with risk (Obrist et al. Citation2010: 291). In social terms, resilience is a contextual process, as it is difficult to categorise and standardise thinking about effective responses in unpredictable situations according to a single measure that does not take into account the historical, social, political or economic functioning of a community (Rast, Younes, Smets and Ghorashi Citation2020). In this sense, the different types of capitals that a particular community has or does not have, especially social and cultural capital, are important.

Researchers point to different response styles, linked by the theoretical framework of so-called resiliencism. The key here is the perception of the threat itself, which can be threefold. Firstly, the threat can be understood as an entirely negative phenomenon that dismantles the system, which can flexibly deform, but ultimately the goal is to eliminate the threat and return to equilibrium understood as the situation before the crisis. The second approach assumes that the threat has a developmental function and that the response should consist of small adaptive changes at specific, not key, but even peripheral points in the system. For this adaptive approach to societal resilience, the key is ‘the ability to innovatively solve existing problems and self-organisation of societies in situations that require immediate implementation of specific public services and tasks’ (Stępka Citation2021: 112). The third approach assumes a fully learning function of risk and the significant social change that can result from a resilient system's response to unforeseen external challenges (Bourbeau Citation2013). In the latter case, crises become the key impetus for rebuilding the whole system.

Factors that foster high social resilience in crises are equality, inclusion, diversity, flexibility, cooperation, loose connections, indirect dependencies, capacity to learn, possibility to experiment and distribution of power among different stakeholders (Comfort et al. Citation2010; Drabek, McEntire Citation2003; see also Ager et al. Citation2015). It seems particularly important to diagnose what determines the shift from reactive to proactive aid actions by individual actors and how this looks in different contexts. Here, the categorisation of actors derived from the concept of multilevel governance leads to the conclusion that, from a macro perspective, the way in which informal actors and grassroots initiatives respond to crises will differ significantly from the actions of institutionalised actors displaying high levels of control, hierarchy and top-down initiatives. In the latter case, new, unstructured responses are treated as a threat rather than an opportunity, making it difficult to mobilise and integrate available resources and thus limiting resilience potential (Boersma et al. Citation2019; Drabek, McEntire Citation2003). In the case of grassroots, non-governmental, informal and resilient initiatives, their networked nature allows them to use informal knowledge and atypical resources, avoid bureaucratic pathways and respond creatively and effectively just-in-time (Rast et al. Citation2020). However, this comparison raises the question of what happens when different levels of governance and different types of actors mix within structures that are difficult to classify because of the way they are organised (e.g. lack of a clear leader) or the way they operate (e.g. mode of martial law administration). Research shows that the different types of social movements emerging from social crises have different characteristics from traditional social movements. Boersma et al. (Citation2019) cite several characteristics of such movements in the case of the migration crisis: combining urban action with spontaneous, grassroots initiatives (Novy, Colomb Citation2013); the volunteers involved in these activities often have a refugee background, which accordingly fosters processes of re-empowerment, self-efficacy and influencing change in the situation (Weng, Lee Citation2016); the use of informal communication, especially social networks, ensuring openness and transparency (Koca Citation2016; Della Porta, Mattoni Citation2014); smooth affiliation of the units to specific entities that are in the process of permanent evolution due to changing external conditions (Drabek, McEntire Citation2003).

In this context, an interesting issue arises – the role of volunteers in humanitarian action and the professionalisation of the volunteering phenomenon. There are views in the literature that professionalisation and volunteering are categories that can be mutually exclusive (Ganesh and McAllum Citation2012), volunteering has sometimes been associated with activities involving peripheral areas, and the work undertaken by volunteers has been considered trivial, unskilled work, as opposed to that done by professionals (Brown and Iverson Citation2004). Volunteers, even if they do socially important work, were associated with unprofessional work because, unlike professionals who form elite networks, they receive only limited training, have no defined subjectivity and exercise little power (Knijn and Verhagn Citation2003). Moreover, volunteering is mainly associated with the ‘non-professional’ work of women. The feminisation of volunteering has made it possible to position these voluntary activities of women as ‘unprofessional’, in contrast to the ‘professional’ work of men (Ganesh and McAllum Citation2012).

3. Methodology

This article is based on the results of a qualitative study conducted from March to September 2022 in Lublin and Lutsk. Two research teams, Polish and Ukrainian, conducted 51 IDIs with entities assisting IDPs/war refugees in Lutsk (central military administration 2, local authorities 6, business 2, NGO 6, volunteers 2, education 2, church 3; women 17, men 5) and in Lublin (central administration 1, local authorities 9, NGO 13, business 1, education 3, church 1; women 19, men 9). We have enriched our analysis with empirical material from a follow-up survey conducted in 2022/2023 in a frame of the international research grant.Footnote1 The questionnaire consisted of three parts. The first concerned a retrospective assessment of an actor's first response to war: what was the origin of involvement, where did the knowledge come from and what were the management, coordination and decision-making processes like in the first weeks? The second part described engagement from the perspective of the resources, needs and problems of actors implementing help activities in the later stages of a humanitarian crisis. This part also raised questions about the subjective and objective scope of cooperation with other entities, including volunteering. The third part dealt with the change in assistance activities after a few months of war: the question was how the organisation/actor itself had changed, how the needs of refugees and the organisation itself had changed, and what support had been received or what would be needed for further activities.

The analysis for each city considered the local context (Yin Citation2003) in two dimensions: the description of activities (legal and organisational framework, institutional landscape, knowledge production, governance and cooperation) and the identification of challenges and success factors during the dynamic processes of local crisis response. These analytical dimensions were embedded in a framework of multi-level governance and social resilience.

We labelled the interviews by city name, respondent category and gender. We selected respondents using the snowball method – in the interviews they identified other actors present on the aid scene. We decided to start with representatives of institutionalised actors – interviews with them, however, defined the broad landscape of individual assistance, which is largely hidden under voluntary activities. We analysed ex-post aid activities, mainly concerning the first phase of the humanitarian crisis response (the first three months), but also the fresh experiences of the actors involved – related to responding to subsequent hostilities and managing the situation in response to the changing dynamics and direction of the refugee influx.

The text also uses the desk research method, i.e. the analysis of reports prepared by various international institutions, as well as by the administration and Polish and Ukrainian think tanks, providing ad-hoc data, enabling the diagnosis of the scale of the phenomenon and needs.

We use the terms humanitarian or migration crisis interchangeably (both of which appear in public debate), while we refer to events in Ukraine as Russian aggression/invasion or simply ‘war’. We also use the term ‘refugees’ or ‘war refugees’ to refer to those leaving Ukraine after 24th February. These terms correspond to the nature of forced migration (as in the case of those fleeing from the east to the west of Ukraine in previous years). However, it should be emphasised that these persons do not enjoy de iure refugee status (as a form of international protection) in Poland, as they entered Poland on the basis of the so-called Special Law Citation2022 of 12 March.

4. Lutsk case

4.1. The landscape of help: levels and structure

Volyn Oblast is a border region, bordering the Republic of Poland and the Republic of Belarus. For some refugees, the region and the city of Lutsk were a transit point when moving to other countries and provided temporary shelter, while for some it became a long-term residence. Some refugees who arrived in the Volyn region are returning home after the de-occupation of some parts of Ukrainian territory.

In response to the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in Volyn on 27th February, by order of the head of the Volyn regional military administration, a regional coordination centre was established to coordinate work in all directions to counter armed aggression. Coordination was needed with local government bodies, foreign organisations, public organisations, citizens who needed help. Activities were to be developed in various directions: collection and shaping of needs, reception and distribution of international aid, organisation of medical aid provision, social adaptation for the temporarily displaced, coordination with volunteers, NGOs, religious organisations, transport structures, mass media, etc. The Social Policy Department of the Lutsk City Council was the main institution in the city for the assistance of displaced persons, whose functions were: social protection and social services for residents, including displaced persons, designation and payment of social assistance, compensation and other social benefits established by law.

At a meeting with the mayor of Lutsk on 25th February, it was decided to equip the Lutsk Aid Provision Centre as a logistical hub (Taras Shevchenko Volyn Regional Drama Theatre). Initially, this centre existed to support the activities of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and territorial defence, but warfare with large numbers of casualties and occupation/de-occupation of communities led to acute humanitarian needs for the population, including IDPs. The work of the Lutsk Relief Centre involves staff from various structural units of the Lutsk City Council. They serve at their main workplace and then volunteer at the Lutsk Territorial Assistance Centre.

Respondents also indicate the importance of business experience (speed of adaptation to new conditions, flexibility). Private businesses as well as religious organisations have been performing complementary functions to the initiatives of local authorities in those areas where the latter cannot provide service, which can be considered a synergy. The Adrenaline City entertainment centre is an example of socially responsible business in the Volyn region. It cooperates with various stakeholders – authorities, businesses, educational institutions.

At first, we helped to transport children from Kherson. Then, starting on February 25, we started to accommodate internally displaced persons non-stop (…). Subsequently, our owner decided to expand and create an aid point for internally displaced persons. And accordingly, allocate larger premises with more beds, and we provide not only accommodation but also three meals a day. (…) Together with psychologists and paramedics, we issued a methodological manual named ‘Tactical Medicine’. We printed 5,000 copies and published them online.

(Lutsk_business_female)

Assistance to IDPs in Ukraine is also provided by international organisations, foundations, public organisations, which are guided by their statutory duties and capacities. For example, financial support for refugee children was possible to obtain from UNICEF. Taking into account the urgent need for housing, thanks to cooperation of the Volyn Regional Government, the Mayor's Office, the Kiwerc City Council, Swedish patrons and local volunteers, a decision was made to build a separate house for 300 people in the municipality of Kiwerc, adjacent to Lutsk. In addition, with financial support from the European Union's NIP programme, they plan to build housing in the town of Kowel, Volyn region.

Various social policy issues under crisis conditions were tackled jointly at more than one level of governance. The issue of food, in addition to state aid, was solved by the local authorities of Lutsk together with the charity foundation Tilky Razom.Footnote2 The demand for food was covered by volunteers, many people were willing to help. Catering (issuing of food rations) was provided by foundations, public and international organisations. The issue of inclusion of forced migrants in the process of school and extracurricular education (545 children as of June 2022)was solved by the Education Department of the Lutsk City Council. The Education Department helps to organise the provision of psychological assistance to IDPs and veterans, involving international funds and organisations. Undoubtedly, the institution could not solve IDPs’ problems on its own, so it engaged external support. It should be noted that decision-making in the local self-government bodies was independent, there was no need to coordinate day-to-day issues with central and regional structures, and therefore there was greater freedom of action to establish assistance for IDPs. However, due to the scale of the needs, cooperation between different organisations (for example between RokadaFootnote3 and the SpivdiyaFootnote4 node, supported by the Office of the President of Ukraine and the Ministry of Youth and Sports of Ukraine) was crucial.

The nature of the assistance in February/March 2022 was spontaneous. Both authorities and citizens acted on the basis of the current and changing needs of the affected people.

When the mayor of Lutsk decided to set up a central volunteer point in Lutsk at the Drama Theatre, there was a great need to collect warm clothes for the people who had arrived (…). The people of Lutsk responded to this need and a great deal of items were collected. These things not only had to be collected, collection points were needed, but also sorted. The Student Youth Palace in Lutsk became such a place. And then, when there were a lot of things, after consultation with the management, it became not only a place to collect things and sort them, but also a drop-off point.

(Lutsk_local_authority_female)

Representatives of the Lutsk City Council, realising the need for coordination and quick action, started to use social networks to inform about events, help points, helplines, created interaction and support groups, in particular the Telegram channel “Ready to help” to quickly inform people who were ready and able to help others.

4.2. The factors of resilience

One of the main facilitators of the response to the humanitarian crisis in Lutsk was the previous experience of responding to migratory challenges: systematic action towards IDPs in Lutsk since 2014 (response on the ground: development of the voluntary sector and NGOs). It is important to highlight that Ukraine completed an important decentralisation reform, which enabled the implementation of community-based governance and embodied the principle of subsidiarity, as many functions and powers were transferred to the community level. Overall, the success of the 2015–2018 local government reform has resulted in greater empowerment of local authorities, in particular by providing them with adequate financial instruments. In wartime conditions, martial law forces the coordination of many decisions with the central government, but in terms of quick action this is not always effective. In such a situation, state governmental actors agree to delegate some competences to third sector actors, recognising their competence.

(…) it was also a situation where the Ukrainian state made a decision that humanitarian aid was not to go to the organizations, to the humanitarian and aid institutions, but only to the Regional Military Administrations, and they also withdrew it very quickly. (…) because the District Military Administrations are nothing but ordinary district administrations, only they changed their name to the District Military Administrations during the war times, so they are simply officials, just like ours, from voivodeship or marshal offices, right? Well, if we suddenly surprise the officials and say to them: listen, from tomorrow you are simply dealing with the transfer of a huge amount of humanitarian aid, well, you know that it will not work out well, right?

(Lublin_local authority/NGO_female)

Empowerment of volunteering was another dimension of third sector involvement. In the case of Lutsk and Ukraine, following the outbreak of war in 2014, the volunteer movement filled in the gaps in the context of weak state institutions. This experience is paying off in the current humanitarian crisis, raising the level of social resilience. It also has a civic and even patriotic dimension, given the course of the process of building an independent, post-revolutionary Ukrainian statehood. In a situation of weakness and ineffectiveness of state institutions, the burden of not only humanitarian aid, but perhaps above all of supporting the army, was taken on by social and voluntary organisations, characterised by high motivation, flexibility and networking skills. Thus, the commitment to helping those affected by war is one's civic standing, patriotism and a high level of responsibility for one's work on behalf of those in need. In general, the volunteer corps shows considerable motivation and willingness to help others.

Patriotic motives were activated, I wanted to do something more for my country, especially since I have such a highly demanded profession now (…). I started receiving requests from internally displaced persons about children, these are mainly fears, I really wanted to help.

(Lutsk_NGO_female)

The idea of subsidising a volunteering project from the salary fund could be seen as supporting the professionalisation of volunteering processes, but it demonstrates the fundamental problems with the financial aspects of voluntary aid activities in the case of Lutsk.

For us, volunteering was more like self-sacrifice. But it is clear that a person who is engaged in volunteer activities must have the means to live. In the first two or three months, when all the funds went to volunteer projects and business funds began to run out, we realized that balance is also important. Therefore, we are now giving 10% of the salary fund to the needs of volunteer projects.

(Lutsk_business_female)

Aid management faced many other challenges. In terms of the problems arising in providing assistance to displaced people, according to interviewees, the system of coordination between voluntary organisations, businesses and authorities was inadequate, especially during the first months of the full-scale invasion. Voluntary organisations experience periodic, temporary human resource needs, especially as the war continues and people burn out of their main work. From time to time, structures and organisations involved in volunteer activities undergo bits of training in stress resilience and professional burnout.

Conflicts arise among the very people who arrive in new places of settlement, as different people with different levels of education, temperaments and previous experiences live together not of their good will. Sometimes conflicts arise when there is not equal access to services or household facilities. Sometimes conflicts arise on the basis of language. Significant fields of aid activities were those aimed at shaping patriotic and civic positions among refugees from the eastern regions. To serve these purposes, lessons in the Ukrainian language or classes on Ukrainian culture and history were organised.

The refugees came from those territories close to Russia and they are used to speaking Russian. People, local residents, do not accept those new residents who speak the language of the aggressor country. Conflicts arise on this ground.

(Lutsk_NGO_male)

It is worth noting the flexibility, comprehensiveness and potential for profiling existing and learning new competences of organisations. The public sector was actively involved in helping displaced people not only in areas where it was active before the full-scale invasion. Members of public organisations helped to set up aid collection points and provided information support on social networks. Although further activities were also carried out in these areas of statutory activity, with a slight change in emphasis and focus.

Before February, 24th we were working for the development of civil society, creating and developing shelters in the region. Current challenges have changed and we realized that we have to change priorities. In March we started volunteering. And now one of our current directions is the integration of immigrants into communities. (…) we carry out activities for the adaptation and integration of displaced persons into new communities, study needs, and identify potential problems and possible conflicts in focus groups.

(Lutsk_NGO_male)

The last resilience factor identified is, as in the Lublin case, previously acquired social ties, informal human capital, i.e. acquaintances and contacts with people who had the resources to help, the knowledge of the public sector of Lutsk was also helpful. Involving the IDP`s themselves in the assistance activities also became a priority.

5. Lublin case

5.1. The landscape of help: levels and structure

After the invasion began, Lublin positively distinguished itself in the way it managed and coordinated the refugee crisis (Panayotatos, Atanda, Schwartz Citation2022: 18-19; Jarosz and Klaus Citation2023). The Lublin Social Committee for Assistance to Ukraine (LSCAU) was immediately established in the city, defining itself as a social movement that included three local NGOs that have been involved in immigrant and refugee advocacy for years: Homo Faber AssociationFootnote5, Borderland Spiritual Culture FoundationFootnote6, Rule of Law Institute FoundationFootnote7, as well as City of Lublin officials seconded to the task. The City also donated the Cultural Centre for the Committee's headquarters. None of these organisations was a formal leader of the Committee.

Later, the Committee was joined by: The Polish Scouting Association, the organisation of Ukrainian scouts PLAST, the Foundation for the Central and Eastern Europe Development, the Polish Red Cross in Lublin and the District Bar Council. The LSCAU became a central actor and pioneer in helping refugees in Lublin. Immediately after the LSCAU was established, efforts were made to mobilise volunteer resources. These included people from different backgrounds, including students from Ukraine and Belarus studying at universities in Lublin. They became key actors because of their language skills.

My first thought is that I have to call XXXX (…) Short conversation, he says ‘Gather the people’. We meet at 6 pm at the Cultural Centre. And I started compiling a list of volunteers, I wrote e-mails to everyone (…), and I put together a list of potential volunteers. I came at 6 pm, and there were a lot of people there, mostly former students (…), but also a lot of officials, a lot of social activists, and friends in general. I don't know how many people were there, seventy, eighty at a time, and they began to form into groups.

(Lublin_private university/NGO_female)

In LSCAU, from the very first day of operation, specific areas of activity began to be distinguished, which were called departments, and their coordinators were appointed from among city officials and volunteers based on a competence key. As one interviewee points out, a clear definition of these areas was necessary to avoid chaos and duplication of activities. On the other hand, it proved important to build a network of all participants in the process, so that through easy contact in a large team, solutions could be developed quickly in an unprecedented situation. Specific tools and solutions for gathering the necessary knowledge about the city's material, housing and human resources proved useful in controlling the chaos. An information desk was set up and a 24-hour refugee hotline became available in several languages. For efficient accommodation of refugees, a continuously updated database of possible private accommodation in Lublin, other cities in Poland (in cooperation with central offices) and abroad was created. A similar tool – an online platform – was used to connect potential employers with potential refugee workers. In the initial phase of the humanitarian crisis response, the LSCAU had about 30 departments – often very narrow fields requiring professional knowledge and specialist competence.

Separate assistance activities in the city were also carried out by other actors from different levels of government: the provincial office, the marshal's office, universities, churches, charities; there were also a number of private informal initiatives, including from private entrepreneurs. The provincial office mainly focused on providing collective accommodation facilities and on livelihood issues, but was mainly active in reception centres. In terms of cooperation, LSCAU respondents point out the difficulties in cooperating with the government level. Among the reasons, they mention different management strategies, personal factors, political and ideological discrepancies and communication problems. This must have resulted in the Committee's subsequent decision not to interfere with government administration. The fact that central and local government administrations are currently opposing political options may not be insignificant.

5.2. The factors of resilience

As Lublin is the largest city in eastern Poland, it has long been a frequent destination for economic and educational immigrants from Ukraine, especially after 2014. Their presence has been noticed by the city authorities. In Lublin, important entities representing the Ukrainian community have for years been the Borderland Spiritual Culture Foundation and the Ukrainian Association, which first targeted the Ukrainian national minority and, over time, also started to function in the field of cooperation with the increasing number of Ukrainian immigrants. A practical manifestation of noticing the presence of the Ukrainian community and other immigrants in the city was the establishment of the Civic Dialogue Commission and several municipal initiatives in cooperation with NGOs aimed at integrating immigrants, as well as fruitful cooperation with 12 cities from Ukraine with established partnership and friendship relations. On the eve of Russia's full-scale aggression against Ukraine, the starting point for action in Lublin was the previous experience of cross-border cooperation and the social and human capital developed in terms of the city's integration policy in consultation with third sector actors. Importantly, the organisations forming the core of the LSCAU came from different worlds, representing different profiles of activity and creating space for diversity (a left-wing human rights organisation, a legal organisation originating from the Catholic University of Lublin and a quasi-religious organisation functioning in the area of culture and dialogue, led by a Greek Catholic parish priest).

It is worth noting that Ukrainian minority and Ukrainian migrant organisations in Lublin had experience in helping Ukraine and Ukrainians even during the Orange Revolution in 2004 and the Revolution of Dignity in 2014. On the other hand, the Homo Faber Association had the fresh and current experience of intervening in the so-called Border Group – an informal initiative of NGOs offering assistance to migrants experiencing so-called pushbacks on the Polish-Belarusian border since August 2021.

A significant number of people and organisations associated with The Lublin Social Committee for Assistance to Ukraine knew each other directly or indirectly from previous cooperation or supra-sectoral activities carried out in the city. Some city officials had extensive experience of working in NGOs before joining the local government unit. Over the past 15 years, Lublin has consciously strengthened its human resources by hiring people to work in local government who previously worked in NGOs and, above all, people with migration experience.

(…) what is interesting, and what is probably so completely unique about Lublin is that simply a lot of people associated with this non-governmental environment in the world work in the local authority office, I am also this person, but not only me … 

(Lublin_local authority_female)

A very important element of Lublin's resilience was therefore the involvement of Ukrainians living, studying and working in Lublin in the years preceding the invasion, who, due to their linguistic and cultural competences, as well as their network of contacts. The earlier cooperation of these local social activists resulted in an informal social network whose capital, understood as human resources, proved crucial at the moment of crisis.

The ability to react quickly, to adapt to new challenges in a rather fluid and loose structure, the practical principle of thrift to move people and resources from lower status areas to more important ones, are undoubtedly some of the key factors of the Committee's success.

We cannot work within a rigid framework, in that case, we wouldn't do anything. (…) In my work and the work of my team now, there is great, great flexibility and a human dimension. We are here for people, right? We do not act in such a way that everything should be nicely written on paper, but everything should stay within the law, but for a human, right? That law exists for humans, not humans for the law.

(Lublin_local authority/NGO_female)

It is interesting to note that the increase in efficiency of activities undertaken as a result of the departure from rigid rules and strong centralisation with low human resources typical of a central administration in the region (we can consider it as an example of a total institution) is also noticed by its officials. This trend is a visible symptom of resilience processes at the formal, central management level.

At one point, this administrative work was relegated to the background. When real refugees arrived and it was necessary to save them from freezing, from disease, to help the children, first of all, against my bosses, and generally against guidelines, I closed my eyes to some things.

(Lublin_central_administration_male)

The application of the principle of subsidiarity proved to be important for the smooth management of LSCAU's activities as an informal platform for cross-sectoral cooperation. In order to improve the flow of information, for the first two months of its operation, LSCAU held daily meetings-briefings with the coordinators of all departments and the LSCAU chief coordinators to discuss the range of activities carried out by each department. These meetings allowed problems to be solved at the highest level that could not be solved at volunteer or department coordinator level.

(…) If a volunteer has a problem, he reports it to the coordinator. It is great if the coordinator knows exactly what to do. If not, one can contact the higher-level coordinator of all volunteers and collective accommodation points, if this coordinator knows, that's great, and if not, one contacts the highest management.

(Lublin_NGO_female)

There was never a vote in the Committee – all issues were decided by consensus. It is worth noting that the role of operator in the LSCAU is held by the Homo Faber Association, which is financially responsible for all activities, but this does not give the organisation a stronger mandate in the decision-making process in the LSCAU.

Synergy in cooperation in the city was possible thanks to the inclusion of city officials in the Committee – on the same terms as representatives of NGOs. The participation of officials in the work of the informal structure (without a seal, seat and statute) somehow legitimised this social movement, while anchoring it in legal and logistical realities.

(…) were former clerks who, as certain procedures or sensitivity to certain procedures, take out of their daily work. For me, it was obvious that when I create housing databases, some General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) must be applied. So that when I assist people and collect their personal data, or fill their data into a document, they must sign the GDPR consent. Right away, right? I think that the fact that the volunteers of the committee were people, in a way, from this systemic area, so also, a priori, standards of our daily work were maintained.

(Lublin_local_authority/NGO_female)

The volunteers at the core of LSCAU's work received professional support quite quickly – they received shopping vouchers (thanks to donors), were able to benefit from hot meals (offered by a local business) and psychological support (using their own movement resources) while working. Organisations also significantly increased their formal staffing levels by offering their volunteers formal contracts of employment or co-operation.

We have normally contracted coordinators who did all of this, and then for the first time … We started hiring people on March 5th. So, ten days later. And also we agreed that everyone, regardless of whether someone is a great specialist or is a volunteer who came for the first time, would get the same wage.

(Lublin_NGO_male)

Noteworthy is the high self-awareness of organisations regarding the potential risks of depletion of human resources and the inevitable fatigue of grassroots mobilisation. The professionalisation of volunteering, based on the competences of the migrants involved, according to the peer-to-peer principle, has become a response to such risks. It was relatively common to employ people who had proven themselves as volunteers in refugee aid activities. Often, these were people who had nothing to do with humanitarian aid before the Russian invasion and whose talents were only discovered during the war. NGOs and local government institutions that made greater use of volunteers’ work provided the most effective volunteers with opportunities for professional training in humanitarian aid and employment, enabling them to engage in aid activities on a full-time basis. An important contribution of volunteers who became humanitarian professionals was to use their personal and professional networks and competences from their lives before the war. Volunteers who started to be paid for their work often performed work that was characterised by a high level of difficulty, expert knowledge or required competences that were limited in the population (e.g. language competence in specialised fields, knowledge of the mentality of refugees, specialised knowledge of Polish and Ukrainian law). The expert knowledge and competence of the volunteers could not be replaced by that of the officials.

6. Discussion and conclusion

The response of the two cities to the challenges of warfare differed due to the different legal frameworks conditioning the activities and the different systems of local actors. Due to the state of war in Ukraine, the structure and scope of humanitarian assistance differed from the MLG approach at the same time in Poland, where there is no crisis mode. What the two cities had in common at the time was certainly the crisis mode of operation and the changing dynamics of the needs of those seeking assistance. In both cases, the response is considered successful and at least two parties were involved in the relief efforts: local authorities and NGOs. In both cases, there was definitely more cooperation than conflict situations. The involvement in relief activities of actors from different levels and sectors, with different – sometimes complementary – resources at their disposal, reflected multi-level mobility management, which proved to be extremely important in a crisis situation. In Lublin, cooperation took the form of an informal social movement (LSCAU) involving NGOs and city officials. Also in Lutsk, synergy was evident in the activities of all actors involved: the central administration (which symbolically left space for NGOs to act), the local authority and the third sector. In the case of Lutsk, an important link turned out to be local business and its social dimension of responsibility, which did not resonate as strongly in the case of Lublin. In Lutsk, the media, playing the role of an active actor managing and producing knowledge, which was a key resource at the time, and religious actors were also important actors, although their involvement in both Lublin and Lutsk requires more detailed research. In both places, ad hoc coordination structures were established, but the principles of this coordination resulted from specific needs triggered by the external situation. All interviewees, both in Lutsk and in Lublin, emphasised flexibility of action as a key factor in the effective implementation of tasks, the ability to react in a timely manner and in the most desirable way. This picture is consistent with the assumption that the characteristics of an emerging crisis organisation include: transient membership, diffuse leadership, unclear boundaries, flexible task definitions (Majchrzak et al. Citation2007).

In the context of the development of volunteering in both locations, it is worth noting the phenomenon of the so-called professionalisation of volunteering. This process builds a resource for the future, not only in terms of emergency response, but also in terms of organising long-term assistance, strengthening local resilience capacity. Such processes demonstrate an adaptive approach to resilience, resulting in new initiatives (Tierney Citation2014). It should be noted, however, that the professionalisation of volunteering is a more visible phenomenon in Lublin than in Lutsk, which may be due to the different motivations of volunteers in a war situation than in peacetime, as well as financial constraints on the Ukrainian side. In both cases, however, there is a rapid professionalisation of humanitarian aid in general. It should be noted that the professionalisation of volunteering also has a gender dimension. The vast majority of volunteers on both sides of the border are women, who are often very well educated and have a responsible professional job at the same time. In the case of Lublin, women also make up the majority of aid coordinators. A significant number of volunteers have had the opportunity to benefit from a number of professional training courses offered by foreign humanitarian organisations (e.g. Danish Refugee Council and others). The experience of the described humanitarian crisis thus highlights not only the position of women with children who are fleeing war, but also the role of women as professional volunteers.

In summary, several groups of common success factors emerge for successful humanitarian crisis response in both regions: (1) previous local experience in emergency response, as well as in the empowerment of social actors involved in public social policies (through different and contextual processes, e.g. earlier administrative reform in Ukraine or the development of informal social networks composed of pre-war labour migration in Poland); (2) the diversity of actors involved and the relationships between them; (3) the way in which the work of individual actors is managed and coordinated.

After a few months of war, the population of Ukrainians in Lublin almost doubled (reaching around 40,000 according to data obtained directly from the municipality of Lublin; while the population of Lublin before 2022 was 334,000) (GUS Citation2022: 5). The increased presence of newcomers is visible in the public sphere, e.g. in markets, parks or playgrounds, while at the same time the cultural offer of the city seems to be constantly adapted to the needs of refugees (e.g. in terms of language needs). Currently, the biggest problem in the city is housing and the lack of long-term solutions to this issue. The city's budget is also feeling the effects of several months of relief efforts. In Lutsk, shelter has been offered to approximately 18,000 IDPs (Lutsk population on 1 January 2022 in Lutsk – 212,900) (Volyn Oblast Military Administration Citation2022; UKRSTAT Citation2022). The permanent presence of these people has an impact on local society, which has realised the high potential of human capital in the city. Sometimes IDPs are employed in municipalities and local NGOs, supporting them with experience and sometimes expanding their activities. Ukrainian language and history courses are offered to new residents and this can be seen, beyond the patriotic context, as an inclusive activity in the local community. Lutsk also suffers from insufficient housing, but the city runs places of collective accommodation.

It is worth noting that the way a crisis is responded to can be considered in the short or long term. The research described here deals with the first case, but the measures taken have an adaptive impact on local communities. In Lublin, six months after the invasion, new urban policies are being considered that take into account the so-called new residents. The accompanying discourse is very sensitive to the phenomenon of potential positive discrimination in the local community. We can also observe a manifestation of the legitimacy of voluntary organisations: they emerge, strengthen themselves and persist over time despite their own very limited material resources. Moreover, the activities of organisations can directly influence communities, whether by publicly designing specific community concepts or by articulating specific interests and needs on behalf of their members (Gnes, Vermeulen Citation2018). In Lublin, NGOs supported by LSCAU-focused volunteers (with a large representation of people with migrant experience, mainly from Ukraine) are now the main actors designing intercultural and inclusive policies and inspiring local governments and NGOs in other cities, not only in Poland. In Lutsk, the assistance offered is also being transformed into long-term activities with an identity and integration dimension at the level of the emerging political Ukrainian nation, which can be manifested in the offer of Ukrainian language instruction to displaced persons from the east of the country and the consolidation of society. And in this sense, the phenomenon of resilience itself can be understood as an active and creative process of change, ‘in which people assemble various tools, including collective resources and new images of themselves’ (Hall and Lamont Citation2013: 14). We find that the response to the humanitarian crisis in 2022 in both cities resulted in a change in local governance systems at least in terms of the approach to local inclusion and integration policies, as well as the empowerment of third sector organisations and their human resources.

Declaration of interest statement

The authors report there are no competing interests to declare.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Correction Statement

This article has been corrected with minor changes. These changes do not impact the academic content of the article

Additional information

Funding

This article has been supported by the Polish National Agency for Academic Exchange under the NAWA Urgency Grants programme (grant number BPN/GIN/2022/1/00025/U/00001).

Notes

1 Project Multilevel governance of the humanitarian crisis caused by the Russian aggression on Ukraine on the examples of activities in the Lublin Voivodeship (PL) and the Volyn Oblast (UA), BPN/GIN/2022/1/00025/U/00001, Polish National Agency for Academic Exchange.

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