Between Reason and Revelation: Petrus van Mastricht’s Critique of the Cartesian Doctrine of the Trinity

ABSTRACT

This paper examines Petrus van Mastricht’s critique of the Cartesian doctrine of the Trinity in his Novitatum cartesianarum gangraena (1677). Mastricht opposed two types of Cartesian approaches to the Trinity. One was by Nicolaus Smiterus, who claimed that the Trinity could be proven rationally. The other was by Christoph Wittich, who argued that the doctrine could not be discussed rationally. Mastricht rejected both positions as benefiting anti-Trinitarian heretics such as the Socinians. Instead, Mastricht took a middle course between Smiterus and Wittich, arguing that while the Trinity could not be proven rationally, its credibility could be enhanced by rational argument.

KEYWORDS:

• Cartesianism
• reformed theology
• early modern philosophy
• René Descartes
• Petrus van Mastricht
• the Trinity

1. Introduction

Throughout the history of Christianity, the doctrine of the Trinity has always been controversial. This is particularly true of the period of high orthodoxy in Reformed theology (c. 1620 – c. 1700).¹ During this time, Reformed theologians engaged in debates concerning the Trinity with various adversaries, including Remonstrants, Socinians, Lutherans, and Catholics. Toward the end of the seventeenth century, orthodox theologians began to debate the doctrine with the followers of René Descartes (1596–1650).²

Reformed orthodox theologians opposed the Cartesians on the doctrine of the Trinity because, according to Richard Muller, the Cartesians introduced ‘rationalist alterations of theology’. Muller pointed to Pierre Poiret (1646–1719) as a representative Cartesian. Poiret argued in 1685 that the Trinity could be proven rationally. Muller also mentioned William Sherlock’s (1639/40–1707) attempt to explain the Trinity on the basis of Cartesian philosophy. Muller concluded that Poiret’s and Sherlock’s Cartesian model ‘led to a departure from the balance between revelation and reason characteristic of theology allied to the traditional Christian Aristotelianism’.³

While Muller made insightful observations, he overlooked a prominent orthodox theologian who opposed the Cartesian doctrine of the Trinity before the arrival of Poiret and Sherlock. The theologian in question was Petrus van Mastricht (1630–1706), a disciple of Gisbertus Voetius (1589–1676).⁴ Mastricht began his literary career as a critic of Cartesianism, with the publication of Vindiciae veritatis et authoritatis Sacrae Scripturae in rebus philosophicis (Utrecht, 1655). In this work, he criticized the Cartesian theologian Christoph Wittich (1625–1687) for interpreting the Bible to fit Copernicanism. By doing so, Mastricht joined the polemic that Voetius and his followers were waging at the time against Cartesian biblical hermeneutics. At this point, Mastricht limited his criticism to this specific issue, sharing many of his arguments with his fellow Voetians.⁵ Mastricht began to develop a more distinctive criticism of Cartesianism around the turn of the 1670s with the publication of Lodewijk Meyer’s (1629–1681) Philosophia S. Scripturae interpres (1666) and Baruch Spinoza’s (1632–1677) Theological-Political Treatise (1670). Mastricht judged the authors of these works to be Cartesian atheists. This led him to view Cartesianism as a kind of gangrene, which, if left unchecked, would gradually worsen and eventually destroy the entire Christian faith.⁶ Based on this diagnosis, Mastricht composed Novitatum cartesianarum gangraena (Amsterdam, 1677), the most comprehensive critique of Cartesianism ever written in the history of Reformed theology. In this work, he attempted to show that Cartesianism clashed with many Christian doctrines.⁷ Mastricht took up the Trinity as one such doctrine in Part 2, Chapter 17 of the Gangraena, where he criticized the Cartesian Nicolaus Smiterus for attempting to provide a rational proof of the Trinity in his Meditatio de Deo tri-uno (Utrecht, 1669).

As Muller’s discussion shows, Smiterus’s proof of the Trinity and Mastricht’s refutation of it have yet to attract scholarly attention. This is not surprising because Smiterus’s Meditatio has left no historical trace except for indirect references taken from Mastricht’s Gangraena.⁸ The present paper seeks to shed light on this otherwise obscure controversy by examining Mastricht’s refutation of Smiterus in the Gangraena.

Focusing only on the criticism of Smiterus, however, would overlook another significant aspect of Mastricht’s discussion of the Trinity in the Gangraena. In Chapter 18, Mastricht continued to deal with the doctrine of the Trinity, but this time he targeted the Theologia pacifica (Leiden, 1671) of Christoph Wittich, a Cartesian theologian at the University of Leiden.⁹ This raises the following questions: What difference did Mastricht find between Smiterus and Wittich? How did he criticize Wittich? What position on the Trinity did he ultimately support against both Smiterus and Wittich? To answer these questions, this paper will also examine Mastricht’s criticism of Wittich.

The present paper also aims to fill a gap in previous scholarship regarding the relationship between Cartesianism and the doctrine of the Trinity. Emanuela Scribano pointed out that Voetius and his disciples, from an early stage in their criticism of Cartesianism, blamed some of Descartes’s teachings for resembling the views of the anti-trinitarian Socinians. They thus criticized Descartes’s philosophy for indirectly supporting anti-Trinitarianism.¹⁰ In our previous article, we also noted that the Reformed theologian Samuel Maresius (1599–1673), in his De abusu philosophiae cartesianae (Groningen, 1670), condemned Descartes’s philosophy for contradicting the doctrine of the Trinity.¹¹ In the present paper, we aim to show how Mastricht engaged with this conflict between Cartesianism and the orthodox doctrine of the Trinity in the Gangraena.

In what follows, this paper will briefly examine Smiterus’s proof of the Trinity found in his Meditatio to provide the necessary basis for understanding Mastricht’s criticism of it. The paper will then explore Mastricht’s refutation of Smiterus, presented in Part 2, Chapter 17 of the Gangraena. Finally, it will turn to Mastricht’s criticism of Wittich, found in Chapter 18.

2. Smiterus’s proof of the Trinity

Little is known about Nicolaus Smiterus. He was born in Gorkum, the Netherlands, in 1644 or 1645 and enrolled at the University of Utrecht in 1666. As early as March 31 of the same year, he defended a disputation titled De naturali Dei cognitione, presided over by the Cartesian philosopher Johannes de Bruyn (1620–1675). The content of the disputation was wholly Cartesian, including the corollary that ‘“Cogito ergo sum” is the first principle to prove the existence of anything’.¹² The disputation shows that Smiterus was a Cartesian from the start of his academic career. Afterward, in 1667, he enrolled at Leiden University, but within the same year, he transferred to the University of Duisburg. In 1670, he earned his doctorate in philosophy and began teaching philosophy and metaphysics at the same university.¹³ In 1669, just prior to receiving his doctorate, he published Meditatio de Deo tri-uno, a 24-page work divided into three parts: the main body of the text, an ‘Address to the Reader’ (Alloquutio ad lectorem) explaining the circumstances of the publication, and ‘Annotations’ (Annotationes) to supplement the main argument.¹⁴

Smiterus opens his discussion by placing Descartes within the history of philosophy. According to Smiterus, philosophers have long been trapped in prejudices and enslaved by Aristotle’s words. However, Smiterus points out that in recent years, they have freed themselves from these constraints and have started making judgments based solely on what is perceived clearly and distinctly. Smiterus identifies Descartes as the most eminent among these philosophers, describing him as ‘the most noble ornament, glory, and light for the world’.¹⁵

Smiterus proposes to prove the doctrine of the Trinity based on Descartes’s philosophy. Just as Descartes did in his demonstration of God’s existence, Smiterus begins his proof by reflecting on the idea of God as the ‘most perfect being’ (Ens perfectissimum).¹⁶ He discovers that God, the most perfect being, necessarily possesses all perfections in the most perfect way. Smiterus identifies one such perfection as God’s power ‘to produce’ (producere) because ‘to produce’ is more perfect than ‘not to produce’ and therefore represents perfection, instead of imperfection. Smiterus continues that since God produces in the most perfect way, what he produces must be perfect; otherwise, he would produce in an imperfect way. This most perfect product ‘resembles the producer and is equal to him in all respects’.¹⁷ Thus, Smiterus identifies two persons in God: the most perfect producer, the Father, and the most perfect product, the Son.

Smiterus proceeds to explore whether anything more exists in God. He makes the following two observations. First, it is possible for an entity to produce and to be produced at the same time. Second, if these two states – ‘to produce’ and ‘to be produced’ – individually represent perfection, their combination in a single entity would constitute another type of perfection.¹⁸ Now, Smiterus counts three types of perfection: ‘to produce’, ‘to be produced’, and ‘to produce and to be produced simultaneously’. He attributes all of them to God because all perfections belong to him. Smiterus concludes: ‘In this way, there necessarily exists in God the one that produces, the one that simultaneously produces and is produced, and the one that is solely produced. As a result, not two, but three should be acknowledged in God’.¹⁹ Smiterus names these three as the ‘Father’, the ‘Son’, and the ‘Holy Spirit’, respectively. He has thus demonstrated the Trinity.

In ‘Annotations’, Smiterus sets out to refute possible objections to his Cartesian proof of the Trinity. He first opposes the objection that the Trinity is a ‘mystery’ (mysterium) and therefore cannot be rationally proven. He responds that the Trinity is not a mystery. He points out that many theologians, from antiquity to the modern age, have attempted to investigate the Trinity based on reason. This shows that they have regarded the doctrine as rationally accessible, not as a mystery.²⁰ Smiterus further supports his claim by adding that even pagans recognized the Trinity:

[…] from all this, it is clear that the idea of the Trinity is included in the idea of God, even if not everyone sees this connection with the same ease because they are hindered by prejudices. Nevertheless, there have been and still are philosophers and theologians of a more independent mind, both among pagans and Christians, who, paying more attention to the idea of the most perfect being, assert that the three in the divine essence are known by nature […].²¹

Smiterus names Porphyry and Orpheus as pagans who knew the Trinity, relying on the testimony of Cyril of Alexandria. Cyril reports that Porphyry, following Plato, admitted three entities in God. Cyril also cites a phrase in the Orphic Hymns, ‘I swear by the voice which the Father first uttered’, and interprets this ‘voice’ to mean the ‘first, his only-begotten Word, which always exists with him’.²² Cyril’s testimony informs Smiterus that pagans recognized the Trinity only through their reason, without the help of revelation; therefore, the doctrine is not a mystery inaccessible to reason.

Smiterus responds to another objection that production should not be attributed to God. First, he insists that eminent Reformed theologians have attributed production to God. He lists the Cartesian Johannes Clauberg (1622–1665), Amandus Polanus (1561–1610), the authors of the Leiden Synopsis (Leiden, 1625), Johannes Hoornbeek (1617–1666), and William Ames (1576–1633).²³ Second, Smiterus points out that even pagans and Muslims attributed production to God. He refers to Aristotle, Proclus, and Averroes, who ascribed eternal production to God in order to prove the eternity of the world. Smiterus does not accept their conclusion of the eternity of the world, insisting that what is eternally produced by God is not the world but his Son. Yet he does acknowledge the significance of their attribution of production to God, as he states: ‘Therefore, this principle that production eternally belongs to God is deeply rooted in the human souls. I do not know on what basis or by what reasoning this principle can be called into doubt or invalidated’.²⁴

Smiterus concludes his Meditatio by arguing against the claim that humanity would never have known the Trinity if God had not revealed it through the Bible. Smiterus asserts that his proof is not based on the Bible, but only on the idea of God, which demonstrates that the doctrine can be known without revelation.²⁵

3. Mastricht’s criticism of Smiterus

Mastricht criticizes the Cartesian doctrine of the Trinity in Part 2, Chapters 17 and 18 of the Gangraena. He targets Smiterus in Chapter 17 and Wittich in Chapter 18.

Mastricht begins Chapter 17 by listing the Cartesians who advocated the rational proof of the Trinity. He first cites the author of Philosophia S. Scripturae interpres, whom he regards as a Cartesian atheist and suspects to be Spinoza. Mastricht claims that because the author of the Philosophia praises Bartholomäus Keckermann’s (c. 1572–1609) rational demonstration of the Trinity, he must also consider the doctrine to be demonstrable.²⁶ Mastricht next observes that Clauberg, the ‘leader of Cartesianism’, offers the rational proof of the Trinity in his disputation entitled De SS. Trinitate.²⁷ At this point, Mastricht introduces Smiterus, accusing him of plagiarizing Clauberg’s disputation:

Dr. Nicolaus Smiterus, a professor of philosophy at Duisburg and also a Cartesian, though otherwise completely unknown, plagiarized these disputations of the renowned Clauberg and imposed them on the world as his own work under the title of Meditatio as if they were a seventh addition to Descartes’s six meditations. He also added an appendix to them. This appendix makes it clear from all sides that Cartesianism is creeping forward and is progressing in a worse direction.²⁸

Mastricht criticizes Smiterus for rationalizing Cartesianism to a greater degree than Clauberg in the following three points. First, whereas Clauberg refrained from calling his argument a demonstration, Smiterus labels his as such. Second, while Clauberg at least ostensibly asserted that revelation is necessary for the initial understanding of the Trinity, Smiterus claims that it can be recognized without revelation. Third, whereas Clauberg referred to the Trinity as a mystery, Smiterus denies this. Observing such an exacerbation of Cartesian gangrene, Mastricht targets Smiterus rather than Clauberg.²⁹

Mastricht begins by stating his own position on the mystery of the Trinity:

Indeed, it is possible and necessary to explain or rather to sketch the mystery of the Trinity by means of similes drawn from nature, which is beyond doubt among the orthodox, in order to make the mystery more probable and believable. However, apart from the Cartesians, only one, or perhaps at most another, Reformed theologian dared to try to firmly prove and demonstrate its [i.e. the Trinity’s] actual existence by natural or philosophical reasoning. Even they were not particularly well received among the Reformed for their efforts.³⁰

According to Mastricht, Reformed orthodox theologians believe that rational argument can enhance the credibility of the Trinity. They often use similes drawn from nature, such as that of a tree: Just as the root of a tree produces the trunk, and the root and the trunk together produce the branches, so the Father produces the Son, and the Father and the Son together produce the Holy Spirit.³¹ However, orthodox theologians hold that such arguments can never prove the existence of the Trinity – only revelation can teach it. Therefore, none of them, with rare exceptions like Keckermann, have attempted its rational demonstration.

Mastricht begins his criticism by summarizing Smiterus’s proof as follows:

[…] every absolute perfection falls into God from eternity; and ‘to produce’, ‘to be produced’ and ‘[simultaneously] to produce and to be produced’ are perfections, and therefore these perfections fall into God in such a way as to constitute the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit […].³²

Mastricht first argues that Smiterus could replace ‘to produce’ with ‘to think’ (cogitare) because ‘to think’ also represents perfection. Smiterus could thus conclude that since ‘to think’, ‘simultaneously to think and to be thought’, and ‘to be thought’ all express perfection, they fall into God to constitute the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit respectively. Mastricht underlines that with this argument, Smiterus would render the Holy Spirit as merely being thought of, not as thinking in itself. Mastricht finds this contradictory to the definition of God’s essence given by the Cartesians. They define the divine essence as ‘thinking’ (cogitatio). Therefore, if the Cartesian Smiterus were to regard the Holy Spirit as not thinking, he would ‘admit a person in God that does not have his essence’.³³

Mastricht extends his argument by insisting that instead of ‘to produce’, Smiterus could use any concept representing perfection such as ‘to determine’, ‘to understand’, or ‘to love’. Mastricht argues that whichever concept Smiterus chooses, he would deprive the Father and the Holy Spirit of some perfection. For example, the Father would only love and not be loved, so he would lack the perfection of ‘being loved’. Likewise, the Holy Spirit would fall short of the perfection of ‘loving’. Consequently, the Father and the Holy Spirit would not be God.³⁴

Mastricht also criticizes Smiterus’s proof because it leads to the conclusion that the world is eternal. Mastricht supports his claim by arguing that Smiterus could replace ‘to produce’ with ‘to create’, since ‘to create’ also represents perfection. With this replacement, Smiterus would affirm that the perfection of creating belongs eternally to God, thereby admitting his eternal creation. Consequently, Smiterus would conclude that the world, as the object of creation, has existed from eternity.³⁵ Furthermore, Mastricht accuses Smiterus of recognizing that his argument risks proving the eternity of the world. As evidence, Mastricht points to Smiterus’s ‘Annotations’, where he positively notes that Aristotle, Proclus, and Averroes proved the eternity of the world by attributing production to God.³⁶

Mastricht goes on to criticize Smiterus for creating a dilemma about whether or not the world is the most perfect product. Smiterus argues that God, as the most perfect producer, produces the most perfect product. With this argument, Smiterus seems to imply that the world is the most perfect product. But if this were so, he would make the world ‘similar and equal to God in all respects’ and thus turn it into another god. Smiterus might be able to avoid this conclusion by arguing that the world is not the most perfect product. But then he would assume that God produced an imperfect product, thereby denying that he is the most perfect producer. As a result, Smiterus would contradict his fundamental assumption that God is the most perfect being.³⁷

Mastricht concludes Chapter 17 by listing the dangers that Smiterus’s proof poses to Christianity. First, he insists that through this reasoning [of Smiterus] supernatural and revealed theology will gradually degenerate into natural and philosophical theology’.³⁸ He supports this claim by referring to the argument of Wittich, according to which what is known to us by the light of reason, even if it concerns God, belongs not to theology but to philosophy.³⁹ Therefore, by arguing that the Trinity is known by the light of reason, Smiterus would place the doctrine in the realm of philosophy, not theology. In this way, he would keep narrowing the domain of supernatural theology to the point of destroying it.⁴⁰

Second, Mastricht criticizes Smiterus for implying that the Bible deliberately withholds important teachings. If, as Smiterus claims, a rational proof of the Trinity exists, and yet the Bible, which, as the Word of God, must know all truths, does not mention it, this would mean that the Bible hides it. Mastricht judges that this conclusion would seriously damage the perfection of the Bible. Therefore, he insists that the Bible does not teach any rational proof of the Trinity because there is no such proof in the first place.⁴¹

Third, Mastricht accuses Smiterus of denying that the Trinity is a mystery because pagans recognized it without revelation. Mastricht responds that pagans did not have the full knowledge of the Trinity, but only a trace of it. Mastricht even claims that they did not discover such a trace on their own, but learned it either from the Hebrew Bible or from their contemporary Jews.⁴²

Finally, Mastricht warns that any attempt to provide a rational proof of the Trinity benefits those who reject the doctrine:

Finally and sixthly, by this kind of pseudo-proofs, the cause of the Holy Trinity is handed over to its adversaries – namely, Jews, pagans, and anti-Trinitarians – in order to be defeated and ridiculed. By destroying these shallow arguments, they try to convince others, if not themselves, that they have defeated the whole cause […].⁴³

Mastricht argues that this danger was recognized even by Thomas Aquinas (c. 1225–1274), whom Mastricht accuses of relying too much on rational arguments concerning other issues. In the Summa theologiae, Aquinas claims that those who try to prove the Trinity harm faith in two ways. First, they deprive faith of its dignity by denying that it teaches something beyond reason. Second, if their proofs fail, they would confirm non-believers’ conviction that Christians believe in the Trinity for no good reason, and thus alienate them from faith.⁴⁴

Mastricht adds that John Calvin (1509–1564) warns against giving unreliable proofs for the Trinity. Calvin objects to an argument for the Trinity based on the observation that the Bible uses the plural Hebrew noun ‘Elohim’ for the singular God. He believes that such a precarious argument would only weaken the case for the Trinity. Instead, Calvin prefers to consult numerous passages of Scripture that provide far clearer and more solid testimony for the Trinity. According to Mastricht, Calvin thus forbids Reformed theologians from inventing weak proofs for the Trinity like those offered by Smiterus.⁴⁵

4. Mastricht’s criticism of Wittich

In Part 2, Chapter 18 of the Gangraena, Mastricht criticizes Wittich on four points: (1) the communicability of the divine essence, (2) the distinction between the divine essence and the persons, (3) the distinction between the divine persons, and (4) the rationality of the doctrine of the Trinity.

4.1. The communicability of the divine essence

First, Mastricht criticizes Wittich for denying the view commonly held by Reformed theologians regarding the communicability of the divine essence. This view explains why the essence of God, unlike those of created beings, can be communicated to multiple persons. On the one hand, the essences of created beings are finite, such that each of them can only be found in one person. Therefore, multiple persons require multiple essences. On the other hand, God’s essence is infinite, so it can be communicated to multiple persons. Consequently, multiple persons in God do not imply multiple essences and thus multiple gods.⁴⁶

Mastricht observes that Wittich, in his Theologia pacifica, rejects this view with the following statement: ‘Because the Trinity is a mystery, it should not be learned from anything other than the Bible’.⁴⁷ Wittich accordingly rejects as unbiblical the explanation that the divine essence is communicable because of its infinity. In response, Mastricht points out Wittich’s self-contradiction. On the one hand, Wittich forbids discussing the Trinity without recourse to the Bible. On the other hand, when he asserts that the communicability of God’s essence cannot be inferred from its infinity, he fails to base this assertion on the Bible.⁴⁸

Mastricht continues that Wittich has another reason for denying that the divine essence is communicable because of its infinity. Mastricht writes: ‘The Cartesians do not fully and straightforwardly accept the infinity of the divine essence and therefore cannot admit that its infinity is the cause of its communicability’.⁴⁹ Mastricht supports this claim by referring to Wittich’s discussion on the divine essence. Wittich defines God’s essence as ‘infinite thinking’ (cogitatio infinita) and argues that God’s thinking is infinite because ‘he thinks of all things and of each thing in a single act’.⁵⁰

Mastricht claims that Wittich’s position makes it absurd to argue for the communicability of God’s essence on the basis of its infinity.

Therefore, it is not surprising that such an infinity cannot be admitted by them [i.e. the Cartesians] as the cause of the communicability [of the divine essence]. Indeed, it would be the same as saying that the same thinking of God is common to several persons because God thinks of all things and each thing in a single act.⁵¹

Here is Mastricht’s argument: Wittich defines the essence of God as infinite thinking, which he understands to mean that God thinks of everything at once. What would happen if Wittich applied this understanding to the claim that since God’s essence is infinite, its essence is communicable to multiple persons? He would then arrive at the following argument: Since God thinks of everything at once, his thinking is communicable to multiple persons. Mastricht finds this argument untenable. For him, even if God’s thinking extends to everything simultaneously, this by no means guarantees its communicability to multiple persons. Mastricht believes that Wittich recognizes this difficulty and thus avoids identifying the infinity of God’s essence as the cause of its communicability.

Finally, Mastricht accuses Wittich of disarming the Reformed theologians against the Socinians. Mastricht claims that the Socinians deny the doctrine of the Trinity with the following argument: Each human and angelic person possesses a distinct essence. The same should be true of divine persons. Therefore, if there were multiple persons in God, each would have its own unique essence. This would imply the existence of multiple gods. Mastricht states that in response, the Reformed theologians criticize the Socinians for confusing the case of God with that of humans and angels. Unlike the finite essence of humans and angels, God’s infinite essence can be shared by multiple persons. Mastricht condemns Wittich for undermining this counterargument by denying that the infinity of God’s essence is the cause of its communicability. ‘How’, asks Mastricht, ‘could it be better than to remain silent in the face of the objections of the anti-Trinitarians and surrender the case to them?’⁵²

4.2. The distinction between the divine essence and persons

Mastricht next opposes Wittich’s claim regarding the distinction between God’s essence and his persons. Wittich argues the following in the Theologia pacifica:

[…] I maintain, with regard to Article 14 [of locus 3 of Maresius’s Systema theologicum], that the divine persons are not distinguished from the divine essence by any kind of distinction found in created beings, and thus they are not distinguished as different things (realiter), or as different modes (modaliter), or by reason of analysis (ratione ratiocinata) (although this last one is said to be commonly accepted by all), but they are distinguished by personal properties […].⁵³

Wittich here rejects the view held by many Reformed theologians, including Maresius and Mastricht: the divine essence is distinguished from the divine persons by ‘reason of analysis’. Mastricht sees this distinction not as a distinction between different things, but as a distinction that the human mind recognizes in God. Nevertheless, Mastricht denies that the distinction is a mere human invention, insisting that it has its basis in God himself.⁵⁴

Against Wittich, Mastricht first argues that if one thing cannot be distinguished from another thing, either as different things, or as different modes, or even by reason of analysis, then the two are identical. Therefore, Mastricht accuses Wittich of identifying God’s essence with his persons. Mastricht criticizes Wittich as reviving Sabellianism, according to which ‘the three persons are different only in name’.⁵⁵

Second, Mastricht opposes Wittich’s claim that God’s essence is distinguished from divine personhood by ‘personal properties’. Mastricht insists that this inevitably results in recognizing four persons in God, a doctrine known as ‘tetratheism’ (Tetradismus). Mastricht draws this conclusion as follows: If God’s essence and persons are distinguished by personal properties, such properties must exist not only in the persons but also in the essence. This would imply that in addition to the three persons, their essence, possessing its own personal property, is also a person – thus four persons in God.⁵⁶

4.3. The distinction among the persons

Mastricht next focuses on criticizing Wittich’s claim that the divine persons are not modally distinct from one another.⁵⁷ Mastricht once again condemns Wittich for rejecting the view shared by Reformed theologians. Mastricht reports that all Reformed theologians regard the divine persons as three modes of existence, and therefore refer to their mutual distinction as modal.⁵⁸

Mastricht observes that Wittich supports his claim by referring to Part I, Article 56 of Descartes’s Principles of Philosophy. There, Descartes writes: ‘Hence we do not, strictly speaking, say that there are modes or qualities in God, but simply attributes, since in the case of God, any variation (variatio) is unintelligible’.⁵⁹ Based on this assertion, Wittich concludes that because there are no modes in God, the distinction between the divine persons is not modal.

Mastricht first criticizes Descartes’s denial of modes in God because it would destroy the Trinity. Mastricht supports this argument by referring to Part I, Article 55 of the Principles of Philosophy, where Descartes regards number and order as modes. Mastricht points out that by rejecting divine modes, Descartes would deny number and order in God. Consequently, Descartes would negate the existence of the three persons of the Trinity, and the order among them. Second, Mastricht rejects Descartes’s claim that modes in God would cause variation. Because modes have existed in God from eternity, their existence causes no variation in him.⁶⁰

Mastricht then opposes Wittich. Wittich rejects the attribution of modes to God because it permits speaking of God as a created being. Wittich names Keckermann as a theologian who made this mistake and criticizes him as follows:

Certainly, Keckermann stumbled here, when in Book I, Chapter 3 [of his Systema s.s. theologiae] he states: ‘But it will be difficult for many to understand what this mode [of God] is. However, I would like them to consider the following: In all things there is something which, added to the thing, is not the thing itself, but a certain degree of that thing: just as the degree of heat by which warmth or fervor is produced is not heat itself, but a mode of heat. In the same way, there is something in God which is not a different thing from God, or which is not another God, and yet it is not the essence of God itself, but a mode of that essence’. When [Keckermann] borrowed the term ‘mode’ from created beings and applied it to this mystery, the way was already paved to stretch further and to compare the divine persons with degrees of heat, with which the divine persons have absolutely no similarity.⁶¹

Wittich criticizes Keckermann for speaking of the divine persons as if they were created beings by comparing them to different degrees (i.e. temperatures) of heat. In response, Mastricht argues that Keckermann does not directly compare the divine essence and persons with heat and its temperatures. Instead, Keckermann uses the example of heat and its temperatures to illustrate the general relationship between essence and modes, and he claims that this relationship also holds between God’s essence and the divine persons.⁶²

4.4. Believing in contradictions

Finally, Mastricht criticizes Wittich’s following assertion:

But because this mystery [i.e. the Trinity] has been clearly revealed, even if we cannot resolve all the contradictions that the Socinians invent, it must not be denied for that reason. Rather, we must confess our ignorance and consider that God is infinite while we are finite, and therefore it is not surprising that we do not understand all things that are in God.⁶³

First, Mastricht criticizes Wittich for making self-contradictory statements. On the one hand, Wittich here argues for the need to believe in contradictory doctrines. On the other hand, he agrees with Descartes that only what is clearly and distinctly perceived should be accepted as truth. Mastricht claims that Wittich cannot hold these two positions simultaneously because contradictory doctrines could never be perceived clearly and distinctly.⁶⁴

Second, Mastricht blames Wittich for betraying the Reformed Church and benefiting its opponents. Mastricht begins by explaining how Wittich would help the Roman Catholics. The Catholics hold the doctrine of transubstantiation, affirming that the bread and wine in the Eucharist are transformed into the body and blood of Christ without changing their appearance. The Reformed theologians reject this doctrine as contradictory. Mastricht accuses Wittich of enabling the Catholics to respond that even if transubstantiation involves contradictions, it should be believed.⁶⁵

Mastricht argues that Wittich would also benefit Lutherans. Lutherans consider the bread and the body of Christ to coexist in the Eucharist, a doctrine known as consubstantiation. Reformed theologians rejected this doctrine because it is contradictory for two substances to coexist in the same place. Mastricht criticizes Wittich for allowing Lutherans to argue that although their doctrine contains contradictions, it should be believed.⁶⁶

Above all, Mastricht fears that Wittich would benefit the Socinians. According to Mastricht, the Socinians would be able to use Wittich’s argument to refute the objections of Reformed theologians that the Bible often speaks of God in the plural and teaches his triune nature. The Socinians would be able to respond that even if their denial of the Trinity contradicts the biblical descriptions of God, it should still be accepted. They should simply confess their ignorance of how to resolve the contradiction, arguing, together with Wittich, that God is infinite and humans are finite. Mastricht concludes: ‘Who, then, would not see that with this Cartesian advice, the Christian warriors, when engaged in dispute with the opponents of the Trinity, are utterly disarmed, and in the end the great cause of Christianity is abandoned and betrayed at its very roots?’⁶⁷

5. Conclusion

The present paper has examined Mastricht’s criticism of Smiterus and Wittich on the Trinity, found in Part 2, Chapters 17 and 18 of the Gangraena. Mastricht criticizes Smiterus for trying to give a rational proof of the Trinity by attributing production to God. Mastricht rejects Smiterus’s proof because it invites several absurd conclusions, such as that the world is eternal or that the world is God. Against Smiterus’s claim that the Trinity can be rationally proven and is not a mystery, Mastricht warns that such a claim would negate the necessity of revelation and destroy supernatural theology. Mastricht also points out that Smiterus’s inadequate proof of the Trinity would allow the anti-Trinitarians, such as the Socinians, to ridicule Christians for believing in the doctrine without good reason.

Mastricht finds that Wittich, in contrast to Smiterus, considers the Trinity to be a mystery beyond rational argument and therefore to be believed even if it contains contradictions. Mastricht accuses Wittich of making it impossible for Reformed theologians to refute heretical doctrines held by the Catholics, Lutherans, or Socinians as contradictory. Mastricht also notes that although Wittich forbids rational discussion of the Trinity, he rejects several orthodox doctrines based on Cartesian philosophy. Wittich denies that the essence of God can be shared by three persons because of its infinity. Wittich also negates that the essence and persons of God are rationally distinct, and that the persons are modally distinct from one another. Mastricht rejects these denials as leading to Sabellianism or tetratheism.

In summary, Mastricht demonstrated that Cartesianism undermined the doctrine of the Trinity in two contrasting ways. Smiterus, on the one hand, claimed to give a rational proof of the Trinity. Wittich, on the other hand, regarded the doctrine as completely inaccessible to reason. Thus, Mastricht identified in the Cartesian doctrine of the Trinity not only the rationalizing tendency that Muller has pointed out, but also an orientation relying solely on revelation. Mastricht argued that both positions would ultimately benefit anti-Trinitarian heresy, and therefore Reformed believers must take the middle road between Smiterus and Wittich: The Trinity could not be proven by reason, but its credibility could be enhanced by reason.⁶⁸

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No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Additional information

Funding

This work was supported by the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science [grant nos 20K00112 and 24K03431].

Notes on contributors

Kuni Sakamoto

Kuni Sakamoto (PhD 2012) is associate professor at the School of Arts and Letters, Meiji University, Japan. The main focus of his research is on early modern Aristotelianism and Cartesianism. His works include Julius Caesar Scaliger, Renaissance Reformer of Aristotelianism (Leiden, 2016).

Yoshi Kato

Yoshi Kato (PhD 2013) is professor at the College of Arts, Rikkyo University, Japan. The main focus of his research is on the relationship between religion and politics in early modern Europe. His works include “Foreshadowing Spinoza: Johannes Clauberg on God and Miracles,” Church History and Religious Culture (2020).

Notes

1 For the periodization of Reformed theology, we have followed Van Asselt, Introduction.

2 The most comprehensive account of the doctrine of the Trinity in Reformed theology can be found in the fourth volume of Richard Muller’s Post-Reformation Reformed Dogmatics. See also Rehnman, “Doctrine of God.” On early modern Trinitarian theology in general, see Lehner, “The Trinity in the Early Modern Era.”

3 Muller, Post-Reformation Reformed Dogmatics, 4:401. Poiret gave a geometric proof of the Trinity in the second edition of his Cogitationes rationales de Deo, anima et malo (Amsterdam, 1685). See Poiret, Cogitationes, III.8, 223–272. This proof does not appear in its first edition (Amsterdam, 1677). On Poiret’s proof, Muller, “Found”; Chevallier, Pierre Poiret, 161–169. On Sherlock, see McCall and Stanglin, After Arminius, 76–81 and the literature cited there. For an overview of early modern Dutch Cartesianism, see Schmaltz, Early Modern Cartesianisms.

4 On Mastricht, see Neele, Mastricht.

5 On the Vindiciae, see Vermij, Calvinist Copernicans, 260–261; Eberhardt, Wittich, 171–173.

6 Sakamoto and Kato, “A Diagnosis.”

7 On the Gangraena, see Bizer, “Die reformierte Orthodoxie,” 357–362; Goudriaan, Reformed Orthodoxy and Philosophy, 58–62; Kato, “Petrus van Mastricht.”

8 For example, see De Moor, Commentarius perpetuus, V.28, 883.

9 On Wittich’s Theologia pacifica, see especially Eberhardt, Wittich, 284–304.

10 Scribano, Da Descartes a Spinoza, 151. See also Vos, “Reformed Orthodoxy,” 169.

11 Sakamoto and Kato, “A Trojan Horse,” 821–822.

12 De Bruyn, De naturali Dei cognitione tertia, sig. A4v. On De Bruyn’s disputations, see Bos, “Cartesian and Anti-Cartesian Disputations.”

13 Album studiosorum Academiae Rheno-Trajectinae, 60; Album studiosorum Academiae Lugduno Batavae, 535; Ring, Geschichte der Universität Duisburg, 184. Although Ring lists Smiterus’s birth year as 1646, the Leiden University enrollment register records that he was 22 years old as of March 3, 1667, which means that he was born in either 1644 or 1645.

14 The Meditatio is rare, and as far as we have been able to confirm, it is only held in the library of the University of Erfurt and the Bibliothèque nationale de France. We use the copy housed in the latter. The book’s frontispiece has a note stating, ‘Second edition, much more accurate than the prior one (Editio secunda priori multo accuratior)’. Smiterus explains the meaning of this in ‘Address to the Reader’. Initially, he published the book anonymously, but due to numerous typographical errors, he created a much more accurate second edition, where he revealed himself as the author. We have not been able to locate the first edition. See Smiterus, Meditatio, 17.

15 Smiterus, Meditatio, 5–6.

16 It is debatable whether Smiterus’s proof can be called Cartesian. If the term ‘Cartesian proof’ is used in the sense that Descartes himself would accept it as a consequence of his philosophy, the proof is clearly not Cartesian. On the other hand, Smiterus himself considers his proof to be in line with Descartes’s philosophy. At the beginning of his book, he states that he will consider God “with Descartes.” Additionally, Smiterus models his proof based on the idea of God as the “most perfect being” after Descartes’s proof of God’s existence found in the Fifth Meditation. Smiterus also frequently uses the expression “to attend to” (attendere), which he clearly borrows from Descartes. In our paper, we will follow Smiterus’s self-understanding and refer to his proof as Cartesian.

17 Smiterus, Meditatio, 8.

18 Smiterus here takes it for granted that ‘to be produced’ is a perfection, but nowhere in the Meditatio does he substantiate this claim. He seems to have arrived at this conclusion by inferring that because the perfection of producing always entails something that is produced, ‘to be produced’ is a type of perfection.

19 Smiterus, Meditatio, 14: ‘[…] atque ita necessario statuitur in Deo unus producens, unus productus et producens simul, et unus productus tantum, ut non amplius duo, sed tres in Deo constituendi sint’.

20 Smiterus, Meditatio, 18–19.

21 Smiterus, Meditatio, 19: ‘[…] ex quibus omnibus ideam Trinitatis in idea Dei licet praejudiciis impediti nexum illum non omnes aeque facile videant, contineri liquet: Quanquam liberioris ingenii philosophi et Theologi tam Ethnici quam Christiani olim non defuerint, nec hodierno tempore desint, qui ad ideam Entis perfectissimi magis attendentes tres dari in Essentia divina natura cognitum esse dictitent; […]’.

22 Smiterus cites Cyril’s remarks from the following Latin translation: Divi Cyrilli Archiepiscopi Alexandrini opera omnia, 3:21. On Cyril’s remarks, see Walker, Ancient Theology, 115–118.

23 Clauberg, De SS. Trinitate, XII.5, 84; Polanus, Syntagma, III.4, 1290–1291; Synopsis purioris theologiae, Disputation VIII, thesis 15–17, pp. 210–215; Hornbeek, Institutiones theologicae, III.22, 119; III.24, 123; Ames, Medulla theologica, I.5.16, 17.

24 Smiterus, Meditatio, 21: ‘Adeo ut hoc principium, Deo sc. ab aeterno competere productionem, hominum animis profundissime sit insitum, nec videam, quo fundamento, quibusve rationibus in dubium vocari, aut infringi posset’.

25 Smiterus, Meditatio, 24.

26 Mastricht, Gangraena, II.17.2, 310; [Meyer], Philosophia S. Scripturae interpres, VI.3, 47–48. On Meyer’s discussion on the Trinity in the Philosophia, see Bordoli, Ragione et scrittura, 150. On Mastricht’s criticism of Spinoza in the Gangraena, see Sakamoto and Kato, “A Diagnosis.”

27 Mastricht, Gangraena, II.17.2, 310.

28 Mastricht, Gangraena, II.17.2, 310: ‘D. Nicolaus Smiterus Philosophiae Professor Duisburgensis, Cartesianus itidem, nullius caetera nominis, Disputationes istas Celeberrimi Claubergii compilavit, et pro invento proprio, edita meditatione, quasi septima quadam cum Cartesii sex, compingenda, orbi obstrusit, non sine auctario, quo scilicet serpentem et in deteriora proficientem Cartesianismum undequaque agnoscas’. Mastricht rejects Smiterus’s claim that he only read Clauberg’s disputation after he conceived his own proof, only to find similar arguments presented there. See Smiterus, Meditatio, 20. Assessing the extent of Smiterus’s dependence on Clauberg is worthy of further investigation, but it is beyond the scope of the present paper.

29 Mastricht, Gangraena, II.17.2, 310–311.

30 Mastricht, Gangraena, II.17.3, 311: ‘Posse equidem et fas esse Trinitatis Mysterium explicare aut adumbrare potius similibus e natura petitis, penes orthodoxos extra dubium est, quo nimirum ejus possibilitas et credibilitas facilior reddatur: attamen ejus actualem existentiam rationibus naturalibus seu Philosophicis solide probare ac demonstrare etiam, praeter Cartesianos, e Theologis Reformatis non ausus fuit tentare nisi unus, forte et alter, qui etiam ejus operae non magnam gratiam a Reformatis abstulerunt’.

31 The simile of tree is taken from Maresius, Systema, III.42, 124a–b. For the extent to which Reformed theologians recognized the role of reason in their discussions of the Trinity, see Muller, Post-Reformation Reformed Dogmatics, 4:157–167.

32 Mastricht, Gangraena, II.17.4, 312: ‘[…] omnis perfectio absoluta ab aeterno in Deum cadit; et producere, produci, ac producere et produci sunt perfectiones, ac proinde sic in Deum cadunt, ut constituant Patrem, Filium et Spiritum Sanctum […]’.

33 Mastricht, Gangraena, II.17.4, 312. For Wittich’s definition of the essence of God as thinking, see Section 4 below. When discussing Cartesianism, the term cogitatio is usually translated as ‘thought’. However, we have chosen to translate it as ‘thinking’ to emphasize Mastricht’s distinction between cogitatio and ‘being thought’.

34 Mastricht, Gangraena, II.17.4, 312–313.

35 Mastricht, Gangraena, II.17.7, 314.

36 Mastricht, Gangraena, II.17.14, 323–324.

37 Mastricht, Gangraena, II.17.8, 316.

38 Mastricht, Gangraena, II.17.14, 322.

39 Wittich, Theologia pacifica, I.2, 2; Eberhardt, Vernunft, 221–227.

40 Mastricht, Gangraena, II.17.14, 322–323.

41 Mastricht, Gangraena, II.17.14, 323.

42 Mastricht, Gangraena, II.17.323–324. We have supplemented our discussion here from Mastricht, Theoretical-Practical Theology, I.2.24.21, 519. For Reformed theologians’ views on the presence of a vague understanding of the triune God in ancient pagan philosophy, see Muller, Post-Reformation Reformed Dogmatics, 4:159–162.

43 Mastricht, Gangraena, II.17.14, 324: ‘Denique sexto hujusmodi demonstratiunculis causa SS. Trinitatis hostibus suis, Judaeis, Gentilibus, Antitrinitariis, debellanda ac deridenda propinatur; hi enim prostratis hujusmodi ratiunculis, si non sibi, saltem aliis admodum plausibiliter persuadere adnitentur, se totam causam debellasse […]’.

44 Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae, I.32.1.

45 Mastricht, Gangraena, II.17.14, 324. On Calvin, see Muller, Post-Reformation Reformed Dogmatics, 4:217–218; Merkle, Defending the Trinity, 12–16.

46 Maresius, Systema, III.12, 107b; Turretin, Institutes of Elenctic Theology, III.25.16–17, 1:270; Mastricht, Theoretical-Practical Theology, I.2.24.7, 503.

47 Wittich, Theologia pacifica, I.6, 4–5; Eberhardt, Vernunft, 229–230.

48 Mastricht, Gangraena, II.18.2, 326.

49 Mastricht, Gangraena, II.18.4, 327.

50 Wittich, Theologia pacifica, X.121, 90; X.122, 91; XIV.185, 156. On Mastricht’s criticism of Wittich’s definition of God’s essence as infinite thinking, see Kato, “Petrus van Mastricht,” 133.

51 Mastricht, Gangraena, II.18.4, 328: ‘Unde mirum non est, talem infinitatem ab ipsis non posse admitti pro causa communicabilitatis, perinde enim esset ac si diceres, eandem cogitationem Dei communem esse pluribus personis, quia Deus unico actu omnia et singula cogitat’.

52 Mastricht, Gangraena, II.18.5, 328.

53 Wittich, Theologia pacifica, I.10, 9: ‘[…] statuo ad articulum 14. personas ab essentia divina non distingui ullo distinctionis genere, quod locum habet in creaturis, adeoque nec distingui realiter, nec modaliter, nec ratione ratiocinata (quod tamen ultimum communiter statui dicitur ab omnibus) sed per proprietates personales […]’.

54 Maresius, Systema, III.14, 109a; Mastricht, Theoretical-Practical Theology, I.2.24.8, 503. On the distinction by reason of analysis, see Muller, Post-Reformation Reformed Dogmatics, 4:191; Muller, Dictionary, 95–96.

55 Mastricht, Gangraena, II.18.6, 329. Mastricht’s definition of Sabellianism is taken from his Theoretical-Practical Theology, I.2.8.8, 174.

56 Mastricht, Gangraena, II.18.7, 329.

57 Wittich, Theologia pacifica, I.7–9, 6–8.

58 Mastricht, Gangraena, II.18.11, 335. For the views of Reformed theologians on this issue, see Muller, Post-Reformation Reformed Dogmatics, 4:192–195 (194–195 on Mastricht); Rehnman, “Doctrine of God,” 395–400.

59 Descartes, Principles of Philosophy, I.56, AT 8-1:26, CSM 1:211.

60 Mastricht, Gangraena, II.18.9, 330.

61 Wittich, Theologia pacifica, I.7, 6–7: ‘Keckermannus sane hic impegit, quando lib I. cap. 3. sic inquit: Sed quid iste sit modus, multis difficile intellectu videbitur. Quos tamen hoc velim cogitare in omnibus rebus esse aliquid, quod rebus additum res quidem non sit, sed quidam rei gradus: Ut gradus caloris, per quem fit tepor, aut fervor, calor quidem ipse non est, sed caloris modus. Sic etiam in Deo aliquid est, quod quidem a Deo diversa res non est, vel quod non est alius Deus, et tamen ipsa Dei essentia non est, sed hujus essentiae modus. Dum enim a Creaturis mutuatus est nomen Modi, idque huic mysterio applicavit, paratus jam erat aditus ad tendendum plus ultra, et comparandas personas divinas cum gradibus caloris, cum quibus nullam plane habent similitudinem’; Keckermann, Systema s.s. theologiae, I.3, 16. On Keckermann’s argument, see Muller, Post-Reformation Reformed Dogmatics, 4:192.

62 Mastricht, Gangraena, II.18.9, 331.

63 Wittich, Theologia pacifica, I.6, 6: ‘Sed cum clare sit revelatum illud mysterium, etsi nos non possumus omnem contradictionem, quam nectunt Sociniani, enodare, propterea tamen non est negandum, sed hic nostra ignorantia est confitenda, et cogitandum quod Deus sit infinitus, nos autem finiti, quodque propterea non sit mirum, si non omnia, quae in Deo sunt, intelligamus’; Eberhardt, Vernunft, 229.

64 Mastricht, Gangraena, II.18.13, 337.

65 Mastricht, Gangraena, II.18.15, 338.

66 Mastricht, Gangraena, II.18.15, 338.

67 Mastricht, Gangraena, II.18.15, 338.

68 Richard Muller explained that Cartesian theologians such as Abraham Heidanus (1597–1678) and Francis Burman (1628–1679) modified Descartes’s philosophy to serve Reformed theology and avoided rationalistic conclusions such as those found in Poiret or Sherlock. This paper does not deny the validity of this conclusion. However, it shows that Mastricht found Wittich’s Cartesian theology no less destructive to Reformed orthodoxy than Smiterus’s rationalism. See Muller, Post-Reformation Reformed Dogmatics, 4:401–402.