Pedagogical imagination and practical wisdom: the role of success-narratives in teacher education and professional development

Abstract

There is an increasing awareness that teaching is a practice where moral action is inseparable from pedagogical action, and where wise deliberation or reflection on what course of action to take as an educator is an important part of being a good teacher. This article focuses on rethinking the role of narratives as an articulation of such practical knowledge and the enrichment they might bring to a teacher’s pedagogical imagination. Working within a conceptual framework drawing on Schön and Aristotle, the study presents a group of narratives describing successful conflict resolution told by students at a newly launched teacher education program. These are discussed as part of a teachers practice repertoire and the argument is made that the local and personal repertoires of practitioners need to be complemented with elements from the repertoire of others, something systematic research into narratives of teaching in action can be part of.

Keywords:

• Reflective practice
• pedagogical imagination
• phronesis
• narrative
• teacher education
• professional development

Acknowledgments

This article is a revised and expanded version of a paper presented at ECER 2015 in Budapest. My gratitude is extended to the helpful reviewer comments.

Notes

1. It should be noted that the concept of moral imagination as presented here also has its roots in the ideas of Rudolf Steiner as expressed in The philosophy of freedom (Steiner 2013/1918/1894), where he writes of moral intuition, imagination, and technique. I have outlined this continuity more extensively in Tyson (2015c).

2. I use the term enrich rather than educate or develop because it seems more straightforward. Narratives of actions and deliberations that are new to us enrich our capacity to imagine possibilities. Perhaps writing stories or doing other forms of art does educate or develop one’s imagination, however, that is a matter that lies outside of the present argument.

3. The distinction between artistry and aesthetic activity is made in different ways depending on perspective. Thus, there is an understanding of art as techne in the Aristotelian tradition that Eisner (2002) proceeds from in discussing why teaching is not just a matter of phronesis. As understood here, aesthetic activity more or less overlaps with artistry and is part of both techne and phronesis. Imagination is a central aspect of aesthetic activity but not the only one. A full argument about aesthetic activity is neither possible nor required here, but would proceed from Schiller (cf. Schiller, 1795/2010; Tyson, 2014, 2015b).

4. Bildung, beyond being German for education in general and literally meaning ‘formation,’ also refers to a tradition where education is involved in the biographical formation of character, morals, aesthetic sensibility, and more (cf. Klafki 2000 for a review).

5. A perceptive reviewer notes that this conceptual framework rests on two bases, Schön’s pragmatism and Aristotle’s virtue ethics and that they are, at least in part, based on different views on moral education which warrants a discussion of possible tensions. This remains an issue to address and where narratively articulated practical knowledge is the link. In brief, since the narrative articulation of practical knowledge overlaps with both Schön and Aristotle’s perspectives, there is a mutual ground for them to meet on. And furthermore, since Schön himself explicitly states that he is saying little about ‘wisdom in response to the ethical dilemmas of practice’ (1987, xiii) the involvement of Aristotle’s concept of practical wisdom as interpreted here can be argued for. This does not resolve potential tensions between the two perspectives as they are sometimes represented and this needs to be kept in mind.