The Problematic Progress of ‘Integration’ in the Chinese State's Approach to Xinjiang, 1759 – 2005

Abstract

The statement that Xinjiang is an integral province of the People's Republic of China (PRC) is not as banal as it would first appear. The primary question that arises from this statement is how—by what processes and strategies—was Xinjiang brought to its contemporary situation as a province of the PRC? This paper seeks to highlight that, although Xinjiang's history since the eighteenth century has been one of great turbulence and dynamism, underlying continuities in both the practice of Chinese power and perceptions of Xinjiang impact profoundly on contemporary China's rule of Xinjiang. Therefore, this study attempts to chart the transition of the Qing goal of territorial incorporation of the region based upon a system of indirect rule c.1760 to the post-imperial Chinese state's goal of territorial incorporation based on the extension of direct, modern strategies of government and control.

Keywords:

• Xinjiang
• Integration
• Geopolitics
• Separatism
• Development

Notes

See also (Dreyer, 1976, pp. 1 – 2).

The Qing actively cultivated the mantle of the legacy of Genghis Khan in their relations with the Mongols, while in relations with the Tibetans, the Qing portrayed themselves as heirs to the thirteenth century Mongol – Tibetan patron – priest relationship established between the Yuan founder, Khubilai, and the Tibetan lama, Phagpa.

Xinjiang has been described as constituting three elliptical basins divided from each other by the Tien Shan mountains. Zungharia constitutes the northern part of the region and geographically and historically is an extension of the steppe regions of Mongolia and Kazakhstan. Uighurstan was centred on the Turfan depression to the southeast of Zungharia and had been a site of settled, oasis agriculture for centuries. Meanwhile, the Altishahr (the ‘seven cities’ in Turki of Kashgar, Khotan, Aksu, Karashahr, Yarkand, Kucha and Korla) referred to the oasis towns on the rim of the southern Tarim Basin with the Taklamakan Desert at its centre.

Millward (1998) also notes that their activities were monitored by the lupiao or road pass system. Merchants had to apply to the appropriate authorities in China proper for a lupiao, which recorded the number of merchants in a party, their names, places of origin, age, distinguishing features, goods and itinerary.

The Khanate of Khoqand was centred on the Ferghana Valley in contemporary Uzbekistan.

Rudelson asserts that up to 10,000 Uighurs were studying abroad in the Soviet Union, Turkey or Egypt, although this figure seems to be unlikely.

The extent of KMT support for Ma Zhongying's endeavours in Xinjiang remains unclear, although one scholar (Wang, 1999) asserts that Nanjing attempted to use Ma as a KMT proxy to establish some form of central government control in the region.

A wide range of issues concerning Xinjiang's re-incorporation must have been discussed during the secret contacts between Urumqi and Chongqing, with General Zhu Shaoliang and Economics Minister, Wang Wenhao visiting Urumqi for talks with Sheng Shicai in March and May 1942, respectively. Contemporaneously, Sheng began his purge of pro-communist elements, including members of the CCP (including Mao Zedong's brother, Mao Zemin), and shut down the Anti-Imperialist Front newspaper (see Forbes, 1986; Garver, 1988; Wang, 1999).

Soviet prevarication stemmed in part from the Soviets' need to maintain access to and control over the Dushanze oil field in Xinjiang (Garver, 1988, p. 173).

The scale of Soviet involvement in the ETR remains a subject of some controversy, both within the scholarly discourse and for the current government of China. It is clear, however, that the Soviets at a minimum supplied the ETR with military aid and advisers (Benson, 1989; Wang, 1999; Forbes, 1986).

Forbes (1986, p. 167) described this situation, ‘At the same time, economic pressures were brought to bear against indigenous trading companies operating within Sinkiang; thus the passport fee for a merchant leaving the province was first trebled, and then multiplied by ten’.

The 13 officially recognized minzu of Xinjiang are: Han, Uighur, Hui, Kazakh, Uzbek, Tajik, Kyrgyz, Mongol, Tartar, Russian, Solon, Xibo and Manchu.