Balinese cultural identity and global tourism: the Garuda Wisnu Kencana Cultural Park

ABSTRACT

The island of Bali has been inextricably bound up with the tourism industry. This article examines the dynamic Balinese cultural identity and its ever changing relationship with tourism in the age of globalism through the analysis of a case study: the construction of the Garuda Wisnu Kencana Cultural Park (between 1993–2018), containing an enormous statue of the Hindu God Wisnu mounting the magical bird Garuda. The park and statue can be seen as a new cultural landmark for the Indonesian nation and for the Balinese tourism industry. However, the case study of the park also shows how Bali has changed its role within the Indonesian archipelago since the fall of the Suharto regime in 1998 while dealing with new challenges of global tourism. Representations of a Balinese cultural identity have evolved from national, top-down level constructions of ‘cultural tourism’ into a global tourist destination through hosting international events at the park.

KEYWORDS:

• Balinese identity
• cultural tourism
• globalism
• nationalism
• Garuda Wisnu Kencana Cultural Park (GWK Park)

Introduction

From 12^th to 14 October 2018, the IMF and World Bank annual meeting was held in the Garuda Wisnu Kencana Cultural Park in south Bali, Indonesia. The location for this international event was chosen with consideration. The construction of the GWK Park was only fully completed a few weeks earlier, with the unveiling of one the largest statues in the world: The God Wisnu mounting the magical bird Garuda. Standing 121 meters tall with a wingspan of 64 meters, this colossal statue – which easily dwarfs the Statue of Liberty in New York and the Christ Redeemer statue in Rio de Janeiro – overlooks the park from the top of Ungasan hill, south of the busy Bali international airport. The statue is visible from the island’s beaches, and welcomes millions of tourists who visit the island each year by airplane.

It took almost three decades to finish the statue and park. The construction process was delayed for two main reasons. Firstly, strong protests were voiced against the project by the Balinese people.¹ The mega statue was considered misplaced in the southern part of Bali. According to religious principles, Wisnu should have been placed in its holy position in the North-East. The construction of the statue in the south disrespected the values of Hinduism, which is the soul of Bali’s cultural identity. In addition to this, the mega project in the south would worsen the imbalanced development of the small island of Bali, since most of its hotels and other tourism facilities are heavily concentrated in the south. Secondly, severe financial problems were exacerbated during the Asian financial crisis of 1997 and 1998.² After 1998, the construction stopped as the investors pulled back from the project. By then, the total cost of the project had already exceeded the initial budget of IDR400 billion by several hundred billion Indonesian rupiah. Internal conflicts of interest between the developer and investors further complicated the project. For almost twenty years the statue pedestal remained empty. The project was eventually restarted in 2013 after the addition of a new investor, the property developer PT Alam Sutera Tbk.

When the park and statue were finally finished in October 2018, the local Balinese opposition had completely faded away. Instead, many welcomed the statue and considered it to be a symbol of pride for both Balinese and Indonesian culture. Similar to other mega projects in Indonesia, such as the building of the National Monument in the early 1960s by President Sukarno and the Taman Mini Indonesia Indah (the ‘Beautiful Indonesia Miniature Park’) in the 1970s – which initially sparked controversies but later became a symbol of national identity- the GWK was gradually accepted as a new icon of Bali tourism and a symbol of local and national identity, attracting many foreign and domestic tourists.³

Over the past thirty years the uncompleted park hosted local, national and international events. Most notably, in 2003, the park became the venue for the first anniversary memorial service of the Bali Kuta bombings, and again in 2012, for the ten-year commemoration of the tragedy. In 2013, the park held the grand opening of the World Culture Forum, initially planned by President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) to take place in 2008. The spacious open location has also been used as a venue for a number of music concerts, successfully attracting large crowds for these events. The unfinished park therefore never became an ‘empty’ or deserted location – even when the construction works were halted for more than a decade. On the contrary, these events triggered gradual alterations to the character of the cultural location and helped contribute to the park’s global appeal. This multilevel interplay concerning the park’s identity, both between local and national interests and the development of global tourism, raises a range of questions relating to ‘Balinese culture’ that we wish to address in this article: How did the Garuda Wisnu Kencana statue change from being an object of protest into a symbol of ‘Balinese-ness’? During this process of transformation, how did the GWK Park change from being a tourist hotspot – that was primarily meant to promote Balinese culture – to a park with a plural and global representation of Balinese identity? And lastly: how has the tourist narrative of ‘Balinese culture’ altered over this period, and what can this teach us about Balinese culture in the twenty-first century now that it has been inextricably bound up with global tourism?

The phenomenon of Balinese cultural identity is complex in many aspects. It is diffuse, multi-layered and has an active and passive form that can crystallize through economic, political and cultural events or developments. Over the last thirty years this identity has been especially dynamic, and has remained closely connected with the tourist industry. Most narratives on Balinese identity appear simultaneously; different ideas continue to overlap and form the pluralist and resilient Balinese culture that tourists can experience today when visiting the island.

This article aims to examine the dynamic Balinese culture and the ‘touristification’ of the Balinese society, by analysing the construction of the GWK Park between 1993–2018.⁴ Although others have commented on the Wisnu statue and the changing dynamics between Balinese culture and tourism, this particular case study has not yet been fully examined against the background of the Balinese globalised tourism industry in the early 21^st century. Because of its long construction, the GWK Park makes an ideal case study for this development. During this period, the Park’s identity changed from a national cultural heritage site into an international location that represents Balinese global tourism.

We will first outline how the concept of ‘cultural tourism’ fits the idea of the GWK Park. The statue and the design of the park is an example of how the national government shapes Balinese culture – and national Indonesian identity – as a part of the tourism industry.⁵ In discussing cultural tourism we will also touch upon the controversy surrounding the initial plans and the protests that the park’s development and the statue incited in the early 1990s. Second, we will look at the changing identity of the park after 1997. After sketching the chronological development of the park we will describe how the dynamics of localism, nationalism and globalism changed, and what this can tell us about the future of global tourism in Bali. This article comprises a mixture of interview material, newspaper articles and a review of the research literature on Balinese tourism. The second author had a chance to interview the sculptor I Nyoman Nuarta in his studio in Bandung (West Java) and attended the second ‘ground breaking’ ceremony of the project in 2013, the Balinese ritual of putting the crown on the statue on 20 May 2018, and the opening celebrations of the statue on 4 August 2018.

Defining developments of cultural tourism and globalization in Bali

Scholars have been studying the relation between Balinese culture and tourism in great detail. In their studies of the dynamics between ‘authentic Balinese culture’ and the ever-growing influx of tourism, Michel Picard and Adrian Vickers have analysed the use of the concept of cultural tourism by Indonesian policy makers.⁶ In short, the concept of cultural tourism weakens the antagonism between an authentic Balinese culture and the destructive force of the modern tourist industry. Picard and Vickers show that Balinese culture has remained strong over the years because of tourism, not in spite of it. By turning tourism into culture and culture into tourism it was established that i) Balinese culture became an ‘object’ – a commercial product – and was therefore shaped by (national)- state policies about tourism and ii) consequently, determining that the fate of Balinese culture was linked to the tourist industry. With the exponential rise in the number of tourists, this relation has become increasingly relevant.

This of course does not mean that the dynamics of cultural tourism are uncontested in Balinese society. The Balinese have had, to say the least, ‘an ambivalent attitude’ towards using Balinese heritage as tourist attractions.⁷ Other worries concerning the tourism industry are that the amount of tourists to the island is beyond control and the island is collapsing under over-exploitation and ‘resort tourism’. From the 1990s onwards, big projects have been launched to manage the flow of tourists at the Bali Nirwana Resort in Tabanan and the Padangalak Beach Hotel.⁸ Many other problems have accompanied the global tourism influx over the last twenty-five years. The enormous plastic waste and traffic jams are harming the physical environment of the island. In addition to this, resort tourism has led to the disappearance of many rice fields throughout the island and to add to this, the construction of a second airport in the north of Island will presumably start next year, which will further damage local villages, plantation areas and temples. Bali has also been severely confronted by the arrival of global terrorism through the bombings of bars in Kuta in 2002 and 2005. Despite these terrorist attacks, over the last few years Bali has maintained and strengthened its position as a global tourist destination. As shown in Table 1, Bali received 5.6 million foreign tourists in 2017 who flew into Bali directly (those who landed elsewhere in Indonesia are not included). The number of domestic tourists is not accounted for, but is estimated to be around the same number. In total, Bali received 11 million tourists, which is almost three times the island’s total population of 4 million. This number will continue to increase as the Indonesian government applies a free visa policy for more than one hundred countries. The influx of Chinese tourists (already 25% of the total tourist population) will continue to increase the total number of visitors to Bali.

Table 1. The top 10 direct foreign tourist arrivals to Bali in 2017.

NATIONALITY	2017	± (%) compared to 2016	SHARE (%)
Chinese	1.385.850	39,88	24,32
Australian	1.094.974	− 4,21	19,22
Indian	272.761	45,59	4,79
Japanese	252.998	7,65	4,44
British	243.827	10,07	4,28
American	191.106	12,11	3,35
French	177.864	7,61	3,12
German	177.184	15,11	3,11
South Korean	174.842	15,45	3,07
Malaysian	170.459	− 5,15	2,99
Total	4.939.332	13,98	86,69
Other Nationalities	758.407	27,60	13,31
TOTAL	5.697.739	15,62	100,00

Source: Bali Hotels Association [https://www.balihotelsassociation.com/media-centre/stats/]

The Indonesian government has planned to receive a total of 20 million tourists by 2019, for which Bali will host 10 million. From Bali the tourists are expected to travel elsewhere in Indonesia, such as to Lombok and Komodo Island in the east, Borobudur and Yogyakarta in central Java, or Lake Toba in Sumatera. Tourism remains a growth market for the Indonesian government. As Table 2 shows, Indonesia received 14 million tourists, while other big South-East Asian countries like Thailand (35 million) and Malaysia (almost 26 million) received more tourists. The Indonesian government is currently employing a range of policies as an incentive for more tourists to come.

Table 2. International tourist arrivals 2017. Southeast Asian Countries.

Countries	Number of arrivals
Thailand	35.381.210
Malaysia	25.948.459
Singapore	17.422.826
Indonesia	14.040.000
Vietnam	12.922.151
Philippines	6.620.908
Cambodia	5.602.157
Laos	3.860.000
Myanmar	3.440.000
Brunei	238.450
Timor Leste	66.000

Source: list compiled by Thailand Skylines, based on registered tourist arrivals.

It is fair to ask whether the national policy of cultural tourism is still adequate to cope with these new ambitions in a globalized world. ‘Globalisasi’ first appeared in the Balinese discourse in the 1990s. Two events that clearly demonstrated Bali had entered the global world were the Asian Crisis and the Kuta terrorist attacks.⁹ Both events had a tremendous impact on the Balinese society while surpassing national borders. A third development that launched Bali into the ‘age of Globalization’ is evident in the global influx of tourism influx to the island. By globalization we mean that national interests and boundaries are progressively challenged and dismantled. The term is employed in this context to show the contested nature of a homogenous national identity of a society, under the influences of massive tourism influx. Global tourism therefore dictates that Bali grows into an attractive tourist destination on a global scale. From this perspective it could be argued that Balinese and Indonesian national culture is challenged more and more by a homogenous and cosmopolitan demand from tourists.

The answer to this challenge has been formulated in two different ways, and both represent a rather static idea of Balinese identity. First: the policy of cultural tourism, which was invented under the New Order government (The Suharto government, 1966–1998). Cultural tourism was based on the philosophy of aligning local Balinese concerns with national Indonesian interests to control tourism, while at the same time benefiting from it. As Picard has rightly argued, the idea of cultural tourism therefore requires a clear idea of national interests versus the outside global world; globalism is a force to be controlled. However, confronted with the massive tourism influx and global tourism industry, cultural tourism is digging its own ideological grave by maintaining this rigid dichotomy between the Balinese and national interest on the one hand versus the outside world on the other. This dichotomy is no longer relevant, now that Balinese interests do not necessarily require a national narrative to attract global tourist attention.¹⁰

The second response is formulated directly from the perspective of an untenable force of globalization attacking Balinese culture. Global tourism has the effect of separating tourists from the reality of the island by offering them stereotypical, static and simplistic (westernized) images of Balinese culture. Regarding this development in Bali, the terms ‘disneyfication’, or more specifically, ‘Bali syndrome’ have been coined.¹¹ It is here, however, that we encounter an interesting paradox of global tourism. In the face of globalization and a ‘one size fits all consumer tourism’, attempts have been made to preserve the authentic culture of the island from the destructive force of tourism. Efforts have stretched as far as to gain UNESCO world heritage status for the whole island.¹² This ‘UNESCO argument’ dictates that local particularities and identities would become extinct under the effect of globalization, and that they basically can only be protected by turning them into a living museum. The cultural heritage sites are then no longer used.¹³ Yet, paradoxically, it is this static defensive reaction that will turn Bali into a homogenous touristic culture as this will create a fake cultural system in which a museum-like, tourist segregated reality is protected.¹⁴ This idea, that is only directed towards pleasing tourists by maintaining a static image of the island as a ‘cultural paradise’, is not a reality and not sufficient to understand the dynamics within Bali.

Contrary to arguing over defence mechanisms against globalization, scholars have shown that global tourism is not an immanent danger for national and local identities. Instead, it might serve as a boost for local cultures as has been recently argued for other touristic destinations around Southeast Asia. New developments in global tourism, like gastronomy tourism, may function to re-brand cultural attributes of tourist hotspots in a global context.¹⁵ The Balinese are equally creative in dealing with global tourism. The Japanese anthropologist Shinji Yamashita therefore asserts in his work ‘Bali and Beyond. Explorations in the Anthropology of Tourism’ (2003) that cultural tourism has turned Balinese culture into a ‘culture for tourists’, which helps to fuel Balinese dynamics. Bali has shown to be a versatile brand, and continues to grow in its dynamism and meaning for many different visitors.¹⁶ It is not in spite of global tourism that Balinese identities exist, but also because of the influx of tourism: Ubud, Sanur, Kuta and Seminyak all offer a different local identity and cultural capital and will continue to do so. Bali is an important place for Indonesian arts and offers a destination for wealthy Indonesians’ social and other events. Contrary to what the concept suggests, globalism does not necessarily work against cultural tourism and the diversity of Balinese identities. However, it does change its classical meaning as a constructivist tool of nationalism. The GWK Park will serve as a case study for this development.

Cultural tourism and the GWK park: local protest and support (1993-1997)

The GWK project was first announced in 1993. It was a typically top-down Suharto New Order initiative, comparable with other big projects that were developed in the beginning of the 1990s, like the Bali Nirwana Resort (BNR project).¹⁷ The development of the GWK Park can therefore be classified as an attempt to encourage and control global tourism by using the policies from cultural tourism. The authorities in Indonesia had relied on cultural tourism to regulate the tourism influx over previous decades.

The project was given to the renowned Balinese sculptor I Nyoman Nuarta. During interviews the architect explained the idea behind the project. He stated: ‘We know that Bali thrives from tourism and culture. If we don’t develop the culture it will disappear one day (…) So we have three responsibilities: to preserve the culture, develop it, and find new alternative cultures.’¹⁸ In this quotation the architect voices the philosophy behind cultural tourism: in order to maintain a presumably unchanged essence of Balinese culture, temples need to be constantly rebuilt and renovated in grander styles. The architect also connected the statue with the millennia-old Indonesian culture: ‘The latest and greatest masterpiece that this nation has is Borobudur. After that, this nation has never produced such creativity again’.¹⁹

Joop Ave, the Indonesian Director General of Tourism and Communications and later Minister of Tourism, can be regarded as the godfather of the statue, first proposing the idea in 1989. During his time as Minister of Culture, Post and Telecommunications (1993–1998) Ave became the personification of the cultural tourism projects in the 1990s.²⁰ He was convinced that arts and culture were the backbone of Indonesian’s civilisation.²¹ His politics were motivated by the presumed fragile status of culture and the need to re-strengthen national identity. He cherished the philosophy that all tourist projects should have a clear nationalistic Indonesian value to them. For Ave the GWK park had three functions: 1) to cherish the old elements of Balinese culture, 2) to become the symbol of Indonesian pride and 3) to reaffirm Bali as the centre of (economic) growth. Ave’s approaches were considered direct and somewhat controversial. The role he played in the GWK park is exemplary: Ave urged that the statue should be as huge and mighty as possible. He promised all the necessary funds for it. Ave comprehended that the statue was ‘too big to fail’. By making the project part of Indonesia’s national prestige, Ave knew that eventually the project had to be completed.

The ambitions of Ave might have been a little too big to digest for the Balinese locals. The enormous statue was creating an imbalance on the island. Protests on aesthetic, economic, environmental and cultural grounds were voiced in the media immediately after the project was announced.²² The classic idea of the policy of cultural tourism dictated that national interests were aligned with Balinese interests. This started to be challenged on an unprecedented scale in the 1990s. Examples of other protests directed against tourism projects are the Taman Ayun Temple, the Jatiluwih rice terraces, Pura Besakih and the river valley of Petanu. The Balinese did not easily accept the implementation of a too rigid form of cultural tourism. The protests gave a voice to the disgust of the commercial exploitation of the island. Increased tensions can also be attributed to the unequal distribution of wealth derived from tourism. The protests showed the emergence of a stronger and more vocal Balinese middle class.²³ Balinese intellectuals would be at the forefront of the protests and the Bali Post would fill its pages with the debate. The influential painter I Nyoman Gunarsa attacked the statue on aesthetic grounds, claiming its height and wingspan would violate Balinese regulations on building heights. According to him it was an over-exaggerated project.²⁴ Cultural protest, from a Hindu perspective, was also heard.²⁵ Researcher Ir. I Nyoman Gelebet stated that it was inappropriate to ask Wisnu to propagate and guard ‘hedonistic mass tourism’.²⁶ Next to culturally motivated protest in the papers, religious leaders complained that the tourist structure would overshadow the major temples of the Hindu religion.²⁷ According to Dr. A.A. Djelantik in the Bali Post, Bali did not need another landmark attraction that would compete with the Besakih temple.²⁸ The attempt to create another tourist hotspot for Bali was portrayed as ‘useless’ and too expensive.

The opposition was strong. However, it should be noted that the project also found quite a lot of support among the Balinese. The Bali Post opened a comment section in June and July 1993 in which readers were invited to give their views on the statue, within which the paper would publish three to five comments every day. Contrary to most experts, a substantial amount of the readers voiced support for the statue. It was believed the statue would bring jobs to the island, become a landmark spot for Balinese tourism and a symbol of Balinese pride.

During the same months, the Bali-Post published interviews with the statue’s sculptor and Joop Ave. Ave tried to downplay the controversy by suggesting that the final structure of the park was still open for debate.²⁹ Sculptor Nuarta would emphasize the technological challenges and the national prestige the statue would bring.³⁰ The construction was interrupted in 1997 because of the Asian economic crisis. The crisis foreshadowed the fall of the New Order government of Suharto. After these events the criticism faded away. When the construction was rebooted after a sixteen-year delay in 2013, no real criticism was voiced.³¹ The attention of the Balinese had shifted towards other matters, such as the Benoa Bay reclamation.³² We can also assume that people just wanted to see the project finished, instead of looking at an empty pedestal.

Today, the statue still propagates the initial ambitions of Ave’s cultural tourism: his ideas on the ‘Indonesianization’ of cultural tourism are still in place, as manifest in the inauguration speech of President Joko Widodo, given during the unveiling of the statue on 22 September 2018. Dressed in traditional Balinese clothing, President Widodo reemphasized the initial role of the statue as aspiring to strengthen and preserve Balinese identity. The speech also underlined the pivotal role of Bali in preserving the authentic Indonesian culture within the Indonesia archipelago. The statue, so said the president, is a ‘source of pride not only for the people of Bali, but also for Indonesia’. The president also drew a direct line between Borobudur in Magelang, Central Java, and Prambanan in Yogyakarta. According to him, both monuments show the presence of a civilisation with sufficient economic power and technological sophistication to construct huge and elaborately decorated monuments. The new statue should also be seen in this light: ‘It will not only serve as the icon of Bali’s culture and Indonesia’s tourism, it will also be an historical footprint of our nation’. According to this narrative, the statue has been granted a place among Indonesia’s most important cultural heritage monuments and shares the same historical and universal values.³³

We should reflect on this narrative of cultural tourism a little more, as it forms an important part of the statue’s appropriated identity today. Scholars of Balinese culture have underlined how cultural tourism encouraged the construction of nationalism. Balinese culture exists because of Indonesian nationalism. The Dutch historian Henk Schulte Nordholt shows in his ‘The making of Traditional Bali’ (1994) how Balinese culture is presented as a continuation of the Hinduistic Majapahit-empire. The statue represents this interpretation of Balinese culture: it is a personification of the Indonesian nation in symbol and it establishes continuity with the national past, becoming a fine example of what Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger have famously called the ‘Invention of tradition’. The invention of an authentic Balinese culture is achieved through establishing a direct connection with ancient Indonesian history and traditions.³⁴ Through the statue, the Indonesian nation would see a representation of its unity. The sculptor emphasized this during the religious pasupati ritual (giving a soul ritual), on 20 May 2018: ‘This statue must belong to the community (…) We imported materials from Japan, from Europe, even from Latin America. Then we put them together here, together with artists. The artist is from Bali. The workers are from Bandung, from Java, from Batak, and so on. They were united to complete the GWK. Well. Like that. So, we are truly Indonesian and take pride in it.’³⁵

The Governor of Bali Mangku Pastika explained during the gratitude celebration on 4 August 2018 that the project faced serious problems. He connected these problems to national, judicial and political issues, thereby ignoring the local protests that the project encountered. This is important to note: in his speech the statue remained a national project and the problems were manifested in a national horizon. These were problems of lands claims, politics relating to reformation, the fall of Suharto and the national economy. All of these problems, according to Pastika, tested the national patience (kesabaran), fortitude (ketabahan), and commitment (komitmen). However, the material and spiritual goals would now align, said Pastika. The park represents: ‘A grand idea started by great people, directed by smart people, and completed by sincere people.’³⁶

With the completion of the statue Ave’s dream of 1993 of this new icon for the Indonesian nation had finally been realised. The protagonists of the park had therefore not been wrong in their nationalist discourse, but had failed to see the new representation of Bali’s touristic image, and the dynamic developments of localism and globalism that the park’s location held. In fact, it was not the nationalist narratives of the park that saved the statue but the events that catapulted Bali into the globalised world after the 1990s. Even so, it should be noted that, despite the superseded dichotomy between an Indonesian cultural nation versus an outside world, a nationalist discourse still remains in place and continues to be relevant for (domestic) tourists that will visit the park in the future. This discourse is part of the official promotion material of the park. The website of the GWK Park reads: ‘The GWK Cultural Park offers a lavish Indonesian cultural heritage for years to come with the monumental Garuda Wisnu Kencana Statue as the Indonesian Icon of civilization, the number one cultural icon in Bali.’

Nationalism, terrorism and globalism (1997 – 2013)

Initially, the target for completion of the statue was set for August 1995, when Indonesia celebrated its fifty years of independence from the Dutch. When this goal was not met, the statue was meant to reach completion in the year 2000. As argued before, the Asian Crisis and the pull back of investors thwarted this goal. The empty pedestal continued to occupy the concerns of policy makers in Jakarta, as new goals were set in the new millennium. The Indonesian President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) wanted the project to be finished by 2008 and used the park as the venue for two events: the commemoration of 100 years of Indonesia Awakening Day on 20 May 2008, and the hosting of the World Culture Forum (planned for the same year). The events were held at the park, but the statue could not be finished in time. The World Cultural Forum ended up taking place in 2013, but even then the statue was far from finished. Overall, the project remained inactive for sixteen years. Only in 2013 new financers invested in the project, most prominently the project developer PT. Alam Sutera Realty Tbk that contributed another IDR 450 billion (40 million USD). This, together with the commitment of Mangku Pastika, revitalised the project.

Although the construction of the park was halted until 2013, Bali found itself in a whirl of events during the years 1997–2013. The Asian financial crisis reshaped the idea of the place of Bali in the Indonesian national Archipelago. A political crisis followed the economic crisis: It led to the downfall of Suharto’s New Order Regime. This was followed by a period of reform, known as Keterbukaan (opening) in which Bali strengthened its position against Java and sought its own Balinese approach to attract tourists, slowly but deliberately moving away form the Tourism Promotion Board in Jakarta. This process was deepened by the gradual decentralization and democratization of the country. With decentralization, local interests became more prominent and local culture was seen more and more as the core of a Balinese identity.³⁷

However, the most important shock that altered the way the Balinese looked at their position in the Archipelago and in the global world came in 2002. On October 12 2002, two bombs exploded in Kuta killing 202 people and wounding another 209. Among the victims were 88 Australians, 38 Indonesians and 30 people of different nationalities (of whom, most were western tourists). The terrorists were inspired by global terrorist organisations. The 2002 bombings of Bali created a watershed for Balinese global tourism. It had an enormous negative effect on the influx of tourists. In 2005 – despite security measures – Bali Kuta was bombed again. This time the seafood restaurants on the beach at Jimbaran and a restaurant in central Kuta were hit, killing a total of 23 people. It showed that international global terrorism was a factor to be reckoned with and Bali was a permanent part of the globalised world.

The representation of Bali was altered in the perception of western tourists. This change went in two directions; many Australians perceived Bali as the cheaper version of their own tourist resorts. Bali was such a safe haven, that tourists never considered the fact that Bali was actually part of the national state of Indonesia. Indonesia had a different image in Australian (and western) tourist perceptions than Bali. This changed because of the bombings.³⁸ However, this sentiment was surpassed by another complementary reaction rooted in the Balinese tourism industry. Although the Balinese initial reflection was to see the bombing as an attack on ‘westerners’, another global narrative could present itself: as tourism is crucial for Bali’s economy and culture, the attack on tourists could also be considered as a (Javanese) Islamic attack on Balinese lifestyle and culture. This lifestyle was shaped by their interaction with the west. International fear of terrorism aligned itself with Balinese interests and that of the global tourism industry against Islamization. In other words: it contributed to the Balinese sense of being part of the globalised world and a shared sense of globalised cosmopolitan modernity.³⁹

The GWK Park was chosen to host the international commemoration ceremonies. Monuments for the victims of the 2002 bombings were erected in Kuta, as well as in other places around the globe: in Melbourne, Perth, Sydney, Canberra and London. The bombings are commemorated every year in different ceremonies around the world. However, the most important commemoration, ten years after the bombings, took place in the GWK Park in 2012. This event turned the park into a global commemoration site. Victims’ families from all around the world visited the park to mourn together over the victims of global terrorism. As eighty-eight Australians were among the victims, the Australian prime minister and other political leaders were present at the commemoration. Speeches were made underlining the Australian and Indonesian relations and shared grief over the victims. The victims of this Islamic terrorist attack became integrated in a broader symbolic narrative that has been formulated by global media networks since 9/11.⁴⁰ The Balinese were aware that both their blood and that of tourists had been shed equally during the terrorist attacks. Therefore, it became an important moment for 21st century ‘Antipodean nationhood’.⁴¹ The Balinese increasingly see themselves as the cultural bridge for the Indonesian-Australian relations, and as a door to western culture. Many of the speeches voiced the narrative that Bali and Australia were friends forever, who share the same fate.

Political and economic crisis, and terrorism directed against the tourism industry, moved Bali away from Java and nationalist interests. However, the national tandem of Java-Bali was still kept in place over the years by policy makers. The GWK Park served as a nationalist icon for Indonesia. The commemoration of 100 years of National Awakening Day on 20 May 2008 is especially interesting to mention in this regard. Hari Kebangkitan Nasional is one of the national days of the Indonesian State. This nationalist event – the commemorating of the founding of the first official nationalist movement under the name Budi Utomo (in English: ‘Highest Endeavour’), in 1908 under Dutch colonial rule – is celebrated as the moment of ‘national awakening’ and regarded as the first appropriation of principles of self-governance. President SBY set a target for completion of the park to coincide with the 100-year celebration of National Awakening day in May 2008. SBY rebranded the GWK by stating that: ‘This park will become Indonesia’s new cultural landmark, playing a very significant role in boosting our self-confidence as a nation. This monument will become a sign of the nation’s new awakening period.’⁴² The GWK Park still had the potential to serve national interest. Cultural heritage is easily branded for nationalist purposes. It should be noted that Bali has a different history than Java, since it was only fully brought under Dutch colonial rule in 1908. No bottom-up nationalist movement was formed on the island and after independence Bali was integrated into the Javanese narrative of nationalism. As mentioned before, the initial plan for the park’s opening was during the celebration of fifty years of independence. It is not inconceivable that in the future, the park’s location will be used again for similar national or local political gatherings.

President SBY also used the park’s location to boost Indonesian National pride by organising an international event. From 23–27 November 2013 the World Culture Forum (WCF) under the patronage of UNESCO was held in Bali. The WCF brought together more than one thousand participants from 45 countries and the opening ceremony took place at the GWK Park (the conference was at the Nusa Dua Convention centre). The aim was to explore the role of culture as a means to achieve sustainable development. President SBY said in his opening speech: ‘we already have a World Economic Forum and the World Social Forum for critical discussions on globalization and all its aspects. However, we are yet to have a global forum for meaningful dialogues on the importance of culture.’ On the development of globalization he commented: ‘Strategic changes demand that culture in all its manifestations be championed as an indispensable agent of change and reconciliation in the face of unprecedented globalization’.⁴³ The Indonesian policy of cultural tourism was specifically addressed as an example is his speech: ‘Indonesia has taken a number of measures to make culture a driver of sustainable development. This includes the development of sustainable cultural tourism and cultural infrastructure.’ President SBY was echoing the dichotomy of cultural tourism, thereby underlining the national containment of the effects of globalization. The same goes for his broader narrative on the importance of a national culture in a globalised world. SBY underlined that culture was important for nations to maintain ‘stability and order’.⁴⁴ Culture, in other words, is presented primarily as a national quality.

The World Culture Forum in Bali resulted in the formulation of the Bali promise: ten strategic recommendations. The tensions between the issue of globalization and national interest during the conference was somewhat reflected in the speeches delivered: while the president stressed the critical discussion on the impact of globalization and in his speech instrumentalized the use of culture as a measure for maintaining a stable nation, thereby trying to subordinate globalism to national interest, Nobel Prize laureate Amartya Sen took another approach as he warned in his key-note speech for a violent nationalist drawback under the influence of globalization. The future is transnational and global, he asserted, even if we admire our past.

The GWK PARK as an international location and modern cultural heritage site (2013-2018)

The park and statue were completed in October 2018 and the current promotional material echoes the original message of cultural tourism. The statue is advertised as the highlight of an authentic cultural Indonesian experience. A pass-partout ticket for the park gives access to Balinese dance shows, street theatre, restaurants and shopping areas. The site is promoted as an ideal wedding location.⁴⁵ We should not disregard this function of the park. Now that the statue is finally completed and as the tourism influx from India and South East Asia grows, the GWK Park may live up to its function as an important modern cultural heritage site. Domestic tourists from other parts of the Archipelago may welcome the symbol of Balinese Hindu religion as an integral part of the propagated narrative on Indonesian diversity. Indian tourists feel connected to a shared Hindu heritage that is celebrated in the different tourist attractions in the GWK Park.⁴⁶ As researcher Thirumaran explains in a recent article on Indian tourism in Bali, Hindu religion offers a medium through which ‘the Balinese and Indian visitors culturally interface’, and the Indian people feel a ‘sense of pride and comfort that their national culture has spread geographically’. Indian tourists connect with the Balinese religion and culture and are aware of a long-standing relationship.⁴⁷ This relationship also works in another direction. Balinese may visit Hindu heritage places outside of Bali, such as the Batu Caves temple complex in Malaysia, and feel part of a growing global Hindu identity (through Hare Krishna or Sai Baba movements), which might complement with the Balinese Agama Hindu form of Hinduism.⁴⁸ To describe this phenomenon of cultural and religious proximity Thirumaran has coined the term ‘affinity tourism’. Chinese tourists (although no in-depth study has been carried out on the effects of the fast-growing Chinese tourism influx) may also be pulled towards this idea of a shared Asian heritage and cultural familiarity in Bali. It shows us that the pull of tourism towards these prominent sites does not necessarily have to be based on ‘exotic’ differences, but may instead be based on similarities. It can be suggested that the GWK Park – now that India and China make up the largest group of foreign tourists to Bali – will benefit from this affinity tourism and the idea of a shared Asian heritage will further fuel tourism in Bali into the future.⁴⁹ The number of visitors to GWK in the last three years has been relatively small, around 700 thousand (in 2016: 754,025 and in 2017: 718,781). This number is low compared to other tourist hotspots like Tanah Lot Temple, which welcomed 3.4 million visitors in 2017. However, now the statue has been completed, the park has gained its landmark symbol and it is expected that visiting numbers will go up.

In the meantime, the park has established itself as a location for international events. Bali governor Pastika recalled during the opening of the park in 2018, that the GWK should remain connected with the World Cultural Forum. According to the governor, if the city of Davos in Switzerland could become the headquarters of the World Economic Forum, then Bali’s GWK Park could permanently host the World Cultural Forum. The recent IMF meeting in October 2018 was therefore an important moment for the park’s global positioning. It was generally seen as the moment Indonesia could present the park to the world and as an attempt to attract more international events to the location and Bali in general.

Looking at globalism from the park’s perspective, it has two visible effects for Bali. First: it changes the island’s physical layout. Most of the big infrastructural projects over the last few years, like the Mandara Toll road and Ngurah Rai Airport underpass, have been driven by the incentive of hosting big international events, such as the APEC Summit Meeting in 2013, Miss World Election, the World Cultural Forum and the IMF.

Second, globalism has changed the Balinese identity and Bali’s role in the Indonesian Archipelago.⁵⁰ This global connection is also illustrated by other international events, like the hosting of the United Nations Conference on Climate Change in 2013 and the Ubud Writers and Readers festival, which since its modest start in 2004 has developed into an internationally renowned event. Similar to the rest of the island, the GWK Park has strongly embraced this international identity over the last few years. At the opening of the World Culture Forum in 2013 the architect Nuarta commented on the gathering saying that the park now functions to ‘introduce different cultures of the world through our mission to educate people to become more understanding towards other cultures.’⁵¹ In 2018, at the celebration ceremony for the park, Balinese governor Pastika reflected on the future layout of the park. He sketched a situation in which the park in the future would be decorated with carvings of cultural peaks from all over the world. This way the park could be a permanent headquarter of World cultures.

Pastika’s idea of the park as a cultural melting pot is not farfetched, since the park has already actively connected itself to the dominant global culture over the last few years. The British heavy metal band Iron Maiden performed in the park in 2011. The park also serves as the location for the Soundrenaline and Bestival pop festivals. Recently the X Djakarta warehouse project – one of the largest annual dance music festivals in Asia – was moved from Jakarta to Bali. This sold out tenth-anniversary edition of the event was held from 7^th to 9 December 2018, and caused massive traffic congestion across the island. The opening act was kicked off with Bali’s famous kecak dance. The different festival stages had names like ‘Garuda land’, thereby blending the initial park’s identity with an international DJ line up.

Considering the fact that the park will succeed in attracting more international events in the coming years, how should we define the park’s global identity? The international events represent a narrative that aligns with the ideal of Bali as a global destination. This is a very dynamic narrative, but it is not a neutral one. Global identity creates a tension with a national Indonesian identity. This clash surfaced during the economic crisis and the terrorist attacks but is implicit in other events. The local interests of Bali, when defined as a tourist destination, connect with globalism and thereby go against traditional policies of cultural tourism. This is the case for two complementary reasons: First, in the age of global tourism Balinese culture is no longer primarily a national quality, as Indonesian politicians maintain. The speeches of Pastika and sculptor Nuarta show that they are aware of the global exchanges of cultures in Bali. However, they still define culture through the lens of national interests. The dichotomy between a national and an outside global culture will become less and less relevant as the globalisation of Balinese culture progresses.

Second, cultural tourism dictates that Balinese Hindu culture is an integral part of the Indonesian identity, next to the Islamic identity. The antagonism between Hindu and Islam has not been politicized in cultural tourism. This would be contrary to the idea of constructing nationalism through tourist attractions. However over the last few years, we have also seen that Bali did attract some events that were rejected in Java, because it did not align with Islamic culture there. The most illustrative example was the Miss World election in 2013. Initially the plan was to have the opening ceremony in Bali and the finale in Jakarta, but strong opposition from (radical) Muslim pressure groups forced the organisation to host the finale in Bali as well. In the future it is plausible that under the threat of Islamic protests more events will move to the GWK Park’s location, turning Bali into the most globalised place in Indonesia.

Conclusion

Over the last thirty years, economic, political and global developments and crises have deeply altered the meaning of tourism in Bali and of the traditional policy of cultural tourism. Balinese culture is alive, but its pluralist nature and different narratives and images make it very difficult to pinpoint it clearly. Today there are many different ways in which ‘Bali’ can represent itself to the world, and the expectations and demands of European, American and Asian tourists may differ. The almost thirty year-long construction of the GWK Park can serve as a case study to analyse the development of global tourism, localism and nationalism in Bali in the 21^st century.

Initially projected as the climax of cultural tourism by Suharto’s Minister of Culture Joop Ave, the project’s aim was to show the beauty of Balinese culture as well as contribute to Indonesian nationalism. This aspect is still very relevant if we consider the discourse by President Joko Widodo, the architect’s ambitions, as well as the way the park is sold in its promotional material. However, the identity of the park has stretched far beyond the classical policy of cultural tourism. Since the beginning of the construction works, Bali has entered the age of globalism. The tourism influx has skyrocketed; Bali remains a tourist hotspot for people from all over the world. At the same time Bali has been confronted with the drawbacks of globalism. Heavily congested roads, the disappearance of rice fields and pollution are only a few examples of these drawbacks. The Bali bombings in 2002 and 2005 came as a big shock and changed the view of Bali as a romantic cultural safe haven. Bali was inaugurated as part of the globalised world and would therefore suffer the effects of global terrorism just as other parts of the world. The GWK Park played an important role in the commemoration of the 2002 terrorist attacks, thereby strengthening Antipodean transnational nationhood. From an Indonesian perspective, Bali appears at the forefront of the globalised world, as amplified in international events such as the miss World Elections, IMF gathering and DJ shows that take place in the park.

This article has focussed on the development of Balinese cultural identity and its attachment to local, national, and globalized interests through the lens of global tourism. The case study of the GWK Park shows that Balinese localism attached itself successfully to new forms of globalism and transnational cultural influence, from western as well as other Asian countries. The Balinese culture today still seems diverse, vivid and dynamic. This diversity is celebrated not in spite of, but because of the integration of tourism into Balinese culture. The case study of the park also shows how Bali strengthened its role within the Indonesian archipelago over the last few years. Representations of Balinese cultural identity have evolved from a national, top-down level as classic cultural tourism, to hosting international events, in which the Balinese culture could connect itself to the global world. The image of Bali as the pride of Indonesia to the rest of the world continues to persist, but its image is formed by its place in the global world, and less by its dependence on the national government.

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No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Bart Verheijen

Bart Verheijen recently completed his PhD on national identity and nationalism during the Napoleonic era, at the Radboud Universiteit Nijmegen (Nederland onder Napoleon, Vantilt 2017). He teaches at the Open Universiteit in the Netherlands and at the Yangon School of Political Science in Myanmar. His research interests include political history of the long nineteenth century, nationalism and cultural identity.

I. Nyoman Darma Putra

I. Nyoman Darma Putra teaches Indonesian literature in the Faculty of Arts, University of Udayana (Bali) and is an adjunct professor in the School of Language and Cultures, the University of Queensland. He is the author of A literary mirror: Balinese reflections on modernity and identity in the twentieth century (KITLV/Brill, 2011). From 2014-2018 he was the head of the Masters programme in Tourism Studies, University of Udayana. He is a researcher at the Centre of Excellence of Tourism, University of Udayana.

Notes

1. Suasta and Connor, “Democratic Mobilization and Political Authoritarianism,” 98–100.

2. Hitchcock and Putra, Tourism, Development and Terrorism in Bali, 107–13.

3. Hitchcock, “Tourism, Taman Mini and National Identity,” 124–35; and Pemberton,“Recollections from ‘Beautiful Indonesia’,” 255–6.

4. For the concept ‘touristification’ of Balinese society, see Schulte Nordholt, Bali. An open Fortress.

5. For the construction of national identities through tourism see e.g.: Palmer, “An Ethnography of Englishness,” 7–27.

6. Vickers, Bali, 270; Picard, Bali and Picard, “Cultural Tourism,” 37–74. Other recent works that study the interplay between Balinese culture and global tourism are: Yamashita, Bali and Beyond, and Hitchcock and Putra, Tourism, Development and Terrorism.

7. Hitchcock and Putra, Tourism, Development and Terrorism, 105.

8. Schulte Nordholt, Bali. An open Fortress, 6–10; and Hitchcock and Putra, Tourism, Development and Terrorism, 21.

9. Connor and Vickers, “Crisis, Citizenship, and Cosmopolitanism,” 162. Connor and Vickers link globalization and changing identities in Balinese society to the concept of ‘crisis’ as employed by German sociologist Ulrich Beck.

10. Picard, Bali, 190; Connor and Vickers, “Crisis, Citizenship, and Cosmopolitanism,” 164.

11. See Minca, “The Bali Syndrome: the Explosion and Implosion of Exotic Tourist Places,” 389–403.

12. Vickers, Bali, 299.

13. See for example the discussions on the Pura Besakih temple in Bali: Putra and Hitchcock, “Pura Besakih: a World Heritage Site Contested,” 225–38; and Hitchcock and Putra, Tourism, Development and Terrorism, 101–5.

14. This is argument is also used by Hobart, “Bali is a Brand”. Hobart asserts that ‘the struggle to rescue Balinese culture from ‘culture’’, will destroy itself. On the destructive force of global tourism also Yasuda, “World Heritage and Cultural Tourism in Japan,” 367. Yasuda argues that globalization and applying UNESCO status on cultural heritage should be considered as a form of (westernized) cultural hegemony.

15. A good example of this is the rebranding and invention of local ‘cultural capital’ in George Town Malaysia after the city was granted World Heritage Status in 2008. See Suet Leng and Badarulzaman, “Branding George Town World Heritage Site as City of Gastronomy,” 322–32.

16. Hitchcock and Putra, Tourism, Development and Terrorism, 181–2; Vickers, Bali, 308.

17. Suasta and Connor, “Democratic mobilization and political authoritarianism,” 100–15; Putra, “Puja Mandala,”331.

18. Quotation from: “Bali building worlds biggest statue Garuda Wisnu Kencana”, 11 June 2017.

19. “Bali building worlds biggest statue Garuda Wisnu Kencana,” 11 June 2017.

20. “Joop Ave: The man behind Garuda Wisnu Kencana,” 27 September 2018.

21. For more examples on Joop Ave’s cultural ambitions, see: Putra, “Puja Mandala,” 343.

22. Suasta and Connor, “Democratic Mobilization and Political Authoritarianism,” 99. Based on an analysis of the articles in the Bali Post, we can conclude that the height of the protests was between June-September 1993.

23. Suasta and Connor, “Democratic Mobilization and Political Authoritarianism,” 112–5.

24. “Rencana pembangunan GWK akan menjadi bumerang perda IMB,” 7 June 1993.

25. Suasta and Connor, “Democratic Mobilization and Political Authoritarianism,” 99–100. Suasta and Connor see the controversy over the statue as a sign of a broader movement of Balinese protests around tourist development. They point at the changing relationship between state and civil society in Indonesia. Also: Schulte Nordholt. Bali. An open Fortress, 11 and “No more stunning monuments for Bali?” 14 June 1993.

26. Bali Post, 7 June 1993.

27. Putra, “Puja Mandala,” 337.

28. See note 26 above. 1993.

29. Bali Post, 11 June 1993.

30. Bali Post, 4 June 1996.

31. The Bali Post did not refer to any of the controversies when the completion of the statue in August 2018 was announced. Instead the paper called the new touristic location a ‘Dollar mine’. Bali Post, 3 August 2018; Bali Post, 9 August 2018.

32. From 2013 onwards a new megaproject was developed near Nusa Dua, leading to even stronger protests by the Balinese: the reclamation of Benoa Bay. See: Cabasset et al., “La poldérisation de la Baie de Benoa à Bali,” 231–4, and Wardana, Contemporary Bali. Contested Space and Governance.

33. Quotation from: The Straits times, 24 September 2018; and “President Jokowi Dresses Balinese For the Opening of Garuda Wisnu Kencana,” 25 September 2018.

34. See the analysis by Yasuda, “World heritage and Cultural Tourism in Japan”, 367. For the concepts surrounding the dynamic development between (ethno)nationalism and tourism see: Hitchcock, “Tourism and Ethnicity,” 17–32.

35. Quotation from the Speeches of architect Nuarta and the Governor of Bali Mangku Pastika during the ritual pasupati (giving a soul) to the statue, marked by the installation of the Garuda crown, the last piece of the project. Transcription and translation by Darma Putra: “Jadi, ini harus menjadi milik masyarakat. Bagaimana memiliki. Bahan kita impor dari Jepang, dari Eropa, bahkan dari Amerika Latin. Kemudian kita satukan di sini oleh para para seniman. Senimannya dari Bali asalnya. Pekerjanya dari Bandung, dari Jawa, dari Batak, dan sebagainya. Inilah bersatu sehingga jadilah GWK ini. Nah. Seperti itu. Jadi, kita ini betul-betul Indonesia. Itu kebanggaan”.

36. “Suatu yang besar dan hebat dimulai oleh orang-orang besar, dikawal oleh orang- orang pintar, dan diselesaikan oleh orang-orang yang ikhlas”. Transcription and translation by Darma Putra.

37. Hitchcock and Putra, Tourism, Development and Terrorism, 110–1, 173.

38. Vickers, Bali, 294.

39. Connor and Vickers, “Crisis, Citizenship, and Cosmopolitanism,” 158; and Lewis and Lewis, Bali’s Silent Crisis, 189.

40. Lewis and Lewis, Bali’s Silent Crisis, 187; Lewis et al., “The Bali Bombings Monument,” 21–43.

41. Hitchcock and Darma Putra, Tourism, Development and Terrorism, 185.

42. Quotation from: The Indonesian Embassy, Bi – Weekly Bulletin. Issue I/03, 6 March 2006.

43. Quotation from: “World Culture Forum: Bali Promise calls for Integration of Culture in Post-2015 Development Agenda”, UNESCO.org [accessed, 14 December 2018].

44. Quoted in: Jakarta Globe, 26 November 2013.

45. See the official website: http://gwkbali.com/.

46. Thirumaran, “Renewing bonds in an Age of Asian Travel,” 135–6.

47. Ibid., 136.

48. Howe, The changing World of Bali, 91–110.

49. Thirumaran, “Renewing bonds in an Age of Asian Travel,” 137.

50. On the decentralization of Balinese regional and local identity, see Hitchcock and Putra, Tourism, Development and Terrorism, 165–74.

51. “Nuarta & GWK’s Mission for World Peace”.