Changes in Chinese legal narratives about religious affairs in Xinjiang

ABSTRACT

Policies introduced by the Chinese government in the name of fighting terrorism, religious extremism and separatism have significantly reshaped the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) – even though securitization has not brought the ‘stability’ that the PRC government claims in its continuous defense of its policies. Analysis of Chinese legal documents can provide a clearer picture of the government’s intentions in the region, since they are almost free from the propaganda ballast abundant in Chinese policy documents. This article analyses recent amendments to two legal documents, the Religious Affairs Regulations and the Regulations of Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region on Religious Affairs. It discusses why certain articles were omitted, modified or added and what this can tell us about the situation in China and in particular in Xinjiang. It also suggests that Xinjiang has been a testing site for national religious policy, not just new surveillance methods.

KEYWORDS:

• China
• Xinjiang
• religion
• religious policies
• legal documents
• human rights

Introduction

The Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR), established in 1955, is the most extensive administrative region in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) with an area of 1.6 million square kilometers and a population of over 22 million people. With the incorporation of Xinjiang into the PRC, the composition of its population changed rapidly. The Hanization process (Hanhua) between the 1940 s and 1980 s increased the Han population by 2,500%.¹ Nowadays Uyghurs make up less than fifty percent,² slowly becoming an ethnic minority within their titular region. In recent years, Xinjiang has become an increasingly prominent topic within but also beyond academia. Several issues, such as violent protests and the existence of mass incarceration camps, have drawn global attention to the current situation and brought increased international media coverage. They have also been touched upon directly or indirectly in critical political statements by influential high-ranking politicians and international actors.³ It can be argued that this amplified political attention has been a result of the recent Sino-US trade war, China’s economic expansion, including the global economic endeavor called the Belt and Road Initiative, or other facets of global high politics. However, it has created a surge in global interest about the wellbeing and suffering of ethnic and religious minorities not just in Xinjiang, but all over China.

This article discusses what changes to China’s religious affairs legislation in the mid-2010 s can tell us about the current worsening situation for religious and ethnic minorities in Xinjiang – and the PRC more generally. It is important to stress that the situation has not been ideal since the establishment of the PRC in 1949. From today’s perspective, the most liberal and lenient period was between the 1980 s and 1990 s. Nevertheless, the official policy to eradicate religion remained a cornerstone of Beijing’s religious policies even during this period. Document 19, issued by the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party on 31 March 1982, provides a Party-State view on religious issues in post-Mao China.⁴ It defines religion as a ‘historical phenomenon’ and ‘product of the history of society’ that exists because of the ‘helplessness of the people’ and the ‘oppressor classes [using] religion as an opiate’ to control the masses. The document admits that the eradication of religion is a lengthy process and that for its success it is necessary to improve radically material wealth, education and culture. Chapter Four states that the basic Party policy is to respect and protect the freedom of religious belief – but all Communist Party members must promote atheism. The document further states that ‘it will be fruitless and extremely harmful to use simple coercion in dealing with the people’s ideological and spiritual questions – and this includes [the] religious question.’

Xi Jinping’s policy has deviated from this strategy quite radically. Economic incentives and affirmative actions aimed at Xinjiang’s Uyghur population did not bring the desired outcomes. On the contrary, the perceived threat of separatism increased. In conjunction with the global war on terrorism, Beijing used the generally negative attitude towards Muslims as a cover to increase the securitization of the region under the pretext of fighting against the so-called ‘three evil forces (sangu shili)’ of terrorism, separatism and religious extremism. Recently published secret documents suggest that Xi decided to speed up the hardline policy toward the region after an alleged terrorist attack in Kunming on 1 March 2014.⁵ Chen Quanguo, the former Communist Party secretary of the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR), was appointed XUAR’s new party secretary in August 2016. During his term in the TAR, Chen was praised for the region’s economic growth and development as well as for its securitization and suppression of any resistance to Beijing’s policies – skills that were much needed in Xinjiang.

Although the situation in Xinjiang has significantly tightened during the second term of President Xi Jinping (starting in 2018), this article argues that these policy shifts can be traced back earlier than this through previous amendments to religious affairs legislation. The legislative process is generally a lengthy bureaucratic endeavor, reflecting serious political decisions and policy shifts. Legal documents are therefore less prone to reflect current moods and short-term political goals than other available sources of information. When something is written in the law, it explicitly declares a long-term and thoroughly thought-out approach. Therefore, changes in the legal narrative on specific issues can provide solid ground for understanding current political goals and intentions among the ruling elites in China.

In this article, I look at two different but thematically related legal narratives and how they have changed over time. My empirical material consists of the 2004 Religious Affairs Regulations (Zongjiao shiwu tiaoli; hereafter RAR) and its 2017 amendment; and the 1994 Regulations of Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region on Religious Affairs (Xinjiang Weiwuer zizhiqu zongjiao shiwu (guanli) tiaoli; hereafter RXR) and its 2014 amendment. While the RAR applies to the whole of China’s administered area (except for Hong Kong and Macau), the RXR applies only to the XUAR; as I will discuss, this makes it unique in the Chinese legal system. Both documents significantly influence the daily life of the whole population of Xinjiang. China is officially presented as a multi-ethnic country and according to its Constitution all of its citizens enjoy freedom of religious belief.⁶ However, these regulations and their amendments provide a clearer picture of the Chinese government’s intentions in this regard.

In the first section I will first clarify how I am using the term ‘legal narrative’ and explain why legal narratives should be considered an essential source to understand the attitudes and long-term goals of the PRC government. This is followed by a brief introduction to legislative processes in China, and then a content analysis and comparison of the original RAR and RXR against their revised versions. Special attention is paid to which articles were amended, added, or entirely omitted.

Legal narrative

Narratology illustrates how law operates, on what assumptions and with what contingencies.⁷ This article conceptualizes legal narrative as a ‘story about changes’ constructed on the basis of the paragraphs of legal documents. It does not follow a strict legalistic approach, which sees a legal narrative as ‘essential to numerous aspects of legal practice and writing, from pleading and negotiation to the interpretation of evidence and conflict resolution’⁸ or as a discourse that ‘denotes the contest of stories that transpires in adversarial or, with different actors, in inquisitorial trials.’⁹ The conceptualization of legal narrative used here aims to tease out and explain what is hidden between the lines of otherwise dehumanized legal writing. It goes beyond the doctrinal approach in legal research, which exclusively builds upon authoritative legal sources.¹⁰ Instead it follows the socio-legal approach¹¹ which analyses how and to what extent the law and legal institutions are embedded within society and can reflect changes in governmental approaches.

China officially adheres to the teachings of Marxism, Leninism and Maoism,¹² in which there is no place for religions. However, after the end of the Cultural Revolution and the beginning of the reform period, it formally awarded its citizens the freedom of religious belief within the boundaries of the law.¹³ The law has been utilized by the state to redefine religions and to retain a monopoly and overall control over all religious matters, resulting in the strengthening of state-defined religious orthodoxy.¹⁴ This article explains how changes in the content of codified laws illustrate the gradual transformation of state policies and the official narrative about religious affairs in the PRC.

Legislative processes

Legislative processes in modern states are arduous and lengthy and require a considerable amount of political will. They differ slightly in method from country to country, but usually follow a similar pattern of agenda-setting, writing and drafting, approval (by parliamentary committees, parliament, the president), and implementation. The legislative discussion and decision-making process generally poses the biggest hindrance to the successful approval of a given law, since it is mostly dependent on the support of various political factions and is therefore prone to political wheeling and dealing. In theory, this should not apply to the legislative process in the PRC, which is an authoritarian party-state with power concentrated in the hands of the Communist Party. However, ambiguities within the law-making system, the size of the forums through which legislation has to pass, and the possibility of intra-Party factionalism, all mean that the process is not as smooth as one would expect.

The legislative process in China is a multi-sited and multi-staged process that requires a significant amount of time.¹⁵ Its stages include: 1) agenda setting; 2) writing and drafting; 3) inter-agency review; 4) top leadership approval; 5) National People’s Congress (NPC) review, debate and passage; and 6) implementation.¹⁶ The whole process ‘is populated by self-interested actors with uneasy power relationships who engage in institutional turf wars at virtually every stage.’¹⁷ Paler primarily attributes this confusing situation to the division of authority among the NPC, State Council and sub-national people’s congresses.¹⁸ The RAR was adopted by the State Council and the RXR by a sub-national people’s congress. In legal terminology these documents are therefore called regulations (tiaoli), rather than national laws (falü), which are adopted by the NPC. They are, respectively, part of the administrative regulations and rules (xingzheng fagui) of the State Council (RAR) and the local regulations (difangxing fagui) of the provincial people’s congress (RXR). Although State Council regulations are third in the legal hierarchy after the Constitution and NPC laws, some scholars regard the State Council as the ‘de facto most powerful law-making institution in China’ because of its extensive legislative powers.¹⁹ The vertical hierarchy does not necessarily mean that decisions made at lower levels are in conformity with higher ones. The Legislation Law, adopted by the NPC in 2000 and amended in 2015, aimed to solve this discrepancy, but with unsatisfactory results.²⁰

Although legislative procedure in China is lengthy and obscure, in some cases the government can act with surprising speed. For example, in response to international outrage about the incarceration camps in Xinjiang, the Chinese state rapidly amended its Regulations on De-radicalization of the XUAR. The new version, adopted on 9 October 2018, de facto recognized and legitimized the existence of re-education camps as ‘vocational education and training centers and other educational transformation institutions.’²¹

Religious affairs regulations (2004, 2017)

The Religious Affairs Regulations were adopted at the 57^th Executive Meeting of the State Council on 7 July 2004 and came into effect on 1 March 2005.²² The law comprised 48 articles organized into seven chapters: I. General Provisions; II. Religious Bodies; III. Religious Activity Sites; IV. Religious Personnel; V. Religious Assets; VI. Legal Responsibility; VII. Supplementary Provisions. Its amendment was adopted at the 176^th Executive Meeting of the State Council on 14 June 2017 and came into effect on 1 February 2018.²³ It increased the number of articles to 77 and the number of chapters to nine, adding chapters on religious schools (Chapter III) and on religious activities (Chapter IV).

According to Article 1, the main goal of the Religious Affairs Regulations is to ‘ensure citizens’ freedom of religious belief, maintain harmony among and between religions, maintain social harmony, regulate the administration of religious affairs, and ‘increase the level of rule of law in work on religion.’²⁴ The last sentence was added in the 2017 amendment, giving us a clue about the general orientation of changes to religious affairs regulations in the 2010 s, which were characterized by a tightened control of religion hidden behind an ostensible increase in the rule of law – as will also be shown in the case of the RXR in the following section.

Article 2 remained unchanged. It states that citizens have freedom of belief and cannot be discriminated against on the pretext of religion. No individual or organization can compel citizens to believe in, or not believe in religion. This article can be seen as protecting both the right to believe and the right not to believe. However, it also implies that any form of proselytization is illegal. This is explicitly reiterated in the newly added Article 44, which prohibits proselytization, as well as the practice of religious activities, the establishment of religious organizations, or the setting up of religious activity sites in schools or educational bodies other than religious schools.

Article 3 was newly added and can be understood as a response to international concerns regarding the situation of religious groups in China.²⁵ It states that the management of religious affairs shall suppress extremism, resist infiltration, and fight crime. According to Article 4 (an expanded version of the previous Article 3), religion should fit in with socialist society and religious groups, schools, activity sites and citizens shall practice the ‘core socialist values’ (shehuizhuyi hexin jiazhiguan).²⁶ Furthermore, religion must not endanger national security, disrupt public order, impair the health of citizens or obstruct the state education system; and must not be used for illegal activities, including those that harm state or societal interests, or citizens’ lawful rights and interests. Article 4 also stipulates that it is forbidden to intensify contradictions and conflicts within a religion and between religions, or between religious and non-religious citizens; and to advocate, support, or fund religious extremism. Religion, it asserts, must not be misused to ‘undermine ethnic unity, divide the nation or carry out terrorist activities.’ These provisions form the kernel of Chinese legitimation attempts and perhaps even the motivation for the internment of many Uyghurs, Kazakhs and other ‘problematic’ groups. The implementation of provisions contained in Article 4 can be further illustrated by the ‘Four Advances (sijin)’ campaign, which requires that mosques raise the national flag, promote the Chinese Constitution and laws (including the amended RAR), learn and practice the core socialist values, and promote China’s outstanding traditional culture.²⁷

Article 5 reiterates the necessity for religions to be ‘independent’ and ‘self-governing’, by which it means that no foreign forces can in any way control or influence religious activities. The same metric does not apply to the Chinese government, which heavily controls and restricts religious affairs that need to be managed in the interests of the state.²⁸

Chapters II to VII set up control mechanisms and restrictions on various aspects of religious affairs. Religious activities can be conducted only at designated religious sites, including temples, churches and ‘other fixed locations.’²⁹ This provision establishes that religious activity must take place at an officially monitored venue, rendering private religious activity, for example in the home, illegal. Religious sites must have necessary funds from legal sources and have a reasonable configuration that meets urban and rural planning requirements and regulations.³⁰ They should also avoid anything that could be seen as extravagant. The 2017 amendment explicitly bans the building of large outdoor religious statues outside temples or on church grounds,³¹ and states that the (re)construction of buildings intended for religious activities can proceed only under the approval of the Religious Affairs Department at appropriate levels.³²

Governmental control of religious personnel is especially strict. In order to become a priest, monk, or imam, a person must be confirmed by the supervising religious affairs department and registered. These rules apply even to the succession of reincarnate lamas in Tibetan Buddhism, who need to be reported for approval. Similarly, Catholic bishops have to be approved by the Religious Affairs Department under the State Council.³³ Without state approved ‘religious professional credentials’ (zongjiao jiaozhi renyuan zige) any religious activity is forbidden for such a person.³⁴

Although various laws and policies have significantly constrained religious affairs, the number of believers has been steadily rising in China.³⁵ The government had overlooked private financial support for religious affairs and by the early 2000 s numerous religious organizations and temples/churches had become noticeably rich and influential, at least at the local level.³⁶ The 2017 RAR amendment can be seen as a legal confirmation of the policy shift that ended this period of ‘negligence’. The newly added Article 52 states that ‘religious groups, religious schools, and religious activity sites are non-profit organizations,’ and therefore their ‘assets and income shall be used in activities consistent with their religious purpose and in public interest charitable matters, and they must not be distributed.’³⁷ Charitable activities must not be used to proselytize.³⁸ Religious groups must not accept foreign donations with attached conditions, and when the amount exceeds 100,000 RMB it must be reported to the religious affairs department for review and approval.³⁹ Moreover, they must ‘establish and complete audits, financial reporting, financial disclosures’ and government departments ‘may organize finance and asset inspections and audits.’⁴⁰

Chapter eight of the amended law brought stricter punishments and fines for RAR offences. It also newly includes passages regarding the prosecution of people ‘advocating, supporting, or funding religious extremism, or using religion to harm national security or public safety, undermine ethnic unity, divide the nation, or conduct terrorist activities and separatism.’⁴¹ Fines for conducting religious affairs illegally can reach 300,000 RMB,⁴² and unlawful gains and illegal assets can be confiscated.⁴³ The Chinese government seems to have deduced that control mechanisms had to be adjusted to twenty-first century ‘threats.’ Therefore, a new paragraph in Article 68 forbids internet-based religious information services that are unauthorized or that exceed their approved scope.

Modifications and additions in the legal paragraphs help us to understand changes in society, new challenges and opportunities for the central government, and shifts in attitude towards specific questions. Similarly, the omissions also speak volumes and can signify significant policy shifts. For example, the new version does not contain the provision that ‘organizations can organize enterprises and undertakings for self-support … [and] religious supplies, religious artworks and religious books can be sold in places of religious activities.’⁴⁴ In other words, religious organizations are no longer explicitly permitted to strive for self-sufficiency. The government’s previous encouragement of self-support was not necessarily in the interests of religious authorities, but it can be argued that self-sufficiency made it more difficult for state authorities to control religious organizations’ day-to-day operations and limited the pressure they could exert on religious affairs. Another paragraph that disappeared from the amended version, which had been contained in Article 23, allowed religious organizations to ‘conduct friendly exchanges with foreign religious groups and religious figures with the consent of relevant departments of the State Council.’ Under current circumstances, contacts with religious organizations or religious personnel abroad can be interpreted as a potential threat to ‘stability’ and ‘ethnic unity’ and as such are punishable.

The Chinese government’s approach towards its citizens is often characterized as ‘stick and carrot.’ The obedient citizen is rewarded for good behavior, while the disobedient citizen is punished. Such a system is being gradually implemented across China through the establishment of a wide reaching social credit system.⁴⁵ Article 26 in the 2004 version of the RAR stated that ‘religious organizations, religious activity sites, and religious personnel, who have earnestly implemented these regulations, and contributed to ethnic unity, social stability … shall be rewarded.’ The 2017 amendment contains no such a provision, allowing us to deduce – in support of other evidence pointing in the same direction – that the policy approach of the Xi administration is becoming ‘less carrot, and more stick.’

The 2017 amendment of the Religious Affairs Regulations expands overall control over religious affairs by the religious affairs departments. Approval and reporting of certain religious activities were transferred from the district level to provincial level, which means that fewer religious matters are dealt with locally.⁴⁶ This followed the general line of Xi Jinping´s governance in increasing the centralization of power and control, as well as introducing more restrictive policies on religious personnel, religious assets and income and expenditure, the publishing of religious material and provision of information services, and the content of online fora. Religion is viewed and tolerated as an obsolete aspect of Chinese culture, and thus it has to be controlled by the ‘modern and atheistic’ Party. The law also enables demolition of religious properties in the name of public interest or urban planning, which is being increasingly implemented across China.⁴⁷ Another striking difference between the 2004 and the 2017 versions is the rapid increase in articles dealing with punishments for violation of the regulations. This suggests that punishment has assumed a greater role in the management of religion and that religious tolerance has been circumscribed. On 21 March 2018, it was decided that the State Administration for Religious Affairs was being dissolved and its functions transferred to the CPC’s United Front Work Department (UFWD),⁴⁸ signifying the further tightening of Party control over religious affairs.

Regulations of XUAR on religious affairs (1994, 2014)

The RXR was adopted by the 9th meeting of the Standing Committee of the 8th National People’s Congress of the XUAR on 16 July 1994 and came into effect on 1 October 1994.⁴⁹ It contained 33 Articles that were not divided into chapters. The amendment was adopted by the 11th meeting of the Standing Committee of the 12th People’s Congress of the XUAR on 28 November 2014 and came into effect on 1 January 2015.⁵⁰ It remodeled and divided the RXR into 8 Chapters: I. General Provisions; II. Religious Groups; III. Religious Activity Sites; IV. Religious Personnel; V. Religious Activities; VI. Religious Assets; VII. Legal Responsibility; and VIII. Supplementary Provisions. The amended law contains 66 Articles. They apply only to the XUAR,⁵¹ and demonstrate the importance of religious affairs in the state’s regulation and control of Xinjiang. As I will discuss, analysis of their content also demonstrates their influence on the revision of the national RAR in 2017.

The amendment doubled the number of articles. Twenty years had passed since the RXR had taken effect; by 2014 it had become necessary to address the new challenges that religion and Xinjiang itself began to pose to Beijing. After Xi Jinping assumed power, a number of violent incidents took place outside the borders of the XUAR that were attributed to Uyghur Muslims. Seven months after Xi became president, a car attack involving a suspected suicide bombing occurred at Tiananmen square in the heart of Beijing. According to Chinese police reports, five people died, among them three Uyghurs inside the car. The Turkistan Islamic Party reportedly claimed responsibility and warned of future attacks.⁵² The following year, at Kunming railway station, eight people armed with knives killed 31 people and injured more than 140 civilians. According to China’s official state-run news agency, Xinhua, the attackers were Uyghur separatists.⁵³

The Regulations guarantee the freedoms to believe and to not believe in any religion.⁵⁴ Article 4 states that: ‘Religious affairs adhere to the principles of protecting lawfulness, stopping illegality, curbing extremes, resisting infiltration, and cracking down on crimes, managing religious affairs in accordance with the law, and actively guiding religious groups, religious personnel and religious citizens in promoting patriotism, unity and progress, national harmony and religious harmony. Actively guide religion to adapt to socialist society.’⁵⁵ The Regulations ban the use of religion to ‘split the country, spread religious extremism, incite national hatred, undermine national unity, disrupt social order, and impair the physical and mental health of citizens’ and to ‘hinder administrative, judicial, educational, cultural, marital, family planning, inheritance and other systems … [and] endanger national security and interests, and public social interests.’⁵⁶ Article 5 stipulates that foreign subjects cannot interfere in religious affairs; but it does allow academic exchanges (xueshu jiaolio) with foreign religious entities after approval has been gained from relevant supervising institutions.

All religious activities have to be monitored; therefore, only officially approved scripture schools are allowed.⁵⁷ Articles 12–14 ban religious home-schooling, including theology classes or scripture readings. It is forbidden for religious groups, activity sites or individuals to accept titles or appointments from overseas organizations, receive instructions from foreign organizations, call for the restoration of ‘feudal privileges’, have self-proclaimed preachers, conduct the search for reincarnate lamas without authorization, or commit other acts prohibited by laws and regulations.⁵⁸ It is interesting that the provision on reincarnate lamas is included in the RXR, since Buddhism does not play an important role in contemporary Xinjiang.

It is not illegal to be a religious specialist in ‘communist’ China. However, numerous regulations make it a very arduous ordeal, and religious personnel are required to undergo political education. According to Article 29, ‘the religious affairs department of the people’s government at or above the county level should formulate a training plan for religious personnel … and regularly hold training courses to improve their national consciousness, civic awareness, legal awareness, and religious knowledge and interpretation.⁵⁹

Although religious activities can be carried out in officially designated places, the regulation does not define ‘religious activity.’ It is forbidden in governmental facilities, schools and public institutions.⁶⁰ Article 37 stipulates that minors cannot participate in religious activities⁶¹ and are banned from religious activity sites (see Figure 1). Although this is one of the shortest articles, it carries the most far-reaching consequences for Xinjiang’s Muslims. According to the Chinese Civil Law, the age of majority is 18. This limitation on the one hand and the ban on religious home-schooling on the other, clearly shows the official attempt to uproot religion from society and everyday life. Without being able to get any religious education, experience religious practice at home, or attend religious activities until the age of eighteen, faith can cease to be an integral part of a citizen’s life.

Figure 1. Gate of a mosque compound with a sign stating: ‘no entry for minors or students.’⁶² Picture taken by the author in Ghulja, 2015

Article 38 states that ‘no organization or individual may … use religious activities to interfere in normal production and business activities … minority customs and habits such as weddings and funerals, … [or] in cultural, literary, sport, and other activities.’ It also stipulates that ‘religious ceremonies shall not be held for marriages that have not been legally registered … [and] no grooming, clothing, signs and symbols shall be used to render religious fanaticism and extremism.’⁶³ The implementation of this regulation is illustrated in Figure 2, a poster that depicts ‘abnormal’ and ‘imported’ styles that are signs of extremism, such as burqas, veils and even long beards.⁶⁴ Note that the clothes in the bottom right of the picture bear the symbol of a crescent moon and star – forbidden because it is associated with Pan-Turkism, separatism and even terrorism.

Figure 2. Poster on a wall in Ürümchi, titled: ‘Prohibited “abnormal clothing”, strive to be the most beautiful person in Ürümchi!’⁶⁵ Picture taken by the author, 2015

The increasing interconnectedness between Uyghurs in Xinjiang and other Muslims in Central Asia and the Middle East, as well as new types of media and information channels, led the Chinese authorities to ‘modernize’ restrictions on religious publications and extend them to media other than the written text. According to the newly added Article 40, the content of religious publications and audio-visual materials must not: 1) undermine ethnic unity, social stability, economic development, or scientific and technological progress; 2) incite national hatred or racial discrimination, or undermine ethnic unity; 3) promote separatism, religious extremism or terrorism; 4) affect religious harmony, causing disputes between and within religions; 5) endanger social morality or Chinese outstanding cultural traditions; or 6) violate other laws and regulations. Article 41 forbids the ‘use [of] satellite ground receiving facilities to listen to, watch, or disseminate domestic and foreign religious radio and TV programs.’⁶⁶

The amended regulations contain a whole section on punishments (VII). In the previous version, only four articles dealt with regulatory violations and did not specify fines. In contrast, the 2014 amendment contains twenty such articles. Penalties are calculated between 3,000 to 30,000 RMB, on top of which is added a fine of between one and three times the amount of any ‘illegal income’ or ‘illegal gains’.⁶⁷ To ensure that religious affairs departments are obedient and diligent, Article 63 stipulates that sanctions will be imposed if members of staff abuse their powers for personal gain or neglect their duties; if a crime is constituted, criminal charges will be filed.

The issuance of specific religious affairs regulations for XUAR shows how important the region is to the central government. No other autonomous region in the PRC has such a law, although there are specific Tibetan Buddhist affairs regulations for Tibetan autonomous prefectures in Qinghai province.⁶⁸ It is also noteworthy that the amendment of this law predates the amendment of the national regulations. Its structure and some of its provisions suggest that the RXR at least inspired the latest revision of the national RAR. In other words, the national law was partially modelled after a more restrictive and locally specific law. This might suggest that Xinjiang is a testing site for new policies, not just new surveillance methods.

Both amendments show the government’s attempts to de-internationalize religious practices in China by constraining international cooperation and potential foreign influence in religious matters. Any religious content without official approval or deflecting the official narrative is illegal; even a holder of such material is criminally liable. It seems that religions need to be controlled and modified – partly secularized – to fit into the system of ‘socialist values.’ Religious organizations and personnel are forced to be more and more dependent on state funding, therefore becoming easier to control through the religious administration. Many of the provisions are phrased very vaguely, allowing local authorities to interpret them in various ways and to apply them to many situations. Stricter regulations are imposed on people in the XUAR than in other parts of the country. Banning minors from all religious activities can be understood as a regulatory attempt to systematically eradicate religion in the region by disconnecting youth from their religious traditions and practices.

Conclusion

Although the State’s policies have alternated between periods of relaxation and tightening, the PRC legal system has remained hostile towards any endorsement of religious authority throughout.⁶⁹ Matthew S. Erie argues that in post-Mao China, the government drew a line between public and private behavior and between children and adults; freedom of religion was a private adult matter.⁷⁰ However, changes in legal narratives show gradual, but thorough modification of official attitudes towards religious affairs. Recent legislative amendments suggest that the speed of such changes has accelerated under Xi Jinping’s leadership. The reasons behind this are likely diverse but might include Xi’s interests in building his own legacy and in curbing any potential threat to Party legitimacy in light of China’s worsening economic outlook.

Under Xi Jinping’s leadership, Beijing has adopted a more legalistic attitude towards its citizens, introducing more restrictive laws increasingly based on punishments rather than on rewards. This change in attitude is not completely surprising. Xi is reportedly an admirer of Qin Shi Huang, the first emperor, who adopted a restrictive and legalistic approach to unite China in the third century BCE,⁷¹ and Xun Kuang (also known as Xunzi), a Confucian philosopher who promoted a pragmatic and legalistic approach in his teachings during the fourth and early third centuries BCE.⁷² Amendments to both regulations illustrate that under Xi’s rule China has become a less tolerant environment for religions and that the central government is willing to adopt drastic measures with immediate results. This strategy is oriented towards speeding up the homogenization of Chinese society, leading amongst other things to the establishment of the incarceration camps in Xinjiang. Moreover, it endeavors to homogenize diverse religions into a socially insignificant somewhat socialist ‘religion’ with Chinese characteristics, or, as William Yang argues, a religion guided by atheism⁷³ that differs mainly in its surface symbolism.

Changes in legal narratives in both of the regulations analyzed here have in common the intention to centralize and bureaucratize the management of religious affairs, isolate religious groups from foreign influences and funding, and gradually uproot religion from peoples’ everyday life by criminalizing it in the name of fighting terrorism, separatism and religious extremism. Xinjiang’s religious affairs regulations are not explicitly aimed at Muslims, but since Muslims represent the majority of the region’s non-Han population, the main target group is clear. Their impact also seems to have extended beyond the region. Their amendment preceded and likely inspired that of the national religious affairs regulations, suggesting that Xinjiang has served as a testing ground for more than surveillance systems and methods.

Acknowledgments

I would also like to thank the editors of this special issue for their valuable comments as well as the two anonymous reviewers. Last but not least I would like to thank Dr Jane Caple for her meticulous copyediting of my article.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Additional information

Funding

This work was supported by the European Regional Development Fund [Sinophone Borderlands – Interaction at the Edges] Project number: CZ.02.1.01/0.0/0.0/16_019/0000791.

Notes on contributors

Martin Lavička

Martin Lavička is Lecturer at the Department of Asian Studies, Palacký University Olomouc, where he teaches modern Chinese history and Chinese politics. He is also Junior Researcher in the Sinophone Borderlands Project where he focuses on the PRC’s ethnic policies and laws.

Notes

1. Gladney, “The Chinese Program,” 112.

2. According to the most recent census in 2010, the Uyghurs constituted 45.84% of Xinjiang’s population, Han 40.48%, Kazakh 6.50%, and Hui 4.51%, see ‘Tabulation on the 2010 Population Census.’ A more recent estimate by the BBC puts the Uyghur population at around 42% in 2018, see ‘Xinjiang Territory Profile’. According to 1953 census data, the population was 75% Uyghur and 6% Han, see Toops 2004, 1.

3. For example, Mogherini, “Speech by HR/VP Mogherini”; and Pelosi, “General Session.”

4. Translated in MacInnis, “Religion in China Today,” 8–26.

5. See Ramzy and Buckley, “Absolutely No Mercy”; and Allen-Ebrahimian, “Exposed.”

6. Constitution of the PRC (2004 version), Art. 36.

7. Olson, “Narration and Narrative.”

8. Stern, “Narrative in the Legal Text,” 121.

9. See above 7.

10. Van Gestel, and Micklitz, “Revitalizing Doctrinal Legal Research,” 26.

11. Vibhute and Aynalem, Legal Research Methods, 87.

12. This is one of the Four Cardinal Principles declared by Deng Xiaoping on 30 March 1979.

13. Constitution of the PRC (1978 version), Art. 46.

14. See Erie, China and Islam, 80; and Goosaert and Palmer, The Religious Question, 317.

15. Tanner, “How a Bill Becomes a Law,” 39.

16. Tanner identifies five stages, see ibid., 45; here I follow the US-China Business Council in adding a ‘writing and drafting’ stage, see “The PRC Legislative Process.”

17. Paler, “China’s Legislation Law,” 301.

18. Ibid.

19. Chen, Chinese Law, 183.

20. See above 17. 318.

21. The original text reads: zhiye jineng jiaoyu peixun zhongxin deng jiaoyu zhuanhua jigou; see Xinjiang Weiwuer zizhiqu jiduanhua tiaoli, Art. 33.

22. RAR 2004.

23. RAR 2017.

24. The original text reads: tigao zongjiao gongzuo zhizhihua fazhihua shuiping.

25. The Chinese government has reiterated that foreign hostile forces disguised as religion are attempting to infiltrate the country, see, for example, Bai, “Xinjiang Party Chief.”

26. See Pieke, Knowing China, 23–24. He defines the core socialist values as ‘national goals of prosperity, democracy, civility, and harmony; social goals of freedom, equality, justice and the rule of law; and the individual values of patriotism, dedication, integrity and friendship.’

27. Yu, “Chule guoqi haiyou shenme.”

28. See RAR 2017, Art. 6.

29. Ibid., Art. 19.

30. Ibid., Art. 20.

31. Ibid., Art. 30.

32. Ibid., Art. 33. What is an ‘appropriate level’ is not clearly specified.

33. Ibid., Art. 36.

34. Ibid.

35. Islam is an exception, see Wenzel-Teuber, “Statistics on Religions and Churches,” 27–28; and Yang, Religion in China, 85–122.

36. McCleary and Barro, The Wealth of Religions, 25.

37. RAR 2017, Art. 52.

38. Ibid., Art. 56.

39. Ibid., Art. 57.

40. Ibid., Art. 58.

41. Ibid., Art. 63.

42. Ibid., Art. 64.

43. Ibid., Art. 65.

44. RAR 2004, Art. 18.

45. See Hoffman, “Managing the State.”

46. See, for example, RAR 2004, Art. 27; and RAR 2017, Art. 36.

47. See Cook, “The Battle for China’s Spirit.”

48. “Zhonggong Zhongyang.”

49. RXR 1994.

50. Ibid. 2014.

51. Ibid., Art. 2.

52. Kaiman, “Islamist group claims responsibility.”

53. Wu, “Xinhuashe.”

54. RXR 2014, Art. 2.

55. The original text reads: jiji yindao zongjiao yu shehuizhuyi shehui xiang shiying.

56. RXR 2014, Art. 5.

57. RXR 2014, Art. 12–14.

58. Ibid., Art. 25.

59. The original text reads: zongjiao xueshi he jiangjingjiejing nengli.

60. RXR 2014, Art. 31.

61. Ibid., Art. 37.

62. The original text reads: jinzhi weichengnianren ji zai xiao sheng ru nei.

63. RXR 2014, Art. 38.

64. For discussion on governmental policies and rules concerning clothing and grooming in Xinjiang, see Leibold and Grose, “Islamic Veiling in Xinjiang.”

65. The original text reads: Jinzhi ‘feizhengchang fushi’, zhengzuo zuimei Wulumuqiren!

66. RXR 2014, Art. 41

67. Ibid., Art. 47, 52, and 53.

68. See “Tibetan Buddhist Affairs Regulations.”

69. Erie, China and Islam, 76.

70. Ibid., 80.

71. Crane, “Why Xi Jinping’s China is Legalist.”

72. Yu, “Yuankan Xi Jinping.”

73. See Yang, “What does China want to Achieve.”