Geopolitics of the NRC-CAA in Assam: Impact on Bangladesh–India Relations

ABSTRACT

The present study examines the contemporary Bangladesh–India relationship analyzing the dynamics of geopolitics centring the National Register of Citizens (NRC) and the Citizenship (Amendment) Act (CAA)-2019 in Assam, India. On the basis of secondary data, this paper explores the historical and geopolitical roots of volatile present and uncertain future of the non-registered people, often termed as ‘illegal Bangladeshi migrants’ living in Assam, portrayed by the Indian ethnocratic state sidelining India’s longstanding pluralist traditions and exercises. The central argument of the study is that peddling the issue of ‘illegal Bangladeshi migrants’ by Indian political elites is destined to transcend the boundary infusing hostility in future into Bangladesh–India relationship.

KEYWORDS:

• Geopolitics
• NRC-CAA
• Bangladesh-India Relations
• Assam
• ethnocracy

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes

1. Here high politics denotes the contestation, conflict and geopolitics between neighbouring states, which share common territorial, ethnic and socio-cultural belongings since the time immemorial, centring multifaceted issues like migration, identity, border dispute, and others within bilateral order. In bilateralism, the nature of political regimes in both states shapes the degree of high politics.

2. Malešević, Identity as Ideology.

3. Chatterji, Bengal Divided.

4. “Otherness is the relative distance between a state’s identity and its perception of another state’s identity.” See Ben-Josef Hirsch and Miller, “Otherness and resilience in bilateral relations”.

5. Ben-Josef Hirsch and Miller, “Otherness and resilience in bilateral relations”.

6. Gillan, “Refugees or infiltrators,” 73.

7. Chowdhury, Identity and Experience at the India-Bangladesh Border, viii.

8. Bangladesh inherited a disputed borderland with India due to the Radcliffe Line in 1947. Sir Cyril Radcliffe, chairman of the Boundary Commission, drew the partition line within six weeks “on the basis of ascertaining the contiguous areas of Muslims and non-Muslims;” see Afsar, “Populations Movement in the Fluid,” 3. Radcliffe tarnished the fair demarcation in the east by drawing a straight line through houses, cultivable lands, villages, rivers and marketplaces; see Banerjee, “Indo-Bangladesh Border,” 1505. When he drew the new frontier between Bengal and Assam, Radcliffe accepted many of the claims of the central and provincial Congress. “The profound ways in which partition affected show how new borders help to shape the polities they circumscribe. What happened to the millions of Hindus and Muslims who found themselves on the wrong side of the Line which divided the eastern territories is an example of how partitions play havoc with divided peoples, in particular those relegated to the status of religious or ethnic minorities in new nation-states;” see Chatterji, The Spoils of Partition, 1-2. Also, see Van Schendel, The Bengal Borderland, 39-49; Bhaumik, Troubled Periphery, 1.

9. The ‘Assamese’ or ‘Asomiya’ or ‘Tai Ahom’ is related to the process of Aryanization as well as the rise and consolidation of Ahom rule in the Brahmaputra valley. The Ahoms, descendants of Tai speaking people, came to Assam in the early 13th century from the Shan region of Myanmar, settled in the eastern part of Brahmaputra valley; see Dikshit and Dikshit, North-East India, 19. The idea of a composite Assamese nationality took shape during the later part of the Ahom rule. “This process had started during the first Muslim invasion from neighbouring Bengal in the 16th century when the people were brought under an Ahom banner against the common enemy;” see Misra, “Immigration and Identity Transformation in Assam,” 1264. The adoption and active patronage of Hinduism by the Ahom rulers in the 17th century during the reign of Rudra Singha (1696-1714) and Siva Singha (1714-44) accelerated the assimilation of many of the tribes into the Hindu fold and the idea of a composite Assamese identity made up of the caste Hindus, the plains-tribals and the small section of Assamese Muslims began to emerge. Historians have noted that during the 17th and 18th centuries large segments of the bodo-kacharis and other tribal groups embraced Hinduism; see Guha, Medieval and Early Colonial Assam, 25.

10. Pisharoty, Assam.

11. The concept of Hindutva–literally ‘Hinduness’ or the quality of being a ‘Hindu’ in ethnic, cultural and political terms–was imagined as the sole basis of Hindu identity is of contemporary lineage; see Tharoor, Why I Am A Hindu, 130-131. Hindutva, a neo-Sanskrit term, was popularized in Bengal during the early 1890s by Chandranath Basu and, its recent usage derives largely from Vinayak Damodar Savarkar of the Hindu Mahasabha and the RSS. Then it was politicized and implanted by them to the BJP from the very begging of its establishment. “These included the belief that ‘Hindus’ constituted ‘a nation’, that Hinduism was under siege or threat of ‘extermination’ in India, that Muslims were the treacherous ‘fifth column’ in the nation and had ‘extraterritorial designs’, the view of Muslim minorities as constituting a separate nation within but not of India, a critique of the politics of ‘communal vote banks’, the consequent necessity of declaring with pride that one is a Hindu, the idea that India was comprised of ‘two nations’, religious conquest using ‘offensive realism’ and consequently treachery to ‘Hindu nation’, and a rejection of the view that communalism was a product of British colonialism in preference for a view of a thousand-year war against Muslim aggression;” see Bhatt, Hindu Nationalism, 77-78.

12. Gillan, “Refugees or infiltrators,” 83; Singh, Ethnic Conflict in India, x.

13. Ahmed, “Arbitrariness, subordination and unequal citizenship”.

14. Bhattarai, “Maps, Border and Boundary,” 19.

15. Ahmad, Origin of Muslim Consciousness in India.

16. Iqbal, “Migration Crisis Deepens in the Indian State of Assam,” 3.

17. Barpujari, The Comprehensive History of Assam, 48.

18. Sonowal, “Immigration in Assam during Colonial rule,” 10-11.

19. Hazarika, “Bangladesh and Assam,” 57.

20. Ranjan, India-Bangladesh Border Disputes, 92.

21. Purkayastha, “Influx Devil,” 47.

22. Misra, “Bodoland”.

23. Hossain, “Three Bengali Districts,” 178-179.

24. Gait, A History of Assam, 384.

25. Fuller, Some Personal Experiences, 104.

26. Wyeth, “The NRC and India’s Unfinished Partition”.

27. Pisharoty, Assam, 253.

28. The Assam government accommodated 3,12,713 refugees in 28 camps while the West Bengal provided shelter for 74,93,474 refugees in 496 camps. Source: Liberation War Museum, Bangladesh.

29. Purkayastha, “Influx Devil,” 47-51.

30. Hazarika, “Bangladesh and Assam,” 57; and Hazarika, Rites of Passage.

31. See note 10 above.

32. Das, “The Political Exclusion of (Illegal) Bangladeshi Immigrants in Assam,” 1.

33. Gillan, “Refugees or infiltrators,” 78.

34. Chapparban, “Religious Identity and Politics of Citizenship in South Asia”.

35. Purkayastha, “Influx Devil”; Dutta, Questions of Identity in Assam; The Daily Star, “From Assam Accord to NRC: A timeline.” September 1, 2019. https://www.thedailystar.net/asia/news/assam-accord-nrc-timeline-1793836 (Accessed 28 October 2019)

36. Yiftachel, ““Ethnocracy” and Its Discontents,” 730.

37. Howard, “The Ethnocracy Trap,” 155-156.

38. See note 36 above, 730-731.

39. Yiftachel and Ghanem, “Understanding ‘ethnocratic’ regimes,” 653.

40. Heydon and Woolcock, The Rise of Bilateralism.

41. See note 5 above.

42. Rana, “Bilateral Diplomacy”.

43. Sen, “Ethnocracy, Israel and India,” 114.

44. See Endnote 34 above, 53.

45. The Law of Return (1950) is an Israeli citizenship law which allows any Jew to enter Israel and receive Israeli citizenship. Section 1 of the Law declares: “every Jew has the right to come to this country as an oleh [immigrant].” Enforcing this ethnocratic law, Israel provided legitimacy to the Zionist movement for establishing Israel as a Jewish state. See Yiftachel and Ghanem, “Understanding ‘ethnocratic’ regimes”.

46. See note 34 above, 56.

47. India’s total area is 3,287,590 sq km, with a population of 1.171 billion (2011). On the other hand, Bangladesh’s total area is 144,000 sq km, with a population of 142 million (2011). India is 22 times larger than Bangladesh in terms of territory and 8 times bigger than Bangladesh in terms of demography. Of the total 4,246 km land boundary, Bangladesh shares 4,053 km borders with India along its western, northern, and eastern frontiers. Indeed, India considers Bangladesh’s southern part laying along the Bay of Bengal, the northeastern part of the India Ocean, as its sphere of strategic influence. Even having structural asymmetry, it is not only difficult but also costly for Bangladesh to maintain an unfriendly relationship with India. See Chowdhury, “Asymmetry in Indo-Bangladesh Relations”; Brewster, “An Indian Sphere of Influence in the Indian Ocean?”

48. Vinayaraj, “India as a Threat”.

49. Chatterjee, “India-Bangladesh Relations”.

50. Chakma, “The BRI,” 231-232.

51. Pattanaik, “India’s Perception of Bangladesh,” 30.

52. Jones and Ferdoush, Borders and Mobility in South Asia, 15-16.

53. Van Schendel, The Bengal Borderland, 296.

54. Ghosh, N. “Why India has not been able to resolve the Teesta stalemate.” Observer Research Foundation. November 25, 2019. https://www.orfonline.org/research/why-india-has-not-been-able-to-resolve-the-teesta-stalemate-58093/(Accessed 27 December 2019)

55. Hussain, Bangladesh’s Neighbours in Indian Northeast, 1-2.

56. See note 51 above, 30-32.

57. http://southasiajournal.net/indias-migration-politics-will-topple-bangladeshs-sheikh-hasina/(Accessed 26 November 2019)

58. https://southasianmonitor.com/focus/bangladesh-and-india-deals-misgivings/(Accessed 01 November 2019)

59. Sarma and Choudhury, Mainstreaming the Northeast.

60. Pisharoty, Assam, 357-358.

61. Baruah, India against Itself, xii.

62. https://www.mapsofindia.com/maps/assam/assam-district.htm (Accessed 29 October 2019)

63. See “About Assam: Tourism, Industries In Assam, Agriculture, Economy & Geography.” New Delhi: India Brand Equity Foundation. 2019. https://www.ibef.org/states/assam.aspx (Accessed 30 October 2019)

64. http://ahecl.com/brief_of_assam.html (Accessed 05 July 2020)

65. Kikon, Living with Oil and Coal.

66. Baruah, Durable Disorder.

67. Bhaumik, Troubled Periphery, xxii, 1.

68. See note 65 above, 11.

69. Bhaumik, “Insurgencies in India’s Northeast;” Bhaumik, Troubled Periphery.

70. Jones, “Agents of Exception,” 883.

71. Baruah, India against Itself.

72. See note 34 above, 55-56.

73. Thapar, The Public Intellectual in India, xxvi.

74. Sen, The Argumentative Indian, ix-x.

75. Pisharoty, Assam, 186.

76. https://indianexpress.com/elections/will-remove-every-single-infiltrator-except-buddhists-hindus-and-sikhs-amit-shah/(Accessed 21 November 2019)

77. According to the Citizenship (Amendment) Act’s section 2 (Amended): In the Citizenship Act, 1955 (hereinafter referred to as the principal Act), in section 2, in sub-section (1), in clause (b), the following proviso shall be inserted, namely:—“Provided that any person belonging to Hindu, Sikh, Buddhist, Jain, Parsi or Christian community from Afghanistan, Bangladesh or Pakistan, who entered into India on or before the 31st day of December 2014 and who has been exempted by the Central Government by or under clause (c) of sub-section (2) of section 3 of the Passport (Entry into India) Act, 1920 or from the application of the provisions of the Foreigners Act, 1946 or any rule or order made thereunder, shall not be treated as illegal migrant for the purposes of this Act.”

78. Gplus. “CAA is Fundamentally Discriminatory: United Nations.” December 18, 2019. https://www.guwahatiplus.com/daily-news/caa-is-fundamentally-discriminatory-united- nations?fbclid=IwAR3fhj4hCQTV2dBD1SGwjovqS9eiyhNa9utV6EFo3HHHs9toOScIPGlQrHM (Accessed 24 January 2020)

79. See note 26 above.

80. Ramachandran, “Operation Pushback,” 640-641; Roy, “Between Encompassment and Closure,” 17.

81. Sur, “Bamboo Baskets and Barricades,” 130-132.

82. Baruah, “Why Privatisation of 12 Oilfields in Assam is an Emotive Issue”.

83. See Table 4.

84. Vaishnav, The BJP in Power.

85. Kumar, S. “Here’s how BJP earned the massive mandate: Explained in numbers.” May 28, 2019. The Economic Times. https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/elections/lok-sabha/india/heres-how-bjp-earned-massive-mandate-explained-in-numbers/articleshow/69529857.cms (Accessed 29 October 2019)

86. Vanaik, “The Indian Catastrophe”.

87. Iyer and Shrivastava, “Religious Riots and Electoral Politics in India”.

88. Dutta, “Assam Polls,” 352.

89. D-voter, literally disputed or doubtful voter, is a category of voters in Assam who are disenfranchised by the state government due to their lack of proper citizenship documents. In 1997, the Election Commission identified a huge number of people as D-voters, most of them were Muslims. The process of determining D-voters started following a huge upheaval led by AASU and other pan-Hindu organizations demanding in-depth modification of the voter list in Assam. “Unlike the rest of India, where the NRC is governed by Rule 4 of the Citizenship Rules, the NRC staff thereby has to go door-to-door to verify citizenship documents and testimonies. While in Assam Rule 4A is followed, according to which in each area (gram panchayat) NRC Seva Kendras are set up where residents have to take a form, fill it up and submit with documents.” See Parween, “The Burden of Proof On D-Voters”.

90. Ahmed, “Anxiety, Violence and the Postcolonial State,” 66.

91. Chakma, “The BRI”.

92. Gulf News. “Citizenship Amendment Act is India’s internal matter, Sheikh Hasina says.” January 18, 2020. https://gulfnews.com/opinion/op-eds/citizenship-amendment-act-is-indias-internal-matter-sheikh-hasina-says-1.69027155 (Accessed 24 January 2020)

93. Sur, “Bamboo Baskets and Barricades,” 130-133; Gillan, “Refugees or infiltrators”; Ramachandran, “Operation Pushback”; Chatterjee, P. “India Sends Bangladeshis Home.” The Christian Science Monitor. November 18, 1992. https://www.csmonitor.com/1992/1118/18061.html (Accessed 11 August 2020)

94. The Governor of Assam. Report on Illegal Migration into Assam. November 8, 1998. https://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/states/assam/documents/papers/illegal_migration_in_assam.htm (Accessed 11 August 2020)

95. https://www.business-standard.com/article/pti-stories/caa-nrc-india-s-internal-issues-but-worrisome-that-uncertainty-could-affect-neighbours-b-desh-119122200189_1.html (Accessed 03 January 2020)

96. Abrar, “NRC, CAA and Bangladesh”.

97. Sen, “Ethnocracy, Israel and India”.

98. Pisharoty, Assam, 356-357.

99. Sharma, “India-Bangladesh Relations”.

100. Jawaharlal Nehru discovers Indian statehood’s unity as lying in culture and not in religion and for him the heroes of India’s history subscribe to a variety of Indian faiths; see Varshney, “Contesting Meanings,” 236. “Of all the characteristics of a ‘nation’, unity is considered as the most essential: no unity, no nation. Thus, the Indian National Congress under the leadership of Nehru not only staked the claim of representing all the Indians, irrespective of their religious moorings, but also canvassed the need for a strong all-India centre in order to protect and promote the unity.” See Chaturvedi, “The excess of geopolitics,” 115.

101. In 1981, disturbed conditions as a result of insurgency compelled to postpone census in Assam.

102. See Annexure 1 and 2.

103. See Annexure 2.

104. Mannan “Infiltration,” 34; see Annexure 2.

105. India Today. “Mamata Banerjee says NRC will lead to bloodbath, civil war in country.” July 31, 2018. https://www.indiatoday.in/india/story/mamata-banerjee-says-nrc-will-lead-to-bloodbath-civil-war-in-country-1301559-2018-07-31 (Accessed 22 November 2019)

106. Ranjan, “National register of citizen update,” 10.

107. Moneycontrol. “NRC creates panic in West Bengal and raises concern in Bangladesh.” October 04, 2019. https://www.moneycontrol.com/news/economy/policy/policy-nrc-creates-panic-in-west-bengal-and-raises-concern-in-bangladesh-4501771.html (Accessed 31 October 2019)

108. Neo-Line System has been portrayed in this study as a psychological and geopolitical extension of the previous ‘Line System’ in Assam, introduced by the British colonial administration. It has been flourishing centring the NRC-CAA in Assam where the pan-Hindu government is using smart power to construct the Muslim psychology and ethnic identity into a heterogeneous manner excluding from India’s longstanding pluralist umbrella.

109. https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/chinas-repression-uighurs-xinjiang (Accessed 24 January 2020)

110. https://www.worldatlas.com/articles/religious-beliefs-in-bhutan.html (Accessed 24 January 2020)

111. https://www.indexmundi.com/nepal/religions.html (Accessed 09 July 2020)

112. http://worldpopulationreview.com/countries/myanmar-population/(Accessed 24 January 2020)

113. https://www.census2011.co.in/religion.php (Accessed 01 November 2019)

114. The Wire India. “329 People Held at Border After Trying to Enter Bangladesh From India, Says Report.” November 23, 2019. https://thewire.in/rights/bangladesh-border-assam-nrc (Accessed 27 November 2019)

115. “The National Registration Card, which was first issued in 1952, under the ‘Residents of Burma Registration Act, 1949ʹ, contains no entry for taingyintha or national races. Even after 1964, no government agency had issued such official document indicating citizenship.” “Under the 1982 Citizenship Law, full citizenship is primarily based on membership of the ‘national races’ who are considered to have settled in Myanmar prior to 1824, the date of first occupation by the British. Despite generations of residence in Myanmar, the Rohingya are not considered to be amongst these national races and are thus effectively excluded from full citizenship.” See Cheesman, “How in Myanmar “National Races” Came to Surpass Citizenship;” BROUK, “Myanmar’s 1982 Citizenship Law and Rohingya,” A Briefing by Burmese Rohingya Organisation UK, Manor Park, London, December 2014.

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Abu Sufian

Abu Sufian is a Lecturer at the Department of Political Studies, Shahjalal University of Science and Technology, Sylhet-3114, Bangladesh. His research interests involve geopolitics and South Asia.