THE BAN AND THE BULL: CULTURAL STUDIES, ANIMAL STUDIES, AND SPAIN

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Notes

1. Each of the titles for the subdivisions of the essay is a bull-related Spanish proverb cited in the definition of Toro [bull] in Covarrubias's Tesoro de la lengua castellana o española (968).

2. The New York Times’ coverage of the ban, which was fairly standard, stated: “In many ways, however, the ban reflected less on the animal rights than on a political debate over Catalan identity and a push by local parties for greater independence from the rest of Spain.…” (Minder). For media coverage of the ban, see “Alegría”, Maiol et al., Minder, and Rainsford.

3. For coverage of the vote protecting the correbous, see “El Parlament”, Piñol, and Woolls.

4. Wolfe proposes two levels at which questions that occupy animal studies need to be addressed: first, at the level of content or object of knowledge (requiring a shift in the ethics of reading and interpretation, attuned to the animal) and second (and this is where he suggests cultural studies necessarily falls short), at the level of theoretical approach. He writes: “Indeed, one of the hallmarks of humanist—and more specifically of the kind of humanism called liberalism—is precisely its penchant for the sort of ‘pluralism’ that extends the sphere of consideration (intellectual or ethical) to previously marginalized groups without in the least destabilizing or throwing into question the schema of the human who undertakes such pluralization” (568).

5. If Fudge here points to the usefulness of the study of the past in order to understand human-animal relations in the present, it's worth noting that she also points to the value of the reverse move; that is, the study of animals (and of human-animal relations) in order to understand the past; “If we agree that there is no such thing as a pure human society …and if we don't expand our horizons to include animals, ultimately we will be ignoring an important aspect of the cultures we interpret… [and] denying ourselves access to an enhanced understanding of the past” (7).

6. For the trial documents, I rely on the excellent transcription of Julián Zarco Cuevas (“Pleito”) and in particular on the study by Francisco Tomás y Valiente (which itself cites Zarco Cuevas). Pablo de Lora also mentions the Párraces trial in his compelling Justicia para los animales, citing it as an example of what he terms “antropomorfismo por exceso” (“anthropomorphism by excess”). See de Lora (45).

7. Let me here mark my gratitude to Professor Frank Peters for helping me understand the finer points of excommunication.

8. In the context of the Párraces trial, it's worth recalling the work of Mary Midgley (“Persons”); she reminds us that the concept of “person” has a long history that remits to a dramatic origin.

9. On animal trials, see also Cohen and de Lora. Cohen suggests that the survival of animal trials “was the result of their simultaneous dependence on two different traditions. Popular anthropomorphism and learned ideas of justice met at this juncture. Furthermore …they fulfilled certain necessary functions. […] They defined man's relationship with the animal kingdom by virtue of his judicial rights over it. They reaffirmed society's self-image as universally just. Finally, the animal trials provided the setting for a communal ritual of self and environment purification” (37).

10. In Las fronteras de la persona, Cortina writes that the Great Ape Project is “una auténtica chapuza desde el más elemental sentido común” (61). For a cogent discussion of animal rights and the intersection of justice towards animals and ethics, see Pablo de Lora Justicia para los animales. De Lora's position is starkly different from Cortina's. See, in particular, de Lora Chapter 6 “¿Para que′ quieren derechos los animales?” (“What do animals want rights for?”).

11. The Latin reads: “Verum si iniquo animo tractaveris, et offenso pede non-retraxeris gradum, et in eadem salebra haeresis, ego suspenso calamo, te, et tua, nostris discipulis commendabo”. I have used the bilingual Latin-Spanish edition by José Luis Barreiro, but have revised the translations to be more literal. I am enormously grateful to María Willstedt for her brilliant help with the Latin.

12. In his Censura prefacing the 1749 edition of the Antoniana Margarita, Nicolás Gallo says that the French philosopher, “too concerned with glory, was not ashamed to build upon a borrowed structure … preferring to hide in shameful silence, the well-earned praise he owed to Gómez Pereira” (IX). See also Barreiro Barreiro's introduction.

13. See Barreiro Barreiro's “Estudio preliminar”, and in particular the section titled “La lectura verosímil o sospechada” (§ 25–26).

14. The Latin passage reads: “quod ipsa seipsam noscit, sic procedendo, nosco me aliquid noscere, & quicquid noscit est, ergo ego sum” (277). Barreiro Barreiro's Spanish translation is as follows: “es decir, porque avanzando así, el alma se conoce—yo sé que conozco algo, luego existo”. I am here following Willstedt: “She [the soul] herself knows herself, proceeding thus, I know that I know something—and whatever knows is, therefore I am”.

15. The passage continues: “The relation to itself of the soul and of thinking, that very being of the thinking substance, implied the concept of an animal-machine deprived of what would be, in short, nothing less than the ego as ego cogito, je pense. Such an automaton would be deprived of a ‘me’ or a ‘self’, and even more of any capacity for reflection, indeed of any mark or autobiographical impression of its own life” (Derrida 76).

16. See note 13.

17. “Ac ultra hanc immanitatem, quae tanto atrrocior, quanto frequentior habetur; crudelitatis apicem obtineret taurorum agitatorum tormentum, sudibus, ensibus, lapidibusque caesis ipsis: nec in alium humanum usum, quam ut iis flagitiis humanus visus dilectetur, quibus bestia vindictam mugitu supplex poscere videtur, Atque non-tantum hominis parvus affectus culpandus offertur, dum haec ita percipi a tauris, ut nutus eorum indicant, creduntur, sed omnis benignitas naturae aboletur & culpatur quae genuerit viventia illa, ac quamplurima alia, ut vitam adeo areumnis & miseriis plenam agant” (8–9). Willstedt's literal translation reads: “Y además de esta barbaridad, que se considera tanto más atroz cuanto más frecuente, el culmen de la crueldad lo detenta el tormento de los conductores de toros [toreros], destrozados éstos mismos con chuzos, espadas y piedras. Y no hay en otro ejercicio humano, como en estos actos ignominiosos en que el hombre parece deleitarse, en los que la bestia de rodillas [o suplicante] parece pedir amparo [libertad] con su bramido. Y no solamente se debe denunciar el poco afecto del hombre mientras se crea que esto es percibido así por los toros (como indican sus gestos/cabezadas), sino que toda la bondad de la naturaleza es abolida y culpada, que generó aquellos seres vivos, y cuantas otras cosas más que hacen una vida tan llena de quebrantos y miserias”.