Following any disaster involving loss of life, it is incumbent upon those in authority to undertake operational and personnel debriefing. In this manner changes in procedures, protocols, standards and methods can be instigated where necessary. For meaningful change to occur, reasoned and informed discussion must be undertaken. To this end I should like to address some of the issues raised by Lyn Turney, in the article entitled “The failure of DNA forensic testing: a case study of the 2009 Australian bushfire disaster.”
As the Senior Forensic Odontologist for the State of Victoria, I have been intimately involved at both Command and Operational level in disaster victim identification incidents internationally (Bali, Indonesia, Thailand tsunami) and nationally (Mt Hotham, Myrrhee, Kerang, Donald). I am aware of the intricacies and nuances of such incidents and, more importantly, of the distress and suffering of surviving relatives of those involved.
The Victorian bushfire incident was an “open disaster.” There was no manifest of the number of individuals involved; their exact whereabouts within the scene was unknown and constantly changing as they moved about a property or fled the fire and no ante-mortem description of clothing, documentation or other distinguishing features was initially available to disaster victim identification (DVI) investigators. To compare the Indonesian tsunami, where deceased were drowned but mainly intact, with the bushfire deceased who were incinerated, fragile and often commingled, is flawed. To further state “physical identification alone was satisfactory for the families who were unlikely to have misidentified their loved ones” (emphasis added) is simply incorrect. As was evidenced following the Bali terrorist attack of 2002, the Indonesian tsunami of 2006 and the recent Pacific tsunami of 2010, families are indeed likely to misidentify their loved ones and have indeed buried a body of uncertain identity. To misidentify one person means in fact that two persons have been misidentified. The entire integrity of the DVI process, from scene investigation to Coronial Inquest would rightly have been questioned if standards based on physical identification or geo-location had been accepted. The faith of the community in the rigors of scientific investigation would have been lost. This reliance on a scientific means of victim identification served to strengthen the DVI process and surviving family members were informed that the process would indeed be exhaustive and time consuming.
As the author states in the paper “there are good reasons for the appropriateness of a policy that treats a mass disaster as a single crime scene when it occurs in a public place … and body parts are displaced and the victims rendered unrecognizable and remains commingled, …” – this is precisely the scenario that occurred in every geo-location of the bushfire incident. To treat each fire-ravaged home, burnt-out shell of a car, e-communication or open field containing a deceased individual as a single crime scene and link it to persons who “were where they were expected to be and where family and friends knew them to be” is naïve in the extreme. Many sought shelter in neighboring houses; many cars contained more than one person; many e-communications came from various unknown locations and those found in the open, having fled the fires, were “nonetheless known to be … there?” (emphasis added). In the same paragraph, to state there was “no mystery that needed forensic solution” is patently incorrect. The mystery which required forensic solution was the establishment of identity of all deceased persons.
The author is correct in stating that Interpol protocols in disaster victim identification (DVI) were used in the recovery and identification of the deceased persons involved in the bushfire incident. Primary methods of identification are based upon fingerprint, dental or DNA comparison. Secondary methods involve circumstantial evidence, age, sex, ethnicity, scars, medical intervention, clothing, jewelry and documentation. Identification can only be achieved when there is sufficient ante-mortem and/or post-mortem data for comparisons to be made. Despite the high temperatures generated during the incident scientific evidence was analyzed from all victims, along with circumstantial evidence, to verify identification. It should be noted that DNA fingerprinting has never been considered the “gold standard” method of identification, nor do protocols require identification of all deceased persons before release of remains to their families. Coronial Identification Boards commenced on 6 March 2009 and concluded on 1 May 2009. During this time evidence of identification was presented and deceased persons were released to their families.
There is also confusion by the author throughout this paper, with the distinction between “missing” and “unknown.” “Missing” relates to those individuals reported to authorities as possibly involved in the disaster – bodies were not rendered missing as the author asserts. In the initial weeks of the investigation several thousand individuals were reported by concerned relatives and friends. Each report had to be investigated and an individual eliminated once confirmation of their existence was confirmed. In some cases, this took weeks to finalize and involved communication with those reporting their relative “missing” several weeks after the Saturday of the disaster. This was undoubtedly stressful to the surviving relatives, but an integral part of establishing the “certainty of death.” “Unknown” relates to the 173 deceased individuals noted on the DVI register. Each “unknown” was assigned a unique identification number. No “unknown” deceased person had a single geo-location label. Few, if any, deceased persons lay in situ for any length of time. Delay in recovery was ostensibly due to the dangerous recovery conditions and possible falling structures in which they lay. Identification is established when the ante-mortem information of the “missing” individual is consistent with the post-mortem data from the “unknown” deceased person and the gathering and comparison of this information will take time. This time factor was explained to surviving family members.
The use of inflammatory terms “containment,” “overflow,” “disorder and discord” in relation to the objectives and undertakings of the DVI process during the bushfire investigations and the phrase “framing up a narrative” smacks of conspiracy, manipulation and a hidden agenda on behalf of authorities. There was an open and transparent Commission of Enquiry following the bushfire. What evidence is there to support this outlandish proposition? Further, the author states “Despite the lack of success in identifying bushfire victims,” it should be noted that of the 173 persons deceased, 172 were positively identified.
The issues raised in the two cases cited need to be addressed.
The grief and frustration expressed by the mother who rang the ABC Radio was palpable – I heard the interview. All of the information supplied by her – circumstantial, geo-location, e-communication, dental information, DNA sample – was used in the identification of her son. While simple in concept, this is time-consuming and exacting work that must be undertaken with care and deliberation. To write that “his body became an object of scrutiny” is despicable. No deceased person was relegated to the status of “object” by any involved in the DVI incident. This mother's son was positively identified and released on 6 March 2009 following the first convened Coronial Identification Board.
The identification of a body, presumed to be a father and husband, within a shed cannot be assumed. Visual and circumstantial identification, undertaken in a stressful and demanding situation is likely to lead to misidentification. And no matter how well trained one may be in autopsy, the process of visual identification is confronting, challenging and traumatic. One can rest assured that the utmost care and respect was afforded to all deceased persons following the bushfire incident.
The standards, protocols and procedures of the DVI process have been developed to ensure that recovery, examination and identification of deceased persons are undertaken in a scientific and timely manner. The process relies upon the collection, translation and comparison of all circumstantial, documentary, medical, fingerprint, dental and DNA evidence. “Mass DNA identity testing” was never undertaken following the Victorian bushfire incident and “forensic knowledge” was not used in isolation. “Circumstantial evidence in the form of geo-location of bodies and e-witness accounts” was not used – standards and protocols could not be compromised. The misidentification of any of the deceased would have compromised the integrity of the entire DVI investigation.
On 7 February 2009, 173 persons died during the Victorian bushfire incident. Three months later, on 1 May 2009, 172 persons had been positively identified and released to their families. All victims were identified with scientific input. The DVI process is exacting, slow and time consuming, but to compromise the process by lowering standards and accepting the possibility of misidentification as being part of the norm is totally unacceptable under all circumstances.