Beyond Intentionality: On the Non-dual Contemplative Practices of the Tibetan Buddhist Tradition ‘The Great Perfection’

Abstract

The Buddhist vision of liberation is intimately related with an experiential state that transcends intentionality, temporality and causality, owing to its non-directed, unchanging and unconditioned nature. As such, this vision reveals a novel mode of non-dual awareness, which is not divided into perceiving subject and perceived objects. In order to directly recognise this mode, several Buddhist traditions utilised diverse contemplative instructions that were meant to dissolve the intending tendencies of consciousness. This paper discusses one of these traditions – ‘The Great Perfection’ (Tib. rDzogs pa chen po) – which affirms an inherent experiential state that is open, luminous and all-encompassing. For the sake of realising such a state, this tradition advocates a contemplative approach which emphasises relaxation, spaciousness and non-intending. Through its view and practices, ‘The Great Perfection’ introduces a vision of lived experience that goes beyond the structures of intentional consciousness and entails a reassessment of our basic assumptions about human awareness.

Notes

1. In this paper we will not attempt to cover the entire range of meanings that are associated with the term ‘Intentionality’. Rather, we aim to discuss the basic meaning of ‘Aboutness’ and its intuitive presence as the directedness of consciousness to distinct phenomena. At the same time, this basic presence is the ground for other meanings of the term, as those presuppose the turning of consciousness towards specific contents of experience (Moran 2013). As such, a state of awareness that is beyond the intentional directedness necessarily transcends the other forms of intentionality, since those cannot function without such directedness.

2. For example, the Buddha described the state of liberation – Nibbāna – as ‘unborn, unbecome, unmade, unconditioned’ (Udāna 8.3), and as free from bondage, death and sorrow (Majjhima Nikāya 26:18). That is to say, this state is beyond our worldly conceptions of human life that are characterised by temporal change, affective conditionings and attachments to views. A discussion on the descriptions of Nibbāna in the early sources can be found in Pasanno and Amaro (2009).

3. In his Madhyānta-vibhāga, Asaṅga stated that ‘There is the imagination of that which is false, duality is not found there. [Yet] emptiness is found there; “he” (imagination) is found in “her” (emptiness) also’. [I.1]. In his commentary on this verse, Vasubandhu provided the following interpretation:

In that place (the verse), the imagination of that which is false is the discrimination of that which is clung to and the one who clings. The pair (duality) is that which is clung to and the one who clings. ‘Emptiness’ is the separation of the imagination from the being of that which is clung to and the one who clings. (Vasubandhu 1967, 1).

4. As will become evident when describing the transformative process that is initiated by applying the contemplative practices of ‘The Great Perfection’, the intuitive sense of selfhood involves somatic distinctions, discursive thinking and affective attachments. Moreover, based on this initial sense of selfhood, a more elaborate and conceptual sense of personal selfhood is constituted, and this sense can become in itself an object for grasping. For discussions on the arising of an elaborate self from basic somatic and emotive experiences, see Damasio (1999), Ratcliffe (2005).

5. In this paper, the main Dzogchen tradition to be discussed is the ‘Heart Essence’ (Tib. sNying thig). This tradition is especially characterised through its integration of a non-dual vision with gradual/intentional motifs.

6. In this paper, the term ‘Transcendental’ denotes the essential dimension of awareness, without which no experience is given. This meaning is reminiscent of the sense given to it by Kant in his Critique of Pure Reason when stating that ‘I call all cognition transcendental that is occupied not so much with objects but rather with our a priori concepts of objects in general’. (Kant 1998, 133). However, unlike Kant who based most of his analysis on critical-argumentative considerations concerning the necessary conditions for conceptual knowledge, the discussion in this paper will focus on the intuitive characteristics of lived experience. The distinction between these two modes of inquiry is reflected in J.N. Mohanty’s classification of transcendental philosophies as belonging to two different kinds, a prinzipen-theoretisch and an evidenz-theoretisch. While the former is concerned with discovering the general patterns of knowledge through a set of principles and derivative arguments, the latter reflectively inquires the general forms of lived experience (Mohanty 1985, 214, 215).

7. Robert Stern in his book on transcendental arguments presents four general contexts of transcendental discussions, being that of ‘truth-directed transcendental arguments, belief-directed transcendental arguments, experience-directed transcendental arguments, and concept-directed transcendental arguments’. (Stern 2000, 10). Owing to the noticeable experiential quality of the original characteristics of primordial awareness, we can see these characteristics as a clear example for an experience-based transcendental description. Moreover, according to the vision of ‘the Great Perfection’ that asserts the primacy of non-dual intuitive awareness over conceptual arguments, we can claim that the primary meaning of ‘Transcendental’ necessarily involves lived experience, since without it there is no possibility to construct any conceptual scheme of human reality.

8. The turn to the immediate presence of phenomena is reminiscent of Husserl’s emphasis on investigation of the immanent Now for the sake of understanding the ways through which transcendent/external objects are constituted (Husserl 2001, 54). Yet, while Husserl proceeded with his investigation to the clarification of constituted reality, Klong chen pa was mainly interested with the noetic and existential fruits that come from a relaxed abiding with the immediate phenomena.

9. Owing to their concentrative orientation those exercises can be regarded as part of the ‘Calm Abiding’ (Skt. Śamatha) practices, which are aimed to cultivate such qualities as stability and calmness. For a discussion on this type of practices, see Wallace (1998, 1999).

10. For a comprehensive presentation of these practices, see Namkhai (1990).

11. For an accessible presentation of these aspects, see Preece (2006).

12. We can also ask whether the basic sense of embodiment is fully dependent on the gross form of the lived body, which is identified as the physical body when objectified. That is to say, is the basic sense of embodied directedness arises from the gross form, or is it a property of intentional consciousness even when it transcends the identification with a gross body. For a phenomenological discussion on this issue, see Ataria, Dor-Ziderman, and Berkovich-Ohana (2015).

13. A poetic introduction to the contemplative instructions of this practice is found in Dowman (2003).

14. For a similar account of the different instructions that form the practice of ‘Cutting through Solidity’, see Wallace (2001). However, unlike the ontological terms that characterise Wallace’s article, in what follows the terminology is mainly phenomenological, as my aim is to show how these practices assist in realising an primordial mode of awareness, in which knowing and known are indivisible. Moreover, the common Buddhist ontological discussion that attributes the self-existence of objects to conceptual acts seems to neglect the fundamental role of lived experience in determining the basic split between perceiver and perceived. Consequently, an account that utilises such terms as ‘self-existence’ or ‘conceptual reification’ should refer to their experiential roots.

15. In this context, the key points indicate certain guidelines for placing the body in a sitting meditation posture in a manner that would not intensify somatic tensions. These guidelines include such instructions as sitting in a lotus posture, placing the hands evenly on one another, sitting with a straight back, connecting the tongue with the palate and breathing slowly and evenly.

16. The tradition of the ‘Heart Essence’ attributes the shift from a non-directed and spontaneous mode of awareness to an intentional mode of consciousness to misrecognition of awareness with regard to its self-expressions. Instead of recognising phenomena as its own inherent radiations, awareness misperceives those as separate from itself (Thondup 1989, 205–210). Consequently, it starts to intend those rather than letting them arise, abide and subside through their own natural rhythm.

17. For a discussion on these terms, see Zahavi (2010).

18. In the context of this discussion, the range of ‘transcendent objects’ also encompasses mental objects that have a sensual presence.

19. The difference in the modes of being can be further extended to a distinction in modes of knowing; on the one hand an intentional knowing that is characterised by division of knower and known and, on the other hand, a non-dual knowing in which the knower is the known, owing to the immediate and undirected state of awareness. A similar distinction between such modes of knowing is found in Forman (1999, 116–123).

20. Among the phenomenologists who questioned the clear distinction between a centre of knowing and known objects, we can mention Heidegger with his emphasis on letting Being express itself without manipulation (Heidegger 1969), Sartre with his notion of the Ego that transcends any intentional perception (Sartre 1972), Marion with his ‘Saturated phenomenon’ that overwhelms the active perceiver (Marion 2002) and Henri’s notion of the invisible dimension that faces ‘us’ once we turn to inquire subjectivity (Zahavi 1999).

21. The ethical transformation that accompanies the investigation of lived experience was also recognised by Husserl in ‘The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology’ when he wrote that ‘Perhaps it will even become manifest that the total phenomenological attitude and the epoché belonging to it are destined in essence to effect, at first, a complete personal transformation, comparable in the beginning to a religious conversion, which then, however, over and above this, bears within itself the significance of the greatest existential transformation which is assigned as a task to mankind as such’ (Husserl 1970, 137). Furthermore, Husserl’s view about the transformative power of knowledge concerning experience is well rooted in previous philosophical works, such as Aristotle’s ‘The Nicomachean ethics’ (Aristotle 1998) and Spinoza’s ‘Ethics’ (Spinoza 1981), which asserted the inherent ethical value of investigating the various contents and structures of human consciousness. Needless to say, such a view has far reaching implications for our understanding of consciousness studies and their relation to ethical questions.