Hate-crimes as racial violence: a critique of the exceptional

Abstract

Violence on the one hand is taken as something natural and normal. On the other hand, certain violent actions, such as hate-crimes, are portrayed as forms of exceptional violence, while systemic inequalities are rendered ordinary. In this paper, I de-naturalize the concept of violence through a critical evaluation of hate-crimes. I argue that the concept of hate-crimes has been, or is at risk, of being co-opted by a more sustained effort to ignore and downplay racial inequalities in society. Drawing on the philosophical distinction between ‘killing’ and ‘letting die’, I contend that an exclusive focus on individual-based hate-crimes deflects attention from the systemic, structural inequalities of society; and that a narrow conceptualization of violence (as direct, intentional action) conforms to a more expansive neoliberal promotion of a ‘race-blind’ or ‘colour-blind’ criminal justice system.

Résumé

D’une part, la violence est considérée comme quelque chose de naturel et normal. D’autre part, certains actes violents, tels que les crimes motivés par la haine, sont présentés comme des formes de violence exceptionnelle tandis que les inégalités systémiques sont rendues ordinaires. Dans cet article, je dénaturalise le concept de violence à travers une évaluation critique des crimes motivés par la haine. Je soutiens que le concept de crimes motivés par la haine est en passe ou risque de devenir coopté par un effort plus soutenu d’ignorer et de dédramatiser les inégalités raciales dans la société. En m’appuyant sur la distinction philosophique entre « tuer » et « laisser mourir », j’affirme que l’accent exclusif mis sur les crimes individuels motivés par la haine détourne l’attention des inégalités systémiques et structurelles de la société et qu’une conceptualisation étroite de la violence ( en tant qu’action directe et intentionnelle) obéit à une promotion néolibérale plus étendue d’un système de justice pénale « aveugle à la race » ou « daltonien ».

Resumen

Por un lado, la violencia se toma como algo natural y normal. Por otro lado, ciertas acciones violentas, como los delitos de odio, se presentan como formas de violencia excepcional, mientras que las desigualdades sistémicas son presentadas como comunes. En este trabajo se des-naturaliza el concepto de violencia a través de una evaluación crítica de delitos de odio. Se sostiene que el concepto de delito de odio ha sido, o está en riesgo, de ser acaparado por un esfuerzo más sostenido de ignorar y minimizar las desigualdades raciales en la sociedad. Sobre la base de la distinción filosófica entre ‘matar’ y ‘dejar morir’, se sostiene que un enfoque exclusivo en los delitos de odio basados en el individuo desvía la atención prestada a las desigualdades sistémicas y estructurales de la sociedad; y que una conceptualización estrecha de la violencia (como acción directa, intencional) se ajusta a una promoción neoliberal más expansiva de un sistema de justicia criminal que no distingue ni color ni raza.

Keywords:

• Racial violence
• hate-crimes
• post-racial
• structural violence

Mots clés:

• violence raciale
• crimes motivés par la haine
• post-racial
• violence structurelle

Palabras clave:

• violencia racial
• crímenes de odio
• post-racial
• violencia structural

Notes

1. As scholars and writers, we are confronted often with decision to censor the use of racial slurs or to literally spell these out in their entirety. There is also the issue of consistency, in that some slurs are routinely censored, whereas others are not. It is necessary to be reflexive on the censorship of these words, for example, to not quote verbatim racial slurs merely as shock value. That being said, censorship is anathema to academic freedom. In this article, I have chosen to spell out this term. For more extensive critical reflections, see Ranta (1983), Dwyer (1999), and Tally (2013).

2. In an earlier draft of this manuscript, a reviewer questioned whether mainstream rhetoric has always reduced racism and racial violence to the fringe – thereby positioning racial violence as always exceptional. This is an important question, and one that speaks to my overall purpose, namely that violence cannot be understood a priori to analysis. We readily forward anti-essentialist arguments that race and racism are social constructs; that the meanings of race and racism are politically contested. And yet, violence is given a trans-historical essence; that how violence is understood today holds across time and space. Thus, for example, we now view slavery as a form of racial violence; for antebellum commentators, however, slavery was a means of civilization and discipline, not unlike the spanking of a child.

3. In this paper, I emphasize racial violence and racism; however, my argument holds that a myopic emphasis on individual sexist or misogynist actions to the neglect of systemic sexism and genderism likewise serves to maintain a patriarchal, heteronormative society.

4. De Waal goes so far to claim that the gendered behaviour of male aggression and female passivity is readily apparent at academic conferences. He explains (p. 51) that ‘this is a predictable event on the first day of an academic gathering when egos from the far corners of the globe face each other in a seminar room or, for that matter, at a bar. Unlike the women, who tend to stay on the sidelines, the men get so involved in the ensuing intellectual jostle that they sometimes turn red or white’. In other words, de Waal imagines that academic gatherings (including the classroom?) are testosterone-driven events, with men fighting for intellectual dominance, while women submissively wait to be claimed by the superior male academic.

5. According to Pollock (2013, p. 220), no state in the United States currently recognize marital exemption; however, some states have retained the concept for ‘lesser’ sexual assault crimes.

6. There are ‘Good Samaritan’ laws in the United States; however, these laws are designed to protect citizens from civil liability if they stop and render assistance and are sued as a result of their actions (Pollock, 2013, p. 51). This is very different from the legal obligation to render assistance. In other words, for the most part, it is not legally wrong to stand by idly while someone bleeds to death.

7. There is no ontological reality of crime; crime and criminal behaviour do not exist a priori to systems of criminal justice, for it is the institutions and social relations that comprise systems of criminal justice that define what counts (or does not count) as crime.

8. Recall, under US criminal law, one’s liability for a failure to act is first satisfied by one’s legal obligation to another person.

9. This is not to suggest that geographers and other social scientists have neglected the oppression associated with structural forms of violence; rather, my point is to highlight that too often our work is compartmentalized; that studies on hate-crimes, for example, may neglect structural forms of violence because these are not generally viewed as hate-crimes. Likewise, work on structural forms of violence may not consider hate-crimes because the focus is not necessarily on direct forms of violence. This is why a dialectic approach is necessary: to blur the supposed dichotomy between ‘direct’ and ‘structural’ violence.