Abstract
In this article I experiment with emotional and relational approaches to further understand the ways that masculine privilege operates in the academy. In doing so, I build on longstanding feminist geographical discussions of masculine knowledge. I argue that emotional and relational more-than-human approaches to examining knowledge offer valuable opportunities to explore the ways that masculine privilege operates through the discipline and lay bare normative Enlightenment (humanist, Cartesian, masculine, Eurocentric) constructions that shape current hegemonic knowledge systems.
RÉSUMÉ
Dans cet article, j’expérimente les nouveaux outils émotionnels et relationnels afin d’examiner les questions du privilège masculin au sein de l’université, et ce faisant, je contribue aux discussions féministes géographiques de longue date sur la connaissance masculine. Je soutiens que les approches émotionnelles et relationnelles plus-qu’humaines concernant l’étude de la connaissance fournissent des occasions précieuses d’explorer les manières dont le privilège masculin fonctionne dans la discipline et dévoile les constructions normatives des Lumières (humaniste, cartésienne, masculine, eurocentrique) qui forment les systèmes hégémoniques de la connaissance.
RESUMEN
En este artículo se experimenta con herramientas emocionales y relacionales para examinar cuestiones de privilegio masculino en la academia, y al hacerlo, el documento se basa en antiguas discusiones geográficas feministas sobre conocimiento masculino. Se argumenta que los enfoques emocionales y relacionales más-que-humanos para examinar al conocimiento ofrecen valiosas oportunidades para explorar las formas en que el privilegio masculino opera a través de la disciplina, y dejan al desnudo construcciones normativas de la Ilustración (humanistas, cartesianas, masculinas, euro-céntricas) que dan forma a los sistemas de conocimiento hegemónicos actuales.
Acknowledgements
Much gratitude to Shandell Houlden, Sue Ruddick, Levi Gahman and Julian Yates, for comments on earlier drafts, and for discussions with Minelle Mahtani, Pamela Moss and Lawrence Berg that were useful in developing the ideas in the paper. Thank you also to the anonymous reviewers for their charitable and critical engagement with the paper and to the editor David Conradson for his care-filled guidance.
Funding
This work was supported by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada [grant number 752-2014-2378].
Notes
1. It is important to clarify the distinction between ‘emotions as intelligence’, which I advocate for here, and the concept of emotional intelligence. Developed through the work of Goleman (Citation1995) and Goleman, Boyatzis, and McKee (Citation2002), emotional intelligence describes a capacity to identify, assess and control one’s emotions. For Goleman (Citation1995) emotions are of much value, however, because they belong to the realm of the ‘irrational’, emotions are best dealt with through rational self-control. Thus, Goleman’s work – however unintentionally – frames emotions as in-need of being subdued by one’s ‘rational side’ and cements an emotional/rational binary in which rational thought remains a distinct and privileged counterpart to emotions.
2. Here I am reminded of a Zapatista saying: ‘un mundo donde quepan muchos mundos’, ‘A world where all worlds fit’.