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Abstract
The term post-Islamism has been broadly applied to suggest that we are witnessing a new phase of Islamist politics in which the goal is not to make the state Islamic but to change the lived experiences of Islam. Whether post-Islamism applies to the Turkish case has been a matter of much debate. We approach post-Islamism in Turkey using a feminist geographic analytic that shifts our focus from formal politics to the embodied and the everyday. Drawing upon eight focus groups with men and women in Istanbul in 2013 and 2014, we analyze discussions of education reform, the possibility of religious politics and religious difference to demonstrate how the premises of post-Islamism depend upon the (often unsuccessful) papering over of multiplicity. We argue that everyday, embodied solutions to the questions of post-Islamism often undermine the very categories (state, society, religion and secularism) upon which the post-Islamic problematic is based.
Résumé
Le terme post-islamisme est appliqué au sens large pour suggérer que nous sommes témoins d’une nouvelle phase de politiques islamistes selon lesquelles le but n’est pas de rendre l’état islamiste mais de changer les expériences vécues de l’Islam. Le fait que le post-islamisme s’applique au cas de la Turquie est une question très débattue. Nous examinons le post-islamisme en Turquie en utilisant une analytique géographique féministe qui déplace notre attention des politiques formelles vers l’incarné et le quotidien. En nous appuyant sur huit groupes de discussions de femmes et d’hommes à Istanbul en 2013 et 2014, nous analysons des discussions sur la réforme de l’éducation, la possibilité de politiques religieuses et la différence religieuse pour démontrer à quel point les prémisses du post-islamisme dépendent des écrans de fumée qui masquent (souvent sans succès) la multiplicité. Nous arguons que chaque jour, des solutions incarnées aux questions du post-islamisme ébranlent ces catégories mêmes (état, société, religion et laïcité) sur lesquelles est fondée la problématique post-islamiste.
Resumen
El término post-islamismo se ha aplicado ampliamente para sugerir que se está presenciando una nueva fase de la política islamista en el que el objetivo no es hacer al estado islámico, sino cambiar las vivencias del Islam. Si el post-islamismo se aplica al caso de Turquía ha sido un tema de mucho debate. El estudio se acerca al post-islamismo en Turquía mediante una analítica geográfica feminista que cambia nuestro enfoque desde la política formal hacia lo corporal y lo cotidiano. Basándose en ocho grupos focales con hombres y mujeres en Estambul en el 2013 y 2014, se analizan los debates sobre la reforma de la educación, la posibilidad de una política religiosa, y las diferencias religiosas para demostrar cómo las premisas del post-islamismo dependen del (a menudo sin éxito) encubrimiento de la multiplicidad. Se argumenta que todos los días, soluciones corporales a las cuestiones del post-islamismo a menudo debilitan las propias categorías (estado, sociedad, religión y laicismo) sobre las que se basa la problemática post-islámica.
Notes
1. There has been much debate over the past four decades about how properly to designate political movements that invoke Islam. For those who make a distinction, ‘Islamist’ refers to projects that are explicitly political and explicitly take Islam as their moral framework, while Islamic, on the other hand, refers to the religion alone. In order to use Bayat’s formulation of post-Islamism, for the purposes of this paper, we are using Islamism narrowly to designate projects that signal the implementation of a theocratic state as their ultimate goal. We recognize that there are many ways to contest all of these distinctions but find them productive as a starting point for our analysis.
2. Sharia is Islamic canonical law. It is a code of living derived from the Koran, the teachings of the Prophet Mohammed (Hadith and Sunnah), and the rulings of Islamic scholars. Interpretation and application is understood to be contingent and subject to scholarly debate (fiqh). The purpose of sharia law is to achieve the ethical and moral objectives of Islam. An Islamic state might adopt sharia law in some or all aspects of its legal framework, but what form this takes cannot simply be read off of the Islamic canon (as diverse articulations of across the Muslim world have demonstrated).
3. We recognize that the idea of sexual difference in some ways separates the feminist thought of Irigaray, Braidotti and Grosz from that of Deleuze and Deleuze and Guattari. For us, however, it is more than possible to bring these thinkers together to frame the question of difference as one of multiplicities taken up into systems of representation and identity that are inherently masculinist in their pejoration of the other.
4. Focus group research was conducted with the assistance of Sosyal Arastirma Merkezi (Social Research Center), Levent, Istanbul.
5. We conducted two sets of focus groups with relatively devout Sunni Muslims on questions of religion and public life as part of a broader project on the role of religion in Turkey today. In July 2013, we conducted four focus groups in Istanbul with women of lower and higher socioeconomic status ages 18–35 and 36–50. In December 2014, we conducted a total of eight focus groups, four of which were in Istanbul and four in Konya. All were with younger people (18–35) and included men and women grouped according to gender and socioeconomic status. In this paper we draw on only the focus groups conducted in Istanbul. These focus groups are part of an ongoing and larger project that will include other participants in different Turkish cities and will, in the end, be balanced between men and women and older and younger people.
6. Alevis constitute the largest socio-religious minority group in Turkey. The estimates of the Alevi population vary drastically between 10 and 25 million out of a total of 75 million in Turkey. Roughly two-thirds speak Turkish while the rest speak different Kurdish dialects (Dressler, Citation2008, p. 281). Alevism is loosely associated with the Shia branch of Islam and, in Sunni dominated Turkey, has long been considered a heterodox sect. Most Alevis do not follow the five pillars of Islam (Es, Citation2013, p. 25). Instead, many Alevis participate in cem ceremonies led by Alevi religious leaders (dedes) in cemevis, fast for 12 days during the month of Muharram, and have their own destinations for pilgrimage.
7. This is not to imply that those who are not religious do not engage with such questions or that their perspectives are uninteresting. Our broader project is national in scope and not limited to moderately to very devout Sunni Muslims. Yet for this paper we are invoking this particular slice of the project because of the ways in which these conversations among the (relatively) devout the potential to counter any easy stereotypes and to open up new ways of thinking about post-Islamism.
8. One of the most controversial reforms was in 2012 when the AKP restructured the educational system in such a way that made it possible for children to attend religious middle schools (imam-hatip schools) as an alternative to the secular track. In the process of this restructuring, some secular schools were converted to imam-hatip schools to meet demand, leading to a great deal of public controversy. The AKP has also made it easier for imam-hatip graduates to be admitted to public universities (Kuru, Citation2014).
9. We realize that the longer passages are mostly from focus groups with men. But similar discussions took place in groups of women as well. Quotes for printing in this article were selected because they were the most succinct expression of the ideas that came up in all focus groups. Our goal here is not to provide a gender, age, or class analysis based on these focus group discussions; this would be the topic of another paper.
10. One such violent attack on Alevis that continues to stir up controversy is what is known as MadımakorSivas massacre. On 2 July 1993, the Madimak Hotel in Sivas where Alevi intellectuals, artists and musicians had gathered for a celebration of the sixteenth-century Alevi poet Pir Sultan Abdal was set on fire by a mob. Thirty-five people lost their lives in this arson attack. Each year Alevi groups organize a commemoration on the anniversary of the event and renew the call for the perpetrators to be brought to justice (Vatan, Citation2014).
11. In 2009, the AKP government started to hold a series of workshops in which over 300 Alevis participated. This process, called ‘Alevi opening’, was seen as the beginning of a period of rapprochement (Köse, Citation2010; Soner & Toktaş, Citation2011). The official report of the workshops discussed many issues previously considered taboo (Republic of Turkey State Department, Citation2010). However, by 2012 this process seemed to have ended (The Economist, Citation2012).