From Geo-Strategy to Geo-Economics: The ‘Heartland’ and British Imperialism Before and After MacKinder

Abstract

In this paper we examine the changing perception of Central Asia and the Caucasus to Imperial Britain from the mid nineteenth to the mid twentieth centuries and consider the importance of Mackinder's 1904 paper ‘The Geographical Pivot of History’ to this process. In it we argue that Central Asia and the Caucasus are seen first as an important buffer zone essential to keeping the Russia aggressors at bay and ensuring Britain's continued dominance of India. By the end of the nineteenth century, however, the region had emerged as a major source of raw materials, particularly oil, and as such was no longer seen as merely a buffer zone, but a considerable prize in itself. Mackinder's paper, which emerged at a critical point in this transition, served as an important synthesis of these long-standing and widely shared British concerns about the region and provided a clear and concise assessment of the region's geo-strategic and geo-economic importance and as such its global significance.

Notes

1. H. J. Mackinder, ‘The Geographical Pivot of History,’ Geographical Journal 23 (1904) pp. 421–42 (reprinted in full, including the post-lecture discussion, in Geographical Journal 170 (2004) pp. 298–321). The ideas developed in 1904 were elaborated after World War I in H. J. Mackinder, Democratic Ideals and Reality: A Study in the Politics of Reconstruction (London: Constable and Co. 1919). The standard works on Mackinder are B. W. Blouet, Sir Halford Mackinder: A Biography (College Station, TX: Texas A & M University Press 1987); W. H. Parker, Mackinder: Geography as an Aid to Statecraft (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1982). For different aspects of his career, see G. Kearns, ‘Closed space and political practice: Frederick Jackson Turner and Halford Mackinder,’ Environment and Planning D: Society and Space 21 (1984) pp. 23–34; Idem., ‘Halford John Mackinder, 1861–1947’, in T. W. Freeman (Ed.), Geographers: Bio-bibliographical Studies Vol. 9 (London: Mansell 1985) pp. 71–86; Idem., ‘Fin de Siècle Geopolitics: Mackinder, Hobson and Theories of Global Closure,’ in P. J. Taylor (Ed.), Political Geography of the Twentieth Century: A Global Analysis (London: Pinter 1993) pp. 9–30; Idem., ‘The imperial subject: geography and travel in the work of Mary Kingsley and Halford Mackinder,’ Transactions, Institute of British Geographers,’ NS 22 (1997) pp. 450–72; R. Mayhew, ‘Halford Mackinder's ‘new’ political geography and the geographical tradition, Political Geography 19 (2000) pp. 771–91; G. O'Tuathail, Critical Geopolitics (London: Routledge 1996) pp. 75–110; J. Ryan, ‘Visualizing imperial geography: Halford Mackinder and the Colonial Office Visual Instruction Committee, 1902–1911,’ Ecumene 1 (1994) pp. 157–76.

2. There are various definitions of Central Asia, none universally accepted. The Soviet definition, for example, refers solely to the region comprising Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. Since independence Kazakhstan has also been incorporated into this wider area. During the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, Central Asia was defined in more expansive terms to include, in addition to the above region, central Russia south of the Taiga, Mongolia, northern and western India, Pakistan, north eastern Iran and Afghanistan.

3. See for example W. M. Marshall, Peter the Great (London: Longman 1996).

4. From the confidential India Office report, Historical Summary of the Central Asian Question, (1874) a copy of which is in the RGS Archives, H. C. Rawlinson Special Collection HCR 20/3.

5. Marshall (note 3).

6. After capturing Baku it is reputed that the Czar exclaimed ‘I have won the key to the Caspian. Yonder,’ pointing towards Asterabad and Herat, ‘lies the road to India.’ See C. Marvin, ‘All bound for Baku,’ The Morning Post (28 September 1888). After Peter's death in 1725 the territories reverted to Persian control until the early 1800s when they were annexed once again.

7. C. E. Stewart, ‘The Herat valley and the Persian border from the Hari-Rud to Sistan,’ Proceedings of the Royal Geographical Society 8 (1886) pp. 138–153. Stewart read his paper to the evening meeting of the RGS early in 1886. The lecture prompted much discussion particularly on Herat's strategic importance. Sir Henry Rawlinson, for example, commented that he entirely agreed with Stewart's assessment of the importance of Herat, viewed by many in Britain as the key to India.

8. P. Hopkirk, The Great Game: On Secret Service in High Asia (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1991); K. E. Meyer and S. B. Brysac, Tournament of Shadows: The Great Game and the Race for Empire in Central Asia (London: Counterpoint Press 1999).

9. Lord Melbourne, letter to The Times (4 April 1878) p. 10.

10. The first Afghan-Anglo War lasted from 1839 to 1842. See J. Kaye, History of the War in Afghanistan (London: Richard Bentley 1851, 2 volumes).

11. A. Lambert, The Crimean War: British Grand Strategy, 1853–56 (Manchester: Manchester University Press 1990).

12. See, for example, the India Office report (note 4).

13. Tashkent was annexed by Russia in 1865 followed by Samakhand three years later. The latter proved the key to subjugating Bokhara, and Khiva eventually fell in 1873.

14. The term ‘Lawrence School’ is used in a Minute by Sir W. R. Mansfield, Commander in Chief of India, dated 1 January 1869. See RGS Archives, H. C. Rawlinson Special Collection HCR 20/3. The Lawrence School was led by Sir John Lawrence, Viceroy of India, who opposed active interference in the affairs of Afghanistan.

15. During his brief two-year tenure as President of the RGS, Frere wrote a lengthy report on the Central Asian question to Sir John Kaye, subsequently printed and circulated amongst the Members of the Council of India. See letter from Sir Bartle Frere to Sir John Kaye, 12 June 1874, RGS Archives, H. C. Rawlinson Special Collection 20/3.

16. When Disraeli came to power, Lord Northbrook was the Viceroy of India. Northbrook resisted attempts by the government to reverse Lawrence's non-interventionist policy, but eventually resigned rather than accept orders from ministers whose diplomatic judgement he believed to be disastrously distorted by Russophobia. Following Lytton's appointment as Viceroy, the Secretary of State for India asked Frere to prepare a new memorandum for Lytton's consideration on the Central Asian question. Although the memorandum had not arrived by the time Lytton left for India, the two men met and discussed the matter at Suez. Lytton subsequently expressed surprise that his views seemed to coincide exactly with those expressed by Frere. See K. E. Meyer and S. B. Brysac (note 8) p. 17.

17. The Times (23 September 1878) p. 9.

18. Rumours of the Russian delegation's arrival in Kabul appeared in The Times in mid August and were confirmed later than month. See The Times (15 August 1878) p. 9; (27 August 1878) p. 9. At this time, Russia was once again embroiled in conflict with the Ottoman Empire. In early 1878 the Russia Fleet was ready to attack Constantinople, raising fears in Britain that Russia would have unassailable control of the Black Sea and further her interests on the Near East. Britain duly mobilised its forces to help Turkey. As a diversionary tactic, Russia sent 20,000 troops to the Afghan border and a secret military mission to Kabul. In response to Russia's activities in Afghanistan, Britain launched its second major campaign against the country. See J. Berryman, ‘British imperial defence strategy and Russia: the role of the Royal Navy in the Far East, 1878–1898,’ International Journal of Naval History 2 (2002), http://www.ijnhonline.org/volume1_number1_Apr02/article_berryman_royalnavy_fareast.doc.htm.

19. For Rawlinson's views, see The Times (18 November 1878) p. 9; (27 November 1878) p. 9; (26 February 1879) p. 11; (4 March 1879) p. 10; (6 March 1879) p. 6.

20. While Gladstone opposed the Afghan war and ordered the removal of British troops from Afghanistan, Britain continued to dictate the country's foreign policy.

21. H. C. Rawlinson, Memorandum on the Russo-Persia-Afghan Border, 27 August 1883, in RGS Archives, H. C. Rawlinson Special Collection HCR 20/3.

22. Charles Marvin was taken to Russia by his father in 1869 when he was 15 years old. There, as is the custom in Russian families with only one son, he was ‘adopted’ by the family of Colonel Volykoff, the chief body guard of the Empress. Marvin lived with the Volykoff family for nearly five years. See ‘Charles Marvin: biographical particulars,’ in L. Tracy, Marvin's Letters to the Morning Post 1888–1890 (Allahabad, 1891).

23. Between 1879 and his death in 1890, Marvin published 25 books and pamphlets and hundreds of newspaper articles, listed in Tracy (note 22).

24. C. Marvin, The Railway Race to Herat: An Account of the Russian Railway to Herat and India (London: W. H. Allen and Company 1885).

25. Tracy (note 22) p. 16.

26. Tracy (note 22) p. 10.

27. Marvin, The Railway Race to Herat (note 24).

28. C. Marvin, The Russian Annexation of Merv (London: John Murray 1884) p. 2.

29. Tracy (note 22) p. 13.

30. Gladstone was forced not only to mobilise British Troops but also to secure a vote for credit of £11 million in anticipation of military defence in India. See Berryman (note 18).

31. Tracy (note 22) p. 16.

32. The Soviet Union and Afghanistan were still discussing boundary agreements over 50 years later, signing two treaties, the first in 1946 and the second in 1958.

33. During the 1890s there was a shift in Russia's strategy to the Far East, signalled by a decision to construct the Trans-Siberian Railway. See Berryman (note 18).

34. J. N. Westward, A History of Russian Railways (London: Allen and Unwin 1964) pp. 59–129.

35. Media interest in Russian railway developments was substantial. See the articles in The Times (4 April 1879) p. 11; (12 September 1896) p. 5; (25 June 1903) p. 5; (29 December 1903) p. 8. See also, G. N. Curzon, ‘The Transcaspian Railway,’ Proceedings of the Royal Geographical Society 9 (1989) pp. 273–295 and A. Krausse, ‘The Transcaspian Railway,’ Black and White (21^st January 1899) pp. 74–75.

36. Westward (note 34) pp. 59–129.

37. G. N. Curzon, Russia in Central Asia in 1889 and the Anglo Russian Question (London: Longman's, Green and Company 1889).

38. Curzon, ‘The Transcaspian Railway,’ (note 35) p. 291.

39. Ibid. p. 291.

40. Ibid. p. 293. Curzon made much of the economic impacts of the Trans-Caspian railway in a lecture that he gave in Newcastle in 1889, a hand written copy of which is available in his personal papers in the Oriental and India Office Collections housed in the British Library (hereafter BL) in London. See BL, India Office, Curzon MSS Eur F111/20.

41. Notes from Sir N. O'Conor to Salisbury, 12 July 1898, and 13 July 1898, in BL, India Office, Curzon MSS F111/28.

42. Lt. Col. McSwiney, ‘Summary of information obtained during a recent journey through Central Asia and Chinese Turkestan (confidential),’ 12 October 1899, in BL, India Office, Curzon MSS EUR F111/28.

43. McSwiney noted that Colonel Polosov's statement that Russia had no intention of attacking India, but desired only a strong Central Asia that would prevent Britain thwarting Russia's legitimate interests in the Far East. Angus Hamilton, a reporter for the Indian Daily News who travelled in Central Asia in the early 1900s, also provided details of the Murghab branch line noting that ‘the line itself is veiled in secrecy by the Russian authorities’ and that completing it will serve as ‘[a] military creation of extreme strategic value.’ See A. Hamilton, ‘The Secret Line: The Murghab Branch,’ Indian Daily News report, 1902, in BL, India Office, Curzon MSS EUR F111/394.

44. J. R. Seeley, The Expansion of England: Two Courses of Lectures (London: Macmillan 1883) p. 301.

45. C. Marvin, The Region of the Eternal Fire: An Account of a Journey to the Petroleum Region of the Caspian in 1883 (London: W. H. Allen and Company 1884) pp. 324–325.

46. Curzon, Russia in Central Asia (note 37) pp. 398–399.

47. Curzon's personal papers contain many newspaper cuttings from England and India as well as translations from Russian newspapers dating from this period.

48. On hearing the news, a furious Balfour accused Younghusband of dishonouring the country and henceforth took personal control of British policy in Central Asia. See J. Tomes, Balfour and Foreign Policy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1997) pp. 109–113; C. Allen, Duel in the Snow: The True Story of the Younghusband Mission to Lhasa (London: John Murray 2004) pp. 1–6; P. French, Younghusband: The Last Great Imperial Adventurer (London: HarperCollins 1994).

49. Under the Anglo-Russia agreement of 1907, Britain and Russia agreed that Persia would be divided into three zones: the north under Russian sphere of influence, the south under British authority, and the central zone left as a buffer zone. Russia also agreed to renounce her interests in Afghanistan, whose foreign policy would henceforth be directed from London, thereby safeguarding the security of India. Both Russia and Britain were to enjoy equal trading rights in the country. Moreover, Russia and Britain recognised China's suzerainty over Tibet. M. Sargent, British Involvement in Transcaspia (1918–1919), Conflict Studies Research Centre, Caucasus Series 2004, April 2002; P. Venier, ‘The geographical pivot of history and early twentieth century geopolitical culture,’ Geographical Journal 170 (2004) pp. 330–336.

50. R. Hakluyt, The Principal Navigations, Voyages, Traffiques and Discoveries of the English Nation Vol. 2 (Glasgow: Maclehose 1903–1905) pp. 449–479.

51. R. A. Pierce, Russian Central Asia 1867–1917: A Study in Colonial Rule (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press 1960).

52. D. Yergin, The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money, and Power (London: Simon and Schuster 1991) pp. 58–72.

53. V. Baker, Clouds in the East (London: Chatto and Windus 1875) p. 351.

54. Arnold, the former editor of The Echo, visited Baku in 1875. He was subsequently MP for Salford from 1880 to 1885. See R. A. Arnold, Through Persia by Caravan Vol. I (London: Tinsely Brothers 1877) p. 138.

55. See for example, ‘The Petroleum Fields of Russia,’ The Times (31 March 1880) p. 11; ‘Oil in Central Asia,’ The Times (5 July 1882) p. 4; ‘The Caucasus Petroleum Region,’ The Times (14 August 1884) p. 7.

56. ‘The Caucasus,’ The Times (2 November 1881) pp. 4–5.

57. Marvin, The Region of the Eternal Fire (note 45).

58. Ibid. p. 319.

59. C. Marvin, The Petroleum Question: The Coming Deluge of Russian Petroleum (London: R. Anderson and Co. 1896) p. v. Public interest in petroleum was substantial. In one of his many contributions to The Morning Post, Marvin estimated with obvious pride that c. 4,000 people turned up to listen to a public lecture he gave on the topic in Newcastle in October 1889. See C. Marvin, ‘I work on a Sunday,’ Morning Post (25 October 1889).

60. The Times (17 November 1898) p. 14.

61. H. Hassmann, Oil in the Soviet Union: History, Geography, Problems (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1953).

62. According to a report in The Times (‘Foreign Labour in the Caucasus,’ The Times [11 September 1902] p. 3), Russian sources claimed that 8,500 Russian oil workers and their families had been deported from the Baku region to make way for British and other foreign workmen from July 1901 to February 1902.

63. In addition to the Anglo-Russian agreement in Persia (see note 49), the 1907 treaty required Britain and Russia to respect the independence of Afghanistan and to confer with each other on all matters relating to the country. Neither the Afghans nor Persians were consulted on the signing or the outcome of the treaty. See Sargent (note 49).

64. Grozny began to extract oil from shallow wells in 1833, but commercial development did not start until 1893. See R. E. Ebel, ‘The History and Politics of Chechan Oil,’ Post-Soviet Prospects 3/1 (The Center for Strategic and International Studies: Washington D.C. January 1995) p. 1.

65. Of the 55 British registered companies involved in the Russian oil industry, 49 were registered after 1909, the vast majority in the period from 1910 to 1912. The amount of capital each company possessed ranged from as little as £25,000 in the case of the South Caucasian Syndicate, established in 1912 at Naftalan, to £2.5 million in the case of the Russian General Oil Corporation Limited also established in 1912 at Baku. The capital investment of most companies ranged from £400,000 and £600,000. A detailed report of British investments in the Russian oil fields was compiled by the Naval Section of the Royal Navy in February 1919 as part of the intelligence gathering for the Paris Peace Conference. See Foreign Office Report, ‘Oils and Minerals of the Caucasus,’ in National Archives (hereafter NA) FO 608/230. It is worth noting that just as the British were becoming seriously involvedin the Russian oil industry, the Rothschild banking family began to withdraw following a wave of strikes and labour unrest and growing concern about anti-Semitic and anti-foreign sentiment in the region. In 1911, the Rothschild family began negotiations with Royal Dutch/Shell and sold their entire Russian oil business interests the following year. D. Yergin (note 52) pp. 132–133.

66. Ebel (note 64) p. 1.

67. Ibid.; Hassmann (note 61).

68. Although oil production in Baku increased sharply between 1900 and 1914, its relative importance declined from over 50% to just 15% of global production in this period.

69. F. Kazemzadeh, The Struggle for the Transcaucasus (1917–1921) (New York: The Philosophical Library of New York 1951).

70. J. Wheeler-Bennett, Brest-Litovsk: The Forgotten Peace, March 1918 (London: Macmillan 1963).

71. J. Hassanov, ‘The struggle for Azerbaijani Oil at the End Of World War I,’ Caspian Crossroads 2 (1997), http://ourworld.compuserve.com/homepages/usazerb/246.htm.

72. See ‘Outline of Events in Trancaucasia from the Beginning of the Russian Revolution in the Summer of 1917 to April 1921’, in NA FO Doc. 219 E 8378/8378/58.

73. According to Harcourt's statement, the British Empire produced only 2% of global supply, 80% of which came from India. The US, by contrast, accounted for 65% of global output and Russia a further 13%. See NA T1/12395.

74. Ibid.

75. See, for example, NA (note 73); NA FO 371/3666; NA FO 371/3673.

76. NA (note 65).

77. The issue of fuel for military purposes came to the fore in 1917 and resulted in the establishment of the Inter-Allied Petroleum Committee later that year. The group comprised representatives from Britain, France, Italy and the US and met at regular intervals over the subsequent year to discuss fuel requirements, supply and storage. Details of the membership of the committee and the minutes of the meetings can be found in NA POWE 33/8 and NA POWE 33/9.

78. ‘Allies Petroleum Tour Across Great Britain,’ Petroleum World (December 1918) p. 502.

79. BL, India Office, IOR/L/MIL/807.

80. Sargent (note 49) spi.

81. M. Gilbert, Churchill: A Life (London: Pimlico 2000) p. 405.

82. D. Gilmour, Curzon: Imperial Statesman 1859–1925 (London: John Murray 1994) p. 513.

83. Minutes of the Inter-Departmental Committee on Middle Eastern Affairs, 6 March 1919, in NA FO 371/3661. Beaverbrook describes how Curzon had long been ‘dinning into the ears of Ministers’ the necessity of keeping troops in Georgia and Azerbaijan, but that some of his colleagues felt that Curzon was merely showing off his ability to pronounce the place names in the region. See W.M.A. Beaverbrook, Politicians and the War, 1914–1916 (London: Osbourne 1959), p. 67.

84. See the secret memorandum on ‘The future of Russian Central Asia’ produced by the Indian Office on 3 December 1918, in NA FO 371/4352/PC 78.

85. A notable supporter of Curzon was Professor J. Y Simpson, one of the Russian experts employed by the Political Intelligence Department (PID) at the Foreign Office which had been established in March 1918 as part of Britain's aim to ensure that it secured as much as possible from the peace process that would inevitably follow the cessation of war. See E. Goldstein, Winning the Peace: British Diplomatic Strategy, Peace Planning, and the Paris Peace Conference, 1916–1920 (Oxford: Claredon Press 1991).

86. R. F. Mackay, Balfour: Intellectual Statesman (Oxford: OUP 1985).

87. Gilmour (note 82) p. 514.

88. NA, Minutes, WC 531, 12 February 1919. This was precisely the argument developed by leading German geopolitical theorists such as Karl Haushofer (who influenced both Rudolf Hess and Joachim von Ribbentrop) who repeatedly advocated an alliance with Russia and Japan creating a ‘Eurasiatic great continental bloc’ that would eventually challenge and overwhelm the British Empire. See H. Weigert, Generals and Geographers: The Twilight of Geopolitics (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1942).

89. Gilmour (note 82) p. 514.

90. The meeting was chaired by Curzon and was attended by Sir Winston Churchill, Secretary of State for War, as well as representatives from Admiralty, the War Office, the India Office, the Foreign Office and the Treasury. See NA (note 83).

91. Italy initially agreed to replace Britain in Transcaucasia but following the collapse of Vittorio Orlando's government, the new regime in Rome reneged on this commitment. See the Foreign Office Report (note 72). See also M. Macmillan, Peacemakers: Six Months that Changed the World, (London: John Murray 2001) p. 452.

92. In his memorandum on the British evacuation of the Caucasus, Professor Simpson was highly critical of the plan, noting that the Italian colonial record was one of persistent failure and selfish exploitation. See NA (note 83).

93. Ibid.

94. NA (note 72).

95. Curzon to Mackinder 6 December 1919, NA T 1/12577.

96. Report on the situation in South Russia by Sir H. Mackinder M.P., in NA FO 800/251.

97. NA (note 72).

98. P. R. Osborn, Operation Pike: Britain Versus the Soviet Union, 1939–1941. (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press 2000).

99. Ibid.

100. Outline plan for the denial of Russian oil to German controlled Europe by air attack, in NA AIR/23/960.

101. Yergin (note 52) p. 336.

102. S. L. O'Hara, ‘Great Game or Grubby Game? The struggle for control of the Caspian,’ Geopolitics 9 (2004) 138–160.

103. M. J. Mackinder, ‘The Round World and the Winning of the Peace,’ Foreign Affairs 21 (1943) pp. 595–605. Mackinder's Democratic Ideas and Realities was also republished in the US in 1942 by Henry Holt and Company.

104. Mackinder, ‘The round world,’ (note 103) p. 601.

105. G. O Tuathail, ‘Introduction, Imperialist geopolitics,’ in G. O Thathail, S. Dalby and P. Routledge (Eds), The Geopolitics Reader (London: Routledge, 1998) p. 25.