American Dual Containment in Asia

Abstract

US grand strategy after 9/11 turned from post-containment drift to preemption. But the costs are high – suspicion of American power, hedging by traditional allies, expensive, go-it-alone ventures like Iraq. Tried-and-true containment better reflects American values. While forward in the world, containment is also defensive. It reassures skittish partners and reflects liberal, anti-imperial US preferences. In Asia, containment would deter the primary contemporary challengers of US power – radical Islam and Chinese nationalism – without encouraging a Bush-style global backlash. In a reductive analysis of US alliance choices, this article predicts a medium-term Indo-American alliance. India uniquely shares both US liberal democratic values and the same two challengers; it is the likely pivot in a US-backed neo-containment architecture in Asia.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This study was supported by the Fund for Humanities and Social Studies at Pusan National University 2009. I would like to thank Steve Chan, Richard New Lebow, and two anonymous Geopolitics reviewers for their helpful comments.

Notes

1. Michael Lind, The American Way of Strategy (New York: Oxford UP 2006); Gerry Kearns, ‘Naturalising Empire: Echoes of Mackinder for the Next American Century’, Geopolitics 11/1 (2006) pp. 74–98.

2. Michael Brown (ed.), America's Strategic Choices, rev. ed. (Cambridge: MIT Press 2000); Walter Russell Mead, Special Providence: American Foreign Policy and How It Changed the World (New York: Routledge 2002).

3. Fred Kaplan of Slate.com has made much of this. See ‘The Pentagon's Outdated Budget Priorities’, 22 Dec. 2005, available at <http://www.slate.com/id/2133059/>; ‘The Money Pit’, 16 Aug. 2006, available at <http://www.slate.com/id/2147823/>; ‘Why Isn't Congress Asking Tough Questions about Pentagon Spending’, 21 Sep. 2007, available at <http://www.slate.com/id/2174398/>; ‘What's Really in the US Military Budget’, 4 Feb. 2008, available at <http://www.slate.com/id/2183592/>. See also Clyde Prestowitz, ‘The Purpose of American Power in Asia’, Global Asia 2/2 (2007) pp. 10–15.

4. Evan Medeiros (‘Strategic Hedging and the Future of Asia-Pacific Security’, Washington Quarterly 29/1 (2005) pp. 145–167) notes how much the US has been hedging against China since the end of the Cold War. Mark Beeson (‘American Hegemony and Regionalism: The Rise of East Asia and the End of the Asia-Pacific’, Geopolitics 11/4 (2006) pp. 541–560) notes how much US intervention in Southeast Asia is ‘dual use’ – both for tamping down Islamic extremism and soft-containing China.

5. The division in IR theory between revisionist versus status quo powers is long-standing. See, e.g., E. H. Carr, Twenty Years’ Crisis, 1919–1939: Introduction to International Relations (New York: Harper & Row 1946); Hans Morgenthau, Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace (New York: Knopf 1948).

6. Randal Schweller, ‘Managing the Rise of Great Powers: History and Theory’, in Alastair Johnston and Robert Ross (eds.), Engaging China: Management of an Emerging Power (New York: Routledge 1999) p. 19.

7. The power transition literature elaborates these concepts in greater detail, and my analysis is based on its general proposition of status quo powers defending an international order against various challengers (A. F. K. Organski, World Politics, 2nd ed. (New York: Knopf 1968); Henry Kissinger, World Restored: Metternich, Castlereagh and the Problems of Peace, 1812–1822 (New York: Houghton Mifflin 1973); Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge UP 1981)). Henry Kissinger's efforts in the 1970s to turn the Soviet Union into a status quo power illustrate commitment in practise, as do contemporary US efforts to ‘manage’ China's rise. Both sought to move the challenger's revisionism from a high to low level of commitment (Johnston and Ross), Engaging China (note 6); Michael Brown (ed.), Rise of China (Cambridge: MIT Press 2000)).

8. Samuel Huntington, ‘Clash of Civilizations’, Foreign Affairs 72/3 (1993) pp. 22–49; Francis Fukuyama, End of History and the Last Man (New York: Free Press 1992). Fukuyama has since counselled greater American restraint in America at the Crossroads: Democracy, Power and the Neoconservative Legacy (New Haven: Yale UP 2006).

9. Mead (note 2); John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: Critical Appraisal of American National Security Policy during the Cold War, rev. and exp. ed. (New York: Oxford UP 2005).

10. David Scott suggests India is hedging slowly toward a “classic containment line-up around China's periphery…running from Japan-Taiwan-Singapore-India's Eastern Command,” with the US and Australia over-the-horizon (‘The Great Power Great Game between India and China: ‘The Logic of Geography’’, Geopolitics 13/1 (2008) pp. 10, 13). My analysis locates the US, rather than Indian, motivation for such a ring and connects to India's other strategic challenge – radical Islam. Donald Gross – ‘Transforming the US Relationship with China’, Global Asia 2/1 (2007) pp. 78–89 – decries the whole anti-Chinese hedging project as unnecessary.

11. See, for example, the many texts of the American Empire Project, available at <http://www.americanempireproject.com>; Niall Ferguson, Colossus: Rise and Fall of the American Empire (New York: Penguin 2005); or Cullen Murphy, Are We Rome? Fall of an Empire and the Fate of America (New York: Houghton Mifflin 2007). On the obscurantism introduced by imperial conceptions of American democratic-capitalist power, see John Agnew, Hegemony: The New Shape of Global Power (Philadelphia: Temple UP 2005).

12. Mead (note 2) ch. 1.

13. Robert Jervis, ‘Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma’, World Politics 30/2 (1978) pp. 167–214; Arnold Wolfers, Discord and Collaboration: Essays on International Politics (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 1962) pp. 12–17.

14. Chalmers Johnson, Sorrows of Empire: Militarism, Secrecy and the End of the Republic (New York: Holt 2004) and Stephen Walt, Taming American Power: The Global Response to US Primacy (New York: Norton 2006) elaborate in detail the US policy of forward basing, while arguing against it.

15. John Lewis Gaddis, Surprise, Security, and the American Experience (Cambridge: Harvard UP 2005) elaborates why America's tactical choice for defence establishes the moral high ground while simultaneously leaving it open to surprise attack.

16. See Walter LaFeber, American Age: United States Foreign Policy at Home and Abroad, 1750 to the Present, 2nd ed. (New York Norton 1994). However this traditional reading of early US foreign policy is under challenge by Robert Kagan, Dangerous Nation: America's Foreign Policy from Its Earliest Days to the Dawn of the Twentieth Century (New York: Knopf 2006).

17. Bernard Brodie, Strategy in the Missile Age (Princeton: Princeton UP 1959); Herman Kahn, On Thermonuclear War (Princeton: Princeton UP 1960).

18. John Lewis Gaddis, Cold War: A New History (New York: Penguin 2006).

19. Schweller (note 6) p. 10; John Lewis Gaddis, ‘Hanging Tough Paid Off’, Bulletin of Atomic Scientists 45/1 (1989) pp. 11–14; G. John Ikenberry and Anne-Marie Slaughter, ‘A World of Liberty Under Law’, Global Asia 2/1 (2007) p. 114.

20. G. John Ikenberry, ‘America's Imperial Ambition’, Foreign Affairs 85/1 (2002) pp. 44–60; Medeiros (note 4).

21. Schweller (note 6) p. 9.

22. Structural US fiscal deficits in the hundreds of billions of dollars make this option nearly impossible without massive tax hikes or domestic spending cuts. The Defense Department's budget is already close to $800 billion; full-blown selective intrusion would add hundreds of billions more onto that figure.

23. Stephen Van Evera, ‘American Foreign Policy for the New Era’, in Stephen Van Evera (ed.), How To Make America Safe: New Policies for National Security (Cambridge: Tobin Project 2006).

24. Halford Mackinder, ‘Geographical Pivot of History’, Geographical Journal 23/4 (1904) pp. 421–437.

25. Paul Johnson, Birth of the Modern: World Society 1815–30 (New York: HarperCollins 1991) pp. 772–806.

26. Christopher Layne has advocated this as US grand strategy for two decades; e.g. ‘Who Lost Iraq and Why It Matters: The Case for Offshore Balancing’, World Policy Journal 24/3 (2007) pp. 38–52.

27. Paul Kennedy, Rise and Fall of Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500–2000 (New York: Random House 1987); Paul Kennedy, Rise And Fall of British Naval Mastery, 2nd ed. (New York: Humanity Press 2006).

28. Klaus Dodds, Geopolitics: A Very Short Introduction (New York: Oxford UP 2007) pp. 22–35; Pascal Venier, ‘Geographical Pivot of History and Early Twentieth Century Geopolitical Culture’, Geographical Journal 170/4 (2004) pp. 330–336.

29. Nicholas Spykman, America's Strategy in World Politics: United States and the Balance of Power (New York: Harcourt, Brace 1942).

30. Consider the controversy and wide rejection of Samuel Huntington's argument for a conventional offensive capability for NATO in the 1980s, ‘Conventional Deterrence and Conventional Retaliation in Europe’, International Security 8/3 (1983) pp. 32–56.

31. National Security Council, ‘NSC 68’, 14 April 1950, available at <http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsc-hst/nsc-68.htm>.

32. William Dobson, ‘Day Nothing Much Changed’, pp. 22–25; and Juan Cole, ‘Think Again: 9/11’, Foreign Policy 156 (2006) pp. 26–32.

33. Anne Applebaum, ‘Superpower without a Partner’, Washington Post, 24 Nov. 2009, available at <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/11/23/AR2009112302899.html>; Robert Kagan, ‘Disturber of the Peace’, Washington Post, 2 April 2009, available at <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/04/01/AR2009040103060.html>; Robert Kagan, Of Paradise and Power: American and Europe in the New World Order (New York: Vintage 2004); Nicolas Eberstadt, ‘Russia, the Sick Man of Europe’, Public Interest 158 (2005) pp. 3–20.

34. Ikenberry and Slaugher, ‘A World of Liberty’ (note 19), p. 113.

35. <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/06/20020601-3.html>.

36. Walt, Taming (note 14).

37. John Mueller, ‘Iraq Syndrome’, Foreign Affairs 84/6 (2005), pp. 44–54; Scott Bittle and Jonathan Rochkind, ‘Confidence in US Foreign Policy Index, 2007: Loss of Faith: Public's Belief in Effective Solutions Eroding’, Public Agenda, <http://www.publicagenda.org/foreignpolicy/pdfs/foreign_policy_index_fall07.pdf/>.

38. Gaddis, ‘Hanging Tough’ (note 19).

39. Michael Lind in Gerard Toal, ‘The Hamiltonian Nationalist: A Conversation with Michael Lind’, Geopolitics 13/1 (2008) p. 178; Robert Kelly, ‘From the Global War on Terror to Containment’, Perspectives on Terrorism 2/4 (2008) pp. 13--14.

40. Daniel Deudney and G. John Ikenberry, ‘The Myth of the Autocratic Revival’, Foreign Affairs 88/1 (2009) pp. 77–93.

41. Ian Bremmer, J Curve: A New Way to Understand Why Nations Rise and Fall (New York: Simon & Schuster 2006); Michael McFaul and Kathryn Stoner-Weiss, ‘Myth of the Authoritarian Model’, Foreign Affairs 87/1 (2008) pp. 68–84.

42. Ronald Inglehart and Christian Welzel, Modernization, Cultural Change and Democracy: The Human Development Sequence (Cambridge: Cambridge UP 2005); Inglehart and Welzel, ‘How Development Leads to Democracy’, Foreign Affairs 88/2 (2009) pp. 33–48.

43. Minxin Pei, China's Trapped Transition: Limits of Developmental Autocracy (Cambridge: Harvard UP 2006).

44. Inglehart and Welzel, ‘How Development’ (note 42) p. 48.

45. C. Raja Mohan, ‘India and the Balance of Power’, Foreign Affairs 85/4 (2006) pp. 17–32.

46. Scott, ‘Great Power’ (note 10) p. 10.

47. Ashley Tellis, ‘The Evolution of US-India Ties: Missile Defense in an Emerging Strategic Relationship’, International Security 30/4 (2006) pp. 113–151; Sumit Ganguly and Dinshaw Minstry, ‘The Case for the US-India Nuclear Agreement’, World Policy Journal 23/2 (2006) pp. 11–19; Ashton Carter, ‘America's New Strategic Partner?’, Foreign Affairs 85/4 (2006) pp. 33–44.

48. Huntington, ‘Clash’ (note 8) p. 35.

49. Ladan Boroumand and Roya Boroumand, ‘Terror, Islam and Democracy’, Journal of Democracy 13/2 (2002) pp. 5–20; Thomas Friedman, ‘Still Not Tired’, New York Times, 3 Oct. 2009, available at <http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/04/opinion/04friedman.html?_r=1&th&emc=th>.

50. John Gershman, ‘Is Southeast Asia the Second Front?’, Foreign Affairs 81/4 (2002) pp. 60–74.

51. On the failure of pan-Arabism with the Six Day war, see Mehran Kamrava, The Modern Middle East: Political History since the First World War (Berkeley: University of California Press 2005) pp. 120–121, 136–137. On the rise of Islamism in its place, see Beverly Milton-Edwards, Contemporary Politics in the Middle East, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Polity 2006) ch. 5.

52. Stephen Walt, Origins of Alliances (Ithaca: Cornell UP 1987).

53. Charlotte Quinn and Frederick, Pride, Faith, and Fear: Islam in Sub-Saharan Africa (New York: Oxford UP 2003); Ayaan Hirsi Ali, Infidel (New York: Free Press 2007).

54. The most coherent and least partisan articulation of Europe's growing strategic irrelevance to the United States is Jeremy Shapiro and Nick Witney, ‘Toward a Post-American Europe’, European Council on Foreign Relations (2009); see also Kagan's more aggressive Of Paradise (note 33) or Joseph Joffe's ‘The Default Power’, Foreign Affairs 88/5 (2009) pp. 21–35. For examples of the growing distance of Europe to US foreign policy needs, see: Roland Flamini, ‘Frenemies’, New Republic, 13 Nov. 2009; Robert Kaplan, ‘The Fall of the Wall’, Atlantic, 9 Nov. 2009; Simon Tisdall, ‘Why Won't Obama be Europe's Friend?’, Guardian, 2 Nov. 2009; Stephen Sestanovich, ‘Ask Not What Europe Can Do for You’, Foreign Policy, March 2009; Edward Joseph, ‘Europe's Balkan Failure’, Foreign Policy, May 2009; ‘EU: Fit at 50?’, Special Report, Economist, 15 March 2007; and ‘France: The Art of the Impossible’, Special Report, Economist, 26 Oct. 2006.

55. NATO, ‘Press Release: Financial and Economic Data Relating to NATO Defense’, 9 Feb. 2009, <http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2009/p09-009.pdf>.

56. Stephen Brooks and William Wohlforth, ‘International Relations Theory and the Case against the ‘New Unilateralism’’, Perspectives on Politics 3/3 (2005) pp. 509–524.

57. Christopher Caldwell, Reflections on the Revolution in Europe: Immigration, Islam and the West (New York: Doubleday 2009); Anne Applebaum, ‘Portents’, New Republic, 10 Nov. 2009, available at <http://www.tnr.com/article/books-and-arts/portents>; Ali, Infidel, ‘Eurabia’, Economist cover story, 22 June 2006.

58. Olivier Roy, Secularism Confronts Islam (New York: Columbia UP 2009); and Olivier Roy, Globalized Islam (New York: Columbia UP 2004).

59. Yuliya Tymoshenko, ‘Containing Russia’, Foreign Affairs 86/3 (2007) pp. 69–82.

60. Zoltan Barany, Democratic Breakdown and the Decline of the Russian Military (Princeton: Princeton UP 2007).

61. Dmitri Simes argues for such piecemeal, issue-driven cooperation to avoid ‘Losing Russia’, Foreign Affairs 86/6 (2007) pp. 50–52.

62. See Moshe Halbertal, ‘The Goldstone Illusion’, New Republic, 6 Nov. 2009, available at <http://www.tnr.com/article/world/the-goldstone-illusion?page=0,0>, for a discussion of Israeli targeting rules.

63. Joseph Nye, ‘The Challenge of China’, in Van Evera (ed.), How to Make (note 23). Robert Sutter (Chinese Foreign Relations: Power and Policy since the Cold War, 2nd ed. (New York: Rowman & Littlefield 2009) ch. 1), and Medeiros (note 4) p. 163, all anticipate deepening Sino-US mistrust as China grows. For Chinese geopolitical writing that suggests the same, see Yinhong Shi, ‘China, the Nuclear Problem and Prospects on the Peninsula’, Qingsi Li, ‘Obama's Foreign Policy and Its Influence on East Asia’, and Xiaoming Zhang, ‘United States, ‘Rising’ China and the Regional Order in Northeast Asia’, papers presented at the ‘Global Economic Crisis and Cooperation in East Asia’ conference of the Institute of Chinese Studies of Pusan National University, Busan, South Korea, 14 May 2009. On the increasing breadth of China's interests as it continues to grow economically, see Yingchun Sun, ‘China's Cultural Soft power and Cooperation in Northeast Asia’, paper presented at the ‘Global Economic Crisis and Cooperation in East Asia’ conference of the Institute of Chinese Studies of Pusan National University, Busan, South Korea, 14 May 2009; and Qian Xin, ‘Extended Horizon: China's Transitional Navy Strategy and Its Implications’, paper presented at the World Congress for Korean Politics and Society, Korean Political Science Association, Seoul, South Korea, 21 Aug. 2009.

64. Even David Kang, arguably the most forceful defender in IR of China's ‘peaceful rise’ (China Rising: Peace, Power and Order in East Asia (New York: Columbia UP 2007)), admits that the “evidence is mixed” on China's benign intent (‘Getting Asia Wrong: Need for New Analytical Frameworks’, International Security 27/4 (2003) p. 68).

65. Zheng Wang, ‘National Humiliation, History Education, and the Politics of Historical Memory: Patriotic Campaign in China’, International Studies Quarterly 52/4 (2008) pp. 783–806.

66. I thank one of Geopolitics’ anonymous reviewers for emphasising this insight.

67. Consider the varying viewpoints of the essays in Johnston and Ross Engaging China (note 7); Brown, Rise (note 7); or the debate between David Shambaugh and John Mearsheimer over China. Shambaugh writes: “Both the logic and application of offensive realism in this case are, in my view, unsustainable. It is a classic example of an international relations theorist, who is not well grounded in regional area studies, deductively applying a theory to a situation rather than inductively generating theory from evidence. As a China specialist, I do not recognize the China that Mearsheimer describes.” Yet eight years earlier Shambaugh had written: “The insular and defensive character of Chinese politics and nationalism suggests that China will be reluctant and difficult to engage and integrate into the existing international order.” David Shambaugh, ‘Containment or Engagement of China? Calculating Beijing's Responses’, International Security 21/2 (1996) p. 180; David Shambaugh, ‘China Engages Asia: Reshaping the Regional Order’, International Security 29/3 (2004) p. 94; John Mearshimer, Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: Norton 2003). Generally it appears that IR scholars see China as a greater potential threat than comparativists and area specialists.

68. Kennedy, Rise and Fall (note 27); Gilpin, War and Change (note 7). Colin Gray nicely captures the concomitant expansion of interests with the growth in national power: “Who will rise next? The motive is unlikely to be world domination, but policy tends to follow role and function and in good part is the product of relative power and its insecurities and opportunities” (‘In Defence of the Heartland: Sir Halford Mackinder and His Critics A Hundred Years On’, Comparative Strategy 23/1 (2004) p. 21). Applied to China, this suggests that as it grows, its appetites will almost certainly expand – as they have in Africa recently – as will its sense of its sphere of influence – as it has in Korea.

69. Wang Jisi, ‘America in Asia: How Much Does China Care?’, Global Asia 2/2 (2007) pp. 24–28; Shi (note 63); Zhang (note 63).

70. Samuel Huntington, Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (New York: Simon & Shuster 1996) ch. 7.

71. Thomas Friedman, ‘The First Law of Petropolitics’, Foreign Policy 154 (2006) pp. 28–36.

72. Fareed Zakaria, ‘Politics of Rage: Why Do They Hate Us?’, Newsweek, 15 Oct. 2001, available at <http://www.fareedzakaria.com/ARTICLES/newsweek/101501_why.html>.

73. Dobson (note 32); Juan Cole (note 32).

74. All sides of the China debate – ‘China threat’ v. ‘peaceful rise’ – agree that contemporary China is a strong prestige-seeker due to the Sinocentric past and the current regime's narrative of China's ‘100 years of humiliation’ at the hands of the West. See Wang (note 65); Medeiros (note 4); Herbert Yee and Ian Storey (eds.), The China Threat: Perceptions, Myths and Reality (New York: Routledge 2004); Alastair Johnson, ‘Is China a Status Quo Power?’, International Security 27/4 (2003) pp. 5–56; Denny Roy, ‘Hegemon on the Horizon: China's Threat to East Asian Security’, International Security 19/1 (1994) pp. 149–168.

75. I thank Randall Schweller for this insight in personal conversation, 2006.

76. Kennedy, Rise and Fall (note 27).

77. That figure comes from Chalmers Johnson <http://www.q-and-a.org/Transcript/?ProgramID=1079>.

78. Kang, China Rising (note 64).

79. Chung Min Lee, ‘How Obama Can Shape Asia's Rise’, Wall Street Journal, 16 Nov. 2009, available at <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704402404574528921733982480.html>; Medeiros (note 4); Gerald Curtis, ‘US in East Asia: Not Architecture, but Action’, Global Asia 2/2 (2007) p. 49.

80. Amitav Acharya, ‘Will Asia's Past be its Future?’, International Security 28/3 (2003/2004) p. 151.

81. The US concern with Chinese expansion dates at least to Alfred Thayer Mahan: J. Michael Robertson ‘Alfred Thayer Mahan and the Geopolitics of Asia’, Comparative Strategy 15/4 (1996) pp. 353–366.

82. Scott ‘Great Power’ (note 10).

83. On Japanese anxiety, see Kent Calder, ‘China and Japan's Simmering Rivalry’, Foreign Affairs 85/2 (2006) pp. 129–139; Korea: Jae Hon Chung, ‘China's Ascendancy and the Korean Peninsula: From Interest Reevaluation to Strategic Realignment?’, in David Shambaugh (ed.), Power Shift: China and Asia's New Dynamics (Berkeley: University of California Press 2005) pp. 151–169; Philippines: Krysty Choi, ‘Sinocentric Hegemony and its Impact on Sino-Korean Relations’, paper presented at the World Congress for Korean Politics and Society, Korean Political Science Association, 22 Aug. 2009.

84. Medeiros (note 4) p. 158 notes that “China's approach toward Taiwan is…seen…as a key litmus test of whether China is a ‘limited aims’ or ‘a revisionist’ rising power.”

85. Robertson (note 81) p. 362.

86. See figure 1 of Gross (note 10) p. 80.

87. Nazli Choucri and Robert North, Nations in Conflict: National Growth and International Violence (San Francisco: Freeman 1975).

88. Lee (note 79); Medeiros (note 4) pp. 148–153.

89. Mark Beeson, ‘Trading Places? China, the United States, and the Evolution of the International Political Economy’, Review of International Political Economy 16/4 (2009) pp. 729–741; Robert Ross, ‘China's Naval Nationalism: Sources, Prospects, and the US Response’, International Security 34/2 (2009) pp. 46–81.

90. Chalmers Johnson, Blowback: The Costs and Consequences of American Empire (New York: Metropolitan Books 2000).

91. Myongsob Kim, Suzanne Parker, and Jun Young Choi, ‘ Increasing Distrust of the USA in South Korea’, International Political Science Review 27/4 (2006) pp. 427–445.

92. Robert Gilpin, Global Political Economy: Understanding the International Economic Order (Princeton: Princeton University Press 2001) chs. 9–10.

93. Mohan (note 45) p. 17; Scott ‘Great Power’ (note 10) p. 20.

94. Mohan (note 45).

95. Spykman contended that only continental-sized powers would be able to compete in the twentieth century (note 29).

96. Federico Bordonaro, ‘Europe Itching to Lift China Arms Ban’, Asia Times, 15 March 2007, available at <http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/IC15Ad02.html>.

97. Jennifer Lind, Sorry States: Apologies in International Relations (Ithaca: Cornell UP 2008).

98. Frances Mautner-Markof, ‘Nuclear Non-Proliferation’, Global Asia 2/2 (2007) pp. 99–100.

99. Edward Luce, ‘Singh Embraced by US as ‘Natural Ally”, Financial Times, 24 Nov. 2009, available at <http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/1f743134-d92a-11de-b2d5-00144feabdc0.html>.

100. Robert Kaplan, ‘Center Stage for the Twenty-first Century’, Foreign Affairs 88/2 (2009) pp. 16–32; Scott (note 10).

101. Fareed Zakaria, ‘Don't Neglect India’, Washington Post, 23 Nov. 2009, available at <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/11/22/AR2009112201239.html>; Bruce Vaughn, ‘Indian Geopolitics, the United States and Evolving Correlates of Power in Asia’, Geopolitics 9/2 (2004) pp. 440–459.

102. Walt, Origins (note 52); Geoffrey Howard, ‘The US Should Support Its’ Defense', pp. 129–134; and Melvyn Kraus, ‘US Allies Should Pay for Their Own Defense’, in Neal Bernards and Lynn Hall (eds.), American Foreign Policy (St. Paul: Greenhaven 1987) pp. 135–139.

103. Edward Lucas, ‘The Fall and Rise and Fall Again of the Baltic States’, Foreign Policy 173 (2009) pp. 72–79.

104. Amy Kazmin and Edward Luce, ‘India Feels the Chill as US Warms to China’, Financial Times, 22 Nov. 2009, available at <http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/a5fe3636-d890-11de-b63a-00144feabdc0.html>; Edward Luce, ‘Singh Backs US Mission in Afghanistan’, Financial Times, 24 Nov. 2009, available at <http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/a5fe3636-d890-11de-b63a-00144feabdc0.html>; Nicolas Burns, ‘America's Strategic Opportunity with India’, Foreign Affairs 86/6 (2007) pp. 131–146.

105. Samuel Bersick notes cautiously that “reactions to date remain incoherent. No real European Asia strategy exists” (‘Europe in Asia’, in David Shambaugh and Michael Yahuda (eds.), International Relations of Asia (New York: Rowman & Littlefield 2008) p. 105). Kishore Mahbubani is more caustic on Europe's strategic irrelevance in Asia (‘Wake Up, Washington: The US Risks Losing Asia’, Global Asia 2/2 (2007) pp. 16, 22–23).

106. Thomas Friedman, The World is Flat: Brief History of the Twenty-First Century 3.0 (New York: Picador 2007) pp. 126–136.

107. Even the free-trading Institute for International Economics decries the particular security issues of trade with China: Edward Graham and David Marchick, US National Security and Foreign Direct Investment (Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics 2006) ch. 4, available at <http://bookstore.petersoninstitute.org/book-store/3918.html>.

108. Robert Reich, ‘China and the American Jobs Machine’, Wall Street Journal, 16 Nov. 2009, available at <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704431804574537892719150978.html>.

109. ‘Stemming the Tide’, Economist, 19 Nov. 2009, available at <http://www.economist.com/node/14903024>; David Brooks has emphasised this theme repeatedly: ‘The Culture of Debt’, New York Times, 28 July 2009, available at <http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/22/opinion/22brooks.html>; ‘The Next Culture War’, New York Times, 28 Sep. 2009, available at < http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/29/opinion/29brooks.html> ‘The Values Question’, New York Times, 23 Nov. 2009, available at <http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/24/opinion/24brooks.html>.

110. Robert Kelly, ‘One Last Chance in Iraq for a Sustainable War on Terror’, OSU Journal of Politics and International Affairs 1/1 (2007) pp. 139–141; Chalmers Johnson, ‘Republic or Empire?’, Harper's, January 2007, available at <http://www.harpers.org/archive/2007/01/0081346>.

111. Emre Iseri, ‘US Grand Strategy and the Eurasian Heartland in the Twenty-First Century’, Geopolitics 14/1 (2009) pp. 26–46.

112. Gaddis, Surprise, Security (note 15).

113. Brent Scowcroft, ‘Don't Attack Saddam’, Wall Street Journal, 15 Aug. 2002, available at <http://www.opinionjournal.com/editorial/feature.html?id=110002133>; Zbigniew Brzezinski, Choice: Global Domination or Global Leadership (New York: Basic Books 2005).

114. LaFeber (note 16); Simon Dalby, ‘Imperialism, Domination, Culture: The Continued Relevance of Critical Geopolitics’, Geopolitics 13/3 (2008) pp. 413–436.

115. Lucas (note 103).

116. Geir Lundestad, ‘Empire by Invitation? The United States and Western Europe, 1945–52’, Journal of Peace Research 23/3 (Fall 1986) pp. 263–277.

117. Zalmay Khalilzad, et al., The United States and a Rising China: Strategic and Military Implications (Santa Monica: RAND 1999).

118. Norman Podhoretz, World War IV: Long Struggle Against Islamofascism (New York: Vintage 2007); Ferguson (note 11).