Afghanistan, Networks and Connectivity

Abstract

Afghanistan is often thought to be a failed state because it is isolated from the networks of globalisation: for example, Afghanistan is viewed as part of Thomas Barnett's Non-Integrating Gap. On the contrary, the article will show that Afghanistan has – for decades – been very much integrated into a range of international networks. These networks have played major roles in Afghanistan and have also spread to have significant impact across the world: offering an example of what Friedman has referred to as the flattening of the world. Afghanistan is thus an example of the substantial role which networks and connectivity can play in ‘failed’ states and of the unpredictable outcomes that can result from such networks.

INTRODUCTION

It is often argued that the reason Afghanistan is ‘failing’ – and is a potential threat to US and UK interests – is because it has not participated successfully enough in the processes and networks of globalisation. On the contrary, this article will show that the Afghanistan has – at least since its successful resistance of attempts to draw it into the Soviet sphere of influence – drawn very effectively on a number of networks. Actors within Afghanistan have been extremely successful at drawing on and engaging with global flows of money, arms, people and information: for example, Afghanistan has dominated the global trade in illegal opiates, defeated one superpower, and reached a position where the defeat of a second superpower looks entirely feasible.

Flows of money, people, products and ideas enter and exit Afghanistan at great speed, passing over borders with minimal effective state interference, and have done so for a considerable length of time: Afghanistan can be read as an example of what can be achieved with the flattening of the world which, Friedman argues, offers a “newfound power for individuals to collaborate and compete globally”. ¹ The article will thus show that it remains the case that – as the 9/11 Commission suggested – actors in ‘failed’ states such as Afghanistan are able to make effective use of globalisation. ²

This article is thus a critique of a number of misconceptions about Afghanistan, networks and connectivity. Following a discussion of key ideas around globalisation, it will be argued that Barnett's concept of the ‘Non-Integrating Gap’ fails to take account of Afghanistan's considerable connectivity. Drawing in part on critical readings of representations of African states, this article will therefore suggest alternate readings of events in Afghanistan.

The article will show that Afghanistan has long been involved in a number of international networks and that it has depended upon these networks in various ways. Al Qaeda's network will be analysed as a specific example of how networks, states and territories can interact, before the article moves to analyse the role of networks in Afghanistan's post-Communist governments and politics. Afghanistan's impressively successful engagement in the global trade in illegal drugs is a particularly telling example of Afghanistan's role in a range of networks and the article will therefore end by considering this trade.

As the troop surge in Afghanistan rolls out, it is accompanied by an emphasis on how “growth is critical to undermine extremists' appeal in the short term and for sustainable economic development in the long term”. ³ However, economic growth and conflict are not necessarily antithetical: as Klein notes, the world can become “less peaceful while accumulating significantly more profit”. ⁴ The article will demonstrate that various Afghan networks have been growing and developing for some time, albeit in ways which do not sit well with US and UK objectives.

GLOBALISATION, CONNECTIVITY AND BARNETT

For Gills there was “a brief moment [when] globalization was a term that meant we were fast arriving at an end of history in which the final outcome was already predetermined by the laws of market economics, liberal democracy, and technological progress”. ⁵ Gills is correct to note, though, that “life and history are never quite so simple”. ⁶ One example of things not being simple is – as will be analysed in the article – the unpredictability that is inherent in the actions of various networks in Afghanistan.

Because of the diverse uses of the term globalisation, Cerny argues that “globalization is too easily used to mean different things at the same time” and Cerny et al. observe that “globalization is itself a highly contested concept”. ⁷ There are also significant questions regarding how long globalisation and related processes have been taking place: there are debates as to whether globalisation or ‘global history’ include “all human history going back to the year dot [or are] very much a product of modern forces of change”. ⁸ Falk thus writes about “this puzzling phenomenon we call ‘globalization’, for want of a better term”. ⁹ Globalisation is, nonetheless, worth focusing on as a subject of study due to its significance for politics today: “Globalisation impacts upon governance by altering the deeper structures which underlie governance processes and mechanisms, altering various conditions or parameters which affect the likely mix of hierarchy, market and network”. ¹⁰

Baldev Raj Nayar describes three broad orientations to globalisation: an “agnostic” orientation, which questions whether anything new is happening; an “enthusiast” orientation, which welcomes globalisation as a dramatic change; and “critics” who may agree that there is “increasing economic globalization [but] disagree strongly with the positive interpretation”. ¹¹ This article is, broadly speaking, a critique of some claims often associated with some (but certainly not all) enthusiasts of globalisation: the idea that globalisation is something novel that has not yet reached states such as Afghanistan and the belief that, when it does, the results will be positive. While much of the article emphasises the globalisation that has already been achieved by Afghan networks, I should make explicit that I share the concern of writers such as Falk regarding what these ‘achievements’ will mean for human well-being. ¹²

The article draws, to an extent, on both agnostic and critical claims regarding globalisation. However, I would concur with enthusiasts and with Nayar that, at least in some cases, “there is a distinctive process under way of a sharper integration of the world economy, which can be categorized as globalization”. ¹³ For Nayar, “the spread of globalization is…uneven and asymmetrical” and economic globalisation should be viewed as “truncated” and treated “less as an end state and more as a process”. ¹⁴ In Afghanistan, these processes have been taking place for some time and with some dramatic effects. While sceptics such as Thompson and Hirst argue that there are few truly transnational companies and global flows, one of the interesting aspects of the networks to be analysed in this article is that they function globally and transnationally in ways which escape many more ‘legitimate’ networks. ¹⁵

Nayar argues that “economic globalization is nothing but the expansion of the market so as to encompass the entire globe within its sphere…it represents the integration of different regional markets into a world market”. ¹⁶ Gilpin suggests that this is made up of “just a few key developments”, including the way that “international trade has greatly expanded and has become a much more important factor in both domestic and international economic affairs”. ¹⁷ In the context of Afghanistan, one should also emphasise that globalisation can be viewed as both an economic process and a political (and ideological) project. ¹⁸

For Smith – taking a critical view of globalisation – globalisation is the “most ambitious fruit” of liberalism. ¹⁹ This expansion to encompass the globe may be an attempt to spread liberal values universally, beyond US territory. ²⁰ However, insofar as a certain type of globalisation is associated with attempts to spread liberal values universally, the article will argue there are also globalised and globalising processes which can make it harder to spread and implement liberal values.

This leads to the question of where Afghanistan sits in these processes of globalisation. Thomas Barnett's work on globalisation and conflict has been influential and will be helpful here. ²¹

For Barnett, in his account of a ‘new map’ through which the Pentagon should view a globalised world, “it is disconnectedness that defines danger. Disconnectedness allows bad actors to flourish by keeping entire societies detached from the global community and under their control”. ²² Barnett argues that the US needs to find ways of responding to this new “threat environment”. ²³

Barnett argues that the US military should focus on “which regions are functioning within globalization's expanding web of connectivity and which remain disconnected from that process”. ²⁴ Barnett argues that US policy makers should be aware that “America stands at the peak of a world historical arc that marks globalization's tipping point”. ²⁵ For Barnett, it is “where globalization has spread” that stable governments will be found. ²⁶ On the other hand, it is beyond globalisation's “frontier [that] you will find the failed states that command our attention”, along with “rogue states” and “endemic conflicts”. ²⁷ Barnett argues that globalisation involves spreading a fairly minimal rule set – that of “a multicultural free-market economy” – across the entire world. ²⁸ As Dalby puts it, Barnett thus advocates the extension of a certain kind of “globalisation, by force if necessary on the clear geographical assumption that the wild zone's violence threatens the core and as such must be civilised”. ²⁹ In Barnett's terms, “Eradicating disconnectness…becomes the defining security task of our age”. ³⁰

Afghanistan has been linked to a number of violent organisations and networks and experienced decades of conflict. Certain of the networks active in Afghanistan do represent plausible risks to the region and more widely. As such, Afghanistan might seem to offer an example of the “Non-Integrating Gap” which, for Barnett, is the source of today's threats to the US. Barnett has explicitly argued that “there is a good reason why Al Qaeda was based first in Sudan and then later in Afghanistan: These are two of the most disconnected countries in the world”. ³¹

However, as will be discussed below, to view Afghanistan (either before or after Operation Enduring Freedom) as a disconnected state would be a misinterpretation of the situation. Afghanistan has been caught up in a range of complex, international networks for some time – including Pakistani, Saudi, Soviet and US interventions in Afghanistan, along with the involvement of Al Qaeda. Moreover, Afghanistan's drug production and export businesses have ensured that it remained very much connected to the international economy, albeit in somewhat unconventional ways. Various international connections with and to Afghanistan – for example, the supply of arms to various factions fighting in the state's civil war – have played a significant role in the political violence that emerged in and from the state.

It is thus the case that certain forms of (inter)connectedness can actually be powerful challenges to the types of integration that Barnett and others advocate. It is, as Barnett acknowledges, often highly interconnected networks like Al Qaeda which violently defy the notion that their ‘homelands’ should join “globalization's Functioning Core”. ³² A web of international connections, along with “dense … communications”, is important for those seeking to engage in this type of networked conflict (what will be discussed below as netwar). ³³ This can thus help them to challenge certain aspects of the ‘progress’ of globalisation.

Barnett does acknowledge that the rule set which globalisation will spread across the world is a minimal one. ³⁴ However, he fails to take account of exactly how minimal this rule set can be. Barnett appears to view ‘black market’ economic activity such as the trade in illegal drugs as a contravention of the rule set of globalisation. ³⁵ However, as demonstrated below, activities such as the drug trade can actually represent an example of globalisation functioning particularly effectively. The assumption that certain ‘black market’ activities are not a ‘genuine’ part of globalisation's interconnectedness appears to be implicit – rather than explicitly argued – in Barnett's work. He fails to justify why the intense interconnectedness of such a substantial part of the international economy should be excluded from analyses of the connections that globalisation forms.

For Barnett, a country or a region is “functioning” as part of globalisation if it can deal with “content flows” associated with economic integration, and if it works to bring “its internal rule sets [into line with] the emerging global rule of democracy, rule of law, and free markets”. ³⁶ In terms of these global rules, Barnett argues that “we would like to see all three occurring at once, but significant movement on any front is more important than the lack of progress in the other two”. ³⁷

Afghanistan has, over a long period, played significant roles in the content flows associated with globalisation. Afghanistan's role in the opiate trade and its effective anti-Soviet insurgency (to be discussed below) have only been possible because of skilled management of such flows. It is thus the case that places that Barnett would place in the Gap (and therefore view as non-functioning) can function very effectively as part of globalisation – even in Barnett's own terms.

There is therefore an interesting tension in the way that Barnett is “concerned to turn the current American dominance into a tool to ensure the final triumph of the processes of globalisation”. ³⁸ As Dalby argues, “Barnett's advocacy is breathtaking in its sheer audacity and its insistence on American “can-do” in the face of apparently huge obstacles”. ³⁹ Ironically, though, one of the problems facing Barnett's world view is that the connectivity of certain Afghan networks is itself a huge obstacle to certain US government goals. Although Barnett appears to, as argued by Roberts, Secor and Sparke, draw on an account of “generic globalization as modernity”, his conception of a type of generic globalisation fails to take into account other – often more effective – ways in which globalisation is happening. ⁴⁰

This raises interesting issues around whether ‘globalisation’ should be used in a normative sense. Certainly, globalisation is often seen as an inherently positive process: as writers such as Smith have noted, globalisation is often seen as inherently progressive and as tied to particular enlightenment values. ⁴¹ Globalisation does hold a certain promise: “When done right and in a sustained manner, globalization has a huge potential to lift large numbers of people out of poverty”. ⁴² However, many of the most successful participants in globalisation are deploying these processes in extremely problematic ways: ranging from groups such as Al Qaeda who have effectively globalised their violence, to the globalisation of the illegal opiate trade, to more ‘legitimate’ actors such as the pharmaceutical companies who have used WTO rules in order limit access to life-saving drugs. Globalisation can therefore be done ‘right’ in at least two ways: it can be done effectively, and it can be done in such a way as to bring genuine benefits to the people affected by these networks. When globalisation takes place ‘wrongly’ – in such a way as to have many negative effects, or largely negative effects – it is inaccurate to assume that this is due to an absence of connections or to insufficient globalisation. Instead, it can be due to an excess of certain types of connection and globalisation.

This raises problems for certain more normative definitions of globalisation. It appears clear that globalisation can ‘work’ – can take place, and have significant political effects – even if, through doing so, it has predominantly negative effects on the conditions in which people live. Even when fulfilling a number of the goals advanced by advocates of globalisation – for example, increases in global trade – such processes can impact in negative ways upon many human lives.

As will be discussed below, projects of globalisation can function in diverse ways – leading to unpredictable consequences. The networks of globalisation therefore exceed attempts to contain them in particular normative visions: while globalisation can lead to significant progress, it also has the capacity to do much more. The effects of these globalised networks can go well beyond those changes that might be associated with improved living conditions for an area's residents and, as will be discussed below, a certain unpredictability is associated with the use of networks.

AFGHANISTAN, AFRICAN STATES AND WESTERN STATES: GLOBALISATION AND DIS/CONNECTIVITY

As discussed above, there are multiple ways of thinking about globalisation. Just as globalisation itself is a contested concept, there have been a number of contestations of how these processes are represented in different parts of the world. There are parallels between Afghanistan and events in African states and with representations of the role of globalisation within such states. It will therefore be useful to reflect on some of these issues, in order to open up avenues to investigate during my analysis of events in Afghanistan.

Writing on representations of African states, Sidaway argues:

The western state, scripted as ‘strong’, ‘successful’ ‘real’ is opposed to the ‘weak’ southern state. In this, the western state is the taken for granted model, the norm. The western state is identical with itself a replica of nothing other than its own model statehood. The southern state by contrast is compared with the supposed reference point of a western prototype, albeit as an imperfect (weak) replication of that prototype. ⁴³

For example, in contrast to common misconceptions, Le Billon shows that the disorder in Angola arose not from a lack of connectivity or an absence of government, but the connection of government and other actors with a range of regional and international networks, in problematic ways. ⁴⁴ Likewise, Reyntjens shows that “economics has played a growing role in the war” in Congo, with this conflict incorporating impressively effective networks of drug and arms trafficking. ⁴⁵

The role of diamonds in the disorder in Zaire can – through the increasing monetisation of the society there – itself be viewed as a process entirely contiguous with capitalism today and as part of the (re)construction of the state. ⁴⁶ Moreover, various networks and a state of “permanent crisis” in the Gulf of Guinea have had significant impacts upon the international oil economy (albeit in ways which fail to benefit many of the region's inhabitants) and allowed states on the Gulf to enhance certain aspects of their functioning. ⁴⁷

Conflicts and ‘failed states’ in Africa are, thus, not failed attempts to emulate capitalism but a contiguous part of this system. It is therefore the case that, as Sidaway argues, rather than the states in question existing despite these networks:

This mixture of seen (for example, military, gems, alcohol, weapons, banknotes, documents, flags) and unseen (electronic capital transfers, debts and surpluses in foreign bank accounts, cosmologies) powers enfold and (re)produce these states. ⁴⁸

There are clear parallels here with conceptions of Afghanistan as failed and disconnected. While Afghanistan may be represented as a failed replication of Western models of activity and globalisation, the dazzling pace and – in many senses – success of ‘their’ globalisation means that such representations are misleading. For Sidaway,

African sovereignties should not be seen as some ‘exotic’ African anomalies. Instead they may sometimes reveal (albeit at times in a particularly stark form) how institutions and discourses of sovereign-power operate and how they relate to the complex inscription of hegemonies and powers. ⁴⁹

Moving away from the assumption of a Western norm can open up other ways of thinking about certain processes. Sidaway argues that African states “are configured not simply by an absence of connection, power and capital, but by a particular form and experience (conceivably a surplus) of these”. ⁵⁰ Analogously, it would be wrong to conceptualise Afghan networks as a failed representation of an external model. As will be argued below, the startlingly ‘successful’ networking and globalisation taking place there may point to other potential models and futures.

NETWORKED INSURGENCY AND AFGHAN INDEPENDENCE

In contrast to perceptions of Afghanistan as disconnected from globalisation, certain global networks have played a major role in Afghanistan's very existence. A brief history of some of these networks will help to illustrate their roles in Afghanistan and in the geopolitics of the region. While Afghanistan has been involved in various economic and political networks for some time (one might, for example, note that it has been part of international trade networks – initially for obsidian – for millennia ⁵¹ ) this article will focus on anti-Communist and subsequent networks in the state: they provide a clear illustration of the processes discussed.

There was a time when it seemed likely that Afghanistan would become part of the Soviet sphere of influence: certainly, when the Soviets intervened in the state, they significantly outgunned and outmanned their opponents. However, a relatively poorly resourced network of insurgents in Afghanistan was able to defeat hierarchical Soviet and Afghan government opponents. The networked structure of insurgent forces played an essential role in their ‘victory’.

Networks can play significant roles in conflict. Dombrowski et al argue that what makes networks especially interesting and useful is the way that

networks harness the power of geographically dispersed nodes…by linking them together into networks. … Networking has the potential to increase exponentially the capabilities of individual nodes or groups of nodes and [to facilitate] the efficient use of resources. … The loss of a network node need not be crippling: in a robust network its functions can and will be assumed by other nodes. ⁵²

Due to the relative robustness of decentralised networks and the potential of conflict to disrupt systems it has been found that “to create a logistic network capable of withstanding the pressures of war, computers and programs must be allowed to make their own decisions, instead of being regulated by a central executive organ”. ⁵³

There are pressures on the organisational structure of forces involved in conflict – for example, actors in conflict will frequently try to disrupt their opponents' organisation – which can provide impetus for the move to network structures. While the above discussion of networks may sound relatively technical, these networks are not purely machinic: instead, military assemblages will include human and non-human animals. ⁵⁴ As will be shown below, the efficacy and robustness of various networks that were and are constituted largely by human nodes has played significant roles in Afghanistan.

To emphasise the advantages that a network form gave to the anti-Soviet Afghan insurgents, I will start by considering the particularly scornful (albeit perhaps somewhat boastful) way in which the prominent Afghan insurgent leader Ahmad Massoud assessed the Soviet troops. This does give a sense of the problems that the Soviets faced, when fighting insurgent networks.

Massoud initially describes what he heard of the conflict from his colleagues in the insurgency: the enemy “are not such good fighters – they just made their column and they launched their offensive, and from behind, we started our firing”. ⁵⁵ When Massoud was fighting the Soviets, “We could one by one to take under our target [sic] (pick them out one by one)”. ⁵⁶ The structures and tactics of the insurgents allowed them to view one of the most powerful conventional armies in the world as a set of targets to be picked off. Massoud successfully took advantage of the failure of the Soviets to keep pace with the insurgents: “The Russian tactics changed very slowly…and when they changed their tactics, we also changed our tactics”. ⁵⁷

These quotes give a sense of (as will be analysed in more detail below) how effectively insurgent groups were able to outfight their opponents. This is the type of approach that Arquilla and Ronfeldt have analysed in their account of the efficacy of networks in conflict (in particular, what they refer to as netwar conflict). For Arquilla and Ronfeldt, “Netwar refers to conflicts in which a combatant is organised along network lines or employs networks for operational control and other communications”. ⁵⁸ They argue that “during the course of a netwar offensive, network forces will…be able to manoeuvre well within the decision-making cycle of more hierarchical opponents”. ⁵⁹

This was very much the case in Afghanistan: the insurgents there were able to respond to changes in Soviet and government tactics extremely quickly and could therefore determine the context in which fighting took place, outpacing their opponents. Although the strength of Soviet forces meant that the insurgents would not succeed in a ‘head on’ confrontation, they were thus able to ensure that most confrontations took place in more favourable circumstances.

An important element of such networked conflict is the manipulation of knowledge of the situation in which combat takes place. Netwar can be used to ensure that one side remains nearly blind while the other more intensely or effectively networked side has a much better awareness of the battlespace. ⁶⁰

In the context of Afghanistan, this allowed insurgent networks to ensure that – most of the time – Soviet and Afghan government forces were not able to learn where they were. ⁶¹ The insurgents could thus avoid direct confrontations, and launch effective and unexpected attacks on ‘enemy’ forces. ⁶² The resistance were so hard to ‘see’ that “during the 1980s, Soviet conscripts besieged by CIA-supplied Afghan rebels called them dukhi, or ghosts”. ⁶³

The Soviet and Afghan government militaries had significant problems with analysing and dealing with this type of netwar or ‘ghost war’: most strikingly, Afghan President and Commander Babrak Karmal chose to blame only the US for the “hullabaloo” following the coup through which he became President. ⁶⁴ Soviet and Afghan government forces were left facing opponents who could blend perfectly into the background of Afghan society until needed and then became visible momentarily – if at all – only to later fade away until needed again. ⁶⁵ For example, insurgents took advantage of the terrain in rural Afghanistan in order to stay hidden while large bodies of Soviet troops passed; they then attacked softer targets, such as the resupply columns needed by these troops. ⁶⁶

Afghan insurgents were able to maintain a much better sense of what government and Soviet forces were doing: the Afghan resistance did make a considerable effort to gather information about its enemies. ⁶⁷ As Massoud puts it, describing how the Mujahedin were able to gain information about and launch surprise attacks on Soviet troops: “From the informational point of view and from the tactical point of view, our troops did very well, and the Russians became like mad”. ⁶⁸

The complex connections that can be formed between different nodes in a network are part of the strength of network forms. However, as will be discussed below, this interconnectedness has broader implications: it can also work to intensify intra-network fighting after common objectives no longer hold a network together or to allow networks to develop and expand in unpredictable ways. ⁶⁹

AL QAEDA AND THE EFFICACY AND UNPREDICTABILITY OF NETWORKS

The removal of the Communist government of Afghanistan thus offers an example of the advantages of a networked form when dealing with a more hierarchical opponent. However, it is also an example of the unpredictability that is an inherent part of the efficacy of networks in conflict. Netwar works so well because it

tends to defy and cut across standard spatial boundaries, jurisdictions, and distinctions between state and society, public and private, war and crime, civilian and military, police and military, and legal and illegal. A netwar actor is likely to operate in the cracks and gray areas of the society. ⁷⁰

Hierarchical actors often find it hard to act in these grey areas. In Afghanistan, Soviet forces had great difficulty dealing with the way that the insurgents fought. However, while the US provided considerable support to these anti-Soviet fighters, it was subsequently unable to control the forces flowing from the anti-Communist Afghan insurgency.

This insurgency was hard to classify in that it was non-state (but heavily reliant on US and Saudi money and weapons and Pakistani/ISI support) and mingled civilian charities and schools with military resistance. ⁷¹ Bin Laden's own work in Afghanistan combined ‘humanitarian’ actions such as building schools, shelters for refugees and clinics with his more explicitly ‘military’ moves. ⁷² Maktab al-Khidmat had the use of money donated to Islamic charities. ⁷³ It used these funds for its humanitarian work, and diverted money and personnel from its charity work towards military ends. ⁷⁴ For example, Bin Laden states that he first came into contact with Wadih el-Hage (jailed in the US for his involvement in the 1998 embassy bombings) when “God was kind enough to steer [el-Hage] to the path of relief work for Afghan refugees”. ⁷⁵

The distinctly mixed structure of such networks means that their political action can spread in any number of directions. As John Urry puts it, the fluidity of these networks is key to their efficacy but also means that fluids “may escape, rather like white blood corpuscles, through the ‘wall’ into surrounding matter, effecting unpredictable consequences”. ⁷⁶ As Friedman describes, a situation was developing where “the global competitive playing field was being leveled. The world was being flattened”. ⁷⁷ Just as computer programmers, telesales workers, etc., have been able to escape from (some of) the bounds of the states they are working in, violent groups have also found opportunities to escape. ⁷⁸

This type of ‘escape’ was seen in the civil war in Afghanistan that followed the Soviet withdrawal, and in the ways in which these networks have continued to impact on other parts of the world. The development of Al Qaeda is a significant outcome of the anti-Communist Afghan insurgency.

Al Qaeda's flexible, changing shape means that Burke prefers to speak of a “loose ‘network of networks’” instead of an ‘Al Qaeda network’. ⁷⁹ As he argues, it is important not to be mislead by the term ‘Al Qaeda’ into reducing this network to a stable, conventionally organised group which can be dealt with as such. ⁸⁰ These points are well taken. However, I would still argue that it is appropriate – and useful – to refer to an ‘Al Qaeda network’.

Effective communication links can allow very different nodes and (sub)networks to work as part of what can still be called a network. Networks can therefore themselves be made up of networks of sub-networks, and an “overlay network” can serve to order numerous underlying networks. ⁸¹ As will be discussed below, Al Qaeda can serve to overlay multiple different networks, in order for them to function as if – and appear to be – a single network. For example, various agents and attacks can be made to function as if part of Al Qaeda even if they might – at least initially – appear to be part of other networks.

In John Mackinlay's terms, Al Qaeda have thus been able to retain an “apparent coherence” as a network. ⁸² Al Qaeda has been able to maintain the impression that they are a network that can, for example, have particular goals or seek the support of particular individuals. What is significant here is that Al Qaeda are able to maintain the appearance of coherence: even if Al Qaeda is made up of various networks of networks, they are able to function as if such a thing as an Al Qaeda network exists.

Al Qaeda's network can be overlaid onto other networks of networks, assuming that these networks follow certain norms. One example of this can be found in the way that Al Qaeda's European network incorporated Zacharias Moussaoui (now sentenced to life in prison for his involvement in the 9/11 attacks). ⁸³ Moussaoui's entry into Al Qaeda's network came, not through direct membership, but through his involvement in the networks of North African and British Islamists. Notably, Moussaoui had links to the Algerian Armed Islamic Group (GIA) and Finsbury Park Mosque; these contributed to his radicalisation and to his making the appropriate contacts. ⁸⁴

Al Qaeda's network was thus able to overlay these other networks, in order to incorporate a useful member of other networks into an Al Qaeda attack. Likewise, Bin Laden's network was able to overlay some of the networks of insurgents in Afghanistan: this overlay network was what later developed into Al Qaeda.

Such an overlay network can serve to give a degree of organisation to numerous different movements. An array of different forces working in different directions can thus be conceptualised as an organisation that some might choose to support or oppose and which can work together as if they are a united group. The Al Qaeda network may be constructed through networks of networks. However, it is nonetheless able to function as a network through overlaying these other networks and the actors in them.

While Burke's point regarding the risks of reducing Al Qaeda to a single coherent network remains an important warning, one should also move beyond Burke to ask some different questions. The issue is not simply whether there is a single, stable Al Qaeda network that is really present. Instead, one important aspect of Al Qaeda's efficacy is the way in which it can construct an apparent coherence out of diffuse and diverse networks of networks: overlaying other networks in order to incorporate them into its work. The question is not just whether there is a stable, coherent Al Qaeda network in existence (Burke is correct to argue that there is not) but also how an apparent coherence can be constructed.

Through using this networked approach Al Qaeda was able, on 11 September 2001, to demonstrate that “no state, not even a superpower, has impermeable borders…or enjoys anything even remotely like a ‘sovereign’ monopoly of the means of coercion at home”. ⁸⁵ Conventional state military technologies and programmes are not sufficient for an effective response to such threats. ⁸⁶ Networks (and networks of networks) such as Al Qaeda can pose a challenge to the functioning of territorial states and ‘conventional’ militaries: for example, they challenge attempts to maintain the sense that the state can protect those ‘inside’ its borders from threats which lie ‘outside’.

NETWORKS’ CHALLENGE TO TERRITORIAL DISCOURSES

This type of network raises distinct problems with the functioning and capacities of territorial states. However, interactions between networks and territories are more complex than might initially appear to be the case and it will therefore be worth looking at these issues in more detail below. This section will analyse some of Al Qaeda's explicit challenges to territorial states; the following section will analyse the more complex ways in which network-territory interactions take place.

Non-state and criminal networks have interacted with states in diverse and problematic ways, for some time. For example, van Creveld describes how the development of communication networks allowed increased cross-border traffic and worked to place certain limitations on the extent to which states could act effectively. ⁸⁷ Strange analyses how the Italian mafia acts as “a rival, or counter-authority, to the state”. ⁸⁸ For Strange, “Cosa Nostra…engages in activities declared criminal and illegal by the government of the state, but at the same time imitates in mirror fashion, many of the characteristics of formal state government”. ⁸⁹ Strange notes that organised crime networks have gone global and interact with states in complex ways. ⁹⁰

Along similar lines, there are complex interactions between Al Qaeda and states. States and territories clearly do feature in Bin Laden's discourse – for example, he does refer to states such as Afghanistan and Bosnia. ⁹¹ While often referring to Americans as part of a “Zionist-Crusaders alliance”, Bin Laden does of course also refer to Americans and to the USA. ⁹² However, for Bin Laden such states play a somewhat secondary role. Instead, the Ummah is central both in the way it suffers the iniquities “imposed…by the Zionist-Crusader alliance” and the way that it constitutes a body to “prepare and instigate against the enemy”. ⁹³ There is a “duty…to motivate our umma to jihad for the sake of God against America and Israel and their allies”. ⁹⁴

What differentiates Al Qaeda from (many) preceding networks, though, is the sheer scope of their ambition and the efficacy with which they action these ambitions: these ambitions significantly exceed, rather than simply mirror, some aspects of state politics and violence. Bin Laden's 1998 Fatwah makes clear how broad their goals are: it provides a wider survey of the alleged crimes of Americans and Zionists, and calls “on every Muslim who believes in God and wishes to be rewarded to comply with God's order to kill the Americans and plunder their money wherever and whenever they find it”. ⁹⁵ Perceived wrongs to the Ummah perpetrated by America and Americans thus lead Bin Laden to advocate violence that goes beyond what one would see in ‘conventional’ wars.

For Bin Laden, “When it becomes apparent that it would be impossible to repel these Americans without assaulting them, even if this involved [sic] the killing of Muslims, this is permissible under Islam”. ⁹⁶ God is therefore thought to have given “permission…to kill the Americans and seize their money wherever and whenever they find them”. ⁹⁷

This violence is therefore unpredictable in that it is almost literally boundless: Bin Laden argues that non-Muslim Americans and if necessary Muslims (or, presumably, any other Americans) can be killed anywhere. This violence – in theory, if not always in practice – thus exceeds any concept of bounded states and bounded space. After the events of September 11, Bin Laden further emphasised the broadness of this violence: “This battle is not between al Qaeda and the U.S. This is a battle of Muslims against the global crusaders”. ⁹⁸

Al Qaeda's discourses and violence resonate with ideas of a flattening world. Friedman argues that Globalization 3.0 is making the world tiny, driven by “the aforementioned power for individuals to collaborate and compete globally”. ⁹⁹ There is a “flat world platform” that allows actors to “go global”. ¹⁰⁰ This opens up possibilities for a whole range of actors.

To take advantage of this flattening, Al Qaeda has adopted the structure of a “spaghetti organisation”. ¹⁰¹ There is a “loose network of committed, lifelong terrorists…what they receive from Bin Laden and associates is less specific orders and training than a clear, simple ideology, which they are expected to go out into the world and put into practice on their own”. ¹⁰² A certain flattening of the world does not ‘just’ allow a programmer in India to write code for a US company or a South African doctor to practice in Britain: it also allows Al Qaeda's network to spread their ideas and ideology through the world. A flat/tening world platform can allow the growth and spread of all kinds of spaghetti organisations: from the entirely benevolent to the terrorist.

This violence crosses state borders, and is linked to a discourse that challenges the normative value attributed to such borders. ¹⁰³ In a direct challenge to the normative status of these borders, Al Qaeda offers a boundless violence that is tied to – and draws upon – a very different set of norms.

Al Qaeda's discourse is thus a challenge to (certain conceptions of) the state. In particular, one might note Michael Mann's move from Weber's work. Mann argues that that a key element of statehood is that “only the state is inherently centralized over a delimited territory over which it has authoritative power”. ¹⁰⁴ For Mann, a state needs to be able to “regulate, normatively and by force, a given set of social and territorial relations, and to erect boundaries against the outside”. ¹⁰⁵ Al Qaeda explicitly challenges this authoritative power and normative regulation through laying out alternative representational frameworks. It is therefore the case that, as Cerny argues, with globalisation, in “the most fundamental traditional concerns of states, those of defense and security, the state is being challenged”. ¹⁰⁶ However, while challenging certain aspects of the functioning of states, Al Qaeda is also prepared to interact with and overlay territorial states in complex ways.

AL QAEDA, NETWORKS AND TERRITORY

In part as a challenge to various common ideas of globalisation and networks, Painter advocates a move beyond any network-territory dichotomy: network and territory discourses should be conceptualised as different aspects of the same reality. ¹⁰⁷ While Al Qaeda's discourse may challenge certain territorial discourses, it is not incompatible with territorial discourses. Instead, Al Qaeda's network discourse can be read as an overlay network: a network that overlays territorial discourses, and functions across and over such discourse.

To echo Ó Tuathail's arguments regarding post–Cold War geopolitics, what we are seeing today is still not a move away from territory – not a ‘pure’ deterritorialisation – but a changing way of giving “people, territory and politics their meaning in the contemporary world”. ¹⁰⁸ Interactions between networks and territories are complex and it is not simply a case on one replacing the other. In Smith's terms, “Power is never deterritorialized; it is always specific to particular places. Reterritorialization counters deterritorialization at every turn”. ¹⁰⁹

The prominent role of networks therefore does not mean that there are no boundaries and no walls in the world today: even Friedman acknowledges that the world is not flat. ¹¹⁰ However, the different ways in which territory and boundaries are now given their meaning means that, for Friedman, “walls simply aren't what they used to be”. ¹¹¹

As discussed above, criticisms of states and calls for territorial changes clearly do play a part in Al Qaeda's discourse. Al Qaeda also utilises some of the opportunities made available by state discourses: by relatively sympathetic states such as Afghanistan and the Sudan, which can serve as bases; by the misguided policies of states such as the Soviet Union, which provide fuel for propaganda and the opportunity for military victories; and by states such as the US, Britain and Saudi Arabia, which assist these networks in order to achieve goals of their own.

One should therefore not ‘just’ focus on the problems that territorial and network discourses face in coexisting. Instead, networks can overlay territorial discourses in particular ways: networks can both draw on territorial discourses and play important roles in these discourses. This is especially clear in the case of post-Communist Afghan government, as will be discussed below.

POST-COMMUNIST AFGHANISTAN: NETWORKS, GOVERNMENT AND FAILURE

A number of networks have played a major role in Afghanistan's post-Communist governments. After the Mujahedin defeated the Communist government of Afghanistan, the rule of the state became divided between the groups of warlords who later became known as the Northern Alliance and a (more) fundamentalist government in Kabul. ¹¹² Afghanistan's functioning has thus depended upon various networks, at least since the removal of its Communist government.

The Taliban was formed in 1994 – led by Mullah Omar – in part to challenge the chaos created by a number of local warlords. ¹¹³ The Taliban won support and funding from the Pakistani government and Pakistani businesses. Growing out of the anti-Communist Afghan insurgency, the Taliban were a network from the beginning: a loose grouping of fighters, whose initial key success was to allow particular types of movement into and through Afghanistan. ¹¹⁴ With Pakistani backing, the Taliban achieved a number of military successes. ¹¹⁵ In September 1996 the Taliban captured Kabul and were able to form a de facto Afghan government. ¹¹⁶

The Taliban regime functioned along distinctly networked lines. The boundaries between who was in and who was fighting against the regime were extremely porous. For example, Hekmatyar's Hizb-e Islami faction fought against the Taliban and with the Northern Alliance, but also shared some aspects of the Taliban's ideology and assisted the Taliban's military campaign against some of Hizb-e Islami's supposed allies. ¹¹⁷ The Taliban government's military efforts were also assisted by Bin Laden's networks: he was able to offer both logistical support (such as trucks for transport) and Al Qaeda troops to fight alongside the Taliban. ¹¹⁸

Even when in government, the structure of the Taliban thus remained extremely decentralised: there was a failure to establish ‘conventional’ state structures and control. The Taliban depended upon a network of supporters including not just those fighting for and/or working for the Taliban, but also Pashtun tribal elders, foreign fighters and workers who assisted the Taliban while they were in Afghanistan, and foreign donors of money and weapons. ¹¹⁹

Afghanistan was a particularly suitable place for Bin Laden to make his base in. In Afghanistan, it was not so much a case of the Al Qaeda network needing to operate in the grey areas in and around states, but Afghanistan itself already being a hospitable networked space. It is thus the case that, as Painter argues, we should move beyond the network-territory dichotomy in order to consider the interactions between territories and networks. ¹²⁰ Afghanistan under the Taliban can be interpreted as one example of how a networked territory and government might function or fail to function, and blend into and be overlaid by other networks.

During and after the removal of the Taliban, networks also played a key role in Afghan government. In order to limit the US-led commitment of ground troops, Operation Enduring Freedom relied largely on Northern Alliance forces on the ground: it therefore depended on a loose network of warlords. The post-Taliban government in Afghanistan has never been able to exert central control over the country and it is therefore the case that, by necessity, much of the government of Afghanistan remains in the hands of networks of warlords or local leaders. Warlords retain considerable autonomy in areas such as law enforcement and taxation; they have also been taken into Karzai's cabinet, apparently to prevent violent dissent. ¹²¹ Afghanistan thus remains very much networked: ruled by networks of ‘local leaders’ rather than a ‘conventional’ government.

There are also clear issues with insurgent networks in Afghanistan today: both Al Qaeda and the Taliban remain active. Government and international forces in Afghanistan have, to date, proved unable to deal effectively with these networks. While there is not space here for a detailed analysis of the current Afghan insurgency or the prospects of the Afghan troop surge, I would argue that networks are very likely to continue to play key roles in Afghanistan for the foreseeable future: the efficacy of such modes of organisation has the potential to prevent any more ‘conventional’ government from gaining a long-term foothold.

For Weber, “The state is that human community which (successfully) lays claim to the monopoly of legitimate physical violence within a certain territory”. ¹²² However, as shown above, the Taliban never had a monopoly of legitimate physical violence (a number of organisations – including Al Qaeda and the different groups making up the Northern Alliance – were also able to exert ‘legitimate’ force). The current Afghan government also lacks this monopoly of the legitimate use of violence. It is therefore the case that – while Afghanistan has often been treated as if it were or should be a ‘conventional’ Weberian state – the Taliban and the Karzai government have never been able to govern Afghanistan in such a ‘conventional’ way. As Gregory puts it, there was therefore – rather than the presence of any pre-existing Weberian state in Afghanistan – “a performance of sovereignty through which the ruptured space of Afghanistan could be simulated as a coherent state”. ¹²³

Despite these performances, Afghanistan fails to meet a number of the criteria usually applied to statehood: for example, as noted above, no recent Afghan government has been able to maintain a monopoly of legitimate force. Following Gregory's account of the simulation of an Afghan state and Mackinlay's aforementioned work on apparent coherence, what may be significant in future is the extent to which is it possible to simulate an apparent coherence for the Afghan government, territory and state.

THE OPIATE TRADE AND AFGHAN DIS/CONNECTEDNESS

The important roles played by Afghan networks – and the limitations to the powers of the current Afghan government and to the ways in which states can deal with networks – are especially clear with regards to the opiate trade. ¹²⁴ It will therefore be useful to use this trade as a final focus for the article's case study. After the Taliban were removed, Afghan opium yield was multiplied by about 9–14 times. ¹²⁵ While the Afghan government is under pressure to reduce the cultivation of this illegal crop, its coercive power is limited. There are significant problems involved in dealing with an illegal opium economy which grew to such an extent that, in 2004, it reached an estimated 60% of the size of Afghanistan's licit 2003 Gross Domestic Product. ¹²⁶

The globalised networks of the opiate trade constitute a significant – and, at the moment, perhaps indispensable – part of Afghanistan's economy. This situation is widely seen as negative, as calling for ‘development’ and globalisation. ¹²⁷ The Obama administration seeks agricultural “redevelopment” in Afghanistan in order to “sap the insurgency of fighters and of income from poppy cultivation”. ¹²⁸ However, one should actually read the booming opiate trade in precisely the opposite way: Afghan networks are engaging extremely effectively with globalisation, albeit in problematic ways.

In Afghanistan, many economic activities – for example, much agriculture and trade – take place without effective state interference. The Afghanistan and Pakistan Reconstruction Opportunity Zones Act of 2009 emphasises “duty-free treatment for certain articles” as an aid to Afghan development. ¹²⁹ However, one might note Afghanistan's largest export commodity is already bought and sold duty-free due to its illegal status. The export of a cash crop plays a key role in the Afghan economy and businesses trading in this crop are very influential in the way that Afghanistan is governed. ¹³⁰

The Structural Adjustment Participatory Review International Network (SAPRIN) advocates trade liberalisation as a means to “achievement of efficiency in the traded-goods sector…and encouragement of growth and diversification of non-traditional exports”. ¹³¹ The opiate industry in Afghanistan has been extremely successful in achieving these goals – especially after the removal of the Taliban government and the resulting liberalisation of Afghanistan's economy. The drugs trade has led to some interesting economic development in Afghanistan: for example, “Agricultural wages in Afghanistan were higher than those for Pakistan…or India…reflecting strong competition for labor from the drug sector”. ¹³²

Afghanistan's networks of warlords and of the opiate trade offer an example of how the “free markets and collective security schemes” that Barnett and others view as key to globalisation can work effectively (achieving, for example, considerable growth in international trade). ¹³³ Large amounts of this cash crop can spread throughout the world largely without (effective) government regulation or interference, offering a compelling example of the power of ‘free’ trade in a flattening world.

In many ways, as a participant in the globalised world Afghanistan puts more ‘conventional’ states such as the UK and US to shame. When describing the US the 9/11 Commission stated that “to us, Afghanistan seemed very far away. To members of al Qaeda, America seemed very close. In a sense, they were more globalized than we were”. ¹³⁴ ‘They’ – using the term in a broader sense, incorporating the citizens of the grey areas of the world – still are more globalised than the US.

As discussed above, there are strong echoes of representations of African states in representations of Afghanistan. Afghanistan's sovereignty is often described in terms of a lack of connectivity and this is often held to be key to the problems in the state. However, in both the African states discussed and in Afghanistan, this sovereignty is configured not by an absence of connections but by an excess of them.

Writing about hawala finance, De Goede notes that “what hawala is vilified for (speed, trust, paperlessness, global reach, fluidity) are precisely the attributes that modern globalising investment banking aspires to”. ¹³⁵ Like hawala finance, the global trade in illegal drugs – while often represented as ‘underground’ or as somehow opposed to ‘legitimate’ globalisation – has achieved a number of the attributes viewed as benefits of globalisation.

The booming Afghan opiate industry offers an excellent example of a trade with many of the attributes attributed to globalisation. The opiate trade is constituted by a wide range of connections that allow products and funds to be moved across the world – passing over national borders with relative ease – and there is not effective state regulation of production or sale. This trade often offers excellent examples of “speed, trust, paperlessness, global reach, fluidity”. ¹³⁶

While ‘conventional’ states may rein in some of the processes of globalisation – for example, restricting the trade in certain substances – it is thus the citizens of the grey areas of the world and the traders in ‘black markets’ who are already living in a more globalised world. Where Barnett discusses the drug trade and insurgent networks, these are viewed as a matter of “parasites” on ‘mainstream’ globalisation. ¹³⁷ However, I would instead emphasise ‘they’ – those living and working in the grey areas of the world – are able to use networked and netwar techniques to great effect, successfully forming and using a number of global and globalising connections. Globalisation is not a problem for such networks; rather, the states that are fighting against such actors are struggling to keep up with the pace of ‘their’ globalisation.

CONCLUSIONS: AFGHANISTAN, NETWORKS AND GLOBALISATION

This article has shown the essential role that networks have played in Afghanistan, over several decades. Far from Afghanistan being somehow excluded from the connectivity of globalisation, Afghan networks have been very effective participants in these processes – as have groups based in and developing out of Afghanistan. While theorists such as Barnett might view disconnectedness as the source of threats to the US today, the article has emphasised the potential of Afghanistan's networked, globalised flows and the unpredictability inherent in such networks.

The article has demonstrated that there is a need to move beyond any network-territory dichotomy. In contrast to such dichotomies, Afghanistan offers an example of how networks can play a significant – even constitutive – role in the functioning or simulation of certain types of territory. This is likely to continue in Afghanistan for the foreseeable future and it may also ensure that international forces are unable to stabilise Afghanistan into a ‘conventional’ territory or a ‘conventional’ state.

Analysing a particular US-led version of globalisation, Smith argues that

globalization is a project not an inevitability, and the Iraq war should be seen as part of an intended endgame for a globalization project that again rehearses these earlier US ambitions and would bring them to fruition. ¹³⁸

While much of Smith's analysis is compelling, I would develop this somewhat in the case of Afghanistan. While globalisation is a significant project, this project (even as described in the work of enthusiastic neoliberal writers such as Barnett) is not necessarily compatible with the US ambitions outlined by Smith. While Smith refers to failures in Iraq as part of “a global American imperialism [that] looks set to fail”, what is currently taking place in and emerging from Afghanistan could go well beyond any failing American imperialism. ¹³⁹

This projection – this throwing forwards – of globalisation will tend to ‘land’ in unexpected places, will tend to exceed the ambitions of those seeking a straightforwardly pro-US version of globalisation. Moreover, the forms of organisation currently in play in Afghanistan mean that – in the projection or throwing forwards of globalisation – it is no longer at all clear who is doing the throwing: instead of globalisation being US-led, a certain kind of project of globalisation may be an emergent property of the networks currently active in Afghanistan and elsewhere. Given the efficacy of such networks it could well – once again – be the case that networks flowing from, within, over and through Afghanistan are able to defeat a superpower.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Thanks are due to David Campbell, Michael Dillon, Stuart Elden and Steve Graham for their insightful comments on the PhD thesis from which this article was drawn, to Nick Megoran and James Sidaway for their invaluable feedback on a draft of this article, to three anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments and to Dundee, Durham, and Newcastle Universities for providing positive environments in which to do this research. I am also grateful to all those who offered helpful feedback on the versions of the article presented at the 2007 RGS-IBG and BISA conferences. Much of the research on which the article is based was made possible by ESRC funding.

Notes

1. T. L. Friedman The World is Flat: The Globalized World in the Twenty-First Century, Updated and expanded (London: Penguin 2007) p. 10.

2. T. H. Kean, L. H. Hamilton, R. Ben-Veniste, F. F. Fielding, J. S. Gorelick, S. Gorton, B. Kerrey, J. F. Lehman, T. J. Roemer, and J. R. Thompson, ‘9-11 Commission Report’, National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (2004), available at <http://www.9-11commission.gov/report/911Report.pdf>, accessed 24 Feb. 2005, p. 340.

3. The White House, ‘Fact Sheet: The Way Forward in Afghanistan’ (December 2009), available at <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/way-forward-afghanistan>, accessed 23 Dec. 2009.

4. N. Klein, The Shock Doctrine: The Rise of Disaster Capitalism (London, New York and Ontario: Penguin 2007) pp. 424–425.

5. B. Gills ‘Empire Versus Cosmopolis’, in B. Gills (ed.), The Global Politics of Globalization: ‘Empire’ vs ‘Cosmopolis’ (London: Routledge 2008) p. 5.

6. Ibid.

7. P. Cerny, Globalisation, Governance and Complexity (Leeds: University of Leeds Centre for Industrial Policy and Performance 1998) p. 1; P. Cerny, G. Menz and S. Soederberg ‘Different Roads to Globalization: Neoliberalism, the Competition State, and Politics in a More Open World’, in P. Cerny, G. Menz and S. Soederberg (eds.), Internalizing Globalization: The Rise of Neoliberalism and the Decline of National Varieties of Capitalism (Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave Macmillan 2005) p. 1.

8. B. Gills and W. Thompson, ‘Globalizations, Global Histories and Historical Globalities’, in B. Gills and W. Thompson (eds.), Globalization and Global History (London: Routledge 2006) p. 3.

9. R. Falk, Predatory Globalization: A Critique (Cambridge: Polity Press 1999) p. iix.

10. Cerny, Globalisation, Governance and Complexity (note 7) p. 1.

11. B. Nayar, The Geopolitics of Globalization: The Consequences for Development (New Delhi: Oxford University Press 2007) pp. 1–4.

12. Falk (note 9) p. 2.

13. Nayar (note 11) p. 5.

14. Ibid.

15. P. Hirst and D. Thompson, Globalization in Question (Cambridge: Polity Press 1999) pp. 2–3.

16. Nayar (note 11) p. 15.

17. R. Gilpin The Challenge of Global Capitalism (Princeton: Princeton University Press 2000) p. 20.

18. Nayar (note 11) pp. 47–48.

19. N. Smith, The Endgame of Globalization (New York: Routledge 2005) p. 52.

20. Ibid., p. 51–52

21. T. Barnett, The Pentagon's New Map: War and Peace in the Twenty-first Century (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons 2004). While I disagree with many of Barnett's political positions – I will explicitly challenge a number of his arguments in the paper, and I support political action that very much differs from what Barnett would want – I have found his work interesting, provocative and often productive. Barnett's work has also been influential in military and policy circles (see G. Jaffe, ‘At The Pentagon, Quirky PowerPoint Carries Big Punch’, The Wall Street Journal, 11 May 2004, available at <http://web.archive.org/web/20080506115711/http://www.thomaspmbarnett.com/published/wsj.htm>, accessed 5 October 2010). It therefore does merit serious discussion in the paper.

22. Barnett, The Pentagon's New Map (note 21) p. 8.

23. Ibid., p. 4.

24. Ibid., p. 121.

25. Ibid., p. 2.

26. Ibid., pp. 121–122.

27. Ibid., pp. 121–122.

28. Ibid., p. 123.

29. S. Dalby, ‘Imperialism, Domination, Culture: The Continued Relevance of Critical Geopolitics’, Geopolitics 13/3 (2008) p. 428.

30. Barnett, The Pentagon's New Map (note 21) p. 8.

31. T. Barnett, ‘The Pentagon's New Map’, Esquire March 2003, available at <http://web.archive.org/web/20080517191229/www.thomaspmbarnett.com/published/pentagonsnewmap.htm>, accessed 5 October 2010.

32. Barnett, The Pentagon's New Map (note 21) p. 83.

33. J. Arquilla and D. F. Ronfeldt, The Advent of Netwar (Santa Monica: RAND 1996) pp. 20–21.

34. Barnett, The Pentagon's New Map (note 21) p. 123.

35. Ibid., p. 351.

36. Ibid., pp. 125–127.

37. Ibid., p. 127.

38. S. Dalby, ‘Regions, Strategies and Empire in the Global War on Terror’, Geopolitics 12/4 (2007) p. 595.

39. Ibid., p. 597.

40. S. Roberts, A. Secor, and M. Sparke, ‘Neoliberal Geopolitics’, Antipode 35/5 (2003) p. 892.

41. Smith, The Endgame of Globalization (note 19) pp. 28–32.

42. Friedman (note 1) p. 437.

43. J. D. Sidaway, ‘Sovereign Excesses? Portraying Postcolonial Sovereigntyscapes’, Political Geography 22/2 (2003) p. 166.

44. P. le Billon, ‘Angola's Political Economy of War: The Role of Oil and Diamonds, 1975–2000’, African Affairs 100 (2001) p. 165; Sidaway (note 43) p. 166.

45. F. Reyntjens, ‘Briefing: the Democratic Republic of Congo, from Kabila to Kabila’, African Affairs 100 (2001) pp. 311–312.

46. F. De Boeck, ‘Domesticating Diamonds and Dollars: Identity, Expenditure and Sharing in Southwestern Zaire (1984–1997)', Development and Change 29/4 (1998) pp. 782–801.

47. R. S. de Oliveira, Oil and Politics in the Gulf of Guinea (London: Hurst & Co., 2007) pp. 3–4, 8–9, 308–320.

48. Sidaway (note 43) p. 170.

49. Ibid., p. 174.

50. Sidaway (note 43) p. 160.

51. A. Frank and W. Thompson, ‘Early Iron Age Economic Expansion and Contraction Revisited’, in B. Gills and W. Thompson (eds.), Globalization and Global History (London: Routledge 2006) p. 148.

52. P. J. Dombrowski, E. Gholz, and A. L. Ross, Military Transformation and the Defense Industry after Next (Newport: Naval War College 2003) p. 6.

53. M. De Landa, War in the Age of Intelligent Machines (New York: Zone Books 1991) p. 108.

54. Ibid., pp. 3–4.

55. A. Massoud, ‘Massoud: U.S. Forgot Its ‘Moral Responsibility’ in Afghanistan’, CNN.com, 2001, available at <http://www.cnn.com/SPECIALS/2001/trade.center/massoud.html>, accessed 24 March 2006.

56. Ibid.

57. Ibid.

58. Arquilla and Ronfeldt (note 33) p. vii.

59. Ibid., p. 11.

60. Ibid., p. 107.

61. S. Coll, Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan and Bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001 (New York: Penguin 2004) p. 116.

62. Ibid., p. 116; W. J. Boyne, ‘Moscow's Fatal Military Adventure’, Air Force Magazine, 2004, available at <http://web.archive.org/web/20041211043918/http://www.afa.org/magazine/dec2004/1204soviets.asp>, accessed 5 October 2010.

63. Coll (note 61) p. 17.

64. M. Binyon, ‘Mr Karmal Gives Promise of New Constitution Soon and Attacks US-Inspired ‘Hullabaloo’ Over Coup’, The Times, 5 Jan. 1980, p. 4.

65. Coll (note 61) p. 17.

66. Boyne (note 62).

67. Coll (note 61) pp. 116–117; Massoud (note 55).

68. Massoud (note 55).

69. Dombrowski et al. (note 52) p. 6.

70. Arquilla and Ronfeldt (note 33) p. 13.

71. Coll (note 61) pp. 61--63, 83.

72. R. Jacquard, In the Name of Osama Bin Laden: Global Terrorism and the Bin Laden Brotherhood, trans. by G. Holoch (Durham: Duke University Press 2002) p. 22.

73. Maktab al-Khidmat – literally the “Office of Services” – was a logistical organisation dealing with foreign volunteers who came to join the Afghan insurgency or do other (for example humanitarian) work with the Afghans (O. Bin Laden, ‘Exclusive Interview: Conversation with Terror. Osama bin Laden lashes out against the West: TIME's January 1999 interview’, Time Magazine, 11 January 1999, available at <http://www.time.com/time/asia/news/printout/0,9788,174550,00.html>, accessed 12 Nov. 2005; J. Burke, Al Qaeda: The True Story of Radical Islam (London: Penguin 2004) pp. 3, 73). Although the organisation was founded by Abdallah Azzam, Bin Laden came to play an extremely prominent role (ibid., pp. 72–75).

74. R. Gunaratna, Inside Al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror (London: C. Hurst 2003) p. 5.

75. Bin Laden, ‘Exclusive Interview’ (note 73).

76. J. Urry, ‘The Global Complexities of September 11th’, Theory Culture Society 19/4 (2002) p. 65.

77. Friedman (note 1) p. 8.

78. Ibid.

79. J. Burke, Al-Qaeda: Casting a Shadow of Terror (London and New York: I.B. Tauris 2003) p. 16.

80. Ibid., pp. 11–12.

81. B. Kahin, ‘Thinking about Information Infrastructure’, in Schwartzstein (ed.), The Information Revolution and National Security: Dimensions and Directions (Washington, DC: The Center for Strategic and International Studies 1996) pp. 10–11.

82. J. Mackinlay, Defeating Complex Insurgencies (London: Royal United Services Institute 2005) pp. 31–32.

83. J. Corbin, Al Qaeda: The Terror Network that Threatens the World (New York: Thunder Mouth Press/Nation Books 2002) pp. 191–194.

84. K. Barling, ‘The Legacy of Finsbury Park Mosque’, BBC News, 9 May 2006, available at <http://www.bbc.co.uk/london/content/articles/2006/05/09/kurt_finsbury_mosque_legacy_feature.shtml>, accessed 16 July 2006; Corbin (note 83) pp. 193–194; T. McKenna and A. Moussaoui, ‘The Recruiters’, ‘CBC News’, CBC News, 16 March 2004, available at <http://web.archive.org/web/20040607064912/http://www.cbc.ca/national/news/recruiters/abdsamad_interview.html>, accessed 5 October 2010.

85. R. W. Mansbach, ‘The Meaning of 11 September and the Emerging Postinternational World,’ in S. Brunn (ed.), 11 September and its Aftermath: The Geopolitics of Terror (London: Frank Cass 2004) p. 20.

86. See M. van Creveld, The Changing Face of War: Combat from the Marine to Iraq (New York: Presidio Press) p. 258.

87. M. Van Creveld, The Rise and Decline of the State (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1999) pp. 378–380, 393–394.

88. S. Strange, The Retreat of the State: The Diffusion of Power in the World Economy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1996) p. 93.

89. Ibid., p. 110.

90. Ibid., pp. 111–117. One might also note Cerny's work on the way in which international financial networks constrain states: for example P. Cerny, ‘The Political Economy of International Finance’, in P. Cerny (ed.) Finance and World Politics: Markets, Regimes and States in the Post-Hegemonic Era (Aldershot: Edward Elgar 1993) pp. 10–11.

91. O. Bin Laden, ‘Declaration of War Against the Americans Occupying the Land of the Two Holy Places’, in Alexander and Swetnam (eds.), Usama bin Laden's al-Qaida: Profile of a Terrorist Network (Ardsley: Transnational Publishers 2001) pp. 14, 19.

92. O. Bin Laden, ‘Text: Osama bin Laden's 1998 interview’, The Guardian, 1998, available at <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2001/oct/08/afghanistan.terrorism15/>, accessed 5 October 2010; Bin Laden, ‘Exclusive Interview’ (note 73); Bin Laden, ‘Declaration of War’ (note 91) pp. 1, 14, 19.

93. Bin Laden, ‘Declaration of War’ (note 91) pp. 2, 8.

94. O. Bin Laden, Messages to the World: The Statements of Osama Bin Laden ed. by B. Lawrence and trans. by J. Howarth (London: Verso 2005) p. 69.

95. O. Bin Laden, ‘Al Qaeda's Fatwa’, PBS, 23 February 1998, available at <http://www.pbs.org/newshour/terrorism/international/fatwa_1998.html>, accessed 17 Nov. 2005.

96. Bin Laden, ‘Exclusive Interview’ (note 73).

97. Bin Laden, Messages (note 94) p. 61.

98. O. Bin Laden and T. Alouni, ‘Transcript of Bin Laden's October Interview’, CNN.com, 5 February 2002, available at <http://archives.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/asiapcf/south/02/05/binladen.transcript/index.html>, accessed 6 Nov. 2006.

99. Friedman (note 1) p. 10.

100. Ibid.

101. J. Meek, ‘‘Spaghetti Organisation’’, Guardian Unlimited, 18 October 2001, available at <http://www.guardian.ac.uk/world/2001/oct/18/afghanistan.terrorism14>, accessed 4 October 2010.

102. Ibid.

103. See D. Campbell, Politics Without Principle: Sovereignty, Ethics, and the Narratives of the Gulf War (Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers 1993) p. 23.

104. M. Mann, ‘The Autonomous Power of the State: Its Origins, Mechanisms and Results’, in N. Brenner, B. Jessop, M. Jones, and G. MacLeod (eds.), State/Space: A Reader (Oxford: Blackwell 2003) p. 60.

105. Ibid., p. 62.

106. Cerny, Globalisation, Governance and Complexity (note 7) p. 3.

107. J. Painter, ‘Territoire et Réseau: Une Fausse Dichotomie?’, in M. Vanier (ed.), Territoires, Territorialité, Territorialisation: Controverses et Perspectives (Rennes: Presses Universitaires de Rennes 2009).

108. G. Ó Tuathail, ‘Borderless Worlds: Problematizing Discourses of Deterritorialization in Global Finance and Digital Culture’, Geopolitics 4/2 (1999) p. 143.

109. Smith, The Endgame of Globalization (note 19) p. 51.

110. Friedman (note 1) p. x.

111. Ibid., p. 506.

112. D. Hiro, War Without End: The Rise of Islamist Terrorism and Global Response (London and New York: Routledge 2002) pp. 233–237.

113. ‘Taliban’ is the plural term for ‘students’, and many of the Taliban were schooled in Pakistani Madrasas; in particular, many of their top leaders studied at the Madrasa Haqqaniya (B. D. Metcalf, ‘‘Traditionalist’ Islamic Activism: Deoband, Tablighis, and Talibs’, in C. Calhoun, P. Price, and A. Timmer (eds.), Understanding September 11 (New York: The New Press 2002) pp. 62–63).

114. Hiro (note 112) pp. 240–241.

115. Ibid., pp. 240–241.

116. Ibid., pp. 249–250.

117. Ibid., p. 263.

118. Ibid., pp. 257, 263.

119. J. Humphrys and F. Vendrell, ‘Interview: FRANCESC VENDRELL, Head of the UN Special Mission to Afghanistan’, BBC On The Record, 14 October 2001, available at <http://www.bbc.co.uk/otr/intext/20011014_int_1.html>, accessed 28 Jan. 2006.

120. Painter (note 107) p. 65--66.

121. G. W. K. Clark, Winning Modern Wars: Iraq, Terrorism, and the American Empire (New York: PublicAffairs 2003) p. 157.

122. M. Weber, ‘The Profession and Vocation of Politics’, in M. Lassman and R. Speirs (eds.), Weber: Political Writings, trans. by Speirs (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1994) pp. 310–311.

123. D. Gregory, The Colonial Present: Afghanistan, Palestine, Iraq (Oxford: Blackwell 2004) p. 50.

124. There are echoes here of some of Strange's work on how the recreational drug trade and money laundering cause certain problems for governments, although the paper will argue that things have gone rather further in the case of Afghanistan. See S. Strange, Mad Money (Manchester: Manchester University Press 1998) pp. 128–137.

125. C. Conetta, ‘Strange Victory: A Critical Appraisal of Operation Enduring Freedom and the Afghanistan War’, Project on Defense Alternatives (30 January 2002), available at <http://www.comw.org/pda/0201strangevic.html>, accessed 10 March 2003; A. Mukarji, Afghanistan: From Terror to Freedom (New Delhi: Sterling 2003) pp. 17–19.

126. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, ‘Afghanistan: Opium Survey’ (2004), available at <http://www.unodc.org/pdf/afg/afghanistan_opium_survey_2004.pdf>, accessed 7 May 2006, p. 4; Mukarji (note 125) p. 53.

127. The White House, ‘Fact Sheet: Assisting People of Afghanistan’ (28 January 2002), available at <http://web.archive.org/web/20080521100247/http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/01/20020128-9.html>, accessed 5 October 2010; T. Blair, ‘Foreign Policy Speech I’, 10 Downing Street Website, 21 March 2006, available at <http://web.archive.org/web/20060411042815/http://www.number10.gov.uk/output/Page9224.asp>, accessed 5 October 2010.

128. The White House, ‘Way Forward’ (note 3).

129. Act is available at <http://www.opencongress.org/bill/111-s496/show>.

130. As David Wilkinson notes, there are strong reasons for growing recreational drugs for export including “the relentless pressure of global consumers for…drugs [and] the absence of equally profitable cash crop exports” (D. Wilkinson, ‘Globalizations: The First Ten, Hundred, Five Thousand and Million Years’, in B. Gills and W. Thompson (eds.) Globalization and Global History (London: Routledge 2006) p. 70.

131. ‘The Policy Roots of Economic Crisis and Poverty: A Multi-Country Participatory Assessment of Structural Adjustment’, SAPRIN, April 2002, available at <http://www.saprin.org/SAPRI_Findings.pdf>, accessed 9 May 2006) p. 29.

132. M. Bolle, ‘Afghanistan and Pakistan Reconstruction Opportunity Zones’, FAS, 15 October 2009, available at <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R40627.pdf>, p. 17, accessed 30 September 2010

133. T. Barnett, Blueprint for Action: A Future Worth Creating (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons 2005) p. 270.

134. Kean et al. (note 2) p. 340.

135. M. De Goede, ‘Hawala Discourses and the War on Terrorist Finance’, Environment and Planning D: Society and Space 21/5 (2003) p. 517.

136. Ibid.

137. T. Barnett, Great Powers: America and the World After Bush (New York: Putnam 2009) p. 303.

138. N. Smith, ‘The Endgame of Globalization’, Political Geography 25/1 (2006) p. 8.

139. Smith, The Endgame of Globalization (note 19) p. 209.