The Mass Media and Russia’s “Sphere of Interests”: Mechanisms of Regional Hegemony in Belarus and Ukraine

ABSTRACT

As conduits for ideas, values and geographical knowledge, the mass media contribute to the construction of regional order. Moscow-based media organisations with audiences in post-Soviet republics have been described as ‘soft power tools’ or ‘information weapons’ which aid the Russian state in its pursuit of regional dominance. However, a heavy focus on the agency of the Russian state obscures the important role that local actors and their motives often play in delivering Russian media content to large audiences in neighbouring countries. This article examines several major news providers which export content from Russia to Belarus and Ukraine, reaching large audiences thanks to partnerships that serve particular local interests and accommodate some local sensitivities. These news providers resemble mechanisms of neo-Gramscian regional hegemony, where actors in the ‘periphery’ are involved in perpetuating norms from the ‘centre’. The article argues that Russia’s political leadership, despite promoting consensual hegemony as its preferred regional order, has in fact undermined the type of media mechanisms that might have helped to sustain such an order. As the Russian state has projected narratives without regard for negative local reactions, it has made itself more reliant on coercive means to secure its declared ‘sphere of interests’ across formerly Soviet territory.

Acknowledgments

I would like to thank Susanna Hast, Iain Ferguson, all participants in the ‘Spheres of Influence’ workshop in Helsinki and also Ben O’Loughlin for providing helpful feedback on this manuscript. I am likewise grateful for various sources of funding which enabled me to work on this topic over several years, first a doctoral studentship from CEELBAS and the ESRC, then a postdoctoral fellowship from the Mellon programme at UCL-SSEES, and finally a fellowship from the European Commission’s Marie Skłodowska-Curie programme.

Notes

1. For a more critical view see Szostek (2014).

2. The limitations of ‘consensual’ hegemony as a means of sustaining a ‘sphere of influence’ are further discussed by Filippo Costa Buranelli in his contribution to this special issue.

3. Details of ownership come from press reports and editorial staff interviewed for the study. However, media ownership in Ukraine and Belarus is far from transparent so inaccuracies cannot be ruled out.

4. In 2012 the reported per-issue readership of Argumenty i Fakty v Ukraine (published weekly) was 1.6 million, with 0.8 million for Komsomolskaya Pravda v Ukraine (published daily). This put them among the top four Ukrainian news publications by circulation. By 2015 their readership figures had fallen to around 0.2 million each (reflecting problems in the Ukrainian economy that affected all tabloids), yet they were still among the most popular publications in Ukraine; see http://vesti-ukr.com/strana/127260-gazeta-vesti-stala-izdaniem-nomer-odin-v-kieve-i-bolshih-gorodah. Komsomolskaya Pravda v Belorussii and Argumenty i Fakty v Belorussii were similarly market leaders in Belarus in 2012. Each daily edition of the former had a weekly print run of around 50,000, rising to 300,000 for the weekly tolstushka (‘fat’ edition containing the TV guide) and its editor claimed a total readership of around one million. AiF v Belorussii reported a weekly print run of roughly 150,000. The only other Belarusian news publication with a comparably high circulation was state-owned Sovetskaya Belorussiya (Belarus Segodnya).

5. Broadcasting Board of Governors and InterMedia, International Broadcasting in Belarus, (2011), unpublished report.

6. Evidence of this convergence can be seen in surveys of Belarusian public opinion, such as IISEPS, ‘Telepropaganda i zhizn’ (2014).

7. V. Dudko, first deputy director of STV responsible for RTR-Belarus, author interview conducted in Minsk on 24 October 2012.

8. O. Yakimenko, programmes director at ONT, author interview conducted in Minsk on 22nd October 2012.

9. S. Bulatskiy, main director at NTV Belarus, author interview conducted in Minsk on 18th October 2012.

10. R. Poddubskiy, head of the news department at ONT, author interview conducted in Minsk on 22nd October 2012.

11. Journalist with experience working for Komsomolskaya Pravda v Ukraine (anonymous), author interview conducted in Kyiv on 27th September 2011.

12. M. Delorentis Polezhayeva, deputy editor-in-chief at Argumenty i Fakty v Belorussii, author interview conducted in Minsk on 16th October 2012.

13. T. Mityusova, head of the project to publish Komsomolskaya Pravda abroad, author interview conducted in Moscow on 15th February 2011.

14. S. Kalinin, deputy editor for work with Argumenty i Fakty regional supplements, author interview conducted in Moscow on 22nd March 2011.

15. Delorentis Polezhayeva (note 12).

16. Journalist with experience working for Komsomolskaya Pravda v Belorussii (anonymous), author interview conducted in Minsk on 27th October 2012.

17. Journalist (note 11).

18. S. Gollands, deputy editor-in-chief at Argumenty i Fakty v Ukraine, author interview conducted in Kyiv on 29th September 2011.

19. Journalist (note 11).

20. Journalist (note 11).

21. Besides Argumenty i Fakty v Ukraine and Komsomolskaya Pravda v Ukraine, Lozhkin built his media empire around mass-oriented, apolitical publications (such as TV guides sports newspapers) and pop-music radio stations.

22. Journalist (note 16).

23. According to official sources, this decision was taken by the cable operators themselves for commercial and legal reasons. However, reports in the media suggested that the move was orchestrated by the authorities. See Charter97.org (2009).

24. Specifically, the channels broadcast stories about Hitler dolls being on sale in Ukraine and CIA prisons being located outside Kyiv.

25. With the exception of war-torn Donbas and occupied Crimea where the Ukrainian authorities no longer control infrastructure; Reuters (2014); Korrespondent (2014).

Additional information

Funding

This work was supported by the Andrew W. Mellon Foundation [Postdoctoral fellowship]; European Commission [Marie Skłodowska-Curie Fellowship]; ESRC/CEELBAS [Doctoral studentship].