So Close, So Far. National Identity and Political Legitimacy in UAE-Oman Border Cities

ABSTRACT

Since the accession of Oman and the United Arab Emirates to the independence in the early 1970s, the building of both a state apparatus and a nation has lain at the heart of the political projects of respective rulers of these countries to assert their legitimacy and control over their respective territory. This issue of the mutual relationship has been particularly crucial, given the two countries’ shared modern history, and the tribal and ethnic proximity between inhabitants living across the new international boundary. The study of the two border towns of al-Ayn (United Arab Emirates) and al-Buraymi (Oman) provides a unique window onto unfolding patterns of the construction of political sovereignty in post-colonial states and the link between the building of national identity and the physical demarcation from the (br)other.

These two towns existed as a single oasis prior to the 1970s. However, the act of drawing an international demarcation across the oasis has led to the sprouting of new dynamics resulting from the increasing difference of social and economic development. This article argues that the adversarial political and economic trajectories of al-Ayn and al-Buraymi have been epitomising the evolution of the relationship between the two countries. While the UAE authorities have been pushing for a stricter regulation of the flow of migrants, it has been in the interest of Oman to keep fluidity in order to alleviate the social and economic challenges on its side of the border. This disparity of interests has impacted bilateral political relationships, as the Omani authorities have had to face the question of the strong extraversion of northern Oman towards the UAE globalised cities and the possibility that these areas could escape Muscat’s allegiance. Growing suspicions and mistrust in both capitals have been accompanied by renewed questioning related to respective national identities, especially when dealing with the relation to the ‘brother.’

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank the two anonymous readers for their helpful comments and critiques of the first draft of this article. All interpretations remain my sole responsibility.

Notes

1. Isra’ and Miraj is an Islamic feast commemorating Muhammad’s journey from Mecca to Jerusalem followed by his ascension to heaven where he received God’s instructions before coming back to Earth.

2. Buursink (2001, 15) explains that ‘an adjacent location evidently is a necessary condition, but not a sufficient condition […] To call two adjacent cities ‘twins’ they should also be of about the same age, appearance and size. Moreover, the ‘twin’ metaphor suggests a cordial relation which makes real twins inseparable, likeminded and acting co-operatively’.

3. Indeed, two of the historical names of the contemporary United Arab Emirates are ‘the Coast of Oman’ (in Arabic, sahl Uman) and ‘Trucial Oman’–in reference to the 1853 Perpetual Maritime Truce treaty enforced by the United Kingdom to the local sheikhs. Moreover, under British rule, up to the 1960s, travel documents identified inhabitants of the current UAE as Omanis.

4. Personal interview, Muscat, 31st May 2003.

5. ‘Zayed Pays Rich Tribute to Qaboos,’ Gulf News (21st July 2002).

6. “Abu Dhabi’s Nexus of Economic Power, Part II: The Abu Dhabi Executive Council,” Wikileaks Cable from US Embassy in Abu Dhabi (03ABUDHABI3208_a), 9 July, 2003.

7. Van der Meulen explains that ‘the domination of the Abu Dhabi military by the Bani Yas and Dhawahir tribes is almost total’ (in The Role of Tribal and Kinship Ties in the United Arab Emirates, PhD (Medford: Tufts University 1997) pp.156ff.). Among a few examples, Mohammed bin Said al-Badi (a lineage of the Dhawahir tribe) was the UAE Defence Forces’ chief of staff (1982–1992) then UAE Minister of Interior (1992–2004), succeeding another tribe member, Hamouda bin Ali al-Dhaheri. Similarly the Ministry of Justice has been held by members of the Dhawahir tribe since 1997.

8. Fatima bint Mubarak, the third wife of Zayed, who is the mother of current Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi and Deputy Supreme Commander of the UAE Armed Forces Mohammed bin Zayed, is from the Bani Qitab tribe.

9. The position of deputy chief of staff of the UAE Armed Forces was held by Ubayd bin Mohammed al-Kaabi at the end of the 1990s, then by Mohammed bin Hilal al-Kaabi (2005–2008) and then by Ali bin Mohammed al-Kaabi at the end of the 2000s, who was previously Commander of the UAE Land Forces.

10. https://www.ecouncil.ae/PublicationsEn/plan-abu-dhabi-full-version-EN.pdf, Accessed November 15 2017.

11. Oman, UAE and the Arabian Peninsula (London: Lonely Planet 2013, 4^th ed.) p.171.

12. Sultanate of Oman, Statistical Year Book 2012 (Muscat: National Centre for Statistics and Information 2013) tables 42–19, 43–19, 44–19 and 45–19.

13. Personal interview, 14th February 2005.

14. In 2008, the average annual rent for a three-bedroom villa in al-Buraymi was UAE Dirhams (AED) 12,000 [US$3,200], compared to AED 70,000 [US$ 19,000] in al-Ayn. In 2013, annual rent for a two-bedroom flat amounted to AED 12,000 in al-Buraymi compared to AED 70,000 in al-Ayn.

15. There was no Indian school in al-Buraymi until 2008. Foreign children are not allowed to register in Omani public schools. On the contrary, apart with special permission, young Omanis cannot frequent community schools which group the expatriates’ children according to their nationality.

16. “Omanis Hiring Maids from the UAE: Probably Legal, but Problematic,” Wikileaks Cable from US Embassy in Muscat (07MUSCAT206_a), 3rd March 2007.

17. 1 Omani Rial = 9.5 UAE Dirham = 2.6 US$. Heavy vehicles over seven tonnes are charged OR8. An annual fee of OR12 is charged for government vehicles, cars carrying students studying in the UAE and those who cross the border every day.

18. The emirate of Abu Dhabi even claimed that a cell affiliated to al-Qaida planning to operate attacks in the UAE from al-Buraymi was unveiled.

19. ‘Looking for Economic Growth in Oman’s Interior,’ Wikileaks Cable from US Embassy in Muscat (08MUSCAT359_a), 14th May 2008.

20. In July 2014, it was estimated that 200 Omanis, mainly native from northern Oman, including al-Buraymi, had joined Sunni military groups in Syria (al-Balushi 2014).

21. On the contrary, residents in the UAE were still allowed to enter al-Buraymi as there was no checkpoint on the Omani side.

22. However Takriti (2013) mentions that by the end of 1974 ‘the Saudis were still indicating interest in the Buraimi villages’ (p.286).

Additional information

Funding

This research was supported by the UK Economic and Social Research Council [grant number ES/J012696/1].