Understanding Pipeline Politics in Eurasia: Turkey’s Transit Security in Natural Gas

ABSTRACT

As the importance of natural gas for the energy future of the European Union rises, many new pipeline projects are proposed to transfer rich resources of Eurasia towards Europe. Why do some of these projects succeed, and others fail? To explain this phenomenon, the energy security literature has focused mostly on the security of energy supply and demand, while the specific challenges faced by transit states attracted relatively less attention. This paper focuses on the reasons that make pipeline politics and economics controversial and challenging by introducing and operationalizing the concept of transit security. It defines transit security broadly where transit countries are sensible to changes in supply and demand in addition to pipeline-specific issues, which are determined by a combination of economic and geopolitical factors. It argues that in the case of Turkey, transit security is influenced by asymmetries in trade dependence and political power in addition to prospect of future rents from transit. The last section applies this framework to Eurasian gas transit in order to explain the success and failure of past, present, and future pipelines.

Notes

1. The paper draws upon in-depth interviews by the author with officials from Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources, and BOTAŞ Petroleum Pipeline Corporation in Ankara in 2015.

2. Interview with Ercan Kılınçkıran. Branch Manager, The Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources. Ankara. 15 June 2015. Interview with Aslin Savran. Chief Clerk, Energy, Water, and Environmental Affairs. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Ankara. 26 June 2015; Analyses estimate that Turkey can facilitate the transit of up to 100 BCM per year if the relevant infrastructure is built and the storage facilities are established. (Austvik and Rzayeva 2016).

3. Interview with İsmail Kürşad Çapanoğlu, Acting Vice Head of Department, International Projects, BOTAS. 25 June 2015.

4. For instance, destination clauses in Turkey’s contracts with Russia and Iran prevent Ankara from re-exporting unused natural gas for profit (Rzayeva 2018).

5. Ankara has expected Turkish companies to pay discounted prices for Russian gas delivered to the Turkish market via the new pipeline (Rzayeva 2018). However, this is unlikely to happen before the contracts expiration due to a recent arbitration ruling against Turkish companies (Sputnik News 2019).

6. Interview with Ercan Kılınçkıran. Branch Manager, The Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources. Ankara. 15 June 2015.