Transnistria’s European Drive: A Means to What End?

ABSTRACT

This paper explores the geopolitical role that a de facto state may play while operating in the context of patron-client relations and engagement without recognition framework. This is especially pronounced in Transnistria, which due to economic incentives offered by the EU through the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA) may not fit well into the overall military-political or socio-cultural expectations of Transnistrians deemed to be part of the Russian dominion. The puzzle this paper seeks to unfold is twofold: first, it examines the motives and instruments that both EU and Russia exploit in their power projections towards Transnistria; second, it probes different avenues how de facto state authorities tackle possible tensions emerging from externally imposed choices, and how this all affects their role choice. It is not ruled out that regional linkages, also interests and needs that shape allegiances will lead to changes in geopolitical roles, and thus in the secessionist conflict dynamics.

Notes

1. We define de facto states as secessionist entities that exhibit the characteristics of a state (permanent population, defined territory under the control of a government, internal legitimacy), but are with limited or no external recognition and are thus denied UN membership.

2. The term coined by the French geographer Jacques Ancel refers to the ‘frontier’ or ‘borderland’, indicating the pressures of power at any given time and of necessity changing as the balance of power itself changed: see Parker (2000, 957–69).

3. Interviews in Brussels were conducted with high-ranking EU officials from the European External Action Service and DG Trade, as well as with a prominent think tank expert. Interviews in Moldova and Transnistria covered a variety of actors: think tank experts, political advisors, the Foreign Minister of Transnistria.

4. The textual analysis involved the following websites: Transnistrian MFA, Transnistrian News Agency Novosty Pridnestrovia. The analysis covered the period of 2015–2019 and entailed the DCFTA negotiation process, implementation and aftermath. The items considered relevant for the study were those discussing the DCFTA, the economic situation of Transnistria, meetings with EU officials, Transnistrian relations with the EU and/or Russia.

5. As stated by Moritz Pieper (2020), Russia uses its diasporas within the wider ‘Russian world’ as means for geopolitical ends. Thus, a combination of direct inferences, as well as support of social and cultural programmes directed to people has been used by Russia to maintain its influence.

6. Russian troops in the area consist of about 1,500 soldiers (Klein 2019, 21), with dual tasks of guarding Soviet-era military warehouses (about 1,000–1,100 soldiers) and about 400 servicemen in the Joint Control Commission – a trilateral force involving also Moldova and Transnistria (Necsutu 2018).

7. The Kozak memorandum, or the Russian Draft Memorandum on the Basic Principles of the State Structure of a United State in Moldova, was a conflict settlement plan that foresaw the federalization of Moldova. The plan would have given Russian language the status of official language within Moldova, would have allowed Transnistria to block policy-making within the Federation, and keep up to 2000 Russian soldiers in Transnistria for a transitional period. The memorandum was rejected by the Moldovan government, under the pressure of Western powers.

8. While Ukrainian territory served as an access point for Russian military and officials visiting Transnistria, as well as for contraband, Ukraine’s generally supportive view of Transnistria changed after the start of the conflict with Russia in 2014. Following these events, Ukraine has deepened cooperation with Moldova and the EUBAM mission to hinder uncontrolled cross-border economic activity, and does not allow Russian military to use its territory for transit to Transnistria. This has also given Moldova further options to deny entry for Russian officials or military attempting to visit Transnistria through Moldova.

9. In addition to reliance on Russian gas, which dominates imports (imports of mineral fuels accounting for approximately 34% of imports, hereinafter 2017 data), Transnistria also relies on import of metals and raw materials for its metallurgical plants (almost 20% of imports). In turn, Transnistrian exports are also dominated by these two categories, with fuels and electricity accounting for 17% of exports, while export of metal products account for almost 40% of exports. Thus, the economy relies heavily on few major industries/companies, which are dependent on what Transnistria considers external trade (Gumene 2019).

10. While there have been some fluctuations in terms of export destinations, the share of exports to EU countries remained over 50% between 2013 and 2017, with 7 out of the 10 most important export destinations being EU countries. Russia’s share accounted for about 15% in 2017 (Gumene 2019, 8)

11. While there are general accounts on how the Transnistrian compliance was achieved and why Russia allowed such convergence (on Russian side mainly related to not carrying the costs of supporting TMR fully on its own), the full process and the actual content of the EU-Transnistria agreements have not been revealed (see Gumene 2019, 4).

12. The process of bringing Transnistrian trade under Moldovan control started already in 1996, when, as part of conflict resolution efforts, Transnistria was granted the use of Moldovan customs stamps while avoiding taxation. This regime ended in 2001 after Moldova joined the WTO, and since 2003, Moldova required Transnistrian companies to register in Chisinau to receive export-import papers, yet maintained limited control and taxation on such goods. As Moldova drew closer to the EU – both figuratively through increasing cooperation and geographically –, more effort was made to legalize Transnistrian trade and to verify the origin and quality of its goods. Instrumental in these efforts was Ukraine’s decision in 2006 to require Transnistrian exports to have Moldovan customs stamps and to pass through official Moldovan customs points, as well as the 2014 EU-Moldova AA, which cut or eliminated tariffs on Moldovan, and thus also Transnistrian goods. The closing of alternative/illegal trade channels and the preferential treatment from EU prompted a trade reorientation for Transnistria to the degree that refusal to comply with the rules and regulations would severely harm Transnistria’s already fragile economy.