Transforming top-tier football in Greece: the case of the ‘Super League’

Abstract

In 2006, the Greek Super League became the organizing body for the country’s top-tier football. It was modelled on the English Premier League, and so can be seen as a mimetic response from Greek football clubs uncertain of how to deal with professionalization and increased commercialization. This article concerns the status of top-tier football in Greece since formation of the Super League, and endeavours to shed light on its organizational, financial and general business attitude. The authors argue that, although the Super League has done an effective job regarding the commercial aspects of the game, it has put less emphasis on governance mechanisms, accountability and organizational issues.

Notes

1. The majority of sport clubs in Greece are multisports organizations (though single-sport organizations also exist). To avoid confusion, when reference is made to ‘football club’ the reader should assume the limited liability company, whereas when reference is made to ‘sport club’, the reader should assume the multisport organization as a whole.

2. See, for example, Chapter 10 in Alexopoulos and Anagnostopoulos, The Business of Football in Greece or Dimitropoulos, ‘Accounting and Tax Legislation’.

3. DiMaggio and Powell, ‘The Iron Cage Revisited’, 148.

4. Ibid., 151.

5. Shils, Centre and Periphery.

6. Greenwood and Suddaby, ‘Institutional Entrepreneurship’, 28.

7. DiMaggio, ‘Interest and Agency’.

8. Leblebici et al., ‘Institutional Change’.

9. See, Davis, ‘Agents Without Principle?’; Kraatz, ‘Learning by Association?’.

10. Zucker, ‘Where Do Institutional Patterns Come From?’.

11. Leblebici et al., ‘Institutional Change’.

12. See, Greenwood, Suddaby and Hinings, ‘Theorizing Change’; Phillips and Zuckerman, ‘Middle-Status Conformity’; Sherer and Lee, ‘Institutional Change in Large Law Firms’.

13. Greenwood and Suddaby, ‘Institutional Entrepreneurship’.

14. Ibid., 43.

15. Ibid., 44.

16. According to Eurostat, Greece’s population in 2008 was 11.2 million of which 4.5 million live in these two metropolitan areas.

17. Deloitte, Reports for Greece 1999–2000.

18. See, Papanikos, ‘Football Clubs From Athens’; ‘Greek Football’; ‘A Proposal for the Organisation of Greek Football.

19. Dimitropoulos, ‘Accounting and Tax Legislation’.

20. See Avgi newspaper, October 14, 2007.

21. Anagnostopoulos, ‘The Battlefield of Greek Football’.

22. Papanikos, ‘Greek Football’.

23. Bogiopoulos and Milakas, ‘A Religion Without Unfaithful’.

24. See, for example, the journalistic work by Georgiadis and Asimakopoulos, The Concealed Business of Football.

25. Dimitropoulos, ‘The Financial Performance of the Greek Football Clubs’.

26. Anagnostopoulos, ‘The Battlefield of Greek Football’.

27. Source: Ministry of Economy and Finance (www.mnec.gr). Retrieved March 30, 2010.

28. In ‘Institutional Pluralism’, Gammelsæter develops a tentative typology of institutional logics that combine to constitute commercialized sport clubs; the logic of politics refers to the direct or indirect political involvement in (local) sport club(s).

29. ‘Political clientelism’ involves the disbursement of financial, employment or other forms of patronage in exchange for political support. See, Ferrera, 1996, cited in Henry and Nassis, ‘Political Clientelism and Sports Policy in Greece’, 43.

30. See Anagnostopoulos, ‘Stakeholder Management in Greek professional Football’, 258.

31. Ibid.

32. Ibid., 55.

33. Dimitropoulos, ‘The Financial Performance of the Greek Football Clubs’.

34. For purposes of consistency, only those football clubs that had a PL status both in 2009 and 2010 season have been considered. The analysis, however, refers to the fiscal years 2007 and 2008 and from the 13 clubs examined here, Panthakikos had a Football League status in both 2007 and 2008, and Asteras Tripolis as well as Levadiakos in 2007.

35. Barros and Douvis, ‘Competitive Analysis of Football Efficiency’. Data refers to the 2002–3 season.

36. Ibid.

37. Careful reading is required here since not all this amount is distributed to the football clubs. For example, 4% goes to the police, 5% to HFA, 2% stays to the organizing body and according to the SL’s financial account €1.4m was the payment to the company who planned and oversaw this joint agreement.

38. At the time of writing, and mainly due to the current economic situation in Greece, SKAI Channel holds discussions with the SL to break the contract, with NOVA being the channel to renegotiate the full package.

39. Alexopoulos and Anagnostopoulos, The Business of Football in Greece.

40. This is an estimated figure for all three years (2009–12), providing that Olympiakos and Skoda Xanthi’s deal with the public sector’s channel ERT remains the same; this clarification is an important one given the financial cuts in all public expenditure due to the recent economic problems that Greece is facing.

41. Fountis, ‘OPAP’s Provocations’.

42. According to the Greek press, 10 more football clubs from the SL (including Panathinaikos) are more than likely to come to an agreement with OPAP for shirt sponsorships for the following years.

43. According to the Hellenic Ministry of Finance, as recently as September 2010, the gambling market in Greece was estimated to be worth between €4bn and €5bn in taxable revenue.

44. See, for example, Chapter 6 in Alexopoulos and Anagnostopoulos, The Business of Football in Greece.

45. During the second Conference of the Pan-Hellenic Association of Sport Economists and Managers, in Athens, February 20, 2009.