![Sample our Politics & International Relations journals, sign in here to start your FREE access for 14 days]({"type":"image" , "src" : "/sda/5947/TOC-Subject-Sample-2021-Politics-International-Relations.jpg"})
Abstract
The concept of empire has undergone a revival in recent years in the context of debates over American power and hegemony in world politics. Authors such as Niall Ferguson and Deepak Lal have used the British Empire as an exemplar to demonstrate that empires can be benign, engendering social and economic development and enabling democracy. In this article, I argue that British imperialism, far from being benign, in most cases undermined colonial democratisation and development through its focus on maintaining physical order and control and sustaining economic extraction. This is demonstrated by both the budgetary priorities and the political and institutional machinations of British colonial regimes. However, different colonies experienced distinct post-independence trajectories, depending upon the character of indigenous social cleavages, elite strategies, the formation of political parties and movements, and the ability of indigenous leaders to manipulate limited opportunity structures. India's distinctive pathway to democracy would not have been possible had partition not fixed a potentially serious demographic problem by making government institutions inherited from the British suitable to India's social structure. Pakistan's transition to democracy was impeded by partition, which deprived Pakistan of both its central state apparatus and its integrative national party. Transitions to democracy in Nigeria, Kenya and Tanzania were blocked by an entrenched history of autocracy, inappropriate government structures and a lack of well-trained political elites. Had British officials done more, earlier on, in these countries to modernise government structures and develop political capacities, they too may have successfully democratised.
Acknowledgement
The author would like to thank Patrick Dunleavy, Katharine Adeney, Andrew Wyatt, Phil Cerny and Jason Stobbs for their useful comments and advice. Special thanks go to the editor of this special issue, Rob Jenkins, for his help in developing this article. I am grateful to the British Academy for supporting this research through the award of a Postdoctoral Fellowship.
Notes
1. For a definition of ‘empire-state’, see Subrahmanyam (Citation2003: 41–42).
2. A review of this literature is available in Arrow Citation(2000).
3. The colonies accounted for one-third of the land mass and half the population of British Africa (Subrahmanyam, Citation2003: 192).
4. Although Kenya's legislature became semi-representative in 1948, it lapsed back to official majority rule in 1954 as a result of the Mau Mau threat. An unofficial majority was not restored until 1961.
5. From 1858. India was effectively ruled by the British state before 1858, although not legally so.
6. British Baluchistan, Delhi, Ajmer-Merwara, Coorg, and the Andaman and Nicobar Islands.
7. Perhaps Tanganyika's lack of deep social divisions made it a more threatening case for democratisation.
8. The dates shown in and approximate the following fiscal years: India (1900/01, 1910/11, 1919/20, 1929/30, 1937/38, 1946/47); Nigeria (1917, 1923/24, 1930/31, 1938/39, 1946/47, 1958/59); Kenya (1899/1900, 1909/10, 1922, 1930, 1937, 1947, 1958/59); and Tanganyika (1923/24, 1930/31, 1938, 1946, 1959/60). For further details on data sources and assumptions, see Subrahmanyam Citation(2003).
9. Three basic cleavage structures exist: cumulative, intermediate and cross-cutting. A society with cumulative cleavages is intensely divided, and group divisions (such as class, race, religion or ethnicity) are mutually reinforcing and ‘run in the same direction and in almost exactly the same place in society’ (Dunleavy & O'Leary, Citation1987: 60–63). A society with cross-cutting cleavages is more pluralistic, and group divisions form ‘along lines running in every direction … [so that] society is sewn together by its inner conflicts’ (Ross, Citation1920: 164–165). A society with intermediate divisions falls between the two.
10. Some members of the Muslim League also joined in these demonstrations.
11. The UN Charter provided for periodic inspections to be carried out in its trust territories and accepted petitions from displeased factions, British or African.
12. Muslims constituted around 85 per cent of the population.
13. Kenya had a range of racial and ethnic groups. Its largest group, the Kikuyu, comprised 20 per cent of the population.
14. Jomo Kenyatta sidelined the Luo, while Daniel arap Moi excluded the three largest ethnicities.
15. Tanganyika had 120 distinct ethnic groups. Its largest group comprised 15 per cent of the population.
16. Africans are still confused about what constitutes democracy. A 2002 Afrobarometer survey of Africans showed that 40 per cent associated ‘democracy’ with civil liberties, especially freedom of speech, and only 9 per cent with voting and elections (Source: Afrobarometer Briefing Paper No. 1, April 2002, http://www.afrobarometer.org/papers/AfrobriefNo1.pdf, accessed 10 May 2005).
17. Zanzibar, which merged with Tanganyika in 1964, was separately administered until 1977. It too was run as a one-party state, with the Afro-Shirazi Party declared the only permitted party (Schönborn, Citation1978). Zanzibar's combination of deep racial cleavages and non-democratically aligned groups meant that developments there mirrored those in Nigeria. When the majority African population sidelined Arab and Shirazi groups from political participation, the excluded factions staged coups and secession movements (Berg-Schlosser & Siegler, Citation1990: 74). After 1977, a single party ruled all of Tanzania.