Partisan-motivated prorogation and the Westminster model: a comparative perspective

Abstract

Recent cases of partisan-motivated prorogations of parliaments at the federal and provincial levels in Canada have focused attention on this phenomenon. While such prorogations are uncommon in the mature Westminster-style parliaments, the Canadian cases are not unique. Systematic study of partisan-motivated prorogations in the Australian states has illuminated the factors commonly associated with such cases. This paper outlines the results of this literature and then tests whether the Canadian cases fit the pattern. It shows that, on balance, these factors do apply. The paper thus concludes that, while partisan-motivated prorogations may not be predictable, it is possible to identify circumstances in which there is a substantially greater risk of their occurrence.

Keywords:

• prorogation
• Westminster model
• Australia
• Canada
• parliament
• executive–legislative relations
• New South Wales
• Tasmania
• Ontario

Acknowledgements

The author acknowledges the financial support of The Global and International Studies Initiative at St. Thomas University, Fredericton, NB, Canada; the research assistance of Ms Natalia Hicks; and the helpful comments of the journal's anonymous reviewers.

Notes

1. See, for example, Aucoin, Jarvis, and Turnbull (2011), Desserud (2009), Heard (2009), Hogg (2010), Miller (2009), and Russell and Sossin (2009).

2. This section was repealed when superseded by s.5 of the Constitution Act, 1982 which prescribes that ‘There shall be a sitting of Parliament and of each legislature at least once every twelve months’(Constitution Act (Canada), 1982).

3. However, the Crown or its representatives sometimes exert a proximate enforcement of conventions concerning parliamentary sessions by, for example, denying a ministerial request for a suspension of parliament. In doing so, they assert a remaining ‘reserve power’ of the Crown to defend constitutional values.

4. For the 2008 prorogation, see, for example, Desserud (2009) and Valpy (2009); for the 2009 prorogation see, for example, Aucoin et al. (2011, pp. 68–70).

5. We use the qualifier ‘attempt’, as included as cases are three situations – in New South Wales in 1899 and 1911, and in Western Australia in 1909 – in which the first minister requested a prorogation for partisan reasons but the Crown's representative refused the request.

6. In the three works cited, Horgan uses the term ‘novel context’. It is clear from the cases that the term refers to unusual parliamentary circumstances. Thus, to delineate this variable more concretely, we have adopted the more specific term ‘novel parliamentary context’.

7. A record of the Committee's work, including evidence taken, is available: Canada (2009a).

8. At the time of writing, 1 of the 6 Australian states and the 2 most populous of the 10 Canadian provinces had minority administrations.

9. Premier Burke's administration was, years later, to become infamous for its involvement in the ‘WA Inc.’ affair, but the 1985 prorogation was prior to the revelations and not related to them.