![Sample our Politics & International Relations journals, sign in here to start your FREE access for 14 days]({"type":"image" , "src" : "/sda/5947/TOC-Subject-Sample-2021-Politics-International-Relations.jpg"})
ABSTRACT
Studies have noted geographical variations in support for the communist parties in Kerala. However, practices adopted by communists in Kerala to maintain their dominance in these geographical regions and how residents of these places relate to these practices have not been sufficiently explored. This article, based on field insights from a panchayat in North Kannur investigates party-society links. It is argued that while material factors help link party and voter, these links are complex and do not conform to clientelism or patronage, as conventionally understood. These links are embedded in a local social context which adds elements of mutuality and non-hierarchical interaction between citizens and party. Ideology also conditions party-society linkages.
Acknowledgements
I am grateful to Professor Pralay Kanungo, Dr Aashti Salman, and Dimple Baruah for their valuable feedback on this draft. I am also very grateful to two anonymous referees and the editor of the journal, Andrew Wyatt for their excellent suggestions and comments.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s ).
Notes
1 The Left Democratic Front (LDF) and United Democratic Front (UDF) are the two important political alliances in the state. The Communist Party of India (Marxist) (CPI (M)) and the Indian National Congress (INC) respectively form the core of these coalitions. These coalitions were formed in 1980 and have since then intermittently governed Kerala. Apart from the CPI(M), the major constituent of LDF is Communist Part of India (CPI), while the Indian Union Muslim League (IUML) is the second most important constituent of UDF. The CPI(M) dominates the LDF and obliges the smaller parties to follow its leadership (Kailash, Citation2019).
2 They argue that current political divisions in Kerala are influenced by the divisions that existed during the inception of mass democracy in the state. In regions where the Communist Party established a stronghold, the majority of the people continued to support the party, transcending other social cleavages (Sunilraj & Heath, Citation2017).
3 For example, in the 2014 National Election Studies (NES) post-poll survey, only 32 per cent of respondents identified as close to a party. This is significantly low compared to other democracies, particularly in the west. For a detailed comparison of partisanship in different countries, see Sheng (Citation2007, p. 281).
4 Consistent with the NES data cited above any individual who is affirms a feeling of closeness towards a political party is considered as partisan for the purpose of this study.
5 By organic frontier, I mean that apart from initiatives of the hegemonic political force, the population at large is organically antagonistic towards opposition. This could lead to interventions on their part without the active approval of the hegemonic force, yet also be aligned to its interests.
6 While the overall number of murder cases is lower by proportion in Kannur than the rest of Kerala, the proportion of politically motivated murders in Kerala are the highest in this district (Ullekh, Citation2018, p. 48).
7 See Crehan (Citation2016) for an elaboration of Gramscian Common Sense.
8 The service sector employs 47.29 per cent of the total workforce in Kerala in 2019–2020 compared to only 22.15 per cent employed in agriculture and allied activities (Government of Kerala, Citation2021, p. 8).
9 Of the total cropped area in Kerala, rubber contributed 21.43 per cent while rice contributed only 7.86 per cent (Government of Kerala, Citation2021, p. 67).
10 Thompson (Citation1971) developed the concept of a moral economy. He notes through his study of England in the eighteenth century, that popular consciousness expects fulfillment of certain traditional social norms and obligations by traditional authorities even when social relationships are hierarchical. When such obligations are not realized by traditional authority figures, it can lead to riot-like situations, as was the case with the food riots in England. Similarly, Scott (Citation1976) through his studies of peasant rebellions in South-East Asia has argued that these rebellions were heavily influenced by the moral economy of subsistence prevailing in the region. Peasants revolted not because of very visible forms of exploitation, but when their subsistence was threatened by measures undertaken by the state and landed elite.
11 There are regional and inter-party variations. For instance, in contemporaneous field visits to Tamil Nadu I witnessed a more relaxed process for becoming a CPI(M) member. The CPI(M) in Mattur differs from other parties elsewhere, such as the Dravidian parties of Tamil Nadu. In field visits to Tamil Nadu, I observed that local parties are amorphous units, run primarily by local bosses and big men. That is not the case in Mattur.
12 The interview was designed in a manner that captured both qualitative (in-depth interviews which recorded narratives) and quantitative data (closed questions coded numerically). The interviews therefore lasted for several hours. In addition to interviews, observations, participant observations (taking part in political rallies and meetings, for instance), informal conversations were carried out. This exercise was carried out in a total of four panchayats and a total of over 300 interviews were conducted in Kerala and Tamil Nadu. The results presented in this paper are limited to only one panchayat in Kerala.
13 The survey revealed a direct transfer of parental partisanship to respondents. The aberrations to these patterns were mostly determined by geographical factors. Several respondents who migrated to Mattur for various reasons like marriage or employment ended up shrugging off the influence of parental partisanship and ended up becoming CPI(M) partisans.
14 Rather than transcending class structures, class compromises which institutionalised provisions of class bargaining through tripartite arrangements were established in Kerala because of initiatives of the Left movement. This applies to certain section of informal sector too.
15 The overall masculine nature of political culture was evident in the survey data also. Most individuals who claimed to be non-partisans were housewives.
16 Theyyam is a part of the little traditions in India since it invokes various indigenous deities. Therefore, it does not sit well with the great tradition espoused by Brahmanism. Therefore, The Hindu-right has attempted to accommodate this popular little tradition within a larger Brahminical milieu by situating the folklore within Puranic traditions, which the CPI(M) has opposed in Mattur.
17 By social anchoring, what is meant is the ability of the party to steer the society to some or all aspects of its ideology, rather than merely representing existing societal values.
18 The authors point out that since government schemes in Bengal are universally availed without noticeable patterns of discrimination, the usage of clientelism in a non-qualified way is not correct. However, they argue that symptoms of clientelism are present in Bengal since voting is based on short-term assistance and not related to long-term programmatic assistance.
19 It should be noted that the political patterns in the region have not changed if we analyse the 2021 assembly elections in Kerala. One can even argue that the strength of the CPI(M) has strengthened in the region, since their majority in the assembly seat under which Mattur comes increased in the 2021 assembly elections compared to the 2016 assembly elections. Similarly in the 2020 panchayat election, the CPI(M) won a seat landslide in Mattur.