Inequality for the Greater Good: Gendered State Rule in Singapore

Abstract

The Singapore state, in response to demographic trends of later marriage and lower fertility, has put in place numerous institutions aimed at “protecting” the family as a unit. In their effects, many of the policies place disproportionate burdens on women, particularly insofar as the policies reproduce “traditional” gendered divisions of labor within the household at the same time that they encourage women to participate in the formal workforce. We might expect the contradictory demands placed on women and the gender inequalities embedded within the state's policies to lead to resistance and/or expressions of displeasure — in ways that could undermine the state's legitimacy — but the policies seem instead to be integral to and enhancing of the state's capacity for rule. This article shows that gendered family policies reproduce state power through three interconnected mechanisms: they establish regular relationships between state and society; articulate particular identities and interests of Singaporeans as members of families, thereby undercutting gender and ethnic identities; and give content to notions of “tradition” and “modernity” that solidify the state's claim to being the only agent able to balance the twin tensions that are at the core of the nation's survival.

Notes

1. See, for example, Abramovitz 1988; Fraser 1994; Gordon 1990; O’Connor et al. 1999. For a review of this literature, see Orloff 1996.

2. Orloff 1993.

3. Haney and Pollard 2003a; Heng and Devan 1995; Kandiyoti 1991; Molyneux 1985; Ong 1995; Yuval-Davis 1997.

4. This is manifested in a number of ways. One of the most significant revolves around women as mothers or potential mothers. See, for example, Kligman 1998.

5. Boris 1995; Williams 1995.

6. Noonan 1995; Ray 1999; Seidman 2001.

7. Haney and Pollard 2003b, 5.

8. Chua 2000.

9. Ministry of Community Development and Sports 2003b.

10. The state's fertility policies were anti-natal from the late 1960s until the early 1980s, and then became pro-natal beginning from the mid-1980s (Total Fertility Rate [TFR] reached replacement level of 2.1 in 1975). For a comprehensive historical overview of specific programs and policies, as well as demographic trends, see Saw 2005. In the early 2000s, after the TFR had begun to dip under 1.6, late marriage and low fertility took on new urgency as national problems and has since received sustained and intense state scrutiny.

11. The MCDS has since been renamed the Ministry of Community Development, Youth and Sports (MCYS).

12. Chan 2000; Chua 1995; Heng and Devan 1995; Lyons 1998; PuruShotam 1997; Teo and Yeoh 1999; Wong and Yeoh 2003.

13. Castles 2003; DeVault 1994; Haney 1996; Haney and Pollard 2003a; Hateley and Tan 2003; O’Connor et al. 1999; Paxson 2004.

14. While female employees are almost universally entitled to twelve weeks of maternity leave — and here there are important exceptions as well, such as foreign domestic workers who are immediately deported if they become pregnant — Singaporean women who wish to qualify for government-paid leave (employers are required to pay only for the first eight weeks of maternity leave for a female em-ployee's first and second children) must be married to their child's father at the time of birth or conception.

15. Lee 2004.

16. Moreover, these mothers have to be married, divorced, or widowed. Women whose children are born outside of marriage do not qualify.

17. Ministry of Manpower 2006.

18. Ministry of Community Development and Sports 2003a.

19. Parents, particularly mothers, continue to care for adult children by preparing their meals, doing their laundry, cleaning the house, while children care for parents financially, or by bringing them for medical examinations. The shifting of care from the older to the younger generation often happens gradually.

20. Abel 1990; DeVault 1994; Teo et al. 2003.

21. The Romancing Singapore campaign, which was designed to encourage dating and romantic involvement amongst overworked, highly educated young Singaporeans, was a project of Family Matters!, an advisory board and public relations wing of the Ministry of Community Development and Sports (before it was renamed the Ministry of Community Development, Youth and Sports in 2004). It was originally launched in February 2003 to coincide with Valentine's Day, and then relaunched in the form of a year-long festival in February 2004. See Family Matters! Singapore 2004.

22. For a description of the various commercial dimensions of the campaign, see Hudson 2005.

23. A respondent received this particular handbook with much amusement and provided me with a copy. Chap. 1 covers marriage; chap. 2 discusses children; chap. 3 talks about education (for children); chap. 4 gives details of public housing; chap. 5 lays out tax incentives one may be entitled to after childbearing; chap. 6 covers healthcare; chap. 7 refers one to family support services should their family encounter financial or other troubles; chap. 8 details elderly support services; chap. 9 deals with social assistance; chap. 10 is on employment. If one requires any of the services, s/he may approach the organizations listed in the handbook, many of which come under the authority of the MCYS.

24. This came to my knowledge when a friend received these pamphlets in the mail and was outraged and amused by what she saw as an intrusion into her personal life; she was especially taken aback because the pamphlets had included specific advice such as taking cold showers to improve sperm count. I subsequently found out from a MCYS staff member that the agency sent out “Planning for Babies: How Babies Make your Life Complete” to those who had solemnized their marriages in 2000 and 2002.

25. All names used are pseudonyms.

26. This was made explicit in the early 1980s, when the “Graduate Mothers’ Scheme” encouraged and rewarded women with tertiary education — disproportionately Chinese — to have more babies, with tax credits and other incentives.

27. There were 3.26 million “Residents” (Citizen and Permanent Resident) in 2000. Of these, 76.8 percent were ethnic Chinese, 13.9 percent ethnic Malays, 7.9 percent ethnic Indians, and 1.4 percent “Others.” According to the 2000 census, 99.6 percent of Malays are Muslim. The term “Malay Muslim” is often used, both by the Malays as well as by non-Malays, to describe the Malay community. All my Malay respondents were Muslim. See Department of Statistics 2000.

28. Although fertility rates for both Chinese and Malays have fallen in the past decade, Malay TFR remains above replacement level. In 2003, TFR for Malays stood at 2.17 compared to 0.98 for Chinese. See Saw 2005.

29. Only three of my respondents lived together with their partners prior to marriage, and all made efforts to explain their extenuating circumstances. I also had respondents tell me that they lived with their partners (sometimes also with in-laws) after their legal marriage but prior to their customary weddings. In two of the cases, it was made explicit to me that they lived in the same home but in separate rooms. Other respondents mentioned cohabitation and informed me that it is still a practice that is frowned upon in Singapore.

30. In light of the issue of low fertility, one might ask why housing policies are not adjusted to allow Singaporean couples easier access to housing. This is because the state wants children to come after marriage, and not prior to nor independent of it. Hence, any reforms to housing rules will stop short of allowing easier cohabitation.