BURMA'S ETHNIC MINORITIES

Abstract

The nearly 60-year-long fight by Burma's ethnic minorities for autonomy and ethnic rights lies at the root of the country's broader political and humanitarian crisis. Yet, in the outside world, this issue is often subsumed under the better-known struggle for democracy, led by Aung San Suu Kyi and the National League for Democracy. The present article seeks to redress this imbalance by directing attention to the numerous groups representing ethnic minority interests, the grievances and aspirations that motivate their struggle, and their own strategies for peace. It argues that in Burma's deeply divided society peace and democracy are two distinct challenges, even if in the long term they must go together, and it calls for the international community to help the country's ethnic groups prepare for future peace negotiations and overcome the debilitating legacy of war.

Notes

1. For more on the danger of ignoring Burma's ethnic conflicts, see Pedersen 2008, 181-86.

2. Many of Burma's ethnic minority leaders refer to themselves as “ethnic nationalities” or “non-Burmans” to emphasize their status as nations in their own right and equal members of the Union of Burma, not subordinate to the Burmans. In practical terms though, they are minorities within the existing state, whose population is about two-thirds Burman. The largest ethnic minority groups are the Shan (9 percent), the Karen (7 percent), the Arakan (4 percent), and the Mon (2 percent). Other main groups include the Kachin, the Karenni, the Pao, and the Wa. Number estimates are taken from the Central Intelligence Agency (2008), but should be considered indicative only, as no proper census has been carried out.

3. Much of the analysis in this article is based on confidential interviews with ethnic leaders and other groups in Burma, stretching back over the past ten years. While these sources cannot be revealed, official statements and secondhand sources are included whenever possible. The author is indebted also to wide-ranging personal conversations on this topic with Martin Smith, David Tegenfeldt, Harn Yawhghwe, Tom Kramer, Ashley South, and Mael Raynaud, in particular.

4. For two authoritative accounts of Burma's ethnic conflicts since independence, see Smith 1999 and Lintner 1999.

5. This included the Communist Party of Burma (CPB), whose leadership was almost exclusively Burman. The party's 15,000-strong People's Army, however, was made up primarily of ethnic Wa, Kokang, Shan, Akha, and Kachin soldiers from its base area along the Chinese border, who after a large-scale mutiny the following year (1989) set up four separate ethnic armies (see further below). The party leadership subsequently fled to China. For estimates of troop strength of the various armed groups, see Smith 1999, xiv.

6. The KNU, with its armed wing the Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA), is one of the oldest active insurgent groups in the world today, having fought the government continuously since 1949. Since losing its main base areas in the mid 1990s, the KNU has reverted to classic guerrilla warfare, staging raids from remote, mountainous parts of Karen state and Tenasserim division along the Thai border into government-controlled areas. Most of its top leaders live in Thailand, where the Karen refugee camps also serve as important rear bases. For detailed historical overviews of the Karen struggle, see Smith 2003 and Fink 2001.

7. The KNPP is similar to the KNU, but significantly smaller. It operates along the Thai border in Karenni state. A cease-fire with the government in 1995 broke down within a few months, reportedly due to disagreements over logging rights.

8. The SSA-S is a splinter group from the Mong Tai Army led by notorious drug lord Khun Sa, who surrendered to the government in 1996. It controls three small base areas on the Thai border near Mae Hong Son, but carries out raids across much of southern Shan state and today may be the most dynamic of the insurgent armies. Aiming to reestablish a genuinely nationalist Shan movement, the SSA-S works closely with the broader Shan resistance complex, including Shan cease-fire groups, the Shan National League for Democracy, and civil society organizations based in Thailand.

9. Personal communication with Martin Smith, July 2006.

10. Khint Nyunt was the main architect of the post-1988 cease-fires and togetherwith a group of high-level intelligence officers managed nearly all subsequent dealings between the government and the cease-fire groups until his purge. Since then, responsibility for government relations with the ethnic armed group appears to have been substantially decentralized to regional commanders in the relevant areas, although the revamped military intelligence (now the Office of Military Affairs Security), headed by Maj-Gen Ye Myint, maintains a role.

11. With an estimated twenty thousand soldiers, the UWSA is by far the strongest of the ethnic armies. It has taken over the former CPB headquarters in Phangsang and controls most of the Wa hills in northern Shan State along the border with China. It also has a southern command on the Thai border and representative offices around the country. The Wa region for all intents and purposes is today an independent state and has much closer links with China than with the rest of Burma. The Wa have their own administration, their own defense force, even their own foreign affairs. The local economy is Chinese, as is the administrative language; most schools teach in Chinese, and there is much Chinese investment in and migration into the area (and the northeast more generally). Still, the Wa accept the nominal authority of the Burmese government and have generally cordial relations with its officials. On several occasions, the UWSA has cooperated militarily with the Burma Army. See Kramer 2007.

12. The KIO has long been one of the most powerful armed groups, with several thousand soldiers. Like the UWSA, it today has formal administrative authority over territory formerly under its control and functions, at least on paper, as a local government. It has departments of health, education, agriculture, women's affairs, and development affairs. It runs civilian hospitals, schools (that teach Kachin language and culture), and even a Teachers Training School. It has also initiated infrastructure projects, including roads, bridges, and hydroelectric power, as well as some community development programs, the latter with assistance from international and local nongovernmental organizations. The KIO maintains an armed wing, the Kachin Independence Army (KIA), along with conscription and other military practices from the past, but it does not appear to be building up its military strength. It has close links with other leaders and organizations in Kachin state.

13. The NMSP, like the KIO, was a leading member of the NDF. The 1995 cease-fire has given it control over some territory in Mon State. Already much weakened at the time, however, it has been penned up in a number of small areas mainly along the Thai border and quite far from the Mon heartland along the coast. The leadership is closely watched by the Burma authorities — probably due to its association with Mon activist groups in Thailand that work with the broader democracy movement — and has had little room to maneuver. Many hardliners have left the organization, feeling that it has compromised too much, and the remaining members are divided

14. See, for example, Endeavours of the My anmar Armed Forces Government for National Reconciliation 2000.

15. For a recent authoritative list, see Smith 2007, 67-68.

16. The Buddhist DKBA broke away from the Christian-dominated KNU leadership in 1994 and subsequently helped the Burma Army capture several of the KNU's main bases. It has as many as two thousand soldiers, but no apparent political structure or objectives, serving mainly as a base of power and business for different commanders.

17. The SNLD was the most successful ethnic minority political party in the 1990 election, winning twenty-three seats out of the fifty-seven it contested, the second highest number of any party. Initially, the party prioritized its survival as a legal entity and kept a low profile. From the late 1990s until he was arrested in 2005, however, its chairman, Khun Htun Oo, in particular, assumed a very vocal role, attending meetings with foreign dignitaries and giving interviews to the international press, including opposition radio stations.

18. The other seven legal parties (in addition to the SNLD) are the Shan State Kokang Democratic Party, Lahu National Development Party, Mro-Khami National Solidarity Organization, Union Kayin League, Union Pao National Organisation, and the Wa National Development Party. All of these appear to toe the government line and have had no noticeable role in ethnic opposition politics.

19. Aside from the SNLD, the members of the UNA are the Arakan League for Democracy, Chin National League for Democracy, Kachin State National Congress for Democracy, Kayah State All Nationalities League for Democracy, Kayin National Congress for Democracy, Mara's People's Party, Mon National Democratic Front, Shan National League for Democracy, and Zomi National Congress.

20. The Shalom Foundation was set up in early 2000, in Kachin state, for the purpose of peace mediation and conflict resolution, but has expanded its activities to include community development work as a means to build and sustain peace. The Foundation aims to work in all religious and ethnic communities, and its board includes both Christians and Buddhists. See the group's website: http://www.shalom myanmar.org/index.htm.

21. The KDC was established in April 2002 by a forum of more than one hundred Karen delegates, who agreed, among other things, to give the new organization organizational responsibility for peace building activities in their areas. The KDN was set up in 2003, partly by former members of the KDC who felt too little was being accomplished. It has since established an active program for training of community leaders.

22. The Mediators Fellowship was established, formally, to help form and strengthen mediators groups in all ethnic areas, facilitate educational and training programs on peace building, undertake development activities, and represent local communities. It operates under the umbrella of the Shalom Foundation, but includes mediators from five states (Kachin, Karen, Karenni, Mon, and Chin) and has invited members from Shan and Arakan states as well.

23. Metta was the first organization to be officially registered as a nongovernmental organization under the Ministry of Home Affairs, in October 1998. The main objective of its programs is to assist local communities to recover from the impact of decades of civil war by initiating a development process that helps them to evolve into stable, self-reliant societies. It has established close working relationships with the development departments of various church organizations, as well as with cease-fire organizations, and as a matter of principle works in all ethnic minority communities, regardless of race and religion. See the group's website http://www.metta-myanmar.org/.

24. The NCUB is an umbrella organization of ethnic and Burman opposition groups based mainly on the two sides of the Thai-Burma border. Formed in August 1992, its official aims are to topple the Burmese military dictatorship, to promote understanding and cooperation among Burma's ethnic groups, to bring about a democratic system of government that guarantees human rights for all Burma's citizens, and to establish a Federal Union under which equality among all ethnic groups is guaranteed. Although particularly influential in the early 1990s, it remains an authoritative voice for the insurgent and exile community. It has drawn up an “alternative” constitution for Burma.

25. The National Reconciliation Program was set up in 1999 to facilitate inter-ethnic cooperation through trainings, conferences, and seminars. It funds non-cease-fire groups and cease-fire groups, as well as political parties, to enable them to exchange ideas and work out a common position.

26. The ENC (formerly the Ethnic Nationalities Solidarity and Cooperation Committee) is the flagship project of the NRP. Created in August 2001, the ENC is another effort by ethnic minority organizations operating from the Thai border to prepare for eventual tripartite dialogue. It presents itself not as a new organization but rather as a task force, and aims to represent non-cease-fire as well as cease-fire groups.

27. The Karen Human Rights Group and Shan Women's Action Network are influential representatives of the large and dynamic ethnic human rights community that engages in fact-finding and human rights reporting. Kao Wao News (a Mon group) and Shan Herald Agency for News serve similar functions with a somewhat broader focus on general news and analysis.

28. Quoted in ABriefHistory of the National Democratic Movement of Ethnic Nationalities 2000.

29. UNICEF n.d. The index measures the relative status of children and women in the fourteen states and divisions based on official government data from 1997-2000.

30. A similar picture emerges from a UN Food and Agriculture Organisation study of food security in Burma (FAO 2004), which includes proxy measures of local food production, physical access for food imports, and the resilience of the population to periodic food shortages. While most of the border townships are judged to be “highly” or “moderately” vulnerable in food security terms (with Shan, northern Kachin, and Chin states being the worst off), nearly all townships in central Burma are considered to have “low” vulnerability. Even then, the actual disadvantages of the border areas are likely to be even greater than indicated by these data sets since the most remote and conflict-affected areas are not included.

31. See, for example, Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in Myanmar 2006; Amnesty International 2005.

32. See, for example, Global Witness 2003; Images Asia 2004; and EarthRights International 2007.

33. See, for example, Article 19 1995, 36-37.

34. Mon Unity League n.d.

35. Smith 2002, 26.

36. South 2003, 311.

37. Article 19 1995, 37.

38. Burma's multireligious population enjoys a relatively high degree of religious freedom in central parts of the country. There have been frequent reports over the years, however, particularly from Chin and Kachin states, of villagers being pressured to adopt Buddhism, as well as restrictions on building new churches. See, for example, U.S. State Department 2002. More ominously, many Burmese, both soldiers and civilians, are strongly prejudiced against Muslims, who are commonly accused of harboring aspirations of turning the country into an Islamic state. In February 2001 tensions between the Muslim and Buddhist populations of Akyab (Sittwe), the capital of Arakan (Rakhine) state, erupted in large-scale riots in which an unknown number of people were killed and Muslim property was destroyed. Anti-Muslim riots have also taken place on numerous occasions in towns in central Burma, for example, in 2001 in Taungoo, Prome, and Pegu. Human Rights Watch/ Asia 2002.

39. This strategy is similar to that applied by the British in Malaya and the Americans in Vietnam, who also faced insurgents who were rooted in the local communities.

40. The Burma Border Consortium (2002) identified more than 2,500 villages believed to have been relocated, destroyed, or abandoned from 1996-2002 in central Shan, Karenni, and Karen states, and Tenasserim division.

41. Amnesty International 2002.

42. The identification of groups associated with each strategy is indicative only. As discussed below, there are significant and growing differences within each of these categories of organizations, which are breaking down traditional boundaries.

43. The idea of betraying a historical cause is particularly pronounced within the KNU, whose leaders since 1950 have sworn to uphold the four principles of Saw Ba U Gyi, the founding father of the Karen revolution: “There shall be no surrender, the recognition of the Karen state must be complete, we shall retain our arms, and we shall decide our own political destiny.” For a wide-ranging statement of the KNU's perspective on the struggle, its grievances and aspirations, see Karen History and Culture Preservation Society 2006.

44. See footnotes 6 and 7.

45. The National Convention was originally convened by the ruling military council in 1993. It was suspended in 1996, after the main opposition party, the NLD, withdrew, criticizing its proceedings as “undemocratic,” but was reconvened in May 2004 and eventually finished its deliberations in September 2007. Since then, the government has appointed a constitution-drafting committee, which is charged with shaping the final language of the document. This supposedly will be followed by a national referendum and fresh elections.

46. For statements on the KIO's rationale for a cease-fire, see KIO 1993a; 1993b; and n.d. See also NMSP 1995.

47. The standpoint of the cease-fire groups in relation to the National Convention 2004.

48. Among other things, the thirteen cease-fire groups called for the constituent states to have concurrent legislative powers with the federal government in certain areas, residual powers (i.e.,power over all areas not otherwise specified in the constitution), the right to appoint their chief minister, separate defense forces, independent finance and taxation, and control over school curricula and certain areas of the economy. They also wanted separate state constitutions and a bill of rights for the ethnic nationalities.

49. The government did agree that the chief minister of the states would be elected locally instead of, as originally proposed, being appointed by the president. It also compromised on demands for greater local influence in certain economic areas.

50. Representatives of both groups returned for the subsequent session in December 2005, but the majority of the SSNA by then had resumed armed struggle, joining forces with the SSA-S.

51. The NMSP did not withdraw altogether, but sent an observer mission only.

52. This has been confirmed by government officials in personal communication with the author, but it remains unclear whether this option will be open to everyone. Since the purge of Khin Nyunt, the more political — and less cooperative — cease-fire groups have come under significant pressure from the army, which has sought to constrain their movements and governance activities and, in a few cases, has demanded that they surrender their arms.