Putting violent armed conflict in the center of the Salween hydropower debates

ABSTRACT

Regional economic integration has become the dominant development pathway promoted, endorsed, and followed by many developing country governments in South East Asia and globally. Focusing on hydropower development, this article shows how forces of globalization manifested in the Myanmar government’s strategies to promote economic growth are shaping the Salween River basin’s development trajectory. Contesting the general belief that economic development would help the country’s transition to full democracy and achieve peace, it illustrates how hydropower development plans in the basin are closely interlinked with human rights issues. Well known for its long histories of violent conflict involving the Myanmar military and ethnic armed groups in various states, hydropower development in the Salween River is not only linked to the ongoing peace process in Myanmar but could also have direct implications on the actual significance of the process. Despite the signing of nationwide ceasefire agreements in 2012, hydropower dam projects could contribute to and trigger reoccurrences of violent armed conflict. Recognizing this conflict-prone and politically fragile condition as the main characteristics of Salween water governance is essential if we are to strive for sustainable and just development.

KEYWORDS:

• Myanmar
• critical hydropolitics
• regional economic integration
• civil conflict
• state transformation processes

Acknowledgements

We would like to thank the entire MK21 team, in particular Carl Middleton for earlier discussion of the paper, Saw Tha Phoe, Moethauk Pan, Ayemyaing, and Boo Lo Moo for their support in conducting field work in Karen State, and Orapan Pratomlek for logistic support. The research data collection, analysis, and interpretation of the result were undertaken exclusively by the authors.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.

Notes on contributors

Diana Suhardiman has over ten years of experience in natural resources governance with particular focus on water governance in Southeast Asia. She is currently a Senior Researcher and Leader of Governance and Gender at the International Water Management Institute, Southeast Asia Regional Office, based in Vientiane, Lao PDR. Putting power and politics central in water governance debates, her research highlights the complex and contested nature of water governance across scale.

Jeff Rutherford holds a Master of Arts in Political Science from Northern Illinois University and has been working in Southeast Asia for more than fifteen years as an independent researcher, journalist, trainer, and media facilitator. He is currently affiliated with the Karen Environmental and Social Action Network (KESAN), focusing on developing strategies for disseminating research on environmental and socio-economic issues in southeast Burma.

Saw John Bright is the Karen Environmental and Social Action Network (KESAN) Water Governance Program Coordinator in Yangon. KESAN works to improve livelihood security and strengthen indigenous people’s knowledge and rights in Karen State. As a core member of Myanmar’s National Dialogue on Water Resource Management, he interacts with a wide range of key stakeholders including parliamentarians, NGO and state officials, and private sector actors.

Notes

1 Page 2000; Gamble and Payne 1996.

2 ADB 2012a.

3 Magee and Kelley 2009.

4 Paoletto and Uitto 1996.

5 KRW 2014, 2016.

6 Radio Free Asia 2016.

7 Gartzke 2007.

8 As stated by Philippe Le Billon: “Resources are likely to influence the type of violent conflict required and feasible to achieve political and economic aim.” See Le Billon 2001, 572.

9 Le Billon 2001.

10 Haacke 2010.

11 Jones 2014a, 2014b; Woods 2011; Holliday 2008.

12 Hlaing 2009.

13 Jones 2014b.

14 Simpson 2014.

15 Norman and Cook 2015; Pahl-Wostl 2015; Molle, Foran, and Kakonen 2009.

16 Molle, Foran, and Kakonen 2009.

17 Boelens 2015.

18 Zeitoun and Warner 2006.

19 Yoffe, Wolf, and Giordano 2003; Giordano, Giordano, and Wolf 2002.

20 Swyngedouw 2009.

21 Stoltenborg and Boelens 2016.

22 Suhardiman 2016; Hoogesteger 2015.

23 Janakarajan 2016; Vijayan 2016.

24 Borras and Franco 2013.

25 Htut 2016.

26 ADB 2015; WB 2015.

27 Mon, 2016.

28 ADB 2012b.

29 According to Sims, “From 1990 to 2012, the ADB’s combined expenditures on transport and electricity within the GMS accounted to 96.2 percent of its total investment.” Sims 2015, 4.

30 Pongsudhirak 2016.

31 Banik 2012; Men 2007.

32 IFC 2016.

33 KRW 2016.

34 Htoh T’Ba Wai, Klaw Tae Hta, P’Tae Hta, Yaw Ma Hta, and Mae Lah.

35 Cited in Fawthrop 2016.

36 KRW 2016, 1.

37 Personal communication, October 2016.

38 Buchanan, Kramer, and Woods 2013.

39 Keovilignavong and Suhardiman 2017.

40 Campbell et al. 2015.

41 World Bank 2015.

42 Fawthrop 2016.

43 Obendorf 2012.

44 Linn 2015.

45 Kramer 2016.

46 Vaughan, Thompson, and Ayers 2017.

47 To provide context, Kaw Ku includes 207 households, Mizan 490 households, and Mokkadi 800 households.

48 Foley and Mather 2016; Sen 2009; Fraser 1998.

49 Sen 1999.

Additional information

Funding

We would like to thank the Water Land and Ecosystem of the CGIAR and the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Government of Australia for their financial support to conduct this study under the MK21 Project: ‘Matching policies, institutions and practices of water governance in the Salween-Thanlwin-Nu River basin: Towards inclusive, informed and accountable water governance’. .