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ABSTRACT
Urban development in Tibetan areas of China lags behind that of other non-coastal, rural areas and occurs at a significantly smaller scale due to remote and mountainous terrain and a lower population density. However, just as in the rest of China, urban development in Tibetan regions is characterized by an unevenness that constitutes and produces new translocal ties, as people belong to multiple localities at the same time. But Tibetan patterns of translocal ties are unique. For college-educated Tibetans, structural factors such as educational institutions and ethnic discrimination and affective factors such as attachment to home places powerfully shape the landscape of urban opportunities along ethnic lines. Instead of educational and employment structures enabling Tibetans to pursue economic opportunities in urban centers across the country, socio-ethnic inequalities and thick relational ties eventually bring many Tibetan graduates back to the urban centers administratively connected to their rural home places in Tibetan areas.
Acknowledgements
I would like to thank Geoff Barstow, Karl Debreczeny, Kristina Dy-Liacco, Sara Friedman, Tina Harris, Charlene Makley, Gedun Rabsal, Gerald Roche, Robert Shepherd, Gray Tuttle, Tsehuajab Washul, Emily Yeh, and two anonymous Critical Asian Studies reviewers for their thoughtful comments and criticisms that greatly improved this article. For generously sharing his knowledge of various indigenous studies authors, I thank Tsepak Namgyal. My deepest gratitude and respect go to my Tibetan collaborators in Beijing, Chengdu, Xining, Lhasa, Golok, and other places on the Tibetan Plateau. Without their help, none of this would have been possible. It is regretful that current circumstances dissuade me from thanking them all by name.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.
Notes on contributor
Eveline Washul is a postdoctoral research scholar at the Weatherhead East Asian Institute and adjunct lecturer in the Department of East Asian Languages and Cultures at Columbia University. Her research interests include historical geographies of Tibet, genealogical histories, and urbanization on the Tibetan Plateau.
Notes
1 Chang Citation2008; Lee Citation2009; Liu Citation2011; Loyalka Citation2012; Pun and Chan Citation2013; Sun Citation2004; Oakes and Schein Citation2006; Zhang Citation2001.
2 I refer specifically to what has been termed “in situ urbanization” or “rural urbanization,” in which rural settlements are urbanized. In other rural areas of China, this process began as early as the 1970s, and took off after the start of the reform period in the 1990s. See Zhu et al. Citation2013.
3 Oakes and Schein Citation2006.
4 Cartier Citation2006; Sun Citation2006; Feng and Zhan Citation2006; Hoffman Citation2006; Oakes and Schein Citation2006; Weng Citation2006.
5 See for instance studies documenting the impact of policies aimed at managing grasslands such as pastoralist settled housing policies (Ptáčková Citation2011), converting pastures to grasslands (Yeh Citation2005), and fencing (Bauer Citation2005).
6 Throughout this article, I use “ethnic Chinese” to refer to Han Chinese citizens of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). I do so to call attention to the implicit ethnic and racial conflation of “Chinese” (zhongguo ren) with “Han Chinese” (Hanzu), as opposed to a Chinese national, (i.e. a citizen of the PRC) and how these implicit meanings reflect a vision of statehood that excludes non-Han citizens of the PRC.
7 Bian and Xiao Citation2017; Hoffman Citation2010; Sun Citation2006.
8 Oakes and Schein Citation2006.
9 Bauer and Huatse Gyal Citation2015; Gruschke Citation2008; Ptáčková Citation2011; Sułek Citation2012.
10 I borrow from indigenous studies scholars the term “relational responsibility,” which conveys a sense of responsibility to others based upon social relationships that “require actions to reciprocate and renew these relationships.” See Corntassel Citation2013; Simpson Citation2013.
11 I collected information from a non-random sample of approximately 200 individuals at these various sites. I also conducted participant observation with about an equal number of individuals who published on public forums on social media. I conducted all interviews and exchanges in Lhasa and Amdo dialects of Tibetan, with the exception of one, which was conducted in English.
12 This thus represents a self-selected group successful in their Tibetan medium track education. In both Beijing and Chengdu, a significant majority of students in these fields were from Qinghai or Sichuan, perhaps owing to the strength of Tibetan medium instruction in local educational institutions, particularly in some areas of Qinghai. Additionally, Chengdu, being the capital of Sichuan, attracts many Tibetans from Sichuan. A significant community of Tibetans from the Tibet Autonomous Region also resides in Chengdu because of numerous TAR government offices in Chengdu.
13 Sun Citation2006. Feng and Zhan (Citation2006) also document the ability of new ethnic Chinese migrants, particularly of the elite groups, from places such as Guangdong, Guangxi, and Sichuan, to actualize permanent moves to the economically booming Hainan Province. These groups adopt a new identification with Hainan as home even as they maintain their old identities linked to their places of origin.
14 For other studies that look at the active relationships between people and places, see Myers Citation1991, Povinelli Citation2002, and Ingold Citation2000.
15 Cencetti studies the changing uses of the Tibetan term pha yul (literally “father’s land”) including its conflation with yul (“home” as in current place of residence) among a community of Tibetan pastoralists in Qinghai (Cencetti 2015). However, here I focus on the term yul. It was the most common term used in the communities I interacted with to refer to various scales of home places, including ancestral. In my study site in Golok, the term yul, particularly for older generations, specifically refers to ancestral homes. In my encounters, pha yul was a more formal, literary term that specifically meant ancestral land, but in a more abstract sense. It was usually used in contexts involving political units of country or nation, or to refer specifically to ancestral lands when interlocutors were from vastly different areas, such as between Tibetans from Lhasa and Amdo, or when foreigners were present.
16 This gratitude for the kindness of one’s parents (Tibetan pha ma’i drin lan) is also one of the sixteen moral codes attributed to the seventh century Tibetan king, Songtsen Gampo (Tibetan mi chos gtsang ma bcu drug). Although called “moral codes” several of the most important codes are directly related to upholding Buddhism. I thank Gedun Rabsal for bringing this to my attention.
17 Indeed there are prayers for enabling people to repay the kindness of their parents and songs of devotion praising the virtue of showing gratitude for one’s parents, for instance this song of devotion written in the early twentieth century and republished several years ago: http://www.tibetcm.com/classics/poem-songs/2014-12-10/2967.html Accessed March 11, 2018.
18 Exceptions of course exist, such as the city of Lhasa, which was established over a millennium ago, as well as Mao-era prisons and nuclear facilities in remote areas of Qinghai. See Rohlf Citation2013. For a discussion of how the “urban-rural” dichotomy was not a traditional concept in the Tibetan context, see Yeh and Henderson Citation2008.
19 The history and building up of these administrative seats varies by locality, but in general, their rapid development into urban sites with a density of multi-story buildings has only happened in the last couple of decades. For a brief account of the history of built settlements in a pastoral area in Sichuan, see Gaerrang Citation2015b, 265–266. For an account of built homes in Golok, see Sułek Citation2012, 238–241. For a study of the development of Qinghai Province through the settling of Han and Hui Chinese in the 1950s, see Rohlf Citation2016.
20 Aba Prefecture Gazetteer vol. 1 (Ch. A ba zhou zhi, shang ce) Citation1994, 218.
21 Survey of the Golok Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture (Ch. Guoluo zangzu zizhizhou gaikuan) Citation2009, 138–139; 204–208.
22 This was under the policy rubric of “ecological migration” (Chi. shengtai yimin) and “converting pastures to grasslands” (Chi. tuimu huancao). See studies by Yeh Citation2005, Citation2009a; Bessho Citation2015; Ptáčková Citation2015.
23 Fischer Citation2009.
24 See Fischer Citation2005; Hu and Salazar Citation2008; Ma and Tanzen Lhundup Citation2008. For a detailed study of how ethnic Chinese migrants utilized hometown and kinship networks to dominate greenhouse farming in peri-urban Lhasa, see Yeh Citation2013.
25 2008 saw unprecedented outbreaks of unrest across the Tibetan Plateau that scholars of Tibet have characterized as expressions of long-held grievances exacerbated by increased militarization and accelerated state development in Tibetan areas (Barnett Citation2009; Fischer Citation2009; Makley Citation2009; Makley Citation2018; Yeh Citation2009b).
26 Gaerrang Citation2015b.
27 For studies of the impact of this policy in Tibetan pastoralist areas in Sichuan, see Levine Citation2015 and Gaerrang Citation2015b; for case studies in Qinghai, see Bauer Citation2015; Ptáčková Citation2015; and Sułek Citation2012.
28 See Yeh and Henderson Citation2008 for a study of the urbanization process in the Tibet Autonomous Region.
29 For instance, in the Tibet Autonomous Region, four of the seven prefectures have been upgraded to municipalities in the last six years. For a discussion of the benefits associated with this move, see Yeh and Henderson Citation2008. For an overview of administrative upgrades in other Tibetan areas and the potential implications for ethnic minority protections, see Roche, Hillman and Liebold Citation2017.
30 The institutional challenges ethnic Chinese rural migrants face in terms of official registration in their new urban homes are a different issue. The creation of a state system of controlling movements of people based on a rural-urban divide and the difficulties of switching one’s household registration from a rural to urban categorization has been well documented. For a comprehensive summary of this literature, see Zhang Citation2001, 23–28. See also Chang 2009; Lee Citation2009; Liu Citation2011; Loyalka Citation2012; Pun and Chan Citation2013; Sun Citation2004.
31 Delhamo Citation2017. In addition to Chengdu's Wuhou neighborhood, pockets of Tibetan communities are also found in the Ximen and Chadianzi neighborhoods, and in nearby areas such as Shuangliu, Pixian, Dujiangyan, and Xinjing, often based on regional and institutional networks. For a brief history of Tibetan neighborhoods in Chengdu, see Trine Brox’s study of the Tibetan market concentrated adjacent to Wuhouci in Chengdu. She cites official census numbers from 2010 that counts the Tibetan population at over 30,000. This reflects the registered population but actual numbers are much higher (Brox Citation2017).
32 For an example of this, see Zenz Citation2017, 64. For a study of Tibetans’ online and offline discussions about ethnic discrimination against Tibetans in Xining, see Grant Citation2017. For a discussion of ethnic and racial prejudice in China, see Tuttle Citation2015.
33 This number is even higher for tertiary institutions with higher percentages of Tibetan students. See Zenz Citation2017, 62–63.
34 It is worth mentioning the special restrictions on mobility that Tibetans from any other province face within the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR). Lhasa is the largest Tibetan city, a major center for pilgrimage, and would potentially be an attractive site for urban employment for Tibetan graduates from all over the Tibetan Plateau. Indeed, graduates who are able to procure state sector employment (and residential status) in Lhasa are often happy to go. However, beginning in 2008, Tibetans who are not registered residents of the TAR are required to apply for travel permits to the TAR from their local security authorities. Once in the TAR, they face interrogation at their point of entry and must surrender their national identification cards that are held in order to ensure their timely departure from the TAR. They are additionally required to stay in specific hotels and to check in regularly with a security office associated with their home province. While it is beyond the scope of this article to examine in depth, it is worth considering how these restrictions further constrain urban opportunities for Tibetan graduates.
35 In their study of rural education in the late 1990s in the TAR, Postiglione, Ben Jiao, and Sonam Gyatso document households’ reluctance to send children to school because it would take children away from needed household labor such as herding. Postiglione et al. Citation2005.
36 This is also confirmed for semi-pastoral areas in the TAR in the study by Postiglione et al. Citation2005.
37 Tsering Bum (Citation2013) provides a first-hand account of the difficulties of such a family decision.
38 These figures include all residents of Qinghai Province. Tibetans generally comprise a majority of the population in Qinghai, which also has a smaller population of ethnic Chinese, ethnic Chinese Muslims, Monguors, Salars, and other groups.
39 All China Data Center. China Data Online. “China Yearly Provincial Macro-economy Statistics for Qinghai. Basic Statistics for Education.” Accessed December 10, 2017.
40 All China Data Center. China Data Online. “Qinghai Statistical Datasheet Citation2015 (Chi. Qinghai tongji nianjian Citation2015) Basic Statistics on Basic Education in Main Years.” Accessed December 10, 2017.
41 All China Data Center. China Data Online. “China Yearly Provincial Macro-economy Statistics for Qinghai. Basic Statistics for Education.” Accessed December 10, 2017.
42 Postiglione et al. document how in the late 1990s, the articulation of schooling as a means to attain a better life by semi-pastoralist households in Central Tibet echoed what they were told at meetings with local leaders. See Postiglione et al. Citation2005, 15.
43 According to the experience of a Tibetan professional’s family, a pastoral household in Ngawa, this has even created localized shortages of eligible wives for pastoral men, who have to seek women skilled in, and willing to do, pastoral labor from areas further afield.
44 While this is true for other areas in China, the over-dependency of Tibetans on state sector jobs, as discussed earlier, combined with the lack of suitable opportunities in the private sector, make the social pressure to gain state sector employment much greater for Tibetan graduates.
45 Zenz Citation2017, 76.
46 See Postiglione et al. Citation2005 for a discussion of household schooling decisions in late 1990s Central Tibet. See Makley Citation2018 for a discussion of the effects of the “New Socialist Village” and school consolidation initiatives on household schooling decisions in the 2000s in eastern Tibet.
47 Levine Citation1998; Goldstein Citation2012; Gelek Citation1998.
48 Some families reported increased herd sizes, which might be explained by the quality of their pastures or livestock management practices, among other factors. But in general, narratives of decreasing herd sizes as well as diversity of livestock were common. Furthermore, families with increasing herds, or poorer pastures, reported having to make financial and household labor decisions between culling herd sizes or renting more pastures from their neighbors.
49 For a brief overview of local government promotion of developing the livestock industry in the late-socialist reform period, see Gaerrang (Kabzang) Citation2015b.
50 For a study of the cultural politics of selling livestock for commercial slaughter vis-à-vis the Buddhist anti-slaughter movement, see Gaerrang (Kabzang) Citation2015a.
51 All China Data Center. China Data Online. “Qinghai Statistical Datasheet Citation2015 (Chi. Qinghai tongji nianjian 2015). Major Livestock Slaughtered in Main Years.” Accessed December 11, 2017. Some of the fluctuations in slaughter numbers might be explained by natural disasters, such as the snow disaster in 2005 that can explain the spike in slaughter numbers for large animals in 2006, or the anti-slaughter movement initiated by Serta’s Larung Gar in 2002. But one would expect the effects of this movement to be more visible in areas more closely connected to Larung Gar, such as in Sichuan and some parts of Golok. For an in-depth study of the anti-slaughter movement in Hongyuan County (Tib. Khyung mchu), Sichuan, see Gaerrang (Kabzang) Citation2012, Citation2015a.
52 All China Data Center. China Data Online. “Qinghai Statistical Datasheet Citation2015 (Chi. Qinghai tongji nianjian 2015). Number of Livestock in Main Years.” Accessed December 11, 2017.
53 All China Data Center. China Data Online. “Qinghai Statistical Datasheet Citation2015 (Chi. Qinghai tongji nianjian 2015). Population and Natural Changes in Main Years.” Accessed December 11, 2017. These figures, of course, include both urban and rural populations in Qinghai.
54 Bauer Citation2005 provides a study of the implementation of fencing policy in the Tibet Autonomous Region and the problematic “tragedy of the commons” rationale behind it. Notably, he discusses the difficulty of interpreting whether the desire for fencing expressed by pastoral communities was a grassroots sentiment, or an echo of official directives, or a bit of both: while fencing was a visible symbol of modern pastoralism that significantly reduced pastoral labor, it was also one of the few material resources pastoral communities could realistically procure from local governments. Yeh Citation2003 provides a study of grassland conflicts in eastern Tibetan pastoral areas arising from state allocations of land over pre-existing territorial claims that were aggravated by the visible marking of territory by fencing.
55 The exception to this in some areas is the harvesting of caterpillar fungus. In some areas of Golok, primary schools are given holidays during caterpillar fungus harvesting season to allow children to help their families harvest the lucrative fungus. However, in 2015, this holiday was not given in some counties, leading some families to speculate that this was a sign that caterpillar fungus harvesting would soon be discouraged in their area.
56 For a poignant sense of the pains of separation and assimilation as a Tibetan in Beijing, see Lhashamgyal’s essay, “Tibetans of Beijing.” Lhashamgyal Citation2015.
57 Sonamgön Citation2017.
58 For interviewees, maintaining “Tibetanness” included language, culture, and a way of thinking that was specifically Tibetan. The ability to send children to schools in home places largely depended on whether parents working in cities could move closer to home, or if they could send their children to stay with their parents or relatives. While many Tibetan professionals in Beijing and Chengdu schooled their children in these cities, this was often lamented as a less than ideal situation.
59 See also Andrew Grant’s Citation2017 study of Tibetan online and offline discussions about ethnic discrimination in Xining, where Tibetans challenged discrimination by claiming the legal rights promised to them as citizens.
60 More often than not, a direct reference to the significance of 2008 was not mentioned, but alluded to by phrases such as “in recent years” (Tib. nye char gyi lo) or “these days” (Tib. deng sang). That year marked a watershed moment in which Tibetans understood their sense of cultural crisis not as a parochial phenomenon, but as a sentiment that linked them to their Tibetan co-members across a broad spatially and culturally defined region.
61 See for instance Premier Li Keqiang’s high profile support for entrepreneurship (Zhao Citation2015): http://english.gov.cn/premier/news/2015/05/12/content_281475106023233.htm
62 See Holly Gayley’s Citation2013 study of the re-articulation of Buddhist ethics for social reform that began in the mid-1990s as a Buddhist response to market reforms in Tibetan areas, and became more broadly popularized in the post-2008 period.
63 For studies on the production of marginalization through education and economic structures in Tibetan areas, see Fischer Citation2009 and Postiglione Citation2008.