Agent politics of Chinese think tanks and cultural industry governance in China’s “new era”

ABSTRACT

This paper analyzes the relationship between the Chinese government and domestic think tanks. Chinese think tanks in the cultural sector have a strong demand-side orientation; that is, they closely follow the instructions of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in their stand on culture-related policies. Since 2018, the CCP has strengthened its control over the propaganda and cultural affairs, using think tanks to this end. Think tanks act as dual agents, maximizing the benefits offered by their two principals – the party government and private businesses, while prioritizing the former. The paper examines the development of the Putuo Island Park in Zhejiang Province and the Cultural Industry Research Institute, the key cultural industry think tank in this province. While upholding Xi Jinping’s aspiration of developing China into a “cultural great power,” cultural think tanks’ main function is to endorse government policies and guide businesses to support those policies when necessary. The CCP under Xi has intensified its manipulation of think tanks to reinforce its control over ideology and the socialist market economy, resulting in a more complex relationship between the state and think tanks.

KEYWORDS:

• Authoritarian resilience
• China
• cultural industry
• propaganda department
• think tanks

Acknowledgements

The authors wish to thank the anonymous reviewers and the journal editor for very helpful comments and suggestions on earlier versions of this paper.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes

1 Hayward 2018, 46.

2 For a related discussion, see Menegazzi 2018, 85–90.

3 By “demand side,” we mean that think tanks provide services in response to the needs of the state. Scholars have noted that law making in China also has a strong demand-side orientation, in that its main function is to strengthen the legitimacy of the state. Cf. Wang 2015, 4–7.

4 Shambaugh 2008a.

5 Since it was introduced at the nineteenth National Congress of the CCP in October 2017, the term “new era” has been used by CCP officials to refer to the current leadership of Xi Jinping, characterized by his promise to intensify reform paired with tightened control by the center. Some scholars argue that the advent of this “new era” marks the end of Deng Xiaoping's reform and opening-up line. Cf. Minzner 2018.

6 Li and Xu 2017.

7 Gandhi 2008; Li and Song 2022, 160–161.

8 Li and Song 2015, 355–357.

9 Qin 2020.

10 Recognizing the pejorative implications of “propaganda” in English, the CCP has changed the official translation of xuanchuanbu to “publicity department.”

11 “Cultural industry” here refers to those institutions that are most directly involved in the production of social meaning. Hesmondhalgh 2002, 11.

12 China Government Net 2018.

13 In addition to the party and the government, the decision-making process may also involve interest groups, individuals, and other actors seeking profit. For a related discussion, see Jones and Hameiri 2021.

14 Due to fiscal and administrative reform policies in the 1990s, government officials at the regional and local levels are much incentivized to generate revenue for their own benefit. See Song 2013.

15 Li 2017.

16 Keane 2011, 4–5.

17 For a discussion of collusion in contemporary Chinese politics, see Zhou 2010. Zhou argues that local governments collude with private bodies to promote their own interests in relation to their superiors.

18 The United Front Work Department, a key branch of the CCP, is tasked with overseeing non-CCP organizations and social groups so as to advance CCP policies, interests, and objectives.

19 Smith 1992; Pielke 2007.

20 Burke 2009.

21 McGann and Sabatini 2011, 20–23; Medvetz 2014.

22 Weaver and McGann 2022, 10–11.

23 Tanner 2002, Shambaugh 2008b, 838; Sleeboom-Faulkner 2007, 83–85; Fewsmith 2003.

24 Zhu 2013, 17–18.

25 Tsai and Lin 2021.

26 Neican reports are restricted CCP official confidential reports. There are different levels of internal reference, which means that relatively few senior officials have access to increasingly sensitive information.

27 Xue, Zhu, and Han 2018.

28 Zhang 2021.

29 Zhu 2020.

30 Zhu and Xue 2007.

31 Nathan 2003.

32 Tsai and Kou 2015, 3–7.

33 Garrick and Bennett 2018.

34 Ma and He 2018.

35 Bernheim and Whinston 1986.

36 Chen 2003.

37 Petition brokers usually are either retired CCP cadres or petitioners who understand how the petition procedure works. They assist first-time petitioners for a fee. But during politically sensitive times, government officials may hire petition brokers to provide information about prospective petitioners in the name of what the CCP calls “stability maintenance.” See Tsai, Liao, and Chen, 2019.

38 Ong 2019.

39 For a related discussion, see Frant 1996.

40 Tsai and Liao 2017, 299–301.

41 We discuss this further in Section 5.

42 Abby 2015, 550–551.

43 Chen 2021.

44 People’s Government of Zhejiang Province 2018.

45 For a discussion on leading and guidance, see Lieberthal 2011, 52.

46 For a discussion of China’s propaganda system and how propaganda is used by the CCP to consolidate its rule, see Brady 2008. For a discussion of China’s soft power, see Edney, Rosen, and Zhu 2020.

47 The fact that since its establishment in 2006, the Cultural Industry Promotion Association has frequently been chaired by the deputy head of the Provincial Publicity Department shows how closely linked it is to the provincial government.

48 Author’s interview with a CIRI staff member, December 16, 2019.

49 Qian 2019.

50 Zhejiang Provincial Development and Reform Commission 2019.

51 Author’s interview with a CIRI staff member, December 29, 2019.

52 This unit is led by the Provincial Publicity Department and is responsible for the management of the province’s universities, think tanks, and related institutions in the field of social sciences.

53 Author’s interview with a leader of CIRI, October 17, 2019.

54 From the minutes of a meeting within CIRI, June 3, 2021.

55 Putuo District Government 2021. The worship of Guanyin (the Bodhisattva Avalokiteśvara) on Putuo Island dates back to the Tang Dynasty.

56 Author’s interview with a leader of CIRI, January 9, 2020.

57 Author’s interview with a researcher at CIRI, November 19, 2020.

58 Author’s interview with a researcher at CIRI, May 4, 2021.

59 Author’s interview with a leader of CIRI, March 17, 2019.

60 Zhejiang Federation of Humanities and Social Sciences 2019.

61 Author’s interview with a CIRI researcher, May 4, 2021.

62 Author’s interview with a CIRI researcher, March 11, 2021.

63 The CCP uses this term to describe overly commercialized or inappropriately commercialized activities in spiritual, sacred, or moral contexts. See Xinhua News Agency 2017.

64 Rong 2017.

65 An example of “excessive vulgarization” is the habit, among some corporate-run Buddhist temples, of forcing visitors to make large donations before being allowed to burn incense and worship.

66 Wanjing Cultural Tourism Company 2019.

67 Author’s interview with a CIRI researcher, March 17, 2021.

68 Author’s interview with a CIRI researcher, April 9, 2021.

69 Wang and Groot 2018.

70 In 2019, Xi Jinping proclaimed, “it is necessary to combine our [country’s] historical heritage with its regional culture.” See Xi 2019.

71 Author’s interview with a CIRI leader, October 11, 2020.

72 Author’s interview with a CIRI researcher, April 6, 2020.

73 Dickson 2003; Pei 2016.

74 Li 2020.

75 Lu 2021.

76 Scholars have long noted how the CCP controls non-state-owned enterprises through Party branches and/or organizations. For a study of this phenomenon under Hu Jintao, see Thornton 2012.

77 Xinhua News Agency 2016. Author’s interview with a CIRI staff member, November 19, 2020.

78 Author’s interview with a CIRI staff member, November 19, 2020.

79 For a discussion of the functions of Chinese NGOs, see Howell, Shang, and Fisher, 2019.

80 Zhu and Xie 2014.

81 Lee 2017.

82 Qiu 2016.

83 Shambaugh 2015.

Additional information

Funding

This research was supported by the Taiwan National Science Technology Council Funding Agency, project number: 111-2410-H-001 -066 -MY2.

Notes on contributors

Wen-Hsuan Tsai

Wen-Hsuan Tsai (蔡文轩) is a Research Fellow at the Institute of Political Science, Academia Sinica, Taiwan. His main research is on Chinese political development, Chinese governance and innovation, comparative politics, and comparative authoritarian regimes.

Gan Li

Gan Li (李敢) is an Associate Professor of Sociology in the School of Management, Nanjing University of Posts and Telecommunications, China. He academic interests are in economic sociology, digital innovation in rural China, Chinese cultural industries, and Chinese think tanks.

Weiqing Song

Weiqing Song (宋卫清) is an Associate Professor of Political Science, the University of Macau, Macao SAR, China. He has academic interests in Chinese foreign policy with regards global governance and transnational norms, European politics, Sino-European relations, and Chinese post-socialist politics.