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Articles

The Pot Calling the Kettle Black: Populism and Thai Conservative Movements, 2006-2014

Pages 440-462 | Published online: 06 Jul 2023
 

ABSTRACT

It is often asserted that the Thai public, particularly members of the urban middle class in Bangkok, are inherently conservative, leading them to support mass protests preceding recent military coups. What is often overlooked is that support for these movements has not been consistent, with polls suggesting that at many points, the Bangkok public has opposed these protests. This prompts the question: why has the broader public supported anti-democratic conservative moments at key moments, but not others? This article argues that Thai conservative movements have received support when they engage in populism, in contrast to when these movements revert to more traditional, authoritarian mobilization tactics. This points to the possible existence of an alternative strand of Thai conservatism, one this article tentatively terms populist conservatism. Paying attention to this vague, yet powerful symbol of “the People” offers a more plausible explanation for the successes and failures of modern Thai conservative movements.

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank Professor Keechi Fujiwara of the Graduate School of Law and Politics, University of Tokyo, for his guidance in developing the thesis that became the basis of this paper. I also would like to thank Professor Meechi Ken of the Graduate School of Asia-Pacific Studies, Waseda University, for his guidance throughout the writing of this paper. Finally, my thanks to all my colleagues and friends in classes and our study group. Our discussions and the feedback I received have been very meaningful for me.

Notes

1 Sae Chua Citation2018, 220–223; Sombatpoonsiri Citation2018.

2 After Thaksin was ousted by the 2006 coup, and his Thai Rak Thai Party (TRT) dissolved, the pro-Thaksin faction regrouped and has continued to be electorally successful. TRT’s successor, the Palang Prachachon Party (PPP), headed the government after the 2007 election, while the Pheu Thai Party (PT) under Yingluck Shinawatra, Thaksin’s sister, won the 2011 election. PT is currently poised to be a major coalition partner with the Move Forward Party following this year’s election.

3 For studies of Thai southerners’ relationship with national politics, see Banthuwong Citation2017; Jory and Jirawat Citation2019; Unno Citation2019.

4 Pitidol and Techasunthornwat Citation2019, 52-54.

5 Connors Citation2021, 2.

6 Sinpeng Citation2021, 127-129.

7 Prachachat Thurakit Citation2008c, September 1, 2.

8 NIDA Poll Citation2014. Further discussion will be in the “Right-wing extremism: 2008 PAD and later PDRC” section of this paper.

9 Rakprachathai Citation2021, 296.

10 Sinpeng Citation2021, 146-147.

11 In this article, I use the term “People” with a capital P to refer to an imagined collective, while the uncapitalized “people” is used as the generic English version of the term. The same applies for “the Elite/elite.”

12 On the other hand, the Red Shirts, the supposedly populist supporters of Thaksin Shinawatra, notably did not include this word in their main organization’s name, the United Front for Democracy Against Dictatorship (UDD). However, as noted by many scholars, the binary between phrai (peasants) and ammart (elites) articulated by UDD closely resembles the politics of the people versus the elite used by populists.

13 Nelson Citation2007, 15.

14 Winichakul Citation2008, 24–25.

15 Sondhi Limthongkul and Suthep Thaugsuban, along with many other public intellectuals, constantly railed against Thaksin Shinawatra’s populism. .

16 Manachotephong Citation2017, 37-40, 48.

17 Satitniramai and Anusorn Citation2017, 67-68.

18 Satitniramai Citation2017, 289; Pitidol and Techasunthornwat Citation2019, 31–43.

19 Pitidol and Techasunthornwat Citation2019, 52.

20 Winichakul Citation2014, 7-14.

21 Manachotephong Citation2017, 25-29, 39.

22 Satitniramai Citation2017, 299.

23 Satitniramai Citation2017, 139–140.

24 Rakprachathai Citation2021, 292.

25 Sinpeng Citation2021, 36.

26 Sinpeng, as I do, treats the two protests by PAD as separate instances with distinct characteristics. She characterizes the first phase, the 2006 protests, as “people and groups who were united only in their opposition to Thaksin and shared little else in common,” and the second phase in 2008 “that followed the ousting of Thaksin […] lost some of its support from the labor movement and NGO community but gained support from the public that had not mobilized the first time around.” See Sinpeng Citation2021, 146-147.

27 Sinpeng Citation2021, 21, 80. Sinpeng also notes that royalism was not a key feature for any of the most popular PDRC Facebook groups before the coup, further complicating the strategic value of royalist appeal.

28 Glassman Citation2010, 1315; Tejapira Citation2002, 340; Tejapira Citation2019; Tamada Citation2009, 100.

29 The economic policy-based definition of populism, often used in the Thai political context, has generally fallen into disuse in comparative scholarship. See Weyland Citation2017, 51–52. In part this is because it does not match real-world cases of populism. Cf. Aslanidis Citation2017, 276–277 and Mudde and Kaltwasser Citation2017, 29–31.

30 Laothammathas Citation2006, 5–26.

31 Laothammathas Citation2006, 71–75.

32 Hawkins and Selway Citation2017, 383–387; Hewison Citation2017, 433-437; Phongpaichit and Baker Citation2008, 64-67.

33 Jansen Citation2011, 82.

34 See Weyland Citation2017, 50.

35 See for instance Bowie Citation1997; Jullapech Citation2005.

36 For key concepts of the discursive approach, see Laclau Citation2005, 73–74, 77–80; Stavrakakis and Katsambekis Citation2014, 123.

37 Jansen Citation2011, 82.

38 Brubaker Citation2017, 362, emphasis in the original.

39 Most notably, Western European right-wing populist parties often adopt traditionally left-wing language and welfare policies. See Betz Citation2013, 216. On populism’s inherent vagueness, see Brubaker Citation2019, 21.

40 Eatwell and Goodwin Citation2018, 9–28.

41 Akkerman, Zaslove and Spruyt Citation2017, 394; Moffitt Citation2020, 86.

42 Brubaker Citation2017, 374, emphasis in the original.

43 Moffitt and Tormey Citation2014, 392.

44 While populist rhetoric can theoretically be combined with a more authoritarian form of mobilization, the findings of this article indicate that such a mobilization tends to be less successful, at best a form of residual populism.

45 Prachachat Thurakit Citation2006f, March 16, 17.

46 Boonyo Citation2013b; Lo Ngoen Citation2013b; Phongjeen Citation2013.

47 Wannasilp Citation2006.

48 Khoniawklang Citation2005.

49 In 2006, with all the opposition parties boycotting the election, the PAD called for voters to cast a “No Vote” ballot in protest. In majority of districts in Bangkok, there were more No Vote votes than TRT candidate votes.

50 Nai Data Citation2013.

51 Pye and Schaffar Citation2008, 41, 43; Parichat Citation2006.

52 Matichon Weekly Citation2006a, March 17, 10.

53 Sombatpoonsiri Citation2018, 31-32.

54 Nation Weekly Citation2013b, November 15, 5.

55 Boonyo Citation2013a.

56 Jaowattana Citation2013.

57 Lertchoosakul Citation2020, 123–125, 129–132.

58 Brubaker Citation2019, 22.

59 Matichon Weekly Citation2005, December 30, 9.

60 During the 2006 PAD demonstrations, Prachachat Thurakit and Nation Weekly overwhelmingly featured articles supportive of the movement, while Matichon reportage was mixed.

61 Ostiguy 2017, 78-81.

62 Nation Weekly Citation2006, January 2, 10.

63 The literal translation would be “uncle headman,” with the word kamnan having a somewhat rural, folksy connotation.

64 Nation Weekly Citation2014a, February 14, 27.

65 The PDRC protest was dubbed the “whistle protest” (mob nok weed) because participants blew whistles at their rallies, in order to symbolize their whistleblowing against government corruption.

66 Prachachat Thurakit Citation2013b, November 28, 41. “V For Thailand” was a group that organized on Facebook and participated in PDRC protests, with members wearing the Guy Fawkes masks at protest sites.

67 Bumrungrat Citation2006. Occasionally, such ideological difference seemed to cause serious disagreement among the movement leaders. Cf. Matichon Weekly Citation2006b, March 24, 10.

68 Prachachat Thurakit Citation2006a, January 2, 1.

69 Maruekapithak Citation2006.

70 Rueaksirisuk Citation2006; Ongkan Citation2006.

71 Indeed, despite the anti-Thaksin camp’s disdain for populism, this sensibility occasionally led them to view Latin American left-wing populists’ nationalization of natural resources favorably as examples of this fight against US dominated global capital. See Meengoen Citation2006.

72 Loeffler Citation2016.

73 Prachachat Thurakit Citation2006g, July 20, 41.

74 Abromeit Citation2016, 236.

75 Kazin Citation2017, 30–38. Comic arts in the media also reflected these caricatures. Cf. Prachachat Thurakit Citation2006i, August 31, 37.

76 Prachachat Thurakit Citation2006h, July 27, 14.

77 Lertchoosakul Citation2012.

78 Saipracha Citation2006.

79 Prachachat Thurakit Citation2006d, March 2, 10.

80 Prachachat Thurakit Citation2013a, October 14, 41.

81 Khun Nammuek Citation2013b.

82 Bumrungrat Citation2014.

83 Connors Citation2008, 149.

84 Nation Weekly Citation2005, December 12, 10.

85 Pongphaiboon Citation2006b.

86 Prachachat Thurakit Citation2006b, January 30, 1; Prachachat Thurakit Citation2006c, February 9, 1.

87 The key issue in the 2013 protests was an Amnesty Bill proposed by the Yingluck administration which would have given amnesty to various political actors, including her father, Thaksin. The movement prior to the official formation of PDRC at the end of November was called the “anti-Amnesty Bill protest” for this reason. The conservatives supplemented this with by attacking the Yingluck administration’s rice subsidy scheme as emblematic of the government buying the votes of the poor, while also referring to American capitalists meddling in Thailand’s politics to allegedly spread democracy.

88 Khun Samranphakdee Citation2006.

89 A daily newspaper that is part of the Nation Group.

90 Jorkor 2006.

91 Pongphaiboon Citation2006a.

92 Prachachat Thurakit Citation2006e, March 16, 8. On the other hand, when described as being elitist, those sympathetic to PDRC would retort that such commentary was “full of Western hypocrisy” (Singhatecha Citation2014), “a surface-level understanding of class” (Yong Citation2013), or “nonsense by academics who are drunk with the notion that they are the most progressive” (Yong Citation2014).

93 Vorng Citation2017, 144.

94 Vorng Citation2017, 166–167.

95 Matichon Weekly Citation2008a, June 13, 9; Nation Weekly Citation2008a, June 27, 15.

96 Matichon Weekly Citation2008b, September 12, 11; Nation Weekly Citation2008c, September 5, 22.

97 Boonyo Citation2008b.

98 Prachachat Thurakit Citation2013b, November 28, 41.

99 Khun Nammuek Citation2013a; Matichon Editorial Citation2014; Nation Weekly Citation2013a, November 1, 11.

100 Lo Ngoen Citation2013a.

101 Wiriyaphanphongsa Citation2013.

102 Nation Weekly Citation2013c, November 29, 10.

103 Matichon Editorial Citation2008, 64–66; Matichon Weekly Citation2008d, November 28, 11; Prachachat Thurakit Citation2008f, December 8, 32.

104 Nation Weekly Citation2014b, May 9, 17.

105 Prachachat Thurakit Citation2008a, June 19, 32.

106 Prachachat Thurakit Citation2008c, September 1, 2.

107 Matichon Weekly Citation2008c, November 14, 12.

108 Nai Data Citation2013.

109 Bangkok Poll Citation2014b.

110 NIDA Poll Citation2014.

111 Bangkok Poll Citation2014a. At the time, PDRC was campaigning for the public to not participate in the election and used language that hinted at their preference for a military coup.

112 Phongjeen Citation2014.

113 Boonyo Citation2008b.

114 Boonyo Citation2008c.

115 Boonyo Citation2008a.

116 Inthep Citation2008.

117 People’s Alliance for Democracy Citation2009. A significant number of essays by PAD participants expressed aggressive hatred towards the police during the clashes that caused many injuries and notable deaths.

118 Srijanthra Citation2008.

119 Kongkirati Citation2017, chapter 3.

120 Inthana Citation2008.

121 An ancient Khmer temple located on the border of Thailand and Cambodia. In July 2008, UNESCO listed the temple as a World Heritage Site, which led to disputes between the two countries. PAD expressed strong jingoistic opposition, claiming that the nation’s sovereignty was being infringed upon by Cambodia.

122 Nation Weekly Citation2008b, August 8, 12.

123 Nation Weekly Citation2008d, November 7, 18. Characteristic of Sondhi’s style of speech in 2008, this line was full of expletives. “Jek” is a slur for Chinese, equivalent to “Chinks” in English. The rude “gu” and “mung” were also used for the last “I” and “you” in the original sentence.

124 This contrast of the “old right-wing [ethnic Thai right-wing]” like Samak against Sondhi’s ethnic Chinese identity was a public expression of “Chinese-ness” (Khwam pen jeen), previously not seen in Thai debates. See Eoseewong Citation2008.

125 Tejapira Citation2009, 280.

126 Kongkirati Citation2017, 85, 88–89; Rojanasunan Citation2008.

127 Asadong Citation2008.

128 Prachachat Thurakit Citation2008d, September 8, 2.

129 Prachachat Thurakit Citation2008e, November 24, 2.

130 Prachachat Thurakit Citation2008b, September 1, 2.

Additional information

Funding

None

Notes on contributors

Motoki Luxmiwattana

Motoki Luxmiwattana is a doctoral student in the Graduate School of Asia-Pacific Studies, Waseda University, Japan. His primary research interests are populism and conservatism in the context of Thai politics and comparative politics.

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