Singing the tune of sovereignty? India and the responsibility to protect

Abstract

With an ostensible commitment to sovereignty and non-intervention and a long standing involvement in United Nations peacekeeping operations, India's position on R2P seems puzzling. Still, despite the rhetoric about India being an ‘emerging power’, it often abstains from diplomatic engagement beyond its region, including in R2P situations. What explains its sceptical interpretation, cautious attitude and limited practice? The paper shows that India's position has evolved in three phases since 2005, from scepticism via calibrated engagement to renewed suspicions after the fallout of the Libya intervention. The paper argues that mainly domestic factors can account for these changes in India's R2P policy. Despite these changes, however, India's main concerns with R2P display remarkable consistency: an insistence on the consent of the state; a narrow definition of its scope involving a high threshold of violence; the exclusive authority of the UN Security Council; and a deeply ingrained scepticism towards the utility of the use of force.

Introduction

In spite of being considered an ‘emerging’ power, it is striking that India often abstains from active diplomatic involvement in concrete crisis situations beyond its region. Equally, India's long-standing contribution to robust peacekeeping operations by the United Nations contrasts with its lukewarm response to the principle of a responsibility to protect (R2P) populations from atrocity crimes such as genocide and crimes against humanity.1 After a very prominent, though highly sceptical role, at the end of the negotiations on R2P at the World Summit in 2005, India has expressed a very cautious attitude and pursued a limited diplomatic practice concerning R2P. This puzzle is what the present paper seeks to unravel and explain. Why has India refrained from actively engaging with R2P diplomatically despite its peacekeeping practice? The existing literature on the subject is deficient. One trend has been to solely attribute interest-driven motives and ‘risk-averse strategic culture’ to India's behaviour.2 Another tendency is to characterise its position as ambiguous,3 oscillating between strong criticism of Western interventionism and practices of regional hegemony.

This paper provides an alternative explanation. A systematic examination of R2P cases, notwithstanding the nuanced differences of each, is revealing: domestic sources through the presence of the so-called regional and other political parties in coalition governments and the role of individual decision-makers influence India's foreign policy-making process. In addition, India continues to privilege the principle of sovereignty and its corollary, non-intervention in the internal affairs of states. Inherent in India's respect for sovereignty is the notion of morality,4 which echoes the value of sovereign equality. This implies that India considers sovereignty to be a value worthy of respect and adherence. Accordingly, non-intervention is construed not just as a foreign policy objective rooted in rational considerations but a deeply ingrained moral value. This is not to suggest that India has always refrained from intervention in the internal affairs of other states. India's insistence on the principle of sovereignty is, to a large degree, however, a result of its earlier inferences in its South Asian neighbourhood. In addition, domestic and personality-based, individual-level factors considerably influence the rhythm of India's evolving position. These propositions are useful in appreciating the manner in which India has perceived, interpreted, deliberated upon and responded to R2P in recent times.

Based on a detailed analysis of statements, speeches and other policy pronouncements as well as personal interviews with experts and policy-makers in New Delhi, London and Berlin, the paper identifies three phases in the evolution of India's position on R2P. The first phase began in the years before 2005, continued through the World Summit in 2005 and lasted until June 2009. This phase was characterised by deep scepticism towards the institutionalisation of R2P. During this period, India's R2P policy was divided between the government in Delhi and the permanent representative of India to the United Nations in New York.

It was only with the first debate at the UN General Assembly in July 2009 that India began to positively engage with the concept of R2P;5 it recognised the notion of ‘sovereignty as responsibility’.6 It was during this second phase, which lasted from July 2009 to February 2011, that India's attitude towards R2P turned positive; its interpretation of R2P included a limited scope with exclusive authority vested in the United Nations Security Council. India's decision to go along with the consensus with regard to UN Security Council resolution 1970 in the wake of the crisis in Libya fits this interpretation.

With the unfolding of the crisis in Libya in 2011, especially in the wake of regime change, India became less supportive and more apprehensive of R2P, signalling the third phase. In this phase, which began in March 2011 and continues as of 2014, India's support for R2P has not faltered completely;7 its attitude is still positive but more sceptical towards pillar three of R2P that includes coercive measures.8 This position was confirmed by India's embrace of the Brazilian proposal of a ‘responsibility while protecting’ (RwP) in 2012, which demanded greater attention to the implementation of Security Council mandates and criteria for the use of force by the Council.9

The article is structured in the following manner. First, it narrates the historical experiences of India with an emphasis on recent Cold War history. Second, it examines India's policy after the end of the Cold War until 2004. Third, the analysis focuses on the period from 2005 to date. These three phases are delineated, discussed and interlaced with a number of concrete cases and multilateral debates, notably in the two years of India's non-permanent membership of the UN Security Council in 2011 and 2012. The article explains India's engagement with regard to the situations in Myanmar after cyclone Nargis, the end of the war in Sri Lanka, the intervention in Libya and the humanitarian crisis in Syria as well as its diplomatic interventions in UN debates. Fourth, an attempt is made to provide an explanation for India's stance on R2P. The conclusion elaborates the inferences drawn from the study.

In search of lineage: the imprint of history

India's perspective on R2P, if it is to be appreciated accurately, needs to be historicised. To this end, this paper asks: what is it in terms of experience and memory that shapes India's attitude, interpretation and practice vis-à-vis R2P? The British rule from 1858 to 1947 has had an indelible imprint on India's psyche, social fabric and public policy.10 For a nascent state that has managed to extricate itself from colonialism and emerge as an independent sovereign state, it was very important to preserve its newly found sovereign space. The stress on sovereignty and non-intervention in the internal affairs of other states is as much a rational consideration as it is a normative position.

The emphasis on non-intervention suited India, which was facing an uphill battle to consolidate its territorial integrity and deflect international attention from the dispute with Pakistan over Jammu and Kashmir. Besides, several parts of India—such as the semi-independent princely states, the Portuguese colony of Goa, the North-East, Tamil Nadu and Punjab—had resisted assimilation, thereby posing challenges to nation-building.11 The persistence of these difficulties reinforced India's normative resolve to stress non-intervention by great powers in its region. Jawaharlal Nehru, India's first prime minister, considered non-intervention to be the defining attribute of sovereignty and the foundational principle of international order.12 He based his foreign policy on this basic premise. The centrality of non-intervention was becoming the anchor for India's foreign policy, finding expression in the ‘five principles of peaceful co-existence’ (Panchsheel)13 and the formulation of non-alignment thereafter.

Non-alignment literally meant staying away from power configurations in the Cold War international system.14 Substantively, it implied preserving freedom, retaining independence and asserting autonomy on issues of international importance and matters of foreign policy.15 Notwithstanding the rhetoric of non-alignment, India was considered to be tilted towards the former Soviet Union rather than the United States; the Indo-Soviet treaty of friendship and co-operation in 1971 was the clearest manifestation.16 India's relationship with the Soviet Union diluted its adherence to non-alignment; it strongly criticised the British and French intervention in Egypt in the Suez Canal crisis of 1956 but responded only mildly towards the Soviet intervention stopping the Hungarian revolution the same year.17 It is worth noting that non-alignment had its roots not just in the ideological preference of Jawaharlal Nehru but also in the preferences of domestic constituencies such as political parties, which were echoing and advocating a left-of-centre worldview.18 In essence, from the very beginning India's foreign policy has been linked to the domestic theatre.

India's intervention in East Pakistan in 1971 is often considered a textbook illustration of humanitarian intervention by many Indian commentators as well as Wheeler.19 The outbreak of civil war in East Pakistan in March 1971 resulted in the influx of millions of refugees into the Indian state of West Bengal.20 India intervened in December 1971 to contain this flow and ‘liberate’ East Pakistan. India initially claimed that it was acting for humanitarian reasons to halt the ongoing ‘genocide’ in East Pakistan committed by Pakistani troops and militias.21 This line of justification, however, was not accepted by the international community. With the Security Council unable to reach a decision beyond transferring the issue to the General Assembly, the latter passed a US-sponsored resolution demanding ‘an immediate ceasefire’.22 All this prompted India to revert to the more acceptable justification of self-defence,23 and to draw a relevant inference:24 the international community would not accept humanitarian justifications for military interventions.25 India's intervention may also be attributed to the calculation by the Indira Gandhi Government that projecting strength26 and diverting attention from a brewing domestic economic crisis would enhance its popularity. Moreover, the very personality and leadership style of Indira Gandhi seemed to have galvanised the state towards intervention.27

The other significant instance of military intervention during the Cold War was the case of Sri Lanka in the 1980s. Ostensibly aimed at protecting the Tamil population in Sri Lanka suffering from an economic blockade against the rebels of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE),28 the initial Operation Poomalai consisted of the forceful delivery of humanitarian assistance by airdrops on 4 June 1987.29 India described the Sri Lankan actions as ‘almost genocidal in their objective’30 and India effectively stopped the Sri Lankan offensive with the airdrop. The following negotiations between the Indian and Sri Lankan governments yielded an agreement on a large-scale intervention, the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF), tasked with disarming the LTTE and ensuring a political conflict resolution process. In essence, the mission to Sri Lanka turned out to be a failure; the IPKF was mired in the fight with the Tamil Tigers, which it was not able to defeat even with more than 50,000 troops deployed.31 India withdrew its troops in 1990 in an attempt to limit the fiasco.

The operation ended up dissatisfying almost every group possible, including the Tamils in Sri Lanka and those residing in the state of Tamil Nadu in India. It ended up fighting Tamils instead of saving them, alienated the Tamil Tigers from India (which had previously trained and supported them), and significantly reduced India's influence on the island. The unpleasant experience of that endeavour rendered India much more risk averse on matters of intervention. It reinforced pre-existing preferences for upholding the sovereignty of states and adhering to non-intervention in the internal affairs as a matter of prudence and principle.

As the cases of East Pakistan and Sri Lanka demonstrate, India has significantly deviated from the proclaimed principle of sovereignty and non-intervention. For India, non-intervention referred to great powers refraining from interference in the South Asian region, where India saw itself as the natural regional hegemon. In addition, domestic considerations influenced Indian decision-makers in sending troops into East Pakistan and Sri Lanka, responding to the refugee flows in West Bengal and South India.

Post-Sri Lanka, India has not undertaken major interventions in its neighbourhood.32 In fact, the ‘Gujral Doctrine’—which derives its name from the former Prime Minister of India, Inder Kumar Gujral—reaffirms the centrality of sovereign territoriality, especially of small states in India's neighbourhood.33 Grounded normatively in non-reciprocity, the doctrine implies that India shall not insist on reciprocity but ‘give and accommodate what it can in good faith and trust with its neighbours’.34 The Gujral Doctrine was not just an innovative foreign policy framework; it heralded change and translated into a visible improvement in India's relations with its neighbours including Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nepal and Sri Lanka.35 As the IPKF left Sri Lanka, India encountered a turning point in its domestic politics as well. The end of the 1980s marked the advent of coalition politics in the Indian political system. Between 1989 and 2014, no political party has been able to form a government on its own, and has had to rely on a host of other parties to form a majority.

In search of trace: India's perspective on humanitarian intervention and R2P, 1991–2004

India's calibrated support for R2P in the contemporary period can be traced to its deep-seated apprehensions towards humanitarian intervention earlier. Throughout the 1990s, India remained unconvinced of the rationale for humanitarian intervention. There are several reasons for this circumspection. Primarily, India perceived humanitarian intervention as an infringement of sovereignty and viewed the utility of the use of force in international affairs as very limited. In addition, India continued to be sceptical of Western intervention in the light of failed promises and high selectivity in Somalia, the Balkans and Rwanda. Lastly, India wanted to avoid becoming the target of international criticism, owing to human rights violations in its own territory, especially in Jammu and Kashmir.

During the first Gulf War, India supported United Nations Security Council Resolution 678, which condemned Iraq for its occupation of Kuwait.36 However, when the United States and its allies began to pursue a coercive modus operandi, India—as a non-permanent member of the Security Council in 1991 and 1992—abstained from voting on Security Council Resolution 688, which was used by the US, the UK and France to justify imposing no-fly zones on Iraq.37 India condemned ‘the suffering and loss of life of innocent people’ but reminded the council that it was not for the international community to decide ‘what should be done, for that would impinge on the internal affairs of States’.38

It is the scale of India's involvement in UN peacekeeping that is often highlighted and compared with its cautious and reluctant support for R2P. These two practices are neither contradictory nor antithetical. India's participation in UN peacekeeping is conditional upon the respect for sovereignty, the consent of the government and clear rules of engagement. For example, India ascertained that there was no functioning government in Somalia in 1993. In that case the question of overriding the sovereignty of the state did not arise, and India waited until the United Nations was vested with authority to command the peacekeeping operation.39 It supported the United Nations Security Council Resolution 794 and provided a large contingent to the peacekeeping mission.40

India cites the international failure in Rwanda to make the argument that, contrary to conventional wisdom, it is not sovereignty that poses an obstacle for effective intervention. There was no such impediment in Rwanda. Rather, effective intervention is hindered by lack of political will and, more importantly, the absence of strategic interests for the great powers to commit themselves. As part of a non-aligned proposal,41 India was ready to commit troops to the UN mission in Rwanda during the genocide, but not without the backing of the UN Security Council.42 In the same vein, India did not hesitate to criticise the so-called ‘safe-zones’ in the former Yugoslavia by the United Nations Protection Force, which were not matched by an adequate mandate to defend them. According to the force commander from India, Satish Nambiar, the massacre in Srebrenica, which was one of these safe zones, was ‘waiting to happen’.43

India's wariness of humanitarian intervention grew more pronounced after NATO intervened against the former Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, because of the impending atrocities in Kosovo in 1999, as Western states warned. Characterising the operation as illegal, India pointed out that NATO was bypassing the United Nations Security Council and violating international law.44 India even co-sponsored a Russian draft resolution that condemned the intervention, although it was not a member of the Security Council at that time.45

After the episode of Kosovo, India's stance on intervention essentially remained the same: scepticism about the motives that underpinned such operations and circumspection of the attendant consequences. It joined the consensus of the non-aligned movement and reiterated its viewpoint that ‘under international law’ there was no right to undertake ‘humanitarian action’.46 It specifically rejected the moralist language of the proponents of humanitarian interventions who asked ‘can we stand by and let people die […]?’.47 That was ‘not the right question’, India argued one year after the Kosovo war, because while ‘superior firepower’ could ‘put an end to genocide by paramilitary gangs’, ‘fighting the roots of the problem required a long-term international presence’.48 This reflected its strategic culture in terms of a sceptical attitude towards the utility of the use of force in general.

It is therefore not surprising that a regional roundtable with non-governmental organisations, held by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty in June 2001, enlisted several criteria that would need to be established for any intervention. These include the restriction of the scope of possible crimes covered ‘to the most heinous crimes, such as genocide, imminent or ongoing gross human rights violations and mass murder’; fulfilment of the precautionary principles later enumerated in the final report (i.e. right intention, last resort, proportional means and reasonable prospects);49 and the stipulation that ‘if at all possible, intervention should occur on the basis of the invitation of the government of the state in which the intervention is to occur’.50 These points summarise India's priorities and concerns on the issue of humanitarian intervention.

Under the government of the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) coalition led by the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), India viewed R2P as interchangeable with ‘humanitarian intervention’. It therefore concluded in 2002 that the concept ‘has not found acceptance among the vast majority of the membership of the United Nations’ and that ‘[f]urther discussion of this subject would, in our view, be infructuous’.51 Nevertheless, the government also tried to present India as an upcoming major power and to improve its relations with the United States, and even considered sending a sizable number of peacekeeping troops to US-occupied Iraq in 2003.52 India's relatively mild criticism of the unilateral intervention indicated a more flexible view of international institutions and the use of force, beyond the rhetoric of ‘non-interventionism’.53

In search of pattern: the evolution of India's position on R2P, 2005–2013

First phase: sceptical interpretation and cautious go-ahead, 2005 to June 2009

During this phase, the Government of India perceived R2P as ‘humanitarian intervention by another name’, which is to say that it was highly sceptical. From the perspective of Western powers, India was ‘the worst of the recalcitrant’.54 The dominant research on the World Summit takes the same perspective, arguing that ‘most dangerous […] was the eleventh-hour attack launched by India’.55 Interviews with former policy-makers in India confirm the general story but shine a different light on this interpretation of events. India did try to block the whole section on R2P at the last minute and its actions were strongly influenced by the personal style of its permanent representative, Nirupam Sen.

India's priorities at the World Summit concerned development, disarmament and institutional reform, including, above all, changes in the set-up of the Security Council.56 For R2P, Sen did not even have a brief from New Delhi.57 Consequently Sen, a left leaning diplomat, constructed India's position himself, building on the long-standing position on humanitarian interventions, India's overall priorities as well as his own convictions. He accepted that atrocity crimes could justify international intervention, but he insisted that the threshold for this be very high. If at all possible, the government or at least the relevant regional organisation should consent to it. R2P could only work, he argued, if the institutional architecture of the United Nations is adjusted significantly. It had to apply to all states equally and every possibility of its misuse had to be avoided. As a start, the permanent members of the Security Council should declare that they would refrain from using their veto powers in situations where the General Assembly had determined R2P would apply. In an interview, he claimed that he put this request forward at a meeting during the negotiations, pointing to the demands by Western civil society for a similar restraint of the veto power. Once there was agreement on this issue, negotiators could have moved forward; ‘but not a single flag went up, not from Canada, not even from Switzerland’,58 Sen said. After this incident, ‘our position really hardened’.59

Consequently, Sen tried to ‘put in as many qualifiers as possible’.60 Sen's campaign to limit the applicability of R2P reached boiling point in the week before the vote on the final draft of the outcome document.61 Calculating for maximum impact, he threatened India's objection to the document even as heads of government had already started to land on the tarmac in New York. His main concern, he insisted, remained the restraint on the veto (‘a voluntary restraint, already a concession instead of a [legally binding] Charter amendment’, he said). At this late stage of the negotiations, he tried to change at least the title of the concept62—reflecting the less contested debate about the protection of civilians in peacekeeping. Some high-level diplomacy ensued that included the British Foreign Minister and the Canadian Prime Minister,63 who struggled to reach Prime Minister Manmohan Singh because he was already in the air.64 In the end, Sen could not add more qualifiers than he did.

Two factors help to explain why an individual ambassador with anti-American leftist views could shape India's agenda on R2P so strongly at the World Summit. First, Sen's rhetoric coincided with the views of many countries in the non-aligned movement, in which India liked to present itself as a leader.65 Second, Sen could feel comfortable in voicing his socialist views because of coalition dynamics. In the first United Progressive Alliance Government (UPA I), the Left Front supported the Congress-dominated coalition from 2004 to 2008. Shadowing the subsequent split between the Left Front and the more liberal-minded (and US-friendly) Congress party, New York and Delhi did not seem to have been on the same page on R2P at that time. Sen's superior, Foreign Secretary Shyam Saran, often did not agree with Sen, who frequently ruffled feathers in New York with his confrontational attitude. Indeed, Saran claimed that India has supported R2P all along.66 Because the coalition government depended on the outside support of the Left Front, Sen could be confident to air his leftist views, especially on an issue that was of little importance to the Ministry of External Affairs.

During the remainder of his time as permanent representative, Sen continued this policy. When UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon tried to formally establish the post of a Special Advisor on the Responsibility to Protect, India joined other states in obstructing the initial funding in the General Assembly's Fifth Committee in 2007. Since the General Assembly ‘had not yet produced a common understanding of the concept in question, particularly in the context of national sovereignty’, the move was ‘premature and lacking a legitimate mandate’.67 India also objected to the proposed renaming of the other related Special Advisor's title to ‘Special Advisor on the Prevention of Genocide and Mass Atrocities’ on the grounds that ‘mass atrocities’ had not been defined by the General Assembly or in the outcome document.68

India's stance on R2P was reflected in its response towards the situation in Myanmar in the context of a natural catastrophe. India's soft and engaging approach, stressing capacity-building and closed-door diplomacy, yielded concrete results. It provided humanitarian assistance to the afflicted population when cyclone Nargis struck Myanmar on 2 May 2008.69 This effort was in contrast to that of major Western donors and non-governmental agencies, which were denied access by the ruling State Peace and Development Council until 6 May 2008 and thereafter only with considerable restrictions.70 Bernard Kouchner, the French Foreign Minister, had resorted to R2P when he called for the forceful delivery of international aid to Myanmar.71 In contrast and demonstrating the fruits of its low-key engagement policy, India's aid was even delivered by Indian naval ships and a military transport aircraft.72

India's engagement in the final stages of the civil war in Sri Lanka is also symptomatic of its larger attitude, interpretation and practice with regard to R2P. In its determined effort to eliminate the LTTE, the Sri Lankan Government, headed by President Mahinda Rajapakse, pursued an operation that killed thousands of civilians, especially Tamils, and rendered many more homeless and internally displaced.73 India expressed a concern at ‘the humanitarian situation’74 and reiterated ‘that there is no military solution to the conflict’.75 In addition, it made clear that any ‘solution will have to be achieved within the political framework’, i.e. the sovereign territory of Sri Lanka.76

India's rhetoric became increasingly critical in its official pronouncements and statements, declaring that a continuation of military strikes after the ceasefire would be ‘totally unacceptable’.77 A stronger statement was made by the Minister for External Affairs, who not only expressed ‘unhappiness at the continued killing of innocent Tamil civilians in Sri Lanka’ but also reminded the Sri Lankan Government that ‘it has a responsibility to protect its own citizens’.78 The timing of this statement can be attributed to the elections to the lower house of parliament in India which were held between 16 April and 13 May 2009. This rhetoric also reflected significant domestic pressure for the UPA I Government from its parliamentary ally DMK, a major political party in the state of Tamil Nadu. The pressure was further amplified by protests in the state that culminated in a brief hunger strike by the chief minister, Muthuvel Karunanidhi from the DMK.79 Consequently, India pressed the Sri Lankan Government for three 48-hours unilateral ceasefires and extracted a commitment in late April that the armed forces would stop using heavy weapons.80

Still, India was playing a difficult game between domestic pressure and strategic objectives in destroying the LTTE and retaining influence in its neighbourhood. India had supported the Sri Lankan Government in fighting the LTTE long before, including with radar equipment and a naval blockade.81 Subsequent developments suggest that India did not want to antagonise Sri Lanka. In May 2009, at a special session of the UN Human Rights Council, India aligned with the Government of Sri Lanka against a European draft resolution,82 criticising the special session as ‘an unfortunate development’, thereby ‘politicising’ the work on reconciliation.83

Second phase: positive attitude and cautious commitment, July 2009–February 2011

During this phase, India expressed a positive attitude towards R2P, acknowledging its basic tenets while adhering to the fundamental aspects of its interpretation. Hardeep Singh Puri's takeover as the permanent representative of India at the United Nations in 200984 signalled the second phase of India's position on R2P. It was at the first General Assembly debate on R2P in July 2009 that the differences between Hardeep Singh Puri and Nirupam Sen became evident. Sen, in a new role as special advisor to the General Assembly president on R2P, drafted the president's concept note for the panel discussion and interactive dialogue on R2P.85 In an attempt to interpret the language included in the 2005 outcome document as narrowly as possible, Sen emphasised the value of sovereignty and identified an international role in upholding R2P as problematic, transforming ‘the people to be protected […] from bearers of rights to wards of this agency [of external intervention]’.86

With his arrival in New York, Ambassador Hardeep Singh Puri made it clear to UN officials that India was taking a new tack on R2P.87 A change of personality coupled with a change in the coalition arrangement—characterised by the absence of the Left parties in the second UPA coalition (UPA II)88—created a conducive environment for India to display a much more positive attitude towards R2P. This implied the creation of manoeuvrable space for the UPA coalition to move closer towards the United States, solidify the civilian nuclear co-operation agreement and become more receptive to R2P; change was indeed observable when Hardeep Singh Puri assumed office as the new permanent representative of India at the United Nations. At the first General Assembly debate on R2P, held in July 2009, India's official statement delivered by Puri dispelled apprehensions by stressing that ‘it has been its consistent view that the responsibility to protect its population is one of the foremost responsibilities of every state’.89 However, the statement continued to insist on several caveats, such as ‘peaceful means’, and the ‘need for extra vigilance’ in the context of application of R2P.90

A comparison with India's earlier policies demonstrates that the 2009 statement indicated a change in style and emphasis rather than in substance. For abstract multilateral discussions about a political concept such as R2P, however, style and emphasis matter a lot. India has come to see the state obligations under R2P as a long-established principle of ‘sovereignty as responsibility’ practised in democratic states such as its own. This insight explains, in part, why India has not engaged with or contributed to the evolution of the R2P norm conceptually. India contends that ‘responsibility’ is inherent to sovereignty and therefore does not perceive the need to coin a new international concept that entails something already codified in democratic constitutions as basic state responsibility.

In August 2010, for the first time, India explicitly conceded that a state could fail or be ‘unable to protect’ its population ‘for whatever reason’ and recognised that under those circumstances the international community ‘does not want to be an innocent bystander’.91 However, it voiced scepticism regarding the efficacy of early warning mechanisms for the implementation of R2P in so far as they did not involve member states.92 While accepting that states are obliged ‘to protect their citizens’, India highlighted the predicament of the state in dealing with militant groups.93 It underscored that under such situations ‘states cannot but take appropriate action’,94 qualifying its support for the first and second pillars of R2P. This point of view resonates with its rationale for the Armed Forces Special Powers Act which allows wide-ranging discretion for the operation of armed forces in counter-insurgency operations. The Act continues to be operational despite pleas from several quarters including members in the Union Cabinet for its repeal.95 With regard to the protection of civilians, India emphasised that the ‘response of the Security Council and the international community must be proportional to the threat involved’ and maintained that ‘force is not the only way of protecting civilians’.96

Indeed, India's support for pillars one and two of R2P echoes its long-standing conviction that, except in very rare cases, states are best equipped to respond to crisis situations. The task of the international community is therefore to assist and support the building of the capacities of governments in fulfilling their obligations. Similarly, India endorsed improving the analytical capacities of the UN Secretariat, including for early warning. At the same time, it reminded its fellow member states that in the cases of Rwanda and Srebrenica, which they cite frequently, missing information and analysis were not the central problem; the problem was competing ‘strategic, political or economic considerations of those on whom the present international architecture had placed the onus to act’.97

India's voting behaviour and statements during the crisis in Libya in early 2011 confirmed its cautious attitude towards R2P. India's vote in favour of resolution 1970 could be seen in the context of its presence in the Security Council, which considerably reduced its leeway for opting out of the exercise; rather, it was impelled to take a concrete stance on the issue. India also felt it had to show solidarity with its traditional Arab and African non-aligned partners, urging it to vote for the referral of the situation in Libya to the International Criminal Court,98 despite its opposition to the Rome Statute.99 More importantly, India was considerably influenced by the need to protect its own nationals caught in the quagmire.100

Third phase: proven apprehensions, serious concerns and limited engagement, March 2011–

India's serious concerns with the implementation of Resolution 1973 in Libya signal the third phase of its position on R2P. This phase is marked by heightened attention to any measures under the third pillar of R2P and the demand for accountability and monitoring measures in its embrace of the Brazilian proposal of a responsibility while protecting (RwP), formalising its previous insistence on caveats for the use of force. Available evidence suggests that India was indeed ‘weary (sic)’101 of the endeavour in Libya from the very beginning and preferred a ‘cautious and gradual approach’ in dealing with the situation.102

When the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1973 approving a no-fly zone over Libya as Gaddafi's troops were advancing on the rebel stronghold of Benghazi, India abstained. The rationale for the decision was clear. It ‘deplored the use of force, which was totally unacceptable’ and stressed ‘the importance of political efforts’ to address the situation.103 In addition, India said that the resolution ‘authorises far reaching measures under Chapter VII of the UN Charter’ and expressed its typical view that there should be ‘full respect for sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity of Libya’.104 The use of the expression ‘all necessary measures’ in paragraph 4 of the resolution, amounting to a blank cheque for the intervention, was not palatable and struck a jarring chord for India, which decided at that point to not go along with the resolution.105 Several scholars make a link between India's abstention and domestic considerations such as the presence of a large Muslim population within its territory.106 While it remains unclear to what extent Indian decision-makers were moved by this consideration, leaders of the Muslim community, a traditional constituency of the Indian National Congress party, had called the intervention ‘unacceptable’ before the vote.107

As the NATO-led intervention in Libya effectively came to assist the rebel forces, leading coalition members declared: ‘so long as Qaddafi is in power, NATO must maintain its operations so that civilians remain protected’.108 The experience confirmed India's suspicion of the lofty rhetoric. An official statement read, ‘we find several member-states all too willing to expend considerable resources for regime change in the name of protection of civilians’.109 As India stressed, ‘almost all aspects of resolution 1973, namely pursuit of ceasefire, arms embargo, and no-fly zone, were violated not to protect civilians […] but to change the regime’.110

In effect, India articulated its core concerns relating to R2P forcefully and with considerable clarity. In Libya, India witnessed what it had always dreaded seeing—the instrumentalisation of R2P to justify regime change. The resulting debate led India to specify its R2P policy further. Notably, it embraced Brazil's proposal of responsibility while protecting, which reflected its previous focus on stringent criteria and conditions for the use of force.111 In effect, India ‘reiterated’ that ‘the real problem lies with the interpretation and application of Pillar III’.112 The Indian point of view was that ‘the support aspect including the capacity building under Pillar II, should take precedence over the response aspect under Pillar III’.113 It rejected the addition of ‘violations’ in the 2012 report by the Secretary-General on these grounds,114 while its permanent representative to the United Nations Singh Puri stressed: ‘the trigger point for invocation of R2P is not human rights per se […] it has to be mass atrocities’.115 Further, the concern was that ‘R2P must not become a tool in the hands of the powerful to pressurise weaker states, and bring about regime change’.116

India continued to pursue diplomatic practices in support of R2P in Syria. India was particularly wary of Western (and Arab) attempts to condemn regime violence, impose sanctions, supply weapons to the rebel forces or even intervene militarily. India claims credit for removing a stalemate in the Security Council (temporarily), as it took on a diplomatic initiative in August 2011.117 Under its presidency, the Security Council issued its first presidential statement on the crisis,118 something that had been fought over for months. When its objections against the first Security Council draft resolution were removed, it joined the consensus on the second draft resolution in February 2012. These objections referred to the threat of sanctions or even (implied) military measures and avoiding selectivity in calling for the renouncement of violence.119 In the summer of 2013, while criticising the Syrian Government for the use of chemical weapons, India nonetheless insisted that any course of action would have to be ‘under the auspices of the UN and not outside its framework’.120

In a slight turnaround, India voted in favour of two resolutions which were critical of Sri Lanka's record with regard to reconciliation and accountability for alleged war crimes and crimes against humanity in 2012 and 2013 at the UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC).121 The vote can be largely attributed to domestic demands from Tamil Nadu, especially from the DMK.122 India did, however, help to tone down the language of the 2012 resolution and emphasise its core priority for state sovereignty: ‘[a] democratic country like Sri Lanka has to be provided time and space to achieve the objectives of reconciliation and peace’.123

However, at the UNHRC in March 2014, India abstained from the resolution that asked the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights to ‘undertake a comprehensive investigation into alleged serious violations and abuses of human rights and related crimes by both parties in Sri Lanka’ between 2002 and 2009.124 While domestic factors were decisive for the decision,125 the abstention was in line with India's long-standing rejection of country-specific resolutions and its scepticism with regard to an international role in criminal investigations.

In search of explanation: making sense of India's stance on R2P

What explains India's perspective and position on R2P? The existing literature on the subject is useful but only to a limited extent. The first strand of explanation interprets India's stance on R2P in particular and its behaviour in general as characterised by ‘ambiguity’ or ‘ambivalence’.126 If ambiguity implies ‘the fact of something having more than one meaning’127 or ‘the quality of being open to more than one interpretation’,128 India's perspective on R2P is clearly unambiguous. The central tendency of India's stance is revealing: a clear privileging of the principle of sovereignty and territorial integrity and its corollary, non-interference in the internal affairs of sovereign states. Where sovereign states are seen as culpable of mass atrocities or gross human rights abuses—such as the former Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Sri Lanka or Syria—India's tilt has been towards the side of caution, which implies that, above all, it favours the principle of sovereignty.

It is worth emphasising that India's behaviour has generally defied a priori theoretical postulates. India's position on R2P is grounded in its social and cultural roots, shaped by its historical experiences and influenced by domestic and individual-level factors. An identity-based understanding may be useful in shedding light on India's perspective. To a certain extent, India is overwhelmed by how other actors (i.e. states) perceive it currently; a rising or an emerging power is the term in vogue. Accordingly, India is conscious of its fluid identity in international society. The dilemma is whether to act ‘responsibly’ so as to satisfy the expectations or to carve out its own niche and become a major power on its own terms. Unlike Brazil, which has promoted the idea of RwP, India is merely responding to the discourse rather than fleshing out its own proposal.129 An attitude of cautious support towards R2P amidst acute concerns such as the infringement of sovereignty and the legitimacy of such enterprises probably echoes this tension.

India's behaviour defies the description of the state as a unitary and rational actor.130 It would be futile to understand India's perspective on R2P without recognising its internal dynamics. The deliberation over R2P has been initiated and shaped during the coalition era. India's stance on Sri Lanka is a case in point. The pressure exerted by the DMK—a political party in Tamil Nadu with whom the INC, the prime constituent of the UPA coalition government was keen to sustain the electoral alliance—was influential. India shifted the scale and voted in favour of resolutions that were mildly critical of Sri Lanka at the UNHRC in 2012 and 2013.131 India's turnaround yet again at the UNHRC in 2014 by deciding in favour of abstention demonstrates that domestic considerations are not just influential but tied to electoral calculations and swing considerably, thereby vacillating India's foreign policy, especially on the issue areas of humanitarian intervention and R2P.

Another significant variable that can explain India's practice with regard to intervention and R2P is the personality and leadership of decision-makers. The priorities, preferences and idiosyncrasies of leaders matter in the Indian context. Nirupam Sen's leftist views contrasted those of Shyam Saran, the foreign secretary, at the World Summit, as well as those of Sen's successor as permanent representative to the UN, Hardeep Singh Puri.

Individual ambassadors at the United Nations can achieve such disproportionate influence because of the very limited personnel capacities of the Ministry of External Affairs,132 especially in terms of policy-planning and the UN divisions. This means that tensions in India's foreign policy are often not resolved officially. These individual differences reflect larger debates within the Indian strategic community and the administration. While decision-making in the Ministry of External Affairs is often insulated from these debates, the political leadership's priorities also take into consideration such strategic ideas, for example India's strong support for the Brazilian initiative of RwP may have been influenced by a priority for co-operation with other emerging powers.

Indeed, in the last two decades or so, India has exercised very little norm entrepreneurship in international politics in general, and concentrated instead on ensuring favourable conditions for domestic development. This contrasts with India's earlier leadership at the United Nations, with Prime Minister Nehru championing a foreign policy based on such moral principles as decolonisation, nuclear disarmament and anti-racism.

Apart from the domestic and institutional factors, it is important to reflect on the social and cultural moorings of India and analyse their probable influence in shaping the discourse on R2P. Quite often, the notion of non-violence is invoked to highlight the pacifist tradition that India seemingly adheres to in its conduct in international relations.133 In the words of Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi, ‘the doctrine of non-violence is more natural for the people at large than that of violence’.134 It needs to be stated that within the social contours of the Indian landscape, non-violence is more rhetoric and less an enduring social practice.135 As Ambedkar, a social and political leader, observed: the perpetration of violence is a ‘fact […] though not many will readily believe this’.136 The social order in India is witness to violence along the lines of caste, religion, gender and region in a regular and systematic fashion.137

Violence has become so common and a matter of almost everyday occurrence that it is considered normal in the minds of people. In the extremely stratified society of India, violence perpetrated towards minorities, women and the so-called ‘lower caste’ groups, viz. Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and Other Backward Classes has not been taken seriously by policy-makers.138 It may be argued that decision-makers who are socialised in this matrix of violence do not just end up saying that the sovereign state is the final arbiter of all issues but also insist firmly that the threshold level of violence, for sovereignty to be trumped and external intervention to step in, ought to be very high, pointing to the insistence on a narrow definition of the scope of R2P in terms of its four core crimes.

Nonetheless, a related point that deserves to be mentioned is that in the Gandhian philosophical tradition, means do matter considerably and have to be justified on their own terms irrespective of outcomes.139 In the context of the R2P debate, India's stress on peaceful means despite the ends may be seen as flowing from this tradition. It is pertinent to note that while emphasising the means employed in any endeavour, the Indian tradition simultaneously exhibits a preference for order. In the external sphere, India's preference for order is manifest in its defence of the sovereign state during the course of the R2P debate; in the internal domain, it is evident in its continual quest for maintaining domestic stability. It is this preoccupation with order that translates into India's fixation with sovereignty and its corollary, the principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs of states.

Conclusion

The purpose envisaged in this study has been to explain India's interpretation, attitude and practice vis-à-vis R2P and the change, if any, with respect to these parameters. The preceding analysis makes it clear that India's stance on R2P, notwithstanding the nuances, has been cautious and calibrated. India is in agreement with pillar one and pillar two but apprehensive about pillar three.

India's respect for sovereignty underlies its basic position on R2P; the influence of domestic factors explains the identification of three phases in the evolution of such a position. It is important to stress that various factors contribute to India's perspective on R2P. While the notion of sovereignty is critical, it can be considered as a background variable setting the tone of India's position. This factor is modulated sufficiently by domestic and individual-level factors. India's practice on R2P and concrete stance during an actual crisis situation depends on the interplay between these factors, where coalition dynamics, public opinion and the preferences of individual policy-makers have to be taken into account.

This paper has argued that India's policy on R2P has evolved in three phases since 2005. The first phase was marked by deep scepticism. The second phase was characterised by a positive attitude. The third confirmed its apprehensions while not watering down the basic support for R2P entirely. As a matter of principle, India has been forthright in stressing that sovereignty is the cardinal principle in international relations, taking precedence over the international responsibility to protect. Its dogged insistence on the consent of the state before the entry of the international community manifests this in great clarity.

India's emphasis on the authorisation of the United Nations Security Council—notwithstanding its unrepresentative character—for applying R2P and undertaking intervention makes it clear that legitimacy matters unequivocally. The idea is that if sovereignty has to be overridden at all, in the rarest of rare circumstances, it ought to command a robust mandate that emanates from the United Nations. In effect, these caveats imply that, if ever questions pertaining to the application of R2P arise, India tends to grant the state in question a reasonable benefit of the doubt. This is evidenced in India's stance on Sri Lanka, Libya and the ongoing crisis in Syria. In essence, this would mean allowing considerable time and space for the erring sovereign state to make necessary amends and fulfil its ‘responsibility to protect’ its population.

In India's worldview, sovereignty connotes the responsibility to protect its subjects; therefore, there is no need to assign a new label such as ‘responsibility to protect’. That is why India did not follow the style of Brazil (with ‘RwP’) in a conceptual contribution to the global debate on R2P. However, much more deeply, India also might not have wanted to consciously engage in a debate over a concept where it felt its core foreign policy principles were at stake and was only gradually accepting R2P as a fundamentally different idea than the long-rejected notion of humanitarian intervention.

India's foreign policy does not preclude its participation in a global debate on R2P. Its support for R2P is based on the premise that the sovereign state will not be circumvented but rather rendered functional so as to discharge its duty in a responsible manner. Ultimately, whether India will display more leadership or norm entrepreneurship on R2P depends on the priorities of its leaders and how virtuously they manage to play the tune of sovereignty.

Acknowledgements

The authors thank Gregor Hofmann, Benoy Khare, C.S.R. Murthy, Philipp Rotmann, Oliver Read and the two anonymous reviewers for constructive comments and excellent feedback. This article is part of a collaborative research project on Global Norm Evolution and the Responsibility to Protect (www.globalnorms.net), generously funded by the Volkswagen Foundation through its Europe and Global Challenges programme.

Notes

^1. For an overview of the concept of R2P and its empirical evolution, see Rotmann, Kurtz and Brockmeier in this issue.

^2. See Raja Mohan, ‘India, Libya and the Principle of Non-Intervention’.

^3. See Virk, ‘India and the Responsibility to Protect’.

^4. For a discussion on ‘morality of states’, see for instance, Beitz, Political Theory and International Relations.

^5.Puri, ‘Statement at the General Assembly Plenary Meeting’.

^6. Ibid.

^7.Puri, ‘Remarks at the Informal Interactive Dialogue’.

^8.Puri, ‘Statement at the Informal Interactive Dialogue on State Responsibility and Prevention’.

^9. See the introduction to this special issue for a full narrative of the evolution of R2P.

^10. See for instance, Singh, ‘Address in Acceptance’.

^11. See for instance, Brass, The Politics of India.

^12. Jawaharlal Nehru observed: ‘[…] Nations by cooperating with one another, in tolerance, and recognising diversities, by respect for one another as sovereign nations, by not interfering in one another's affairs, can survive, progress and advance […]’. See Nehru, Foreword to Paths of Peace..

^13. Panchsheel, or the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence, which were enunciated on 29 April 1954, is based on the following principles: (1) Mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty; (2) Mutual non-aggression; (3) Mutual non-interference; (4) Equality and mutual benefit; and (5) Peaceful co-existence. See India, Ministry of External Affairs, ‘Joint Statement on Panchsheel’.

^14.Nehru, ‘Broadcast to the Nation’.

^15. See for example, Mansingh, India's Search for Power, 14.

^16.Mitra and Schottli, ‘The New Dynamics’, 32. On the treaty with the Soviet Union, see Mohanty, ‘The Indo-Soviet Friendship’.

^17. See for instance, Mazumdar, ‘India's Search for a Post-Cold War Foreign Policy’; and Alam, ‘The Concept of Non-Alignment’. See also Harshe, ‘India's Non-Alignment’.

^18.Mansingh, Nehru's Foreign Policy, 4.

^19. Interviews with Indian experts, Delhi, April 2013; Wheeler, Saving Strangers, 55–77.

^20. Marwah puts the number of refugees that had crossed the border from March to December 1971 at 11 million. Marwah, ‘India's Military Intervention’, 560.

^21. Wheeler, Saving Strangers, 63.

^22.UNGA, ‘Question Considered by the Security Council’.

^23.Murphy, Humanitarian Intervention, 98.

^24.Banerjee, ‘India and R2P’, 94.

^25.Hall, ‘Tilting at Windmills?’, 9.

^26. See Cohen, India: Emerging Power, 58, 84, 135 and 301.

^27. Critics have characterised Indira Gandhi's foreign policy as paranoid. See Cohen, India: Emerging Power, 19 and 35.

^28.Tyagi, ‘The Concept of Humanitarian Intervention’, 895.

^29. R. Hariharan, ‘A Tale of Two Interventions’. The Hindu, 28 July 2012; ‘Gandhi Opponents Back Move’. The New York Times, 5 June 1987.

^30. According to a statement handed over to the Sri Lankan foreign minister. See Dixit, Assignment Colombo, 99.

^31.Richardson, Paradise Poisoned, 533.

^32. The only exception is India's intervention to restore the government of the Maldives in 1988 (that had been ousted by a coup). India intervened, however, only after the request was received from the government of the Maldives. See Hagerty, ‘India's Regional Security Doctrine’, 359.

^33. Gujral articulated the doctrine when he was the Minister of External Affairs during the United Front government with Deva Gowda as the prime minister in 1996. The United Front was a Janata Dal-led coalition government comprising 13 parties which assumed office on 1 June 1996 with the support of the Indian National Congress. Inder Kumar Gujral was the Minister for External Affairs and later became the prime minister on 21 April 1997. He continued to hold the portfolio of external affairs throughout that government. See Gujral, ‘Aspects of India's Foreign Policy’, 161; Gujral, ‘India's Foreign Policy’; and Cartwright, ‘India's Regional and International Support’, 407–408. See also Nayar, ‘Policy and Performance under Democratic Coalitions’, 25.

^34.Gujral, ‘Aspects of India's Foreign Policy’, 161.

^35. See Harshe, ‘South Asian Regional Co-operation’, 1104–1105. See also, Gupta, ‘India in the Twenty-First Century’, 307–310.

^36.UNSC, ‘Resolution 678’.

^37.UNSC, ‘Resolution 688’.

^38.UNSC, ‘Meeting Records, 2982^nd Meeting’.

^39.Krishnasamy, ‘A Case for India's Leadership’, 228.

^40.Singh, ‘Speech at 48^th Session’.

^41.UNSC, ‘Report of the Independent Inquiry’.

^42. Interview with Chinmaya R. Garekhan, New Delhi, April 2013.

^43. Interview with Satish Nambiar, New Delhi, 19 April 2013.

^44.Sharma, ‘NATO Military Action’.

^45.UNSC, ‘Draft Resolution’.

^46.UNSC, ‘Meeting Records, 4037^th Meeting’, 22.

^47.UNSC, ‘Meeting Records, 4109^th Meeting’, 15.

^48. Ibid.

^49. See ICISS, ‘The Responsibilty to Protect’, 32–37.

^50.ICISS, ‘Regional Roundtable Consultation’.

^51.UNGA, ‘Official Records, Fifty-seventh Session’, 16.

^52. In face of deep domestic resentment, India ultimately decided against sending troops to Iraq. See John Kifner, ‘After the War: Other Forces; India Decides Not to Send Troops to Iraq Now’. The New York Times, 15 July 2003.

^53.Raja Mohan, ‘The Changing Dynamics’, 38.

^54. Interview with Western diplomat, London, June 2013.

^55.Bellamy, Responsibility to Protect, 88.

^56. Interview with Ambassador B.S. Prakash, Joint Secretary United Nations (Political Division) in 2005, Delhi, April 2013

^57. Here and in the following: interview with Nirupam Sen, Delhi, March 2014.

^58. Ibid.

^59. Ibid.

^60. Ibid.

^61. Based upon extensive (but only Western) interviews, Pollentine claims that Sen made his final demand in a meeting of the negotiating Group of 15 (of which he was a member) on 12 September, one day before the adoption of the draft by the General Assembly. See Pollentine, ‘Constructing the Responsibility to Protect’, 341–42.

^62. See Traub, The Best Intentions, 385–386.

^63. For more details concerning the role of Europe during the World Summit, see Brockmeier, Kurtz and Junk in this issue.

^64. Interview with British diplomat, London, June 2013.

^65. Interview with former UN official, London, June 2013.

^66. Interview with Shyam Saran, Delhi, April 2013.

^67.UNGA, ‘Summary Record of the 23^rd Meeting’, 9; Teitt, ‘Paper Tiger or Platform’, 200.

^68. UNGA, ‘Summary Record of the 23^rd Meeting’, 10.

^69.Selth, ‘Even Paranoids have Enemies’, 386.

^70. Ibid.

^71. See Brockmeier, Kurtz and Junk in this issue.

^72.India, Ministry of External Affairs, ‘On India's Assistance’.

^73. See UNGA, ‘Report of the Secretary-General's Panel’.

^74.India, Ministry of External Affairs, ‘Indo-Sri Lanka Joint Press Release’.

^75.India, Ministry of External Affairs, ‘Suo-Motu Statement’.

^76. Ibid.

^77.India, Ministry of External Affairs, ‘Statement by EAM on the Situation in Sri Lanka’, 17 April.

^78.India, Ministry of External Affairs, ‘Statement by EAM on the Situation in Sri Lanka’, 22 April. Emphasis added.

^79. ‘Karunanidhi Launches Indefinite Fast on Lankan Issue’. Livemint & The Wall Street Journal, 27 April 2009.

^80.Moorcraft, Total Destruction of the Tamil Tigers, 140–144

^81.Gokhale, Sri Lanka, 121, 125.

^82. Sri Lanka introduced a counter-draft that was adopted by a majority of the Human Rights Council, including India. See UNHRC, ‘Assistance to Sri Lanka’.

^83.India, Permanent Mission of India, ‘Statement by H.E. Mr A. Gopinathan’.

^84. ‘Hardeep Singh Puri Named India's Permanent Envoy to UN’. The Indian Express, 16 April 2009.

^85. Interview with Nirupam Sen, New Delhi, March 2014.

^86.UNGA, ‘Concept Note on the Responsibility’.

^87. Interview with Edward Luck, Berlin, June 2013.

^88. The Left Front withdrew support to UPA I coalition on 8 July 2008; thereafter, the coalition continued to rule owing to the support of the Samajwadi Party (SP). The UPA II coalition, which did not rely anymore on the Left, was elected in May 2009.

^89.Puri, ‘Statement at the General Assembly Plenary Meeting’.

^90. Ibid.

^91.Puri, ‘Statement at the Informal Interactive Dialogue on Early Warning’.

^92. Ibid.

^93. Puri, ‘Statement during the Open Debate’.

^94. Ibid.

^95. See for instance, Sandeep Joshi, ‘Army's Stand Makes it Hard to Amend AFSPA: Chidambaram’. The Hindu, 7 February 2013. See also ‘Looking Within: Chidambaram Makes a Point’. The Statesman, 6 October 2013.

^96.Puri, ‘Statement during the Open Debate’.

^97.India, Permanent Mission of India, ‘Intervention by Ambassador Hardeep Singh Puri.

^98. Hardeep Singh Puri explained that the Arab League had ‘approached us and said look, rivers of blood will flow, when Gaddafi attacks Benghazi and, therefore, the international community has to step in’. See Puri, ‘Keynote Address’.

^99. See UNSC, ‘Meeting Records, 6491^st Meeting’, 2.

^100. The Minister of External Affairs S.M. Krishna made a categorical statement in Lok Sabha: ‘There are around 18,000 Indians in Libya […] we are putting in place plans for possible evacuation by land, air and sea from Libya […]’. See Krishna, ‘Statement by Minister’.

^101. Hardeep Singh Puri appears to have used ‘weary’ instead of ‘wary’ in his keynote address at Harvard. See Puri, ‘Keynote Address’.

^102. Ibid.

^103.Puri, ‘Explanation of Vote’.

^104. Ibid.

^105.UNSC, ‘The Situation in Libya’.

^106. See for instance, Manoj Joshi, ‘Dodgy Stand on Libya’. Mail Today, 24 March 2011; Mukherjee, ‘Perspective’.

^107. ‘Foreign Military Intervention in Libya Unacceptable: Indian Muslims’. The Milli Gazette, 5 March 2011.

^108. Barack Obama, David Cameron and Nicolas Sarkozy, ‘Libya's Pathway to Peace’. The International Herald Tribune, 15 April 2011.

^109.India, Permanent Mission of India, ‘Statement by Ambassador Hardeep Singh Puri’.

^110. Puri,‘Remarks at the Informal Interactive Dialogue’.

^111. For more details on RwP, see Stuenkel and Tourinho in this issue.

^112. Puri, ‘Remarks at the Informal Interactive Dialogue’.

^113. Ibid.

^114. Ibid.

^115. Puri, ‘Keynote Address’.

^116.India, Permanent Mission of India, ‘Statement by India’.

^117. Interview with MEA official, New Delhi, April 2013.

^118.UNSC, ‘Presidential Statement’.

^119.India, Permanent Mission of India, ‘Draft Resolution on Syria’; India, Permanent Mission of India, ‘Explanation of Vote’.

^120. ‘UN Backing Must for Syria Action’. The Statesman, 7 September 2013.

^121.UNHRC, ‘Promoting Reconciliation’, 2012; UNHRC, ‘Promoting Reconciliation’, 2013. The resolutions asked the Sri Lankan Government to implement the recommendations of its own Lessons Learned and Reconciliation Commission (LLRC) and refrained from calling for an international investigation.

^122. Interestingly, the DMK withdrew its support to the UPA government in March 2013: the reason being that it was ‘not satisfied’ with India's stance at the UNHRC. See ‘DMK has Taken Right Decision in Withdrawing Support to UPA: Karunanidhi’. The Times of India, 21 March 2013.

^123.India, Permanent Mission of India, ‘19th Session of the Human Rights Council’.

^124.UNHRC, ‘Promoting Reconciliation’, 2014, paragraph 10. See also ‘India's Abstention at UNHRC Vote on Sri Lanka a Political Decision’. The Hindu, 4 April 2014.

^125. The fact that the Congress party was bereft of any coalition or electoral partner from Tamil Nadu in the Lok Sabha elections of 2014, and to that extent devoid of any pressure from within the coalition, helps to explain the decision of abstention. It is important to underline the dissenting opinion of the Finance Minister P. Chidambaram who expressed the personal view that India should have supported the UN resolution. See ‘India Should have Supported UN Resolution against Sri Lanka: P. Chidambaram’. The Indian Express, 28 March 2014.

^126. See Virk, ‘India and the Responsibility to Protect’.

^127. Cambridge Dictionaries Online. Available at: http://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/british/ambiguity?q = ambiguity [Accessed 10 October 2013].

^128. Oxford Dictionaries Online. Available at: http://oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/ambiguity?q = ambiguity [Accessed 27 June 2013].

^129. For an Indian critique of this, see Khilnani et al.Nonalignment 2.0. Also notice the attempt to reset foreign policy. On this, see Sandeep Dikshit, ‘Manmohan Favours the Reset of Foreign Policy’. The Hindu, 5 November 2013. See also Salman Haidar, ‘Reset of Foreign Policy’. The Statesman, 12 November 2013.

^130. Jaganathan and Sunmbul, ‘Emerging Power?’, 308; Jaganathan, ‘India in International Society’.

^131. UNHRC, ‘Promoting Reconciliation’, 2012; UNHRC, ‘Promoting Reconciliation’, 2013.

^132. While the exact figures differ, India has considerably less diplomats than other middle powers and just about as many as Singapore. See Tharoor, Pax Indica, 319.

^133. See for example, Gandhi, India of My Dreams, 68.

^134. Ibid.

^135. Jaganathan, ‘India in International Society’. For a critique on Gandhian thinking from the other end of the spectrum, see for instance, Karnad, ‘The Cultural Context of Moralpolitik’, 219.

^136.Ambedkar, ‘Untouchables or the Children’, 3978.

^137.Jaganathan and Sunmbul, ‘Emerging power?’, 308.

^138. See for instance, Narula, Broken People, 3. The author observes, ‘[p]ublic outrage over large-scale incidents of violence or particularly egregious examples of discrimination fades quickly, and the state is under little pressure to undertake more meaningful measures’.

^139.Gandhi, Hind Swaraj, 67.