Turkey’s struggle with the PKK and civilian control over the Turkish Armed Forces

Abstract

Although most scholars of Turkey’s civil-military relations argue that the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) insurgency has led to a decrease in civilian control over the Turkish military from the 1980s onwards, this has not always been the case. This article argues that the presence or the degree of the PKK threat is not sufficient to explain the civil-military balance of power in Turkey throughout the 1980s and the 1990s. Instead, the article shows that in the face of the PKK threat, three major factors have influenced the behaviours of both civilian and military policy-makers in Turkey and shaped the level of civilian control. These factors are first, the Turkish political leaders’ control over their political parties and these parties’ control of a majority of seats in the parliament; second, how negatively or positively the military perceives the political leadership; and third, European Union pressures for democratisation.

Keywords:

• Civil-military relations
• internal threats
• counter-insurgency
• Turkey
• PKK
• insurgency

Acknowledgements

The author would like to thank the editors and the anonymous reviewers for their highly constructive and helpful comments, which greatly contributed to improving the quality of the article.

Notes

1. The post-modern coup in Turkey refers to the process in which the Islamic-oriented coalition government under the leadership of Necmettin Erbakan was forced to resign in 1997. First, on 28 February 1997 the military-dominated National Security Council issued a series of recommendations to the government about policies that needed to be implemented in order to protect the secular nature of the regime. Then the military applied increasing pressure on the Erbakan Government in the following months, which led to its resignation on 18 June 1997.

2. The e-memorandum refers to the public warning that the Turkish General Staff made against the AKP Government through its website on 27 April 2007. It resulted from the General Staff’s sensitivity about the issue of secularism in Turkey within the context of the 2007 presidential elections. During this period, the military was concerned about the likelihood that the next Turkish president would be from the ruling Justice and Development Party and have a strong Islamist background.

3. See, for example, Özbudun, Contemporary Turkish Politics; Cizre, ‘Politics and Military in Turkey’; Heper and Güney, ‘The Military and the Consolidation of Democracy’; Jenkins, Context and Circumstance; Satana, ‘Transformation of the Turkish Military’; Karaosmanoğlu, ‘Transformation of Turkey’s Civil-Military Relations’. For an exception see Aknur, ‘Civil-Military Relations in Turkey’.

4. Feaver, ‘Civil-Military Relations’.

5. Croissant et al., ‘Beyond the Fallacy of Coup-ism’, 955.

6. Ibid., 954–955. In line with Croissant et al., the starting point of this article is that civilian control is a necessary condition for the establishment of a democratic regime. Although the presence of civilian control does not guarantee a political regime based on the rule of law or respect for human rights, it is a prerequisite for democratic rule. That is why, rather than multidimensional analyses of democratic civilian control, which take into account various aspects of a democratic regime such as the parliamentary oversight of the defence budget or security sector reform (e.g. Burk, ‘Theories of Democratic Civil-Military Relations’; Cottey et al., ‘The Second Generation Problematic’; Bruneau and Tollefson, Who Guards the Guardians), this article focuses first and foremost on the civilian executive control over the military.

7. Huntington, ‘Patterns of Violence’, 19–22.

8. Stepan, ‘The New Professionalism of Internal Warfare’.

9. Desch, Civilian Control of the Military, 14–15.

10. Pilster and Böhmelt, ‘Do Democracies Engage Less in Coup-Proofing?’, 363.

11. Barber and Ronning, Internal Security and Military Power; Pion-Berlin and Arceneaux, ‘Decision-Makers or Decision-Takers?’, 432.

12. Barber and Ronning, Internal Security and Military Power, 222–223, 233.

13. Pion-Berlin and Arceneaux, ‘Decision-Makers or Decision-Takers?’, 414.

14. Pion-Berlin and Trinkunas, ‘Democratization, Social Crisis, and the Impact’, 10–11.

15. Weeks, ‘Fighting the Enemy Within’.

16. In addition to these three groups of studies, it is possible to encounter the common conviction about the connection between internal threats and weak civilian control in several other studies. Just to give a few well-known examples, Welch and Smith, Military Role and Rule; O’Donnell, Modernization and Bureaucratic Authoritarianism; Rouquié, The Military and the State; Pion-Berlin, ‘Military Autonomy and Emerging Democracies’; Hunter, Eroding Military Influence; Fitch, The Armed Forces and Democracy; Koonings and Kruijt, Political Armies; and many others, all argue in one way or another that the presence of internal threats contributes to a decrease in civilian control over the armed forces.

17. Staniland, ‘Explaining Civil-Military Relations’.

18. Ibid., 322.

19. Pion-Berlin, ‘The Study of Civil-Military Relations’, 225.

20. Born et al., cited in Croissant et al., ‘Beyond the Fallacy of Coup-ism’, 951.

21. Janowitz and Hunter, cited in Kuehn and Lorenz, ‘Explaining Civil-Military Relations’, 235.

22. Pion-Berlin, ‘Introduction’, 18.

23. See Tsebelis, ‘Decision Making in Political Systems’.

24. Scharpf, ‘The Joint Decision Trap’.

25. Martin and Vanberg, ‘Parties and Policymaking in Multiparty Governments’, 979.

26. In the British political system, where there is a unified civilian leadership, political leaders were able to change the military’s reward structure and urge innovation in military doctrine. However, this was not possible for the US experience in Vietnam, where the military confronted a civilian leadership divided between the Administration and the Congress. See Avant, Political Institutions and Military Change.

27. Trinkunas, Crafting Civilian Control of the Military.

28. I borrowed this variable from the presidentialism literature. See Mainwaring and Shugart, Presidentialism and Democracy.

29. Public support is also an important factor that strengthens the head of government’s hand vis-à-vis the military. However, public support is not presented as a separate measure of strength in this article because variation in a political leader’s public support often has an impact through other factors mentioned in the article such as election results, a change in the military’s respect towards the civilian leadership, or a change in one’s control over a political party. For example, a decrease in the head of government’s public support may not have a practical impact on this politician’s ability to influence policy until this decrease is reflected in the next election results.

30. Stepan, Rethinking Military Politics; Nunn, The Time of the Generals; Loveman and Davies, The Politics of Antipolitics; Fitch, The Armed Forces and Democracy; Loveman, For la Patria.

31. Birand, cited in Jenkins, Context and Circumstance, 33.

32. Chief of General Staff Hüseyin Kıvrıkoğlu, cited in ibid., 33.

33. Beichelt, ‘The Research Field of Democracy Promotion’.

34. Sedelmeier, ‘Europeanisation in New Member and Candidate States’.

35. Ibid., 7.

36. See Schimmelfenning and Sedelmeier, The Europeanization of Central and Eastern Europe; Grabbe, ‘Europeanization Goes East’; Jacoby, ‘Inspiration, Coalition, and Substitution’; Kubicek, ‘International Norms, the European Union and Democratization’.

37. Sedelmeier, ‘Europeanisation in New Member and Candidate States’, 11.

38. The reason why the article does not examine the period between 1997 and 1998 and after 2002 is to isolate the PKK insurgency as the main internal threat in the country. For these are the time periods when concerns about Islamic reactionism (irtica) as a threat to Turkey’s secular regime were also raised among certain circles in society in addition to the PKK threat and the study of two different internal threats would have complicated the analysis about the connection between a particular internal threat and civilian control over the Turkish military in a single article.

39. İmset, PKK: Ayrılıkçı Şiddetin 20 Yılı, 115, 121.

40. Kışlalı, Güneydoğu: Düşük Yoğunluklu Çatışma, 179.

41. Özal also followed the military’s preferences on the PKK issue, such as initiating the village guard system in 1985.

42. Kışlalı, Güneydoğu: Düşük Yoğunluklu Çatışma, 215.

43. Although there were a number of policies which Özal failed to put into effect during this period, such as opening discussion of the possibility of a federation with the Kurds, broadcasting in Kurdish and including Kurdish in the education system, he resisted leaving the PKK issue only to the military, and before Özal’s death in 1993 the military did not have full control over the situation. See Özdağ and Aydınlı, ‘Winning a Low Intensity Conflict’, 104.

44. Under the state of emergency, the military was not officially part of the chain of command in the fight against the PKK. The state of emergency chain of command consisted of the State of Emergency Governor, Gendarmerie Public Order Commander and the Minister of Interior respectively. See ibid., 42–43.

45. Bila, Komutanlar Cephesi, 130. The NSC is an institution in the Turkish security establishment, which was established after the 1960 coup in order to bring together a number of high-ranking civilian and military decision-makers to discuss the most important security issues on the country’s agenda. The NSC’s influence increased tremendously in the aftermath of the 1980 coup, because with the 1982 Constitution it was stipulated that the Council of Ministers would give priority to the NSC’s recommendations. However, as a result of the EU harmonisation reforms that the GNAT passed in the early 2000s, the NSC was reduced to an advisory body.

46. Birand and Yalçın, The Özal, 451, 454. Also see Alan Cowell, ‘Turkey Offers Temporary Haven to Top Iraqi Kurd’. The New York Times, 4 September 1988; Güzel, Kuzey Irak, 119–121.

47. Nilüfer Yalçın, ‘Askeri Yetkililer Kaygılı [The Military Authorities are Concerned]’. Milliyet, 28 March 1991.

48. Tayfun Talipoğlu, ‘Cumhurbaşkanı Özal’dan Komutanlara Güvence: “Kürtler Devlet Kuramaz” [Assurance from President Özal to the Commanders: Kurds Cannot Establish a State]’. Milliyet, 26 March 1991.

49. See Gunter, ‘Turkey and the Kurds’, 36.

50. Ibid.

51. Aziz Utkan, ‘Kürt Liderlerle Askeri Toplantı [Military Meeting with the Kurdish Leaders]’. Hürriyet, 12 August 1991.

52. Birand, APO ve PKK, 249–253.

53. With respect to this first variable, Özal’s ability to mobilise the political and bureaucratic cadres was partly related to him being the prime minister of a single party government. The presence of a single party government meant that ANAP had a majority of seats in the GNAT and as the leader of this government Özal potentially had power over various political and bureaucratic appointments without the interference of other political parties. However, his actual control over these processes was partly the result of his authority over his political party, as discussed in the next paragraph.

54. Aknur, ‘Civil-Military Relations in Turkey’, 101–102.

55. Altan Öymen, ‘Siyaset hayatımızda “normalleşme” nin ilk adımları [The First Steps of “Normalisation” in Our Political Life]’. Radikal, 20 May 2007.

56. Cited in Acar, ‘Turgut Özal’, 166.

57. Author interview with a retired colonel who requested anonymity, Ankara, 6 January 2007.

58. Aknur, ‘Civil-Military Relations in Turkey’, 103.

59. David Barchard, ‘Bold Visions of Change’. Financial Times, 20 May 1987.

60. Interview with former Minister of Defense Zeki Yavuztürk by Neşe Düzel, ‘Bakan Askeri Harcamayı Bilmez [The Minister Does Not Know the Military Spending]’. Radikal, 20 June 2005.

61. Cited in ‘Kenan Evren Turgut Özal’ı Anlattı [Kenan Evren talked about Turgut Özal]’. Bugün, 9 March 2008.

62. Dağı, ‘Transition in Turkey’, 137.

63. Ibid., 137–138.

64. Ibid., 137.

65. Karaosmanoğlu, ‘The Limits of International Influence’, 129.

66. After Turkey received a response from the EC about its membership application in 1989, the EC’s pressure for democratisation in Turkey gradually decreased. The Commission acknowledged that Turkey was eligible for membership; however, it did not recommend starting accession negotiations. Until Turkey became an official candidate in 1999, Turkey was out of the close focus of the EU.

67. Resolution ‘on the ruthless violation of human rights and the bloody reign of terror in Turkey’, cited in Dağı, ‘Human Rights, Democratization and the European Community’, 21.

68. Dağı, ‘Human Rights, Democratization and the European Community’, 31–32.

69. Ibid., 33.

70. Aknur, ‘Civil-Military Relations in Turkey’, 168.

71. Gökmen, Sarışın Güzel Kadın, 71–72.

72. Barkey and Fuller, Turkey’s Kurdish Question, 137.

73. In fact, Çiller had not even come to office as a result of elections. After Özal died of a heart attack in 1993, Süleyman Demirel, the then Prime Minister and leader of the DYP, was elected president. In the general congress of the DYP on 13 June 1993, Çiller was elected new party leader and she automatically became prime minister of the existing DYP–SHP coalition.

74. Quoted in Cizre, ‘Tansu Çiller’, 206.

75. İlknur Çevik, ‘The Civilians Have to Learn How to Run Turkey?’. Turkish Daily News, 28 October 1997; author interview with a retired colonel who requested anonymity, Ankara, 6 January 2007.

76. Author interview with a retired general who requested anonymity, Ankara, 29 May 2007.

77. Ibid.

78. Gökmen, Sarışın Güzel Kadın, 84.

79. Cited in Aknur, ‘Civil-Military Relations in Turkey’, 180.

80. İlknur Çevik, ‘The Civilians Have to Learn How to Run Turkey?’. Turkish Daily News, 28 October 1997.

81. Arıkan, ‘A Lost Opportunity?’, 34.

82. Cited in ibid.

83. Müftüler-Baç, ‘The Impact of the European Union’, 166.

84. Arıkan, ‘A Lost Opportunity?’, 36.

85. Cited in ibid.

86. Şükrü Elekdağ, ‘PKK Zayıflıyor, Kürt Sorunu Ağırlaşıyor [The PKK is Getting Weaker, the Kurdish Problem is Getting Heavier]’. Milliyet, 26 July 1999. According to Gencer Özcan, what was interesting about Kıvrıkoğlu’s plan was that the measures were not limited to the military realm. See Özcan, ‘The Changing Role of Turkey’s Military’, 28.

87. Antakya is a city in Turkey near the Syrian border

88. Murat Yetkin, ‘137 Fırtınalı Gün [137 Stormy Days]’. Radikal, 9 August 2004.

89. ‘Suriye’ye Karşı Sabrımız Taşıyor [Our Patience is Running Out Against Syria]’. Radikal, 2 October 1998.

90. The process of Öcalan’s capture took several months after he was expelled from Syria and it was the result of an international operation, which involved the Greek Intelligence Agency, Kenyan security officials, as well as several Turkish and American intelligence officials. See ‘U.S Helped Turkey Find and Capture Kurd Rebel’, The New York Times, 20 February 1999. Available at: http://www.nytimes.com/1999/02/20/world/us-helped-turkey-find-and-capture-kurd-rebel.html [Accessed 15 February 2015].

91. Fatih Altaylı, ‘Pişmanlık Yasası Gerek [Repentance Law is Necessary]’. Hürriyet, 27 November 1997.

92. Milli Güvenlik Kurulu Basın Bildirileri [National Security Council Press Briefings]. Available at: http://www.mgk.gov.tr/Turkce/basinbildirileri.html [Accessed 5 January 2009].

93. Uzgel, ‘Between Praetorianism and Democracy’, 207.

94. Cited in Aydınlı, ‘Between Security and Liberalization’, 218.

95. Makovsky, ‘An Analysis of the 1999 Elections’.

96. Kınıklıoğlu, ‘The Democratic Left Party’, 15.

97. Ibid., 16; author interview with the DSP Deputy Chairman Hasan Macit, Ankara, 11 January 2008.

98. Aras and Bacık, ‘The Rise of Nationalist Action Party’, 54.

99. ‘Quake Rescue Repairs Government’s Image’, BBC News, 17 November 1999. Available at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/524621.stm [Accessed 4 January 2015].

100. Aydın and Çarkoğlu, ‘EU Conditionality and Democratic Rule of Law’.

101. Cizre and Çınar, ‘Turkey 2002’, 309.

102. See Cizre, ‘Demythologizing the National Security Concept’, 222.

103. Quoted in ibid., 213.

104. ‘Military to Yılmaz: Don’t Exploit National Security’, Turkish Daily News, 8 August 2001; ‘Genelkurmaydan Sert Uyarı [Harsh Warning from the General Staff]’, Radikal, 7 August 2001.

105. Murat Yetkin, ‘Doğru, Ecevit’e Müdahale Edilmişti [True, Ecevit Faced Intervention]’. Radikal, 17 July 2008.

106. Ibid.

107. Murat Yetkin, ‘Ecevit Gitsin, Özkan Gelsin [May Ecevit Resign and Özkan Come to Office]’. Radikal, 31 October 2001; Bila, Ankara’da Irak Savaşları, 24–26.

108. Çarkoğlu, ‘Who Wants Full Membership?’, 173.

109. Uğur, ‘Testing Times in EU-Turkey Relations’, 176.

110. Ibid.; also see Tocci, ‘Europeanisation in Turkey’, 81.

111. Uğur, ‘Testing Times in EU-Turkey Relations’, 176.

112. Learning languages other than Turkish here refers to learning Kurdish in private language courses. Education in the mother tongue, in other words, education in Kurdish continues to be a topic of fierce discussion in Turkey.