Does accountability matter? How electoral systems affect conflict initiation

Abstract

Recent work on conflict suggests that electoral systems impact foreign policy-making in important ways; however, the discipline has reached different conclusions regarding how different types of electoral systems affect conflict initiation. In this study we contend that legislators are more accountable individually in candidate-centred electoral systems which impacts a state’s decision to initiate interstate conflict. We test our argument using a time-series cross-sectional analysis of 54 democracies from 1975 to 2001. The results provide strong support for the hypothesis that candidate-centred electoral systems result in less conflict initiation than party-centric systems due to higher levels of individual accountability for legislative members.

Keywords:

• Accountability
• candidate-centred Systems
• conflict initiation
• democracy
• electoral systems
• party-centred systems

Notes

1. Ghosn et al., ‘The MID 3 Dataset’.

2. Araujo et al., ‘Political Institutions’, 27.

3. Ghosn et al., ‘The MID 3 Dataset’.

4. Payne et al., Democracies in Development, 51.

5. Carey, ‘Discipline, Accountability, and Legislative Voting’, 195.

6. Leblang and Chan, ‘Explaining Wars Fought’; Prins and Sprecher, ‘Institutional Constraints, Political Opposition’.

7. Carey and Shugart, ‘Incentives to Cultivate a Personal Vote’.

8. Birch, ‘Electoral Systems and Electoral Misconduct’; Chang and Golden, ‘Electoral Systems, District Magnitude’; Thames and Edwards, ‘Differentiating Mixed-Member’; Golden and Chang, ‘Competitive Corruption’; Lizzeri and Persico, ‘A Drawback of Electoral Competition’; Persson and Tabellini, ‘The Size and Scope of Government’; Samuels, ‘Incentives to Cultivate a Party Vote’.

9. The term ‘Member of Parliament (MP)’ also refers to legislative members in non-parliamentary democracies as well.

10. Anderson and Souva, ‘The Accountability of Political Institutions’; Auerswald, ‘Explaining Wars of Choice’; Bueno de Mesquita et al., ‘An Institutional Explanation’; Bueno de Mesquita et al., The Logic of Political Survival; Gates, ‘Democratic Regimes and War Involvement’; Gaubatz, ‘Election Cycles and War’; Koch and Fulton, ‘In the Defense of Women’; Koch and Gartner, ‘Casualties and Democratic Accountability’; Maoz and Abdolali, ‘Regime Type and International Conflict’; Maoz and Russett, ‘Normative and Structural Causes’; Reiter and Tillman, ‘Public, Legislative, and Executive Constraints’.

11. Morrow, ‘On the Theoretical Basis’; Williams et al., ‘War Voting’.

12. Goemans, War and Punishment; Rosato, ‘Flawed Logic’.

13. Persson and Tabellini, ‘Electoral Systems and Economic Policy’, 6.

14. Bueno de Mesquita et al. ‘An Institutional Explanation’; Gates, ‘Democratic Regimes and War Involvement’; Gaubatz, ‘Election Cycles and War’; Leblang and Chan, ‘Explaining Wars Fought’; Maoz and Abdolali, ‘Regime Type and International Conflict’; Maoz and Russett, ‘Normative and Structural Causes’; Prins and Sprecher, ‘Institutional Constraints, Political Opposition’; Rummel, ‘Libertarianism and International Violence’; Rummel, ‘Libertarian Propositions on Violence’.

15. Bueno de Mesquita et al., ‘An Institutional Explanation’; Bueno de Mesquita et al., The Logic of Political Survival; Gaubatz, ‘Election Cycles and War’; Leblang and Chan, ‘Explaining Wars Fought’; Reiter and Tillman, ‘Public, Legislative, and Executive Constraints’.

16. Kant, Perpetual Peace; Kant and Reiss, Kant: Political Writings; Reiter and Tillman, ‘Public, Legislative, and Executive Constraints’.

17. Auerswald, ‘Inward Bound’.

18. Reiter and Tillman, ‘Public, Legislative, and Executive Constraints’. While not all states rely on conscription, 28 out of 54 states in our analysis have conscription as of 2010 (CIA, World Factbook 2010). Many additional states can legally draft citizens into the military during periods of war, conflict or crisis.

19. Danilovic and Clare, ‘The Kantian Liberal Peace’, 402.

20. Morgan and Campbell, ‘Domestic Structure, Decisional Constraints’; Reiter and Tillman, ‘Public, Legislative, and Executive Constraints’.

21. Ames, Political Survival; Geddes, Politician’s Dilemma; Mayhew, Congress; Ray, Democracy and International Conflict.

22. Bueno de Mesquita et al., The Logic of Political Survival; Bueno de Mesquita and Siverson, ‘War and the Survival’; Gaubatz, ‘Election Cycles and War’; Goemans, War and Punishment; Koch and Gartner, ‘Casualties and Democratic Accountability’; Maoz and Russett, ‘Normative and Structural Causes’; Reiter and Stam, ‘Understanding Victory’; Reiter and Tillman, ‘Public, Legislative, and Executive Constraints’; Williams et al., ‘War Voting’.

23. Gaubatz, ‘Election Cycles and War’; Leblang and Chan, ‘Explaining Wars Fought’; Prins and Sprecher, ‘Institutional Constraints, Political Opposition’; Reiter and Tillman, ‘Public, Legislative, and Executive Constraints’.

24. Reiter and Tillman, ‘Public, Legislative, and Executive Constraints’.

25. Gaubatz, ‘Election Cycles and War’; Leblang and Chan, ‘Explaining Wars Fought’; Prins and Sprecher, ‘Institutional Constraints, Political Opposition’.

26. Gaubatz, ‘Election Cycles and War’; Koch and Fulton, ‘In the Defense of Women’; Leblang and Chan, ‘Explaining Wars Fought’; Prins and Sprecher, ‘Institutional Constraints, Political Opposition’; Williams et al., ‘War Voting’.

27. Auerswald and Cowhey, ‘Ballotbox Diplomacy’; Auerswald and Maltzman, ‘Policymaking through Advice’; Auerswald, ‘Explaining Wars of Choice’; Bueno de Mesquita et al, The Logic of Political Survival; Edwards and Swenson, ‘Who Rallies?’; Gartner et al., ‘War Casualties, Policy Positions’; Kam et al., ‘Rallying Around the Flag’; Koch and Gartner, ‘Casualties and Democratic Accountability’; Mueller, War, Presidents and Public Opinion; Sigelman and Conover, ‘The Dynamics of Presidential Support’.

28. Auerswald, ‘Inward Bound’; Auerswald, Disarmed Democracies; Auerswarld, ‘Explaining Wars of Choice’.

29. Regan et al., ‘New Datasets on Political Institutions’.

30. Auerswald, Disarmed Democracies.

31. Regan et al., ‘New Datasets on Political Institutions’.

32. Ibid.

33. Arena, ‘Success Breeds Success’.

34. Bueno de Mesquita et al., The Logic of Political Survival; Gaubatz, ‘Election Cycles and War’; Maoz and Russett, ‘Normative and Structural Causes’; Reiter and Tillman, ‘Public, Legislative, and Executive Constraints’.

35. Alvarez and Gronke, ‘Constituents and Legislators’.

36. Williams et al., ‘War Voting’, 455.

37. Gartner, ‘The Multiple Effects of Casualties’; Gartner and Segura, ‘War, Casualties, and Public Opinion’; Williams et al., ‘War Voting’ employ an interactive theory and methodology that considers how economic conditions and conflict affect incumbent vote share. Koch, ‘Casualties and Incumbents’ also contributes to this discussion of incumbent vote support.

38. Leblang and Chan, ‘Explaining Wars Fought’; Prins and Sprecher, ‘Institutional Constraints, Political Opposition’.

39. Reilly, ‘Electoral Systems for Divided Societies’; Reynal-Querol, ‘Ethnicity, Political Systems, and Civil Wars’; Maoz and Russett, ‘Normative and Structural Causes’; Prins and Sprecher, ‘Institutional Constraints, Political Opposition’; Schjølset, ‘Are Some Democracies More Peaceful’.

40. Brancati, ‘Decentralization’; Cohen, ‘Proportional Versus Majoritarian’; Reynal-Querol, ‘Ethnicity, Political Systems, and Civil Wars’; Saideman et al., ‘Democratization, Political Institutions, and Ethnic Conflict’; Schneider and Wiesehomeier, ‘Rules That Matter’.

41. Koch and Gartner, ‘Casualties and Democratic Accountability’.

42. Leblang and Chan, ‘Explaining Wars Fought’; Prins and Sprecher, ‘Institutional Constraints, Political Opposition’.

43. Prins and Sprecher, ‘Institutional Constraints, Political Opposition’.

44. Mayhew, Congress.

45. Grofman, ‘Comparisons among Electoral Systems’, 736.

46. This variation in accountability has also been used to explain the relationship between electoral systems and corruption in Golden and Chang, ‘Competitive Corruption’.

47. Carey, ‘Discipline, Accountability, and Legislative Voting’; Hix, ‘Electoral Institutions and Legislative Behavior’; Mitchell, ‘Voters and their Representatives’; Payne et al., Democracies in Development.

48. Bowler and Farrell, ‘Legislator Shirking and Voter Monitoring’; Farrell and McAllister, Voter Satisfaction and Electoral Systems; Payne et al, Democracies in Development.

49. Carey and Shugart, ‘Incentives to Cultivate a Personal Vote’.

50. Ibid.

51. Bowler and Farrell, ‘Legislator Shirking and Voter Monitoring’; Carey and Shugart, ‘Incentives to Cultivate a Personal Vote’; Cox, Making Votes Count; Katz, A Theory of Parties.

52. Hix, ‘Electoral Institutions and Legislative Behavior’, 196.

53. See Thames and Williams, ‘Incentives for Personal Votes’.

54. A small number of states included in our study fluctuate between being democratic and non-democratic as defined by the Polity2 measure in the Polity IV database. Thus, while these states are included in our study and are displayed in Table 6, the state-years in which these states fall below the threshold of ‘6’ on the Polity2 measure are excluded from our statistical analyses because they are not considered democratic for the given state-year.

55. Ward et al., ‘Disputes, Democracies, and Dependencies’; Williams, ‘Blood in the Water’.

56. Lemke and Reed, ‘The Relevance of Politically Relevant’; Williams, ‘Blood in the Water’.

57. Leblang and Chan, ‘Explaining Wars Fought’; Reiter and Tillman, ‘Public, Legislative, and Executive Constraints’.

58. Ghosn et al., ‘The MID 3 Dataset’.

59. Ibid.

60. Ibid.

61. Jones et al., ‘Militarized Interstate Disputes’.

62. Ibid., 178.

63. Ibid., 178. See also Souva and Prins, ‘The Liberal Peace Revisited’.

64. Souva and Prins, ‘The Liberal Peace Revisited’.

65. Johnson and Wallack, ‘Electoral Systems’.

66. Carey and Shugart, ‘Incentives to Cultivate a Personal Vote’.

67. In separate analyses, we have estimated the presented models with additional institutional, economic, region-specific and conflict-related controls. These results are available upon request.

68. We used xtlogit with Stata version 11 to estimate the models in this analysis because the dataset consists of cross sectional, time-series data. We also have estimated the models with clustering standard errors by country. The statistical and substantive results of these tests were unchanged from what is presented here.

69. These results are available upon request.

70. Lektzian and Prins, ‘Taming the Leviathan’.

71. Cook’s D is a measure that calculates the leverage that a given case may have on an estimation. Generally, cases that return Cook’s D results greater than 1 are concerning and in our estimations Israel, the UK and the US surpass this threshold, which is why they were excluded from additional analyses.

72. These results are available upon request.

73. These results are available upon request.

74. Carey, ‘Discipline, Accountability, and Legislative Voting’, 194.