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Abstract
This article provides an ethnographic analysis of shifts in the political economy of one key district in Afghanistan, in order to analyse the links between elections and shifting constellations of power at the local level. Drawing on field research before and after the elections of 2009, 2010 and 2014, it suggests that elections have enabled a small group of the ruling elite to further solidify its grasp on local political and economic resources. The resources and opportunities generated by elections have been used by political elites in order to strengthen patronage networks and consolidate local hierarchies. This outcome, essentially the obverse of the proclaimed objectives of promoting democracy through electoral processes, raises questions about the assumed relationship between elections and democratisation.
Notes
1. Elections were held in 2004, 2005, 2009, 2010 and twice in 2014 as a result of the presidential run-off.
2. Lindberg, ‘Introduction’, 2.
3. See Lust-Okar, ‘Legislative Elections’.
4. Lindberg, ‘Introduction’, 4.
5. North et al., Shadow of Violence. As an anthropologist who primarily focuses on the diversity of local political structures, my natural tendency is to avoid restrictive categories and debates over whether Afghanistan is a fragile limited access order or a basic limited access order (it seems to me that it shows some elements of both), but these terms, used as ideal types, emphasise some useful patterns in analysing political and economic structures. For more, see Byrd, this volume.
6. Byrd, ‘Understanding Afghanistan’s 2014 Presidential Election’, 5.
7. Few accounts thus far have clearly linked local and national processes, particularly in Afghanistan, and the approach in this article draws on the ethnographic case studies used by Astri Suhrke in When Less is More.
8. Names and some identifying features have been changed in this article. Abdul Aziz is used in this article as an example of some of trends in the area. Other leaders in Qara Bagh were also influential and, in the opinions of some, perhaps even more important. Focusing on one leader, particularly considering his role in removing the district governor in 2014, helps provide more focus to the analysis.
9. There are multiple cases of analysis driven by the military’s interest in counterinsurgency theory over idealising this process; for example, see Gant, ‘Strategy for Success in Afghanistan’. At the same time, however, many in the area also tend to dwell on the positive aspects of these mechanisms, ignoring times when they fail or the abuses that they allow for. For more, see Coburn, ‘Informal Justice’.
10. See Sharan, ‘Dynamics of Elite Networks’, for more on the importance of the patron–client relationship in post-Bonn Afghanistan.
11. Lindberg, ‘Introduction’, 9.
12. This paper draws on extensive field research conducted between 2009 and 2015, including interviews with candidates, voters and officials both before and after the elections of 2009, 2010 and 2014. Funding for this research was provided by the Afghan Research and Evaluation Unit, the United States Institute of Peace, Chatham House and Bennington College. For some of the other findings from this research see, in particular, Coburn and Larson, Derailing Democracy; Coburn, ‘Parliamentarians and Local Politics’; and Coburn and Larson, ‘Transitioning in Afghanistan’.
13. UNHCR, ‘District Profile: Qara Bagh’.
14. For more on the history of politics of the area, including some of these shifts in the manifestations of political power, see Coburn, Losing Afghanistan; and Coburn and Larson, Derailing Democracy.
15. The fact that these elections were paid for by the international community and that international diplomats exerted a good deal of influence over them (not to mention the fact that there was an enormous international military presence in the country during them) deeply shaped these elections, often in contradicting and counterproductive manners. See Coburn and Larson, Derailing Democracy, chapters 3 and 6. However, since this article deals primarily with how local actors participated in elections, the role of the international community is only considered in how it impacted politics in Qara Bagh.
16. See for example Dupree, ‘Afghanistan’s Slow March’.
17. See Barfield, Afghanistan, chapter 4.
18. Ruttig, ‘Islamists, Leftists and a Void’.
19. For more on the struggles of these parties to organise politically, see Wilder, ‘A House Divided’.
20. Dahl, Democracy and Its Critics. For a more thorough discussion of debates over the definition of democracy, particularly in the Afghan case, see Larson, ‘Toward an Afghan Democracy?’
21. Dupree, ‘Afghanistan’s Slow March’, 2.
22. See Edwards, Heroes of the Age; and Jones, Men of Influence for example. Azoy in Buzkashi provides an account of wealthy local khans who would host sports tournaments whose ultimate success would be determined by whether more ordinary local residents decided to attend them. The khans controlled more resources than others, but ultimately their reputations depended on local opinion of them. A similar case is found in. Of course, these democratic values were limited, since, for example, women were rarely able to participate politically except when represented by a male relative; however, it is still remarkable that these practices were not built upon in any meaningful manner in the 2004 constitution. Instead of building on local democratic values, a Western model of democracy was imported.
23. Lindholm, ‘Kinship Structures and Political Authority’.
24. Rubin, Fragmentation of Afghanistan.
25. For examples and more thorough discussion of local leadership in this area, see Coburn, Bazaar Politics, chapter 2.
26. Coburn, ‘Parliamentarians and Local Politics’, 23.
27. This shift was even more notable in Bagram, the district to the north that housed an American air base. Here, a younger generation of Afghan contractors gained influence over traditional leaders because of the wealth that they gained directly through contracting with the military. In Qara Bagh the results of the intervention were more indirect and it was more common for older leaders, like Abdul Aziz, to attempt to become involved in the business of supplying the base. For a thorough discussion, see Coburn, Losing Afghanistan.
28. This is a part of the decline of the dichotomy between areas under government control and those under control of tribal leaders, referred to in Thomas Barfield’s analysis as Yagistan; see Barfield, Afghanistan. In the former, government resources are the most valuable commodity; in the latter it is reputation.
29. See for example Goodhand, ‘Frontiers and Wars’.
30. Kouvo, ‘Transitional Justice’; and Human Rights Watch, ‘“Today We Shall All Die”’.
31. Quoted in Coburn and Larson, ‘Transitioning in Afghanistan’.
32. Van Bijlert, ‘How to Win an Afghan Election’. For a further assessment of some of the key issues around fraud in these elections, see Perelli and Smith, ‘Anticipating and Responding to Fraud’.
33. Coburn and Larson, Derailing Democracy, chapter 5.
34. Coburn and Larson, ‘Transitioning in Afghanistan’.
35. At the time of writing, it appeared unlikely that these elections would occur in 2016, as political debates over potential reforms continue. Further complicating the matter locally, Ghani has suggested that district elections should also be held. These are constitutionally mandated, but have never been held and would further complicate local politics.
36. Lust-Okar, ‘Legislative Elections’, 231.
37. Of course, particularly considering the continuing international presence, it has been in the best interest of both the Afghan and these regional actors not to draw attention to this de facto autonomy. For more, see Coburn, Bazaar Politics, chapter 8; and Mukhopadhyay, Warlords, Strongmen Governors and the State.
38. Przeworski, ‘Democracy as a Contingent Outcome of Conflicts’, 63.
39. Lust-Okar, ‘Legislative Elections’, 241–242.